Judgment 1. The question of law for determination in this appeal is whether the suit is barred under Article 11A of the Limitation Act because the suit was brought after one year from the date or decision of the executing court on 20-1-1948, dismissing an application of the plaintiff under Order 21, Rule 97, Code of Civil Procedure. The application was dismissed by the executing court, first, on the ground that it was not maintainable because there was no resistance by the judgment-debtor to the delivery of possession and also on the ground that even if there was resistance the application was barred by limitation because the application was made more than thirty days from the date of resistance or obstruction. The question depends upon the correct interpretation o£ Article 11A of the Limitation Act, which states as follows: "11A. By a person against whom an order has been made under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. upon application by the holder of a decree for the possession of immoveable property or by the purchaser of such pro perty sold in execution of a decree, complaining of resistance or obstruction to the delivery of possession thereof, or upon an applica tion by any person dispos sessed of such property in the delivery of possession thereof to the decree-holder or pur chaser, to establish the right which he claims to the pre sent possession of the pro perty comprised in the order."One yearThe date of the order It is submitted by Mr. Prem Lall, who appears on behalf of the plaintiff appellants that the present case is governed by the authority of Razi-uddin Hussain V/s. Bindesri Prasad Singh, 5 Pat LJ 652: (AIR 1920 Pat 123) and Subedar Singh V/s. Ramprit Pande, 11 Pat LT 28 : (AIR 1929 Pat 116). In our opinion, the decision of this Court in 5 Pat LJ 652: (AIR 1920 Pat 123) is not a binding authority, though the material facts in that case are closely similar to the material facts of the present case. In our opinion, the decision of this Court in 5 Pat LJ 652: (AIR 1920 Pat 123) is not a binding authority, though the material facts in that case are closely similar to the material facts of the present case. The reason is that in 5 Pat L.T 652: (AIR 1920 Pat 123) the learned Judges have not dealt with the interpretation of Article 11A of the Limitation Act; on the contrary they have dealt with Article 11 of the Limitation Act, the language of which is quite different from Article 11 A. It is true that the proper article of limitation applicable to the facts of that case was Article 11A but the learned Judges have not applied that article or interpreted it. We, therefore, consider, that the decision of this Court in 5 Pat LJ 652: (AIR 1920 Pat 123) was given per incuriam and it has no binding authority. That is the very reason why the decision was not followed and accepted as correct in a subsequent decision of this Court in Dwarika Sahu V/s. Mt. Anandi, ILR 28 Pat 828: ( AIR 1950 Pat 25 ). The other decision upon which Mr. Prem Lall relied, namely, 11 Pat LT 28: (AIR 1929 Pat 116), is also not authoritative in point because that was a case dealing with the interpretation of Article 11 of the Limitation Act and an order of the executing court dismissing an objection under Order 21, rule 58, Code of Civil Procedure. The material facts of the present case are obviously different because we are here concerned with the effect of the order dismissing an application made under Order 21, Rule 97, Code of Civil Procedure, and the interpretation of Order 21, rule 103, Code of Civil Procedure, read with Article 11A of the Limitation Act. In our opinion the present case is governed by the principle laid down by this High Court in ILR 28 Pat 828: ( AIR 1950 Pat 25 ), where it appears that a petition under Order 21, Rule 97, was dismissed for default without any investigation on 10-4-1943. and the applicant thereafter filed a suit under Order 21, rule 103, Code of Civil Procedure, on 2-5-1944. A plea was raised in that suit that Article 11A of the Limitation Act operated as a bar. and the applicant thereafter filed a suit under Order 21, rule 103, Code of Civil Procedure, on 2-5-1944. A plea was raised in that suit that Article 11A of the Limitation Act operated as a bar. It was held by the High Court that this argument was incorrect and Article 11A of the Limitation Act did not apply because the order passed in the execution case was not the kind of order contemplated by Order 21, Rule 98, or Rule 99, or rule 101. In our opinion the decision of this Court in ILR 28 Pat 828: ( AIR 1950 Pat 25 ) states the law correctly on this point and the principle of that decision applies to the present case. 2 We accordingly hold that the question of limitation has been rightly decided by the lower appellate court and there is no merit in this second appeal. We accordingly dismiss this appeal with costs.