Judgment Kanhaiya Singh, J. 1. The petitioner has been convicted under Sec. 411 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for four months. 2. On the night of the 12th and 13th September 1958, a theft was committed in the house of Kishun Singh (P.W. 1), and a box and some utensils including a lota were taken away by the thieves. Subsequently, the lota was recovered from the house of the petitioner and was identified both at the test Identification parade and in the Court by P. W. 1. as his lota. 3. The only contention urged by learned Counsel on behalf of the petitioner is that the prosecution has failed to prove that the lota was in exclusive possession of the petitioner. It was pointed out that the house from which this lota was recovered was occupied both by the petitioner and his son, and the argument advanced is that when the house was in joint possession of both father and son, the prosecution should have proved that this lota was recovered from a place which was in: exclusive possession of the petitioner. It was urged that there is no, evidence to that effect. On the other hand learned Counsel for the opposite party contended that the joint possession of the house by the father and son did not affect the prosecution case on merits and that the petitioner being the eldest member of the family, it must be presumed that he was in exclusive possession of the lota in question. Reliance was placed upon a Bench decision of this Court in Mahabir Singh V/s. State, AIR 1951 Pat 296 ; therein Shearer, J. in delivering the judgment of the Bench observed, as follows; "It was not enough for the prosecution to show that the appellants were co-owners of the houses from which the stolen property was recovered. That, in my opinion, is a correct statement of the legal position. The appellant Ramautar was, however at his house when the Sub-Inspector went to search it. The sarees and dhotis, which were recovered, were in a sack which was of such a size, and was found in such a position, that Ramautar must have been perfectly well aware of its existence. The appellant Ramautar was, however at his house when the Sub-Inspector went to search it. The sarees and dhotis, which were recovered, were in a sack which was of such a size, and was found in such a position, that Ramautar must have been perfectly well aware of its existence. Ramautar was the eldest member of the family in the house at the time, and it must, I think, in the circumstance be presumed that he had control over the sack, and was, therefore, in law, in possession of it either exclusively or jointly with other members of his household. There is no reason to suppose that he has at any time said that it was brought into the premises by some other member of the family and, even if he had, one might safely presume that Ramautar had ratified this mans action and had adopted his possession as bis own also"; These observations do not lay down an inflexible rule of law that in all cases where a stolen property is recovered from a house in possession of the joint family consisting of different members, the eldest member must, as a matter of law, be presumed to be in possession of it either exclusively or jointly with other members of his household. Those observations must be confined to the peculiar facts of that case. If that were not so, then in all cases the eldest member of the family will be punished for the sin of the junior members, which is opposed to the fundamental principles of our Criminal Jurisprudence. There is, on the contrary, ample authority for the view that the mere proof that an incriminating article is found in premises having a number of rooms and occupied by a number of persons belonging to a joint family does not, in itself, establish prima facie the guilt of any particular person or of all of them jointly. There is, on the contrary, ample authority for the view that the mere proof that an incriminating article is found in premises having a number of rooms and occupied by a number of persons belonging to a joint family does not, in itself, establish prima facie the guilt of any particular person or of all of them jointly. In the case of Punia Mallah V/s. Emperor, AIR 1946 Pat 169, it has been laid down that where an article alleged to have been stolen at a dacoity is recovered from a house occupied by the accused and his father, and there is no evidence as to which portion of the house was occupied by the accused and which portion by the other members of the family and from which portion the article was recovered the article cannot be said to have been recovered from the possession of the accused. The principles laid down in this case govern the instant case also. Again, in the case of Bhekha Ahir V/s. Emperor, AIR 1947 Pat 236, a similar view has been expressed. In other words, mens rea or guilty knowledge must be proved in a particular individual or group of individuals. Because the other members of the family cannot be found guilty it does not follow as a necessary corollary of law that the head of the family must be held guilty. Like all other criminal trials, the burden lies entirely on the prosecution arid all the time on the prosecution, to show the guilty knowledge in any particular individual or the head of the joint family. It is remarkable that in this case the key of the room from where the articles were recovered was handed over to the police by the head of the family; still tnis circumstance was not regarded as sufficient to draw an inference that he was consciously in possession of the incriminating article. 4. Again, in the case of Dwarika Lohar V/s. Emperor, AIR 1941 Pat 223, a Bench decision of this Court has laid down that where dacoity is committed by son the mere fact that one of the articles taken in the dacoity is found in the house which is jointly occupied by the son and his father is no ground for convicting the father under Sec. 412. The presumption in such a case is that the article remained in possession of the son. The presumption in such a case is that the article remained in possession of the son. Although this case related to an offence under Sec. 412 I. P. C., the principles apply to an offence under Sec. 411 also. It is noteworthy that Shearer, J. was a party to this decision. There is, therefore, abundant authority in support of the proposition that where the house from which the incriminating article was recovered was in possession of more than two persons, a person cannot be convicted for the offence under Section 411 I.P.C., Unless It was established that the portion of the house from which the recovery was made was in his-exclusive possession. In absence of such evidence, a person cannot be convicted of the offence under Sec. 411 I. P. C. merely on the ground that he was the Karta of the joint family. It is apparent that in this case the house from which the lota was recovered was occupied jointly by the father and son, and there is no evidence to show that it was in the petitioners exclusive and conscious possession. Accordingly, the conviction of the petitioner cannot be sustained. 5. In the result, this application is allowed, and the conviction and sentence passed on the petitioner are set aside.