JUDGMENT : Barman, J. - In this civil revision the six Plaintiffs are the Petitioners in revision directed against an order of the learned Subordinate Judge, Berhampur, in Title Suit No. 28 of 1957 The facts, shortly stated, are those: The suit was filed by the six Plaintiffs being the five sons and wife of the Defendant Ananda Mohakudo against the said Defendant Ananda Mohakudo as Defendant No. 1 and the alienees from him in respect of certain properties alleged to be belonging to the joint family. The suit was valued at Rs. 48,000/- and the court-fee paid by the Plaintiffs was Rs. 150/- under Article 17 A of the Court-fees Act on the basis that it was a pure and simple partition suit. At the time of the presentation of the plaint the trial Court, however, directed payment of court-fee on ad valorem basis by the Plaintiffs. The Defendants in the suit did not raise any objection to the said order for payment of court-fee on ad valorem basis the matter having involved a question of court-fee, the State of Orissa was added as a party. 2. The only question for consideration in this revision is whether on the pleadings in the plaint the determination of the suit comes within the provisions of Section 7(iv)(c) of the Court-fee Act, which provides that in suits to obtain a declaratory decree or order when consequential relief is prayed, the court-fee shall be according to the amount at which the relief is valued in the plaint. This leads me to the consideration of the question whether the plaint as framed involves declaration of title in respect of the suit property. 3. Mr. AS. Khan. learned Counsel appearing for the Plaintiff-Petitioners, contended that this was a suit for partition of the suit properties and did not involve declaration of title in favour of the parties. In this context the plaint was placed before me and it appears from the plaint itself that Defendant No. 1 Ananda Mohakudo, who was the father and manager of the joint family of which the Plaintiffs were members-is alleged to have alienated certain valuable properties of the family for nominal debts which he had incurred, for extremely low prices as alleged. In fact, Ananda had executed sales, mortgages and made other alienations of lands as fully stated in Schedule 'B' attached to the plaint which was to be treated as part of the plaint itself. The Plaintiffs-sons and their mother, all appear to have been so much disappointed with the father and Karta of the family that they ultimately separated themselves in food and worship. It is clear from the pleadings in the plaint that the Plaintiffs were challenging the said alienations made by the Defendant Ananda. Ultimately they filed the suit for partition of the joint family property as prayed for. In paragraph 4 of the plaint it has been specifically pleaded that this suit is filed for a partition of the joint family properties by metes and bounds after declaring that the alleged debts and alienations are incurred for immoral and illegal purposes and do not bind the Plaintiffs or their joint family and that such partition "necessarily includes recovery of possession of properties in the hands of alienees who never had any right to squat upon the same together with mesne profits". That apart, the prayer itself in the plaint makes it clear that the determination of the suit for partition involves a declaration impugning the validity of the sales and mortgages effected by Ananda in the circumstances aforesaid. For convenience of ready reference the prayer in the plaint is set out as follows: The Plaintiffs therefore most respectfully pray that the Hon'ble Court may be pleased to pass a decree for partition with metes and bounds and direct delivery of possession of properties unlawfully in the hands of alliances i.e. Defendants together with mesne profits with such other consequential reliefs. B. Award mesne profits against alienees together with interest at 6 percent per annum from the beginning. C. For the costs of the suit; and D. For such other relief as the Hon'ble Court deems proper. It is clear from the substance of the plaint read with the prayer that the determination of the suit would involve passing of a declaratory decree within the meaning of Section 7(iv)(c) of the Court-fees Act. 4. Mr. Khan in this context relied on a decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Y. Geeshapati Gurukul v. Y. Subrahmanyam and Ors. 4. Mr. Khan in this context relied on a decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Y. Geeshapati Gurukul v. Y. Subrahmanyam and Ors. AIR 1957 AP 955 where the suit was brought by a coparcener for a declaration that the decree for partition obtained by the widow of his father's brother against his father without making him a party is not binding on him and for partition of the plaint properties into two equal shares. It was held that the suit was properly governed by Articles 17A and 17B of Schedule II (Madras) and the Plaintiff who was not eon mine party to the suit was not required to have the decree set aside. It was further held that he can very well ignore the decree and ask for partition of the properties. If he had asked for a declaration that the decree would not bind him, it would be unnecessary relief. The broad principles on which the Andhra Pradesh High Court decided this case were clearly laid down by a Full Bench of the Madras High Court in Ramaswami v. Rangachariar AIR 1940 Mad 113, 117-8 namely that a Plaintiff who is not economies a party to a suit or a document is not bound to sue for a declaration or cancellation of it. The facts in the Andhra Pradesh case were that the Plaintiff had filed a suit for a declaration that the decree obtained by the second Defendant (his widowed aunt) in a previous suit for partition was not binding on the Plaintiff, not having been a party to the previous suit; and for partition of the plaint schedule properties into two equal shares. In that particular case the first Defendant was the father of the Plaintiff, the second Defendant being the widow of the first Defendant's brother. It was urged on behalf of the Plaintiff in that particular case that the case did not fall u/s 7(iv)(c) of the Court-fees Act for the reason that the Plaintiff was not eon mine a party to the suit and therefore was not required to have the decree set aside and that the prayer for the declaration mentioned in the judgment was a surplusage. The contention in substance on behalf of the Plaintiff was that when a person is not eon mine a party to a suit or a document it is unnecessary for him to have the deed or the decree annulled and he can proceed on the assumption that there was no such document or decree. On the facts of the Andhra Pradesh case certainly the Plaintiff in that case could very well ignore the decree and ask for partition of the family properties on the basis of the non-existence of the decree. If he had asked for a declaration that the decree would not bind him, it was an unnecessary relief. 5. In the Madras Full Bench case cited above, the Plaintiff challenged the validity of certain transactions entered into by the Plaintiff's father as manager of the family and the particulars of the transactions were supplied. The Madras High Court extracted nineteen items of particulars from the statement of transactions which the Plaintiff alleged were invalid as against the family. Among these nineteen items the majority opinion of Full Bench was that the Plaintiff could not be called upon to pay any additional court-fee in respect of the transactions challenged other than the transactions described in items 4, 9, 1, 11 and 14 as stated in the judgment. The Madras High Court thus discussed the two different categories of cases, namely, where the Plaintiff clearly has to stamp his relief in accordance with provisions of Section 7(v) and the other category where he cannot be called upon to pay additional court-fee as aforesaid and laid down the principles on which these two lines or cases have to be decided. The Andhra Pradesh case on the facts, belonged to that category within which the transactions other than items 4, 9, 10, 11 and 14 fell. The present case before me is governed by the principles applicable to the items 4,9, 10,11 and 14 of the Madras case. The Plaintiffs, when relying on the Andhra Pradesh decision, appear to have overlooked this aspect of the Madras decision on which Andhra Pradesh decision was based. This calls for examination of what the Madras Full Bench laid down regarding items 4,9, 10, 11 and 14 under which category the present case directly falls. The Plaintiffs, when relying on the Andhra Pradesh decision, appear to have overlooked this aspect of the Madras decision on which Andhra Pradesh decision was based. This calls for examination of what the Madras Full Bench laid down regarding items 4,9, 10, 11 and 14 under which category the present case directly falls. On items 4, 11, and 14, the Madras High Court was unable to accept the contention of the Plaintiff in that particular case that he should not be called upon to pay court fees in respect of any of the transactions which he challenged because he held not asked for specific relief in respect of them. It was held that the Plaintiff must pay court-fees in accordance with the relief which; he was actually seeking. He could not be allowed to evade payment by omitting to ask for relief when the success of his suit depended on relief being granted to him. The Court must look at the real nature of the suit' and decide what the Plaintiff was asking for. In that particular Madras case the Plaintiff was asking for possession of his share in the estate to be calculated after certain transactions had been set aside. If it was necessary for the Plaintiff to ask for relief in respect of any of the transactions he must pay extra court-fee. The Plaintiff in that case was, in effect, asking in respect of alienations where possession had passed to the alienees that they be set aside and that he be placed in possession of his share of the property alienated. In respect of these transactions the Plaintiff clearly had to stamp his relief in accordance with the provisions of Section 7(v). The Madras High Court held that this would apply to the said items 4, 11 and 14 of the transactions in the table set out in the judgment. 6. With regard to items 9 and 10 of the said Madras case, being simple money decrees against the Plaintiff in suits in which he had been eo nomine impleaded as a party, it is plain that he must pay the fee prescribed by Section 7(iv-a). Such decrees bind him until set aside. 6. With regard to items 9 and 10 of the said Madras case, being simple money decrees against the Plaintiff in suits in which he had been eo nomine impleaded as a party, it is plain that he must pay the fee prescribed by Section 7(iv-a). Such decrees bind him until set aside. The Plaintiff must be held to have impliedly asked for a cancellation of the decree passed against him and must accordingly stamp his plaint ad valorem on the amount of the decrees and not merely on his share fraction, as his liability is for the full amount, though limited to the extent of his share in the joint family assets. These remarks applied to items 9 and 10 in the table of the Madras case. 7. This aspect has to be considered in the context of the present case. Mr. Khan argued that this case should be decided on the facts of the plaint as it stands and therefore he invited the Court not to look at the written !statements which brought into issue the questions as to whether in the transactions, which were being challenged, the parties had been mentioned eon mine. Without looking into the written statements, the plaint itself shows that certain transactions were being challenged which involve going into the question of title and the transactions in suit appear to belong to the same category as items 4, 9, 10, 11 and 14 of the Madras case, where the Plaintiff was called upon to pay additional court-fee in respect of the transactions challenged. The question, therefore, for this Court to decide now is whether-the suit being in the nature of a declaratory suit relating to title-the order of the lower Court directing payment of ad valorem court-fee was a valid order. 8. Mr. Khan in this context relied on a decision of this Court in Chaitan Senapati v. Mani Bewa ILR Cutt 3 where it was held that in partition suits where the Plaintiff claims the allotment of his separate share of the joint family property and separate possession thereof, he claims nothing more than to be conversion of the joint possession of the whole into a separate possession of the allotted part. The subject-matter of dispute therefore is only the right to conversion in the mode of enjoyment and it is not capable of being estimated in money value; accordingly to such suits Article 17A of the Orissa Court-fees (Amendment) Act, V of 1939 applies. It appears from the judgment that the facts on which the Court came to express this view were that the Plaintiffs brought a suit for partition of some properties into three equal shares and for possession of one-third share therein along with Defendant No. A. The real controversy in the suit centered round the properties to be actually divided. The question that was raised by the Taxing Officer on the reference in that connection was whether the court-fee payable on the memorandum of appeal was the fixed court-fee under Article 17 A, Schedule II, of the Court-fees Act or ad-valorem court-fee payable under Article 1, Schedule I, of the Court-fees Act. In that case, it was clear from the basis of the plaint that the suit was for division of shares between the parties and that there was no question of dispute of title in the suit. This High Court in the said judgment made it clear that where the suit itself is in substance a title suit and not a partition suit the court-fee payable is ad-valorem. It depends on what may be determined to be essence of the plaint and the relief sought for; it has nothing to do with the decision of the issues in the suit. I do not see how this decision helps Mr. Khan's contention. On the other hand, I find that the principles laid down in this decision supports the contentions made by the learned Government Advocate in support of the ad-valorem court-fee directed by the lower Court to be paid. Indeed the present suit is a comprehensive suit involving partition of properties which would be available to the parties for partition after considering the validity of the alienations made by the Karta of the joint family which are being challenged in the suit itself. That apart, there is the circumstance that there are schedules to the plaint showing, as mentioned eo nomine, in which of the particular Defendant's possession, the different properties were. That apart, there is the circumstance that there are schedules to the plaint showing, as mentioned eo nomine, in which of the particular Defendant's possession, the different properties were. Therefore, in order to get back the properties from the alienees mentioned eo nomine as aforesaid-incidentally a declaration of title in that respect would necessarily be involved. 9. I, therefore, uphold the order of the learned Subordinate Judge. This revision is accordingly dismissed with costs. Hearing fee Rs. 32/- The Defendants other than the State of Orissa also appeared in this case, although just to watch the proceedings. I think that their appearance was not necessary in this case. I therefore, make no order as to costs so far as the Defendant opposite parties other than the state of Orissa is concerned. Revision Dismissed. Final Result : Dismissed