Jalpaiguri Tea Co Ltd. v. STATE OF WEST BENGAL — 1959 DIGILAW 70 (CAL)

JUDGMENT 1. THE petitioner holds lands under opposite party No. 1 under two leases dated the 7th June, 1926 and 5th May, 1937 comprised of lands under Touzi Nos. 215 and 217 respectively, within the Collectorate of Jalpaiguri in the State of West Bengal, commonly known as the Western Dooars. These are khas-mahal lands for the purpose of cultivation and growing of tea and other ancillary purposes. The petitioner grows tea in these lands and carries on the business of a tea-estate known as the Magulkata Tea Estate, which of course includes other lands as well with which we are not concerned in this application. The question that arises in this application is a short one and it is this: According to section 33 of the Cess Act, 1880, which section appears in Part II, in the case of lands held directly under Government and used for the cultivation of tea, coffee or cinchona, the annual value of such lands shall be fixed at ten rupees in respect of every acre therein entered as cultivated, unless the Board of Revenue shall, in any particular case, prescribe a lower rate. There is no dispute that in this case the petitioner held lands directly from Government and used it for cultivation of tea. Therefore, prima facie, it appears that the valuation must be made in accordance with section 33 and the annual value cannot be fixed at more than ten rupees, but the Board of Revenue can fix a lower rate. In July/august 1951 notices were issued by the Director of Land Records and Survey upon the petitioner to submit a return under section 107j of the Cess Act and to show cause why assessment should not be determined under Chapter VIIA of the Cess Act. The petitioner preferred objection on the ground that Chapter VIIA did not apply, but it was Chapter II which applied. On the 27th March, 1952 the Director of Land Records rejected the objection. Thereupon an appeal was preferred to the Commissioner, Presidency Division. By his order dated the 30th December, 1952 the Commissioner allowed the appeal and set aside the order of the Director of Land Records and held that it was Chapter II which applied and not Chapter VIIA. On the 27th March, 1952 the Director of Land Records rejected the objection. Thereupon an appeal was preferred to the Commissioner, Presidency Division. By his order dated the 30th December, 1952 the Commissioner allowed the appeal and set aside the order of the Director of Land Records and held that it was Chapter II which applied and not Chapter VIIA. On the 31st May, 1954 the Board of Revenue issued suo motu a show cause notice upon the petitioner to show cause why the appellate order should not be revised in terms of sections 107-A (1) (a) and 107-A (2) of the Cess Act. On the 26th August, 1954 the order of the Commissioner was set aside by the Board of Revenue. It is against this order that this application has been made. The short point that arises in this case is as to whether Chapter II or Chapter VIIA applies to the facts of this case. Mr. Meyer appearing on behalf of the petitioner has taken a preliminary objection that the Board of Revenue had no power to act suo motu in issuing a show-cause notice. He has referred me to section 105 (b) of the Cess Act which lays down that all proceedings of the Commissioner under Part II shall be subject to the general control and supervision of the Board of Revenue. The revision application to the Commissioner is itself under this Part and therefore it cannot be disputed that the Board of Revenue exercises general control and supervision over proceedings of the Commissioner. Mr. Meyer has however drawn my attention to a note appended to the official publication,-"the West Bengal Cess Manual, 1953", under section 105. wherein it is stated that the decision of the Commissioner being final under section 102, the action of the Board of Revenue would be limited to laying down general rules and instructions for the Commissioner's future guidance if the Board should be of the opinion that the Commissioner had proceeded upon wrong principles. In my opinion, this is merely a departmental note and cannot assist in the interpretation of the section. Since proceedings before the Commissioner is subject to the general control and supervision of the Board of Revenue, I do not see any impediment in the issue of a show cause notice as was done in this case. 2. In my opinion, this is merely a departmental note and cannot assist in the interpretation of the section. Since proceedings before the Commissioner is subject to the general control and supervision of the Board of Revenue, I do not see any impediment in the issue of a show cause notice as was done in this case. 2. COMING now to the merits of the case, I find that the Board of Revenue has come to the opinion that the provision laid down in the body of section 107a applies, and that this is in conflict with the heading of the Chapter and therefore the provision in the body should prevail. Coming to the body of section 107a, the Board considers that as the district of Jalpaiguri is mentioned in Schedule G, the tea-estates in every part of that district will come within the mischief of this section, irrespective of the fact as to whether the record of rights had been finally published or not. In my opinion, this is an erroneous interpretation of the law on the subject. The relevant part of Chapter VIIA runs as follows: Valuation and revaluation of lands in a district or part of a district in respect of which a record-of-rights has been finally published, and payment of cess on such lands. 107-A (1 ). Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act- (a) the valuation or revaluation of lands in a district included in Schedule G or in a part of such district shall be made in accordance with the provisions of this Chapter. Provided that if at any stage of the operations regarding valuation or revaluation of lands under this chapter, the State Government is of opinion that the valuation or revaluation of such lands should be made in accordance with the provisions laid down in Chapters II, III and IV, the State Government shall, by notification in the official gazette, make an order to that effect, and on the publication of such notification-The relevant part of Schedule G runs as follows:-Schedule G. Names of districts in which, or in parts of which valuation or revaluation shall be made under Chapter VIIA: -. . . . . . . . . . . . (10) Jalpaiguri." 3. . . . . . . . . . . . (10) Jalpaiguri." 3. THERE can be no doubt that where there is a conflict between the law as laid down in the body of an Act, and the heading or the marginal note, then the law contained in the body of the Act must prevail. But in this case there is no inconsistency. In the absence of an inconsistency, the heading of a chapter cannot be ignored. It is one of the most important indicia of the policy which led to the promulgation of the law. In fact it appears that Chapter VIIA has come in by way of an amending Act, being Bengal Act XI of 1934. The Commissioner, who is doubtlessly well aware of such things, has mentioned in his judgment that it was well-known that Chapter VIIA was included in the Cess Act with the object and purpose that the procedure of this Chapter should be adopted in future in such districts where the record-of-rights under the Bengal Tenancy Act had been prepared and finally published. In fact, he points out that this should become clear from the statement of objects and reasons of the Bengal Cess Amendment Bill, 1933, which eventually resulted in the promulgation of Bengal Act XI of 1934. In my opinion, this is amply clear from the wordings of the section and the schedule itself. Both the heading, as well as the body of the section, as also the schedule, contain the words "district or part of a district" in respect of which the record of rights had been finally published. The meaning is that as and when a district or a part of a district came to be included in a finally published record of rights, then the provisions of Chapter VIIA would be applicable. Simply because Jalpaiguri is mentioned in Schedule G, it does not mean that the whole of the district has automatically come within the provisions of Chapter VIIA. The heading of Schedule G itself shows that this is not so, and that it is not as if the whole of the districts named therein are within the mischief of Chapter VIIA, but those provisions may apply to a part of the district. The heading of Schedule G itself shows that this is not so, and that it is not as if the whole of the districts named therein are within the mischief of Chapter VIIA, but those provisions may apply to a part of the district. Reading all these provisions together, it is obvious to me that what was intended was exactly as the Commissioner has laid down, namely, that section 107a applied only to a district or part of a district where the record of rights had been finally published. Otherwise there is no sense in using the words "district or part of a district". It would have been sufficient to say that as soon as a district has been included in Schedule G, then the provisions of Chapter VIIA will apply to the whole district. In this particular case a vague statement has been made in the affidavit in opposition that with regard to a part of Jalpaiguri district the record-of-rights were-"in course of preparation". It is not disputed that the record of rights had not been finally published in any part of the district. In any event, the respondents are not in a position to prove that there has been even an attempt to prepare the record of rights so far as the petitioners' lands are concerned. In my opinion, therefore, the decision of the Board of Revenue is erroneous on the fact of the records and the decision of the Commissioner was correct. 4. THE result is that this Rule is made absolute and the order of the Board of Revenue dated the 31st May 1954 is quashed by a Writ in the nature of Certiorari. There will be no order as to costs. C. R. Nos. 1374 to 1377 of 1956. In these four applications, the facts and the law involved are the same as in C. R. No. 1373 of 1956 in which I have delivered my judgment as above. For the reasons stated therein these four Rules are also made absolute and the respective orders made by the Board of Revenue which are complained of in these matters are quashed by a Writ in the nature of Certiorari. I make no order as to costs in these applications also.