JUDGMENT D. N. Roy, J. - These are two connected special appeals under Chapter VIII, Rule 5 of the Rules of the Court. 2. The appellants in both the cases are Bishambhar Nath and Gur Prasad; the defendants and the respondents are Srimati Suraj Kali and Krishna Kumar. The plaintiffs Special Appeal No. 183 of 1958 arises out of First Appeal From Order No. 124 of 1956, which in turn arose out of an order dated the 23rd of April 1956 of the Court of first instance. Special Appeal No. 198 of 1958 arises out of First Appeal From Order No. 153 of 1956 which in turn arose out of an order dated 7th of February 1956 of the same Court. 3. The facts giving rise to these special appeals are these. The plaintiffs instituted a suit against the defendants claiming : (a) declaration to the effect that the partnership be declared dissolved from 12th of April 1954 or with effect from such date as the Court may deem fit. (b) that accounts of the partnership be taken and the defendants be ordered to render full and correct accounts for the period 19th October 1952 to 12th of April 1954 and a decree be passed for whatever sum that may be found due upon proper accounting. 4. The suit for the purposes of jurisdiction and court fee was tentatively valued at the sum of Rs. 1,35,000/-. Along with the plaint an application No. 6 C was filed for attachment before judgment under O. XXXVIII, R. 5, C. P. C. of a number of items of property. The first item was the existing stock of the firm known as Bishambharnath Arunkumar located in three premises in the City of Kanpur. The second item was the outstanding balance of Rs. 10,000/- of the above noted firm. The third item was a sum of Rs. 70,000/- deposited as security with Messrs. Rajhans Minerals Udaipur in the name of the firm Messrs Martand and Co. The last item was the attachment of house No. 36|36 situate in Ram Mohan-Ka-Ahata Kanpur. On this application an ex parte order of attachment was made on the 4th of January 1956; but after notice had been served upon the defendants, the ex parte order was vacated on the 7th of February 1956 and the application was dismissed. The last item was the attachment of house No. 36|36 situate in Ram Mohan-Ka-Ahata Kanpur. On this application an ex parte order of attachment was made on the 4th of January 1956; but after notice had been served upon the defendants, the ex parte order was vacated on the 7th of February 1956 and the application was dismissed. On the 6th of January 1956, another application No. 11|C was made before the trial court by the plaintiffs for an interim injunction; and an ex parte order of injunction was passed on that very date. After notice had been served upon the defendants that ex parte order was vacated on the 7th of February 1956 and application No. 11|C was dismissed. The order of the 7th of February 1956 formed the subject matter of F. A. F. O. No. 153 of 1956 from which has arisen special Appeal No. 198 of 1958. After the order of the 7th of February 1956 aforesaid had been passed, another application No. 55|C Was made by the plaintiffs purporting to be one under O. XXXVIII, R. 5, O. XXXIX, R. 1, and Sec. 151 of the C. P. C. and in that application they claimed attachment before judgment of the sum of Rs. 70,000/- aforesaid or in the alternative an injunction to restrain the defendants from dealing with the said amount in any way. In the affidavit accompanying the application it was alleged that the defendants were contemplating to withdraw the security money which was deposited with Messrs. Rajhans Minerals of Udaipur. It was further alleged in the affidavit that the defendants were in financial straits and that if they succeeded in withdrawing the said sum of Rs. 70,000/- it would be difficult for the plaintiffs to realise the amount of any decree which may ultimately be passed in their favour in the suit. The court of first instance dismissed the application on the 23rd of April, 1956 holding that the present case did not attract the operation of O. XXXVIII, R. 5 or O. XXXIX, R. 1 or Sec. 151 of the C. P. C. The order of 23rd of April 1956 formed the subject matter of F. A. F. O. No. 124 of 1956 from which Special Appeal No. 183 of 1958 has been preferred. F. A. F. O. No. 124 of 1956 and F. A. F. O. No. 153 of 1956 were allowed by a learned Judge of this Court. In F. A. F. O. No. 124 of 1956 an ad interim injunction was granted to the plaintiffs directing the defendants not to withdraw the amount with Messrs. Rajhans Minerals Udaipur. A further direction was given to the effect that in case the defendants apprehend that it would be difficult to realise the amount from Messrs Rajhans Mineral Udaipur, they or the plaintiffs could apply for attachment of the amount and deposit the same in Court. In F. A. F. O. No. 153 of 1956 an injunction was granted to the plaintiffs restraining the defendants during the pendency of the suit from transferring house No. 36|36, Ahata Ram Mohan, Kanpur. 5. A preliminary objection has been taken against these Special Appeals to the effect that the decision of the learned Single Judge is not a "judgment" within the meaning of the term as contemplated in Chapter VIII, Rule 5 of the Rules of the Court and consequently it is not appealable. Chapter VIII, Rule 5 lays down: "An appeal shall lie to the Court from the judgment (not being a judgment passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to the superintendence of the court and not being an order made in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction, and not being an order passed or made in the exercise of its power of superintendence, or in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction) of one Judge, and an appeal shall lie to the Court from a judgment of one Judge made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a court subject to the superintendence of the Court, where the Judge who passed . the judgment declares that the case is a fit one for appeal." 6. In the present case we are not concerned with the second part of rule 5 of Chapter VIII of the Rules of the Court. the judgment declares that the case is a fit one for appeal." 6. In the present case we are not concerned with the second part of rule 5 of Chapter VIII of the Rules of the Court. In order to arrive at the true meaning and the scope of the word 'judgment' as it occurs in Chapter VIII, Rule 5, we may refer to certain decisions which bear upon the meaning and the scope of the word as it occurred in corresponding provisions of the Letters Patent. Sir Richard Couch, C. J. in the well-known and often cited case of The Justices of the Peace for the Town of Calcutta v. The Oriental Gas Company "Limited", XVII W.R. 364 said as follows: "We think that 'judgment' in clause 15 means a decision which affects the merits of the question between the parties by determining some right or liability. It may be either final or preliminary or interlocutory, the difference between them being that a final judgment determines the whole cause or suit, and a preliminary or interlocutory judgment determines only a part of it, leaving other matters to be determined." 7. The question was pointedly raised before the Madras and the Rangoon High Courts as to whether an order for transfer under clause 13 of the Letters Patent was a "judgment" for purposes of an appeal, and while the Madras High Court in Krishna Reddy v. Thanika Chala, AIR 1924 Madras 90 answered the question in the affirmative, a negative answer was given by the Rangoon High Court in re: Dayabhai v. Muruguppa, AIR 1935 Rangoon 267 FB The Madras decision was in accordance with the view enunciated by a Full Bench of that Court in Tuljaram v. Alagappa, XXXV I.L.R. Mad. 1 F.B. Sir Arnold White, C. J. sitting with Krishnaswami Ayyar and Ayling, JJ. formulated a definition of "judgment" in a comprehensive manner: "The test seems to me", thus observed the learned Chief Justice, "to be not what is the form of the adjudication but what is its effect on the suit or proceeding in which it is made. 1 F.B. Sir Arnold White, C. J. sitting with Krishnaswami Ayyar and Ayling, JJ. formulated a definition of "judgment" in a comprehensive manner: "The test seems to me", thus observed the learned Chief Justice, "to be not what is the form of the adjudication but what is its effect on the suit or proceeding in which it is made. If its effect, whatever its form may be, and whatever may be the nature of the application on which it is made, is to put an end to the suit or proceeding so far as the Court before which the suit or proceeding is pending is concerned, or if its effect, if it is not complied with, is to put an end to the suit or proceeding, I think the adjudication is a judgment within the meaning of the clause." 8. The decision, it may be pointed out, has not only been adhered to in Madras since then without any comment, but the Calcutta High Court has in several instances manifested a marked leaning towards it: vide Mathura Sundari v. Haran Chandra, AIR 1916 Calcutta 361, Chandi Charan v. Jnanendra Nath, AIR 1919 Calcutta 667 at p. 668, Lea Badin v. Upendra Mohan, AIR 1935 Calcutta 35 9. On the other hand, a Full Bench of the Rangoon High Court in A.I.R. 1935 Rangoon 267 took a view altogether different from that of the Calcutta and the Madras High Courts as regards the meaning of the word 'judgment' in clause 13 of the Rangoon Letters Patent, which corresponds to clause 15 of the Letters Patent of Calcutta and Madras High Courts. It was held by the Full Bench of the Rangoon High Court that the term 'Judgment' in the Letters Patent means and is a decree in a suit by which the rights of the parties in the suit are determined. 10. It was held by the Full Bench of the Rangoon High Court that the term 'Judgment' in the Letters Patent means and is a decree in a suit by which the rights of the parties in the suit are determined. 10. The wide divergence of the judicial opinion of the Courts aforesaid and of other Courts had been noticed by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Asrumati Debi v. Kumar Rupendra, A.I.R. 1953 S.C. 1958 Delis but their Lordships refrained from expressing any final opinion on the question by observing that it might be necessary for that court at sometime or the other to examine carefully the principles upon the different views mentioned above purport to be based and attempt to determine with as much definiteness as possible the true meaning and scope of the word 'judgment' as it occurs in clause 15 of the Letters Patent of the Calcutta High Court and in the corresponding clauses of the Letters Patent of the other High Courts. Never the less the Supreme Court without framing an exhaustive definition of the word "judgment" observed that the essential features of a 'judgment' are what has been observed by Sir Richard Couch, C. J., in the case of The Justices of the Peace v. Oriental Gas Company, XVII W.R. 364 and by Sir Arnold White, C. J. in the Full Bench decision of the Madras High Court in Tuljaram v. Alagappa, XXXV I.L.R. Mad. 1 F.B cited above. Applying the same principle to the term 'judgment' in Chapter VIII, Rule 5 of the Rules of the Court with special reference to the facts of the present case, we are of opinion that the decision which is the subject of appeal before us is a "judgment" and is therefore appealable since the effect of the decision in the proceedings in which it was made was to put an end to the proceedings so far as the Court before which that proceeding was pending was concerned; and if its effect, if it is not complied with, was to put an end to the proceedings, the adjudication would be a "judgment" within the meaning of the clause. 11. We are therefore of opinion that the preliminary objection has got no force and must be overruled. 12. 11. We are therefore of opinion that the preliminary objection has got no force and must be overruled. 12. Coming now to the merits, it would appear that the facts which were advanced on behalf of the plaintiffs in respect of the application under O. XXXVIII, R. 5, O. XXXIX, R. 1, and Sec. 151 of the C. P. C. did not make out a case in which either an attachment before judgment or an injunction should have been allowed. XXXVIII, R. 5 inter alia says that where, at any stage of a suit, the Court is satisfied, by affidavit or otherwise, that the defendant, with intent to obstruct or delay the execution of any decree that may be passed against him: (a) is about to dispose of the whole or any part of his property, or (b) is about to remove the whole or any part of his property from the local limits of the jurisdiction of the Court the Court may direct the defendant, within a time to be fixed by it, either to furnish security, in such sum as may be specified in the order, to produce and place at the disposal of the Court, when required, the said property or the value of the same, or such portion thereof as may be sufficient to satisfy the decree, or to appear and show cause why he should not furnish security. Order O. XXXIX, rule 1 says that where in any suit it is proved by affidavit or otherwise that any property in dispute in a suit is in danger of being wasted, damaged or alienated by any party to the suit, or wrongfully sold in execution of a decree, or that the defendant threatens or intends to remove or dispose of his property with a view to defraud his creditors, the Court may by order grant a temporary injunction to restrain such act, or make such other order for the purpose of staying and preventing the wasting, damaging, alienation, sale, removal or disposition of the property as the Court thinks fit, until the disposal of the suit or until further orders. 13. 13. In the present case, the affidavit that was made in support of application 6C by Baboo Ram, the pairokar and servant of the plaintiffs stated that the deponent learnt from one Sharda Shanker (whose identity had not at all been disclosed in the affidavit) that the defendants in order to obstruct and delay the execution of the decree which was likely to be passed against them were trying to withdraw the amount deposited in the Bank and to dispose of the same and were further trying to transfer the property detailed in the application. It was further stated in the affidavit that the defendants did not possess any property belonging to them within the jurisdiction of the court and they were heavily indebted. These allegations in the affidavit were sworn on information received and believed to be true. An affidavit of such a nature without stating the grounds of belief or the source of information with sufficient clarity was an inadequate and defective affidavit, specially when those assertions were refuted by the other side in their counter-affidavit. The same defect was to be found in the affidavit which was made by Baboo Ram in support of the other application No. 11|c under Order XXXIX, rule 1 of the Code. The affidavit that was made in support of the subsequent application No. 55|6 was made by Krishna Kumar, one of the plaintiffs, and there the source of information leading Krishna Kumar to certain belief so as to entitle the plaintiffs to get relief either by attachment before judgment or by way of a temporary injunction had not been stated with sufficient clarity. The court of first instance was, therefore, in our opinion, right in dismissing the applications for attachment before judgment and temporary injunction. The learned single judge of this Court who allowed the two appeals against the decision of the trial court observed that in regard to the sum of Rs. The court of first instance was, therefore, in our opinion, right in dismissing the applications for attachment before judgment and temporary injunction. The learned single judge of this Court who allowed the two appeals against the decision of the trial court observed that in regard to the sum of Rs. 75,000/- which was said to be deposited with Messrs Raj Hans Minerals, Udaipur, in the name of Martand and Company belonging to the defendants, there was some dispute going on interest between the partners of Martand and Company in which Gur Prasad one of the defendants was a partner, but the partners can at any time settle their dispute and withdraw the amount, and so the Court should have issued an injunction restraining the defendants from withdrawing that amount. As regards the attachment before judgment in respect of house No. 36|36 situate in Kanpur, the learned single Judge observed:- "Attachment has also been refused on the ground that the plaintiff had no where alleged that the defendants were about to dispose of the properties mentioned. It is true that they have not made that allegation; and that may have been a ground for refusing attachment, but there was a danger for the property to be wasted or alienated as there were other creditors. Under the circumstances an interim injunction restraining the defendants from transferring the property should have been passed." 14. But since the amount which was deposited with Messrs Raj Hans Minerals Udaipur in the name of Martand and Company belonged to Gur Prasad, one of the defendants, and to certain other persons who were not parties to the present suit, and since there was dispute interest between the partners of Martand and Company, the security amount was not at the disposal of Gur Prasad, the defendant above. Consequently a temporary injunction under Order XXXIX, rule 1 of the Code could not have been granted. Again, in the case of attachment before judgment of the house No. 36136 situate in Kanpur, since no allegation was made by the plaintiffs that the defendants were about to dispose of the property, a case under Order XXXVIII, rule 5 of the Code was not made out. Nor can it be said that there was danger to the property being wasted or alienated simply because there were other creditors. Nor can it be said that there was danger to the property being wasted or alienated simply because there were other creditors. In all the circumstances of the case, with all respect to the learned Single Judge, we are unable to uphold the decision passed in F. A. F. O. No. 124 of 1956 and F. A. F. O. No. 153 of 1956. We accordingly allow these special appeals, set aside the judgment dated 28-3-58 passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court and restore the decisions of the court of first instance. The appellants shall be entitled to their costs in all the courts.