ORDER A.H. Khan, J 1. This and the application numbered 13 of 1957 are petitions by Sub-Inspectors of Excise dismissed from service by the orders of the State Government in similar circumstances. They had been dismissed after inquiry and punishment notices, by the Commissioner of Excise. Following a High Court judgment, in what Government considered comparable case, the order of dismissal, by the Commissioner was set aside, the officer formally re-instated and] simultaneously suspended, served with a fresh punishment notice and now dismissed by the Government itself. 2. In each of them certain general arguments have been made applicable, from the petitioner's view-point, to the other case as well. These have been considered in the judgment of the respective petitions in which the particular grounds have been specially emphasised. 3. The prayer, under Art. 226 of the Constitution is for a writ on the State Government, directing it to reinstate the petitioner in his post of Sub-Inspector of Excise, and to give the consequential reliefs by way of full pay since his dismissal. The allegation being that the order of dismissal passed on 29-10-56 is illegal for want of compliance with the Civil Service (Punishment and Appeal Rules of 1950, which incorporate the principles of Art. 311 and other reasons. 4. It may be noted that the petitioner was proceeded against on a number of charges all relating to one incident in connection with the levy of duty (excise) on. a consignment of asphalt on which taxes were payable. It is however, unnecessary to go into the details of the charge itself. There was an inquiry in the presence of the petitioner held by the Inspector of Excise. He gave a report to the Superintendent of Excise of the District, who in his turn asked the petitioner if he would care to submit any further explanation in writing He gave a reply to which I shall refer later on, and in the meanwhile sent the report to the Commissioner of Excise. He accepted the findings of the inquirying authority, namely the Inspector, issued punishment notice and after studying the cause dismissed him by his order dated 13-7-55. Sometime later the High Court held that another Excise Officer named Shri Abid Hussain, should not have been dismissed by the Excise Commissioner, and could have been dismissed only by the Government. He accepted the findings of the inquirying authority, namely the Inspector, issued punishment notice and after studying the cause dismissed him by his order dated 13-7-55. Sometime later the High Court held that another Excise Officer named Shri Abid Hussain, should not have been dismissed by the Excise Commissioner, and could have been dismissed only by the Government. On the impression that this officer's position was analogous to that of Abid Hussain, the Government got the order of dismissal set aside and the officer accord dingly reinstated. Simultaneously that is, on the same day 19-1-56 and at the same hour another order was passed suspending the petitioner with effect from the date of the original suspension namely 12-7-1956. I shall consider separately the propriety or otherwise of the suspension order being made retrospective; it need only be noted here that to setting aside of the earlier dismissal order by the Commissioner, the reinstatement, and the suspension are as it were one order. Soon after a fresh punishment notice to show cause on the findings already served on him, he had no new grounds to make, nor did he ask leave to lead any further evidence, but argued that the whole proceeding was illegal. The Government now recorded the order of dismissal adopting the same report and on the same grounds as were the basis of the dismissal by the Commissioner. 5. A large number of grounds have been convassed with great ability and at very considerable length, but the material issues far decision are not very complicated, they being: (1) Whether the setting aside of the order of dismissal and the reinstatement in this case had the effect of quishing of the entire proceedings and the cancellation of the old charge-sheet and exoneration from all those charges: (2) If it had not, whether a new punishment notice alone was sufficient or a fresh charge-sheet and a fresh inquiry with all its incidents, were necessary; (3) Whether, as a fact, the petitioner wanted a fresh inquiry and leave to adduce fresh evidence and that was refused; (4) Whether the mention of asphalt in the dismissal order and that of coal tar in the proceedings is irregular and calls for setting aside of the dismissal itself. (5) Whether the original inquiry by the Inspector of Excise was in accordance with the rules or whether the petitioner was entitled to ask for "open" inquiry after the Superintendent of Excise sent him a gist of the Inspector's findings. (6) Whether the Supreme Court has held that the inquiry should be conducted by the authority competent to punish him and not by any subordinate authority. 6. On the grounds 1, 2 and 3 our findings are identical with those in the case of Lekh Ram Sharma (Civil Misc. Petition No. 13 of 1957) decided today. It is, therefore, unnecessary to reproduce them. 7. Ground No. 4--has been expressly mentioned as typical of the arguments 'made in the present case. The material concerned is a particular coal-tar stuff used for surfacing the roads; properly called asphalt but popularly described as coal-tar also any way, the proceedings were in regard to one consignment of this material, whether we call it coal-tar or asphalt. I certainly fail to see any. irregularity or prejudice. 8. Ground No. 6,--Shri H N. Dvivedi, learned counsel for the petitioner has taken me through the judgment of the Supreme Court in Khem Chand vs Union of India (A. I. R. 1958 S. C. 300). I do not find anything in that judgment supporting the view that the authority competent to punish should hold the inquiry. The other argument ostensibly based on this judgment has already been discussed in paragraph 7 of the judgment on petition 13 of 1957. 9 Ground No. 5.--This takes us to the propriety and legality of the inquiry by the Excise Inspector held in the presence of the petitioner. Throughout the arguments which have been very able and very lengthy we have been told that the petitioner did not have an opportunity to cross-examine and defend himself in the inquiry. It was. difficult to understand, because he was actually present before the Inspector and was cross-examining the witnesses of the department. In fact, the main point is not whether the petitioner did actually cross-examine, but whether being present he had an opportunity to cross-examine. Another argument urged was that he was not asked whether he would like to be heard personally. difficult to understand, because he was actually present before the Inspector and was cross-examining the witnesses of the department. In fact, the main point is not whether the petitioner did actually cross-examine, but whether being present he had an opportunity to cross-examine. Another argument urged was that he was not asked whether he would like to be heard personally. Certainly, in the event of the officer not being present he should be asked expressly to state whether he would like to be heard personally, but when he is bodily present during the inquiry and is participating in it, I do not see what necessity there is of asking him, if he would like to be heard personally, because in the event of his wanting to be so heard he has only to open his mouth or hand la a written statement. 10. When this was pointed out the argument made was that the inquiry by the Inspector of Excise was no inquiry at all, and there should have been fresh inquiries, when the District Superintendent of Excise wrote to him and again when the Commissioner of Excise issued the punishment notice, and yet again, when, having set aside the dismissal order, the Government issued the fresh punishment notice. It is difficult to accept this contention but it has to be examined at least for the sake of seriousness with which it has been urged. The Inspector served on the petitioner on 12-4-1954 a questionnaire, containing six separate questions, each charging him with an irregularity in connection with the consignment already described. It begins, "Shri Na. rain Prasad Trivedi, please reply to the following questions as you have already sent the documents connected with this inquiry and the railway record.'' Then follow the six questions. This is exactly what the rules require, special attention being necessary that each allegation is put separately in the form of a charge. This has been done. The petitioner gave a reply and then the department called its witnesses. The petitioner cross-examined though he did not want to call any witnesses of his own. Concluding his inquiry the Inspector sent a report to his immediate superior that is the Superintendent, who in his turn sent it to the Commissioner. Meanwhile, the Superintendent wrote to the petitioner giving a summary of the findings of the Inspector and calling upon him to give an explanation. Concluding his inquiry the Inspector sent a report to his immediate superior that is the Superintendent, who in his turn sent it to the Commissioner. Meanwhile, the Superintendent wrote to the petitioner giving a summary of the findings of the Inspector and calling upon him to give an explanation. It also called upon him to explain why he should not be made to make good the loss he had caused to government, that being Rs. 750/. While the Inspector has used the word 'prashnawall or questionnaire, the Superintendent has used the word "charge," The petitioner, therefore, argues that what the Inspector held was no inquiry at all, and it should have been started again It is obviously impossible to agree. Each of the six questions is a charge and a mere perusal will show that no man in his senses would have got any doubt about it. Actually, the petitioner himself bad no doubt. He gave his explanation and as already mentioned participated in the inquiry. He has replied to the Superintendent's letter, but (he reply did not bring in any fresh material. It was on the contrary a prayer for another type of inquiry, what he called "an open inquiry." We have not been able to understand, (sic)or has the learned counsel been able to explain what exactly an "open inquiry" meant. If an inquiry was meant certainly it had been held by the Inspector. Nor could the petitioner ask again for an inquiry in which he could participate, because in the inquiry by the Excise Inspector he had participated. 11. At this stage the petitioner started making a number of requests which could not obviously be granted. For example, he wanted copies of the entire record. The department, however, allowed him to inspect and to take notes. In fact, the learned Government Advocate stated, without being contradicted, that they were prepared to allow the petitioner to take his own copyist and make copies in the office. Again, the petitioner was asked to make good part of the loss. He declined to do so, but that has nothing 'to do with the present inquiry. Any way, the inquiry held by the Inspector was one started after giving the petitioner a gist of the allegations against him, calling upon him to give his explanation, and made in his presence', with full opportunity to 'cross-examine and adduce his defence. He declined to do so, but that has nothing 'to do with the present inquiry. Any way, the inquiry held by the Inspector was one started after giving the petitioner a gist of the allegations against him, calling upon him to give his explanation, and made in his presence', with full opportunity to 'cross-examine and adduce his defence. That, in fact, is not the petitioner's grievance. It is that the inquiries were not started de novo or what he calls 'open inquiries' were not held on three more occasions. There is nothing in Art. 311 or in the Civil Services (Punishment and Appeal) Rules calling for this sort of inquiry. 12. For reasons fully discussed in para 13 of the judgment in petition No. 13/57 a suspension order with retrospective effect is wrong in principle. But it has caused no prejudice in this case: The dismissal is operative from & later date that is 28-1-1956 (Order No. 4921 dated 5-10-56 signed by M- Y. Godbole). the suspension order itself being dated 19-1-56 He was in fact deemed to have been in service till the 27th January. Therefore, while disapproving of the form of the suspension order we (sic)d that, as matters took shape it has given rise to no grievance. 13. In the result, the application is dismissed- It has been quite groundless. Costs to the non-applicant and hearing fee of Rs. fifty only. A. H. Khan, J. 14. I agree with my learned brother that in dismissing the petitioner, the Government has observed the formalities prescribed by Article 311 of the Constitution of India. But should like to add a few words in respect of the order of Government, suspending the petitioner with retrospective effect. 15. In this case, the petitioner was first of all dismissed on 12-7-55 by the Commissioner of Customs & Excise It was, however discovered that the order dismissal by the Commissioner was erroneous, because it was passed by an authority subordinate to the one who appointed him. The Rajpramukh of Madhya Bharat, therefore, set aside the order of dismissal passed by the Commissioner and re-instated the petitioner on 19-1-56. After re-instating him another order of suspension was passed by the Rajpramukh on 19-1-56, suspending the petitioner from 12-7-55. In other words, the petitioner was ordered to be suspended with retrospective effect. The short question is: Can the Government suspend a civil servant retrospectively. After re-instating him another order of suspension was passed by the Rajpramukh on 19-1-56, suspending the petitioner from 12-7-55. In other words, the petitioner was ordered to be suspended with retrospective effect. The short question is: Can the Government suspend a civil servant retrospectively. My answer is no. 16. Suspension of a servant means temporary stopping or cessation of work by the servant. Naturally this cessation of work will be in the future, because whatever work has been performed by the servant In the past, he can not be asked to stop that which he has already done. Like the proverbial moving finger, which writes and having writ moves one, and not with can lure it back to cancel half a line, the service which is rendered in the past cannot be undone by an executive, fiat. This is what a suspension order with retrospective effect seeks to accomplish. I,' therefore, hold that a suspension order is effective from the day it is passed for the future but it is ineffective ex-post facto. This point was considered in A. I. R. 1954 Cal. 340 (Hemanta Kumar Bhattacharjee vs. S. N. Mukherjee) and Chakravarti C. J. observed that "the basic idea underlying the root word 'suspend' and all its derivatives is that person in the service of the Central Government while holding an office and performing its functions or holding a position or privilege, should be interrupted in doing so and debarred for the time being from further functioning in the office or holding the position or privilege. He is intercepted in the exercise of his functions or his enjoyment of the privilege and put aside as it were for a time, excluded during the period from his functions or privileges. Such being the concept of a suspension order, suspension with retrospective effect is a contradiction in terms. There is thus both reason and authority that suspension with retrospective effect is meaningless 17. In the instant case, the applicant was ordered to be suspended on 19-1-56 with effect from 12-7-55. This order is partly invalid and partly valid, it is invalid in so far it seeks to suspend the petitioner retrospectively from 12-7-55. It is held that till 19-1-56, the petitioner is entitled to full pay and that is after 19-1-56 that the suspension order is valid and operative. Application dismissed.