JUDGMENT C.A. Vaidialingam, J. 1. This, in my opinion, is only a desperate attempt made by the first defendant appellant to continue in possession of this building at any rate, if he could get any protection available in law. In this particular case, the provisions of Kerala Act XVI/1959 are sought to be invoked and in my opinion, the view of both the subordinate courts that the appellant is not entitled to invoke any protection under and in pursuance of the provisions of Kerala Act XVI/59, is perfectly correct. 2. In a suit filed by the plaintiff for eviction, the latter has obtained a decree for eviction and the present appellant also attempted to claim protection by virtue of the provisions of Travancore-Cochin Act VIII/1950 and also Kerala Act I/1957. He failed in that attempt to get any protection, because it was held that the lease in this case is of land or building or both given on lease for industrial or commercial purposes coming within the exemption provided under S.3(d) of Kerala Act I/1957. 3. It is also in evidence that the landlord has taken delivery of the 72 cents of paddy land which formed part also of the lease transactions Exts. B and C in favour of the appellant. Now the appellant claimed protection in respect of the house and an extent of 7 cents, which he claims to be appurtenant to that house on the ground that the transactions evidenced by Exts. B and C amount, in so far as this present property is concerned, to a lease of a building. Therefore, the petitioner claimed protection under the provisions of Kerala Act XVI/1959. 4. Both the subordinate courts have, after a consideration of the various recitals in the two documents namely, Exts. B and C, negatived the claim made on behalf of the appellant. The view of both the subordinate courts is that there is no indication in any of those documents to show that the parties intended to treat the building, which is the subject matter of the present dispute, as separate and distinct from the other properties comprised in the lease deeds. 5. Mr. Mathew, learned counsel for the first defendant appellant contended that a reading of the lease deeds namely, Exts. 5. Mr. Mathew, learned counsel for the first defendant appellant contended that a reading of the lease deeds namely, Exts. B and C clearly shows that the parties must have taken into account a payment of rent in respect of the building also and the document itself clearly says that what is taken on lease is the 72 cents of 7cents purify and the stipulation is also to pay and at Rs. 6/- per months From this recitals, it is quite natural that Mr. Mathew should content that the parties must have included in the sum of Rs. 6/- some amount representing the rent payable for the building also. 6. It may not really be necessary to consider the various other recitals in the lease deed as such, because this court has nothing to do with those recitals. The relevant recitals to be considered in Exts. B and C are only regarding the nature of the transaction regarding the entire property on which this building also was situated. Though no doubt, the parties have used the expression and there is nothing to indicate in the document that any particular part of the sum of Rs. 6/- fixed as the total rent was really as and for the building, nor is there anything to show in the document that the parties intended to separate the building with a reasonable portion of land appurtenant to it from the rest of the property. The documents, as rightly understood by both the subordinate courts, are only to this effect namely, that the entire property is treated as a single unit in which also the existence of a building is mentioned in the lease deeds. That by itself, in my opinion, will not enable the petitioner to separate the building portion of it with a reasonable part of the land tacked on to it as constituting a lease of a building under the Kerala Act XVI/1959. In my opinion, before the provisions of Kerala Act XVI/1959 could be invoked by the party, that party must be able to establish that the main and sole object of the transaction relied upon by him and covered by any document relates to the lease of a building. The fact that in a particular lease of property, a building also is situated will not by itself bring the said lease within the ambit of Kerala Act XVI/59. The fact that in a particular lease of property, a building also is situated will not by itself bring the said lease within the ambit of Kerala Act XVI/59. The definition of 'landlord' as a person receiving or entitled to receive the rent of a building and also of a 'tenant' as a person by whom and on whose account rent is payable for a building and also the various other provisions of the said Act clearly give an indication that before a lease can be brought within the ambit of the said Act, it must be essentially a lease of a building. No doubt, under the definition of 'building' it is also stated that it will include the garden, grounds, wells, tanks and structures, if any, appurtenant to such building. But the emphasis is in the main that it should be the lease of a building. Judged by this test, in my opinion, neither Ext. B nor Ext. C satisfies the requirements of this enactment. 7. Mr. Mathew contended that though the entire transaction may be a composite one, still in view of the fact that him is also is mentioned, which must obviously relate to a building namely, the disputed building, it is open to his client to treat the building as separate and claim relief under Kerala Act XVI/1959. In my opinion, it is not open to a party to cut up what otherwise is a composite lease transaction. I do not mean that in and by virtue of a same document, a lease of a building as such and a lease of other properties could not be created. But there must be clear indication in the document itself to show that the parties intended to create also a lease of a building, in which case alone the provisions of Kerala Act XVI/59 would stand attracted. 8. As I have stated earlier, I fully agree with the views of both the subordinate courts regarding the interpretation placed upon Exts. B and C and therefore, it follows that the appellant is not entitled to claim any protection under Kerala Act XVI/59. The Second Appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. No leave.