Judgment Kanhaiya Singh, J. 1. This is an appeal by the judgment-debtor from the decision of the District Judge, Motihari, dated 1-12-1956, who in disagreement with the learned Munsif, held that the decree was not a nullity and allowed the execution to proceed. 2. The facts are these. The respondent instituted Money Suit 562 of 1953 against the appellant for recovery of Rs. 2244, principal and interest, on the basis of a promissory note. This suit was instituted in the Court of the Munsif, Motiliari. At the time of the institution of the suit Mr. Umakant Jha was the Presiding Officer. He had powers to try suits up to the value of Rs. 4,000/-. Having regard to the value of the suit Mr. Jha was competent to entertain and dispose of the suit. But before the suit was heard and decided, Mr. Jha was transferred and was succeeded by Mr. Bishwanath Prasad. The pecuniary jurisdiction of the latter extended up to Rs. 1000.00 only. By notification No. 303A dated 5-11-1954, he was soon vested with powers to try under the ordinary procedure original suits up to Rs. 4000/-in value arising within the local limits of the Motihari Munsif. A copy of this notification was sent to the District Judge of Champaran for information and for communication to Mr. Prasad as soon as he joined at Motihari with a direction that the powers should not be exercised till they were notified in the Bihar Cazette (vide exhibit 2, dated 17-11-1954). The aforesaid notification was published in the Bihar Gazette of date 15-12-54. It appears, however, that after the notification dated 5-11-54, vesting him with powers to try suits up to Rs. 4000.00 in value and before its publication in the Bihar Gazette, he tried the said money suit and passed a decree after contest by the judgment debtor in favour of the plaintiff on 27-11-54. The decree was sealed and signed on 6-12-54. The defendant did not prefer any appeal against the said judgment and decree which eventually became final. The respondent presented an application for execution of the decree on 8-9-55 which was registered as Money Execution Case 569 of 1955. On 25-11-55 the judgment debtor appellant filed an application under Sec. 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure raising objection that the decree was without jurisdiction and, therefore, null and void and not executable. The respondent presented an application for execution of the decree on 8-9-55 which was registered as Money Execution Case 569 of 1955. On 25-11-55 the judgment debtor appellant filed an application under Sec. 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure raising objection that the decree was without jurisdiction and, therefore, null and void and not executable. His submission was that on the date the learned Munsif tried and disposed of the money suit his pecuniary jurisdiction did not extend beyond Rs. 1000.00 and since the value of the suit was Rs. 2244/- he was not competent to pass the decree. This objection prevailed in the executing Court, and the execution was dismissed. The decree-holder carried an appeal to the District Judge, and the learned District Judge set aside the order of the learned Munsif holding that the decree was not a nullity and directed the execution to proceed. The judgment debtor has come up in Second Appeal against the said order. 3. Mr. Thakur Prasad appearing for the appellant contended that the suit being beyond the pecuniary jurisdiction of the learned Munsif the decree passed by him was wholly without jurisdiction and a nullity, and, therefore, the judgment debtor was entitled in law to object to the execution of the decree. In support of his contention he relied upon the following observations of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Kiran Singh V/s. Chaman Paswan, AIR 1954 SC 340 : "It is a fundamental principle well-established that a decree passed by a Court without jurisdiction is a nullity, and that its invalidity could be set up whenever and wherever it is sought to be enforced or relied upon, even at the stage of execution and even in collateral proceedings. A defect of jurisdiction, whether it is pecuniary or territorial, or whether it is in respect of the subject-matter of the action, strikes at the very authority of the Court to pass any decree, and such a defect cannot be cured even by consent of parties." This is a well-established principle of law and there can be no quarrel with this. If in fact the fate of this suit rested upon this general principle, the decree was without jurisdiction, since having regard to the valuation of the suit, it was beyond the competence of the Munsif. If in fact the fate of this suit rested upon this general principle, the decree was without jurisdiction, since having regard to the valuation of the suit, it was beyond the competence of the Munsif. The decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in that very case furnishes an effective answer to the contention raised by Mr. Prasad. The argument of Mr. Prasad overlooks the provisions of Sec.11 of the Suits Valuation Act, and the important question for consideration is as was before the Supreme Court, what is the effect of this section on this question. The section provides as follows: "11(1) Notwithstanding anything in Sec. 578 of the Code of Civil Procedure, an objection that by reason of the over-valuation or under-valuation of a suit or appeal a Court of first instance or lower appellate Court which had not jurisdiction with respect to the suit or appeal exercised jurisdiction with respect thereto shall not be entertained by an appellate Court unless- (a) the objection was taken in the Court of first instance at or before the hearing at which issues were first framed and recorded or in the lower appellate Court in the memorandum of appeal to that court, or (b) the appellate Court is satisfied, for reasons to be recorded by it in writing, that the suit or appeal was over-valued or under-valued and that the over-valuation or under-valuation thereof has prejudicially affected the disposal of the suit or appeal on its merits. (2) If the objection was taken in the manner mentioned in Clause (a) of Sub-section (1), but the appellate Court is not satisfied as to both the matters mentioned in Clause (b) of that sub-section and has before it the materials necessary for the determination of the other grounds of appeal to itself, it shall dispose of the appeal as if there had been no defect of jurisdiction in the Court of first instance or lower appellate Court. (3) If the objection was taken in that manner and the appellate Court is satisfied as to both those matters and has not those materials before it, it shall proceed to deal with the appeal under the rules applicable to the Court with respect to the hearing of appeals; but if it remands the suit or appeal, or frames and refers issues for trial, or requires additional evidence to be taken, it shall direct its order to a Court competent to entertain the suit or appeal. (4) The provisions of this section with respect to an appellate Court shall, so far as they can be made applicable, apply to a Court exercising revisional jurisdiction under Sec. 622 of the Code of Civil Procedure or other enactment for the time being in force. (5) .........." Old Sec. 578 of the Code of Civil Procedure corresponds to new Section 99 which is as follows : No decree shall be reversed or substantially varied, nor shall any case be remanded, in appeal on account of any misjoinder of parties or causes of action or any error, defect or irregularity in any proceedings in the suit, not affecting the merits of the case or the jurisdiction of the Court." The main object of this section is "to prevent technicalities from overcoming the ends of justice, and from operation as a means of circuity of litigation". It will be seen thus that the decree cannot be reversed or varied on purely technical grounds unless the merit of the case is affected or the decree is without jurisdiction. As will appear from the opening words of Sec.11 of the Act, the decree will be saved even if it is apparently beyond the jurisdiction of the Court provided the case falls within the ambit of the said section. Sec.11 saves all decrees beyond the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Court. As will appear from the opening words of Sec.11 of the Act, the decree will be saved even if it is apparently beyond the jurisdiction of the Court provided the case falls within the ambit of the said section. Sec.11 saves all decrees beyond the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Court. As regards the territorial jurisdiction of tha Court the same object is achieved by Sec.21 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which is in the following terms: "No objection as to the place of suing shall be allowed by any appellate or revisional Court unless such objection was taken in the Court of first instance at the earliest possible opportunity and in all cases where issues are settled at or before such settlement, and unless there has been a consequent failure of justice." Manifestly, when a Court has no jurisdiction over a litigation the decree is a nullity. No decree, however, can be declared a nullity even if the Court had no territorial jurisdiction unless the objection was taken in the Court of first instance at the earliest possible opportunity. Thus, Sec.11 of the Act and Sec.21 of the Code provided exception to the general principles enumerated before. Commenting on the effect of Sec.11 of the Act and Sections 21 and 19 of the Code on the decrees which are beyond the pecuniary or territorial jurisdiction of the Court, their Lordships of the Supreme Court made the following significant observations in the case referred to above: "The reference to Sec. 578, now Section 99, C. P. C., in the opening words of the section is significant. That section, while providing that no decree shall be reversed or varied in appeal on account of the defects mentioned therein when they do not affect the merits of the case, excepts from its operation defects of jurisdiction. Section 99, therefore, gives no protection to decrees passed on merits, when the Courts which passed them lacked jurisdiction as a result of over-valuation or under-valuation. It is with a view to avoid this result that Sec.11 was enacted. It provides that objections to the jurisdiction of a Court based on over-valuation or undervaluation shall not be entertained by an appellate Court except in the manner and to the extent mentioned in the section. It is with a view to avoid this result that Sec.11 was enacted. It provides that objections to the jurisdiction of a Court based on over-valuation or undervaluation shall not be entertained by an appellate Court except in the manner and to the extent mentioned in the section. It is a self-contained provision complete in itself, and no objection to jurisdiction based on over-valuation or under-valuation can be raised otherwise than in accordance with it. With reference to objections relating to territorial jurisdiction, Sec.21 of the Civil Procedure Code enacts that no objection to the place of suing should he allowed by an appellate or revisional Court, unless there was a consequent failure of justice. It is the same principle that has been adopted in Sec.11 of the Suits Valuation Act with reference to pecuniary jurisdiction. The policy underlying Sections 21 and 99, C. P. C. and Section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act is the same, namely, that when a case had been tried by a Court on the merits and judgment rendered, it should not be liable to be reversed purely on technical grounds, unless it had resulted in failure of justice, and the policy of the legislature has been to treat objections to jurisdiction both territorial and pecuniary as technical and not open to consideration by an appellate Court, unless there has been a prejudice on the merits." 4. It will thus appear that Sec.11 of the Act and Sec.21 of the Code are exceptions to the fundamental rule of law that a judgment of Court without jurisdiction is a nullity and that want of jurisdiction cannot be waived. The principle which both the sections embody is that in cases falling under them the defects are not fundamental in character and are no more than a mere irregularity in exercise of the jurisdiction, and therefore, where no objection to the valuation or jurisdiction was taken by a party to the suit in the manner and to the extent mentioned in Sec.11, it cannot be allowed to be raised in the appellate Court. In my opinion, the decision of the Supreme Court is clear and unequivocal, and, therefore, the contention of the appellant that the decree and judgment of the learned Munsif of Motihari was a nullity cannot be maintained under Sec.11 of the Act. Mr. In my opinion, the decision of the Supreme Court is clear and unequivocal, and, therefore, the contention of the appellant that the decree and judgment of the learned Munsif of Motihari was a nullity cannot be maintained under Sec.11 of the Act. Mr. Prasad, however, attempted to take the case out of the ambit of the rule laid down by the Supreme Court in that case by urging that Sec.11, of the Act comes into operation when there is a question of over-valuation or under-valuation and that in this case the valuation was indisputably as was stated in the plaint and so it is a case of neither over-valuation nor under-valuation, and, therefore, this case should be determined on the general principle of law and not by a recourse to the provisions of Sec.11. I do not find any distinction in principle in a case where on the valuation stated in the plaint the suit was beyond the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Court and a case in which after determination of the valuation by the appellate Court the suit by reason of the increase in the valuation becomes incompetent for lack of pecuniary jurisdiction in Court. At any rate this distinction was not maintained by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid case. They have referred to the case of Shidappa Venkatrao V/s. Rachappa Subrao, ILR 36 Bom 628, which was affirmed by the Privy Council in Rachappa Subrao V/s. Shidappa Venkatrao, AIR 1918 PC 188. In this case the valuation for declaration was put at Rs. 130.00 and for injunction at Rs. 5/- in the plaint and for purpose of pleaders fee the suit was valued at Rs. 69,016/9/0, being the value of the estate. The suit was decreed by the Subordinate Judge. The plaintiff took up the matter in Second Appeal to the High Court and contended that on the valuation in the plaint the appeal against the decree of the Subordinate Judge lay to the High Court and that the appeal to the District Court was incompetent. This contention was upheld, and the decree of the District Judge was set aside. It will be seen that point in dispute was whether on the allegations in the plaint the value for purposes of jurisdiction was Rs. 135/- or Rs. 69,016/9/0, and the decision was that it was the latter. This contention was upheld, and the decree of the District Judge was set aside. It will be seen that point in dispute was whether on the allegations in the plaint the value for purposes of jurisdiction was Rs. 135/- or Rs. 69,016/9/0, and the decision was that it was the latter. No question of over-valuation or under-valuation arose, and no decision on the scope of Sec.11 of the Act was given. As a result of this decision the High Court came to entertain the matter as a first appeal and affirmed the decree of the Subordinate Judge. The defendant then took up the matter in appeal to Privy Council in AIR 1918 PC 188, and there his contention was that, in fact, on its true valuation the suit was triable by the Court of the Subordinate Judge of the Second Class, and that the District Court was the proper Court to entertain the appeal. The Privy Council held that this objection was "the most technical of technicalities", and since it was not taken in the Court of first instance, the Court would not be justified "in assisting an objection of that type" and that it was also untenable. It observed as follows: "The Court-Fees Act was passed not to arm a litigant with a weapon of technicality against his opponent but to secure revenue for the benefit of the State....The defendant in this suit seeks to utilise the provisions of the Act not to safeguard the interests of the State, but to obstruct the plaintiff, he does not contend that the Court wrongly decided to the detriment of the revenue but that it dealt with the case without jurisdiction. In the circumstances this plea, advanced for the first time at the hearing of the appeal in the District Court, is misconceived, and was rightly rejected by the High Court." The Supreme Court has approved of this observation of the Privy Council in the aforesaid case and has emphasised that the observations of the Privy Council show that an objection of the kind now put forward being highly technical in character should not be entertained if not raised in the Court of first instance. It will be seen that, as in the present case, there was no question of over-valuation or undervaluation in that case and still the objection was not entertained, because it had not been raised in the Court of first instance. It will be wrong, therefore, to say that these principles will not apply, while, strictly speaking, there is no question of over-valuation or under-valuation. Apart from this, even if a restricted meaning be given to Sec.11 of the Act, as contended for by Mr. Prasad, the general principles deducible from that section must be applied to a case of this nature where the defendant, with full knowledge of the suit and the jurisdiction of the Court contested it and did not raise objection about jurisdiction in the Court of first instance at the earliest opportunity. Therefore, he cannot be permitted to raise this contention now in the execution proceeding, unless, of course, he establishes prejudice, for which there is neither evidence nor finding of the Court below. 5 In view of the pronouncement of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the aforesaid case. I do not propose to examine the earlier decisions of the High Courts cited on behalf of either the appellant or the respondent. I would only say that the case of Rajlakshmi Dassee v Katyayani Dassee ILR 38 Cal 639 at p. 660, referred to by Mr. Prasad does not establish a contrary proposition of law and was discussed and distinguished by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid case. I would, however, refer to two decisions of the Madras High Court in Zamindar of Ettiyapuram V/s. Chidambaram Chetty, ILR 43 Mad 675: (AIR 1920 Mad 1019) and Akkammal V/s. Kullampattiyan, AIR 1956 Mad 593 , for the proposition that objection about want of jurisdiction cannot, having regard to the provisions of Sec.21 of the Code of Civil Procedure and Sec.11 of the Suits Valuation Act, be allowed also in an execution proceeding and other collateral proceedings or a separate suit. I must hold, therefore, that the decree and judgment of the learned Munsif, Motihari, cannot be regarded as a nullity. 6. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. V.Ramaswami, J. 7 I agree.