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1960 DIGILAW 105 (PAT)

In Re v. .

1960-05-12

H.K.CHAUDHURI, TARKESHWAR NATH

body1960
Judgment Tarkeshwar Nath, J. 1. This Court, by an order dated 16-2-1960, directed Bhola Nath Chaudhary, contemner, to show cause by 8th March 1960 why he should not be committed for contempt of court for causing obstruction to the proceedings in the Court of Sri K. S. Pande, First Addl. Sessions Judge, Patna, after he dictated an order on 19-12-1959 refusing bail to Sushil Kumar Choudhary, appellant, in Criminal Appeal No. 470 of 1959 (Sushil Kumar Chaudhury V/s. The State) and for addressing the learned Addl. Sessions Judge loudly and vehemently and in a highly excited and furious manner in course of which he (1) vilified and insulted the Public Prosecutor Sri Pande Narsingh Sahai, (2) threatened the Munsiff Magistrate who had tried the criminal case giving rise to the criminal appeal, and the Public Prosecutor with violence boasting that it was he who had fired at Lord Wavell, (3) attacked the integrity of the trying Magistrate and the Public Prosecutor alleging that the latter had secured the judgment of conviction in the case against Sushil Kumar Chaudhary by exercising influence over the Magistrate, (4) attempted to overawe the Addl. Sessions Judge, the Munsiff Magistrate and the Public Prosecutor by naming some high dignitaries in connection with the criminal appeal, (5) gave out that he would get his son released by the President of India and (6) alleged that the conviction of his son Sushil Kumar Chau-dhary was brought about by means of a conspiracy hatched by the Public Prosecutor and others. 2. The facts and circumstances in which this proceeding was drawn up are these: On 20-3-1959 some time after 3-45 p.m., three girls and a boy Rakesh Kumar, were returning home from the Womens College, Patna, on a rickshaw driven by Jagdeo Mandal Two boys on one cycle followed them from the College and when the rickshaw reached near the building then occupied by the Oriental Life Assurance Company, on the Dak Bungalow Road, they came on the right side of the rickshaw and one of them who was tall and was driving the cycle, threw some liquid on the occupants of the said rickshaw. That boy and the other one who had brown hair and white complexion and was sitting on the carrier of the cycle fled away. That boy and the other one who had brown hair and white complexion and was sitting on the carrier of the cycle fled away. The liquid, however, fell on the four occupants of the rickshaw and also on the driver and they felt much pain and an alarm was raised. The drivers attempt to get at the miscreants was futile. The rickshaw proceeded ahead and reached up to a laundry known as M/s. Sunshine" from where an information was sent to the guardians of those girls about this incident. Dr. R. V/s. P. Sinha, who was returning with his daughter from the College by the same route, found those girls and the boy in misery and came to their rescue by taking them to the hospital in his car. Medical aid was given to them in the Medical College hospital and an information was sent to the Sub-Inspector of Pirbahore Police Station. The Sub-Inspector went to the Hospital, and recorded the statement of Onika Kapoor, one of the girls. Investigation proceeded and Sushil Ku-mar Chaudhary was arrested later in the night the same day whereas one Sultan Jaffar was arrested on the following day. They were put on a test identification parade on 21st March, 1959 and Sushil Kumar Chaudhary was identified by two girls and the driver of the rickshaw. The police submitted a charge-sheet against Sushil Kumar Chaudhary and Sultan Jaffar and they were put on trial. They pleaded innocence and alleged that they were falsely implicated. The trial was a long and protracted one. The evidence in the case was recorded by Sri Ramji Upadhya. a Magistrate of the 1st class, and a date was fixed for judgment. Sushil Kumar Chaudhary did not, however, appear on that date and the judgment could not be delivered. The case was later transferred to the file of Shri Shambhunath Sinha, Magistrate, Patna and heard the arguments. He held that Sushil Kumar Chaudhary threw sulphuric acid on the three girls and the boy sitting on the rickshaw and it fell on the driver as well and that the other accused Sultan Jaffar was sitting on the carrier on the same cycle when Sushil Kumar Chaudhary threw the acid. He held that Sushil Kumar Chaudhary threw sulphuric acid on the three girls and the boy sitting on the rickshaw and it fell on the driver as well and that the other accused Sultan Jaffar was sitting on the carrier on the same cycle when Sushil Kumar Chaudhary threw the acid. He thus by his judgment dated 17th December, 1959 convicted Sushil Kumar Chaudhary under Sec.326 of the I. P. C. and sentenced him to rigorous imprisonment for a year and a half and also to pay a fine of Rs. 1000/-. He convicted Sultan Jaffar under Sec.326/34, I. P. C., and sentenced him to one years rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 100/-. On 19-12-1959, Sushil Kumar Chaudhary preferred an appeal, Criminal Appeal No. 470 of 1959, before the Sessions Judge of Patna, and a prayer for bail was made on his behalf. The matter of bail was heard on 19-12-1959 by Sri K. S. Pandey, First Addl. Sessions Judge at Patna. Sri Khaderan Singh, Advocate, moved for bail on behalf of the appellant and it was opposed by Sri Pandey Nar-singh Sahai, Public Prosecutor. The learned Addf. Sessions Judge having heard arguments, dictated an order in court refusing bail to Sushil Kumar Chaudhary. The contemner, it is alleged, then got up and started a harangue which I will deal with, hereafter elaborately as this was the subject-matter of the charge for contempt. The learned Addl. Sessions Judge, however, directed that the appeal should be put up on 22-12-1959 before the Sessions Judge of Patna giving liberty to the appellant to renew his prayer for bail. 3. This incident in the Court of the Addl. Sessions Judge on 19-12-1959 interrupted the proceeding of the Court and attracted a crowd in the Court room affecting the dignity of the Court itself. The District and Sessions Judge made enquiries from certain members of the Bar who were present in the Court room and also from the learned Addl. Sessions Judge about this incident and the reports are from Sarvashri Sridhar Dayal Singh, advocate, Phanibhusan Prasad, advocate, Pandey Narsingh Sahai, Public Prosecutor, Khaderan Singh) advocate, Brajeshwari Prasad advocate, Pande Gunjeshwari Sahai, advocate and K. S. Pandey, Addl. District and Sessions Judge, Patna. Sessions Judge about this incident and the reports are from Sarvashri Sridhar Dayal Singh, advocate, Phanibhusan Prasad, advocate, Pandey Narsingh Sahai, Public Prosecutor, Khaderan Singh) advocate, Brajeshwari Prasad advocate, Pande Gunjeshwari Sahai, advocate and K. S. Pandey, Addl. District and Sessions Judge, Patna. It appears from these reports that the contemner called the Public Prosecutor, a liar, threatened him and the Munsiff Magistrate alleging that the Public Prosecutor had influenced the Magistrate and secured the conviction of Sushil Kumar Chaudhary. On receipt of these reports the contemner was directed to show cause why he should not be committed for contempt of Court. 4. The contemner has shown cause denying the correctness of the reports and has indicated the circumstances in which he addressed the court. According to him he addressed the Court in all humility and what he said were nothing but the wails of an aggrieved father. He also took an objection to this Courts drawing up proceedings for contempt in the circumstances of the present case and asserted that there was basis for the remarks made against the Public Prosecutor. He, however, tendered an unqualified apology in the event of this Court finding him to be guilty of contempt. 5. In view of the denial of the correctness of the reports submitted by the members of the Bar, the learned counsel for the State summoned some of them to prove the reports and their versions of the incident which happened on 19-12-1959. Sarvashri Sridhar Dayal Singh, Phanibhushan Prasad and Pandey Gunjeshwari Sahai have been examined as witnesses Nos. 1, 2 and 3 for the State and they have proved reports dated 20th January 1960, 17th January 1960 and 15th January 1960 respectively. Apart from them, Sri Rashbihari Singh, advocate, has been examined as witness no. 4 as he also happened to be present in that court on 19-12-1959 although he did not submit a report. Sri Khaderan Singh, advocate who appeared for the appellant Sushil Kumar Chaudhary has been examined on behalf of the contemner in this proceeding and he has proved his report dated 15th January 1960, Sri Pandey Narsingh Sahai, Public Prosecutor of Patna has been examined as a court witness as we considered that hip, examination was essential inasmuch as he opposed the prayer for bail and was the target of the various criticisms. He also has proved his report dated 9th January 1960. 6. He also has proved his report dated 9th January 1960. 6. Mr. Baldeo Prasad Singh for the contemner urged at the outset that this court had no jurisdic-tion to draw Up proceeding for contempt in view of the provisions of Sec.3(2) of the Contempt of Courts Act (Act 32 of 1952) which runs thus : "No High Court shall take cognizance of a contempt alleged to have been committed in respect of a court subordinate to it where such contempt is an offence punishable under the Indian Penal Code (Act 45 of 1860)." He also referred to Sec.228 of the Indian Penal Code and it was worded as follows: "Whoever intentionally offers any insult, or causes any interruption to any public servant, while such public servant is sitting in any stage of a judicial proceeding, shall be punished with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both." He submitted that even if the facts alleged were true, the offence, if any, by the contemner was one which came within the purview of Sec.228 of the Indian Penal Code and the contempt if at all committed was one in respect of a court subordinate to the High Court regarding which the High Court had no jurisdiction to take any cognizance. Mr. Varma for the State refuted this contention and pointed out that the effect of the utterances by Bholanath Chaudhary was not only to interrupt the proceedings of the Court, but also to scandalise the court and threaten the trying Magistrate and the Public Prosecutor and in those circumstances the provisions of Sec.3(2) of the Contempt of Courts Act did not bar the jurisdiction of the High Court. These provisions have been the subject-matter of interpretation from time to time and Mr. Singh has first referred to the decision in the case ot Kaulashia V/s. Emperor, AIR 1933 Pat 142. In that case it was held that the meaning of Sec.2(3), of the Contempt of Courts Act (Act 12 of 1926) which is the same as Sec.3(2) of Act 32 of 1952, was that where under the Indian Penal Code there was already a provision for punishing a contempt of Court as contempt, the Contempt of Courts Act itself shall have no application. It, however, did not mean that when the Act which constituted a contempt of court also constituted an offence under the Indian Penal Code, it could not be punished under the Contempt of Courts Act. It was further observed that a single act might be both, an offence under the Indian Penal Code and also might amount to contempt of court and could be punishable under the Indian Penal Code as well as under the Contempt of Courts Act. He then referred to another decision in the case of Jnanendra Prasad Bose V/s. Copal Prasad Sen in the same volume AIR 1933 Pat 204, wherein it was held that the real meaning of the sub-section referred to above was that if the act constituted an offence under the Penal Code, it could be punished under that Code and if the same act also constituted a contempt of court but was not of the character set forth in Sec.228 of the Indian Penal Code, then it was punishable by the High Court. The scope of these provisions has been clarified by the Supreme Court in the case of Bathina Rama-krishna Reddy V/s. State of Madras, AIR 1952 SC 149 . In that case proceedings for contempt were drawn up against the publisher and the managing editor of a weekly paper for publishing an article which appeared under the caption "Is the sub-Magistrate Kovvur corrupt?" The Madras High Court has held that the publication in question did amount to contempt of Court as it lowered the prestige and dignity of the Courts and brought into disrepute the administration of justice and Bathina Ramakrishna Reddy was found guilty for contempt of Court. In support of the appeal it was urged that the allegations made in the article in question constituted an offence under Sec. 499 of the Indian Penal Code and thus the jurisdiction of the High Court to take cognizance of that case was expressly barred under Sec.2(3) of the Contempt of Courts Act (Act 12 of 1926). It was further urged that the meaning of the sub-section was that if the act by which a party was alleged to have committed contempt of a subordinate court constituted offence of any description whatsoever punishable under the Indian Penal Code, the High Court was precluded from taking cognizance of that. It was further urged that the meaning of the sub-section was that if the act by which a party was alleged to have committed contempt of a subordinate court constituted offence of any description whatsoever punishable under the Indian Penal Code, the High Court was precluded from taking cognizance of that. But this contention was repelled and their Lordships observed as follows: "In our opinion, the sub-section referred to above excludes the jurisdiction of High Court only in cases where the acts alleged to constitute contempt of a subordinate court are punishable as contempt, under specific provisions of the Indian Penal Code but not where these acts merely amount to offences of other description for which punishment has been provided for in the Indian Penal Code." It was further held that the Contempt of Courts Act gave the High Court the right to protect a subordinate court against contempt, but subject to ,the restriction that cases of contempt already provided in the Indian Penal Code should not be taken cognizance of by the High Court, and this was the principle underlying the relevant provision of the Contempt of Courts Act, The provision of Sec. 480, Cr. P. C., was referred to which empowered any civil, criminal or revenue court to punish summarily a person found guilty of committing any offence under Sec.175, 178, 179, 180 or Sec.228 of the Penal Code in the view or presence of the Court. Their Lordships held that the appeal had no merit and concluded as follows: "It seems, therefore, that there are offences which the punishable as contempt under the Indian Penal Code and as subordinate courts can sufficiently vindicate their dignity under the provisions of criminal law in such cases the legislature deemed it proper to exclude them from the jurisdiction of the High Court under Sec.2(3), Contempt of Courts Act, but it would not be correct to say that the High Courts jurisdiction is excluded even in cases where the act complained of, which is alleged to constitute contempt, is otherwise an offence under the Indian Pena] Code." These observations made in the case of AIR 1952 SC 149 , have been referred to and relied upon in the case of State of Madhya Pradesh V/s. Revashankar, AIR 1959 SC 102 . In that case serious aspersions were made in an application for transfer against a Magistrate, and the High Court had held that the act of the contemner amounted to an offence under Sec.228 of the Indian Penal Code and it was precluded from taking action for the contempt committed in the court of the Magistrate. The view taken by the learned Judges of the High Court with regard to the provisions of Sec.228 ot the Indian Penal Code was held to be erroneous and the case was remanded for taking cognizance of the act complained of. While dealing with Sec.228 of the Indian Penal Code it was pointed out that the essential ingredients of the offence were (1) intention, (2) insult or interruption to a public servant and (3) the public servant insulted or interrupted must he sitting in a stage of judicial proceeding. It is useful to quote the following observations: "Learned counsel for the respondent has contended before us that as soon as there is an element of insult in the act complained of, Sec.228 I. P. C., is attracted and the jurisdiction of the High Court to take cognizance of the contempt is ousted. We are unable to accept this contention as correct. Sec.228 deals with an intentional insult to a public servant in certain circumstances. The punishment for the offence is simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees or with both. Our attention has been drawn to the circumstance that under Sec. 4 of the Act the sentence for contempt of court is more or less the same, namely, simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months. The fine is a little more and may extend to two thousand rupees. Sec. 4 of the Act contains a proviso that the accused person may be discharged or the punishment awarded may be remitted on apology being made to the satisfaction of the court. We do not, however, think that a similarity of the sentence in the two sections referred to above is a real test. The true test is: is the act complained of an offence under Sec.228, I. P. C., or is it something more than that? We do not, however, think that a similarity of the sentence in the two sections referred to above is a real test. The true test is: is the act complained of an offence under Sec.228, I. P. C., or is it something more than that? If in the true nature and effect the act complained of is really scandalising the court rather than a mere insult, then it is clear that on the ratio of our decision in Ramakrishna Reddys case, AIR 1952 SC 149 the jurisdiction of the High Court is not ousted by reason of the provision in Sec.3(2) of the Act." Having considered the principles laid down in these decisions, it is necessary to keep in view certain provisions of the I. P. C., and those of the Criminal Procedure Code. Sec. 480 of the Cr. P. C., lays down the procedure in certain cases of contempt and provides that in case of an offence described in Sections 175, 178, 179, 180 or Sec.228 committed in the view or presence of any civil, criminal or revenue court, the court may, cause the offender to be detained in custody and at any time before the rising of the court on the same day, may, if it thinks fit, take cognizance of the offence and sentence the offender to fine not exceeding two hundred rupees, and in default of payment to simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to one month unless such fine is sooner paid. In other words, it means that the court itself in whose presence such offences are committed is competent to take cognizance of these offences and sentence the offender. It deals with what may be called as direct contempt of court and provides punishment of an offender summarily in respect of offences mentioned therein. The procedure in this section is summary, but it undoubtedly involves the consideration of the sufficiency of what took place in the presence of the court. Sec. 481, Sub-clause (2) of the Code provides that if the offence is under Sec.228 of the Indian Penal Code, the record should indicate the nature of interruption or insult as well. The procedure in this section is summary, but it undoubtedly involves the consideration of the sufficiency of what took place in the presence of the court. Sec. 481, Sub-clause (2) of the Code provides that if the offence is under Sec.228 of the Indian Penal Code, the record should indicate the nature of interruption or insult as well. The following Sec. 482 provides that if the court is of the opinion that the case should not be disposed of under Sec. 480, then it can forward the case to a Magistrate having jurisdiction to try the same and the latter can then deal with the matter. Sec. 484 gives power to a court to discharge the offender or remit the punishment on his submission to the order or requisition of such court or on a satisfactory apology. In view of these provisions it is clear that the court in whose presence the offences referred to are committed, is competent to impose a fine up to two hundred rupees, but if that court forwards the case to another Magistrate the latter can impose a penalty provided under the various sections as the case may be. The net result is that if the acts alleged are offences under Sections 175, 178, 179, 180 or Sec.228 of the Indian Penal Code, then they constitute contempt and they can be taken cognizance of by the court in whose view or presence they are committed and in respect of only such contempt, the High Court would not take cognizance and Sec.3(2) of the Contempt of Courts Act (Act 32 of 1952) bars its jurisdiction. On the other hand, if the act complained of which is alleged to constitute contempt, is an offence under the Indian Penal Code but other than an offence under Sections 175, 178, 179, 180 or Sec.228 of the Code, then the jurisdiction of the High Court is not excluded. In the present case, therefore, if the acts complained of had amounted only to an insult or interruption in the proceedings of the court, they would have come within purview of Sec.228 of the Indian Penal Code. But here the acts in question amount to something more and therefore the jurisdiction of the High Court is not barred. 7. In the present case, therefore, if the acts complained of had amounted only to an insult or interruption in the proceedings of the court, they would have come within purview of Sec.228 of the Indian Penal Code. But here the acts in question amount to something more and therefore the jurisdiction of the High Court is not barred. 7. Having dealt with the preliminary objection relating to the jurisdiction of this court in the matter of contempt, I now proceed to determine the truth or otherwise of the various allegations against the contemner. The facts admitted are these: Sushil Kumar Chaudhary, son of the con-temner, was convicted and sentenced under Sec.326 of the Indian Penal Code by the Musiff Magistrate on 17th December, 1959, in the case known as the Acid Throwing Case. On 19th December 1959, a petition of appeal, Criminal Appeal No. 470 of 1959, was filed on his behalf in the court of the Sessions Judge at Patna, but in his absence the prayer for bail was made before Sri K. S. Pandey, 1st Addl. Sessions Judge, Patna. Sri Khade- ran Singh, advocate, D. W. 1 in the present proceeding, moved for bail on behalf of Sushii Kumar Chaudhary and Sri Pandey Narsingh. Sahai, Public Prosecutor (Court witness No. 1) opposed the prayer on behalf of the State. Having heard arguments, the learned Addl. Sessions Judge dictated an order the same (day ?) in court refusing bail. Then the eontemner got up and addressed the learned Judge for some time in connection with the prayer for bail of his son Sushii Kumar Chaudhary. There is no controversy with regard to these facts, but the parties are at variance as to what was the tone and the manner of the address, what were its contents and whether there was any justification for that. The set of witnesses examined on behalf of the State characterised the address of the eontemner as a harangue delivered on the top of ids voice in an excited and violent manner whereas the eontemner asserted that he made submissions with great respect and humility with the permission of the court. 8. * * * 9. It is necessary first to consider as to what were the statements which the contemner made, while addressing the learned Addl. Sessions Judge on that day in his court. 8. * * * 9. It is necessary first to consider as to what were the statements which the contemner made, while addressing the learned Addl. Sessions Judge on that day in his court. The reports of Sarvashri Sridhar Dayal Singh, Phani Bhusan Prasad and Pandey Gunjeshwar Sahai dated 20-1-1960, 17th January 1960 and 15th January 1960 have been marked Exs. 1, 2 and 3 respectively and the report oE Pandey Narsingh Sahai also dated 9th January 1960 has been marked as an Ex. (court Ex. I). These reports contained the statements made by the contemner and the expressions used by him while addressing the court and these witnesses have stated on oath about this incident. The reports are almost identical and in order to determine the propriety of the statements made by the contemner, it would be proper to reproduce below an extract from the report. (Ex. 1) of Sri Sridhar Dayal Singh: "Pandey Narsingh Sahai jhootha hai. Upne roti ke Bye maire nirdosh bachcha ko Munsiff Magistrate so kali kar bhandawa diya hai. Mai Munsif Magistrate ko bhi dekhunga. We transfer ho gaye hain aur unko jahaj pur charh kar us per jana hai. Unse aur mujh se awashya mulakat hogi. Logon jo janna chhahaya ki Lord Wavel ko goli marne wala main in hun. Yadapi Pandit Jawahar-lal Nehru ne Shri Krishna Sinha ko case uthane ka adesh diya hai tauvi mai nahain chahta hun ki case uthaya jai. Chu ki mai yis adalat men yis bat ko sabit kar dunga ki mere bachcha nirdosh hai. Mai Sri Krishna Sinha ka dahina hath hun. Yah case kara kar unki shakti kum ki jati hai. Mai ub communist ho jaunga". Sridhar Dayal Singh joined the Bar in 1930 as a pleader and was enrolled as an advocate in 1944. He practises mostly in the District Court at Patna and is on the panel of senior assistant public prosecutors. He was present in the court of Sri K. S. Pandey when Shri Khaderan Singh moved for bail on behalf of Sushii Kumar Chaudhary. He has proved his report and has deposed that after the learned Judge passed the order, Bholanath Chaudhary suddenly took up a very violent and unreasonable attitude. He started shouting in the court at the top of his voice in a violent and uproarious manner and could not tolerate the arguments advanced by the Public Prosecutor. He has proved his report and has deposed that after the learned Judge passed the order, Bholanath Chaudhary suddenly took up a very violent and unreasonable attitude. He started shouting in the court at the top of his voice in a violent and uproarious manner and could not tolerate the arguments advanced by the Public Prosecutor. The witness and others present there felt that sense of decorum, and decency vanished from the precincts of the civil court and particularly from the court-room". He was asked in cross-examination whether there was any interruption from the Judge and the answer was that the Judge gave a signal by his hand asking Bhola Nath Chaudhary to be quiet, but he was at the top of his voice and his voice out topped the voice of the Judge. Phanibhusan Prasad, witness No. 2 also gave a report dated 17th January 1960 and his report contains the following additional facts which were parts of the address of Bhola Nath Chaudhary : "Apnahi jante hain ki hamare larke ko saza dilwane ke lie Pandey Narsingh Sahay ne Munsif- Magistrate ke ghar par jakar faisla likhwa diya hai. Hamare sath anyay ho raha hai Judge Saheb". xx xx xx" "Ek bahut bare chal ke karan hamare larke ko tatha ham ko tabah kiya ja raha hai. Main Janta hun ki ap ne hamare larke ko zamanat nahi dekar ap ne neyay nahi kiya hai. Lekin ap samajn len ki ap ne zamanat nahi di hai na den. High Court par bhi hamara biswa nahin. Lekin Rajendra Pra sad se main apne larke ko chhurwa lunga. Main ne tees sal tak desk ki sewa ki hai. Ab ham samajh gae ki ipke yahan insaf nahi hota hai.". xx xx xx" Judge Saheb, main aj ap ke dwara Sri Krishna Singh ko kali dena chahta hun ki ab main sah nahi sakta. Main Communist ho jaunga aur Sri Krishna Singh ke raj me ag laga dunga. Aisa raj nahi rah sakta jis men beimani hoti hai. Main dekhunga ki Pandey Narsingh Sahay kis tarah se P. P. rahta hai. Sat din ke andar ise bata dunga". xx xx xx Phanibhusan Prasad has deposed that this address by the contemner was in an excited manner at the top of his voice and the Public Prosecutor sought the protection of the Court. Main dekhunga ki Pandey Narsingh Sahay kis tarah se P. P. rahta hai. Sat din ke andar ise bata dunga". xx xx xx Phanibhusan Prasad has deposed that this address by the contemner was in an excited manner at the top of his voice and the Public Prosecutor sought the protection of the Court. This witness was present in court that day and he also is an assistant public prosecutor in the District of Patna. Witness No. 3 Pandey Gunjeshwari Sahai has a long standing at the Bar and has been working as assistant public prosecutor since 1946. He also was present in court when the bail matter was being heard and he has proved his report, exhibit 3. In answer to a court question as to the matter in which Bhola Nath Chaudhary addressed the court, he has deposed as follows ; "He was shouting at the top of his voice saying that the Public Prosecutor Pandey Narsingk Sahay jhutha hai apne roti ke liya mere bekasoor bachey ko Munsif Magistrate se kah kar bahndwa dihis hai, Ham dekhenge ki Munsif-Magistrate steamer par charh kar oos paar kaisey jaata hai". According to him, Bhola Nath Chaudhary was shouting at the top of his voice in a manner which attracted a large number of lawyers, clients and litigants in the court. He is no doubt related to Pandey Narsingh Sahay, but no contempt has been made on that score. (After considering the evidence the judgment continues as follows:) On a review of the evidence I am of opinion that the contemner addressed the learned Judge in a violent and excited manner which attracted a large crowd interrupting the proceeding of the court and in course of his address he did the following : 1. Called Pandey Narsingh Sahay Jhutha and accused him for exercising influence over the Munsif Magistrate for getting his son convicted. 2. Threatened Pandey Narsingh Sahay and the Minsif Magistrate as well with violence. 3. Attacked the integrity of the Munsif-Magistrate and that of Pandey Narsingh Sahay, Publice Prosecutor, 4. Attempted to overawe the Additional Sessions Judge and the Public Prosecutor by naming the high dignitaries in connection with the case then pending in criminal appeal. 10. Learned counsel for the contemner referred to the decision in the case of Rasik Lal Nag, in the matter of, AIR 1917 Cal 428. Attempted to overawe the Additional Sessions Judge and the Public Prosecutor by naming the high dignitaries in connection with the case then pending in criminal appeal. 10. Learned counsel for the contemner referred to the decision in the case of Rasik Lal Nag, in the matter of, AIR 1917 Cal 428. In that case it was held that misconduct in the presence of the court which showed disrespect of its authority or which had a tendency to interfere with the due administration of justice was contempt and it was not limited to misconduct in the actual presence of the Judge inasmuch as the court as deemed to be present in every part of the place set apart for its use and for the use of its officers, jurors and witnesses. Misbehaviour in all those places amounted to misconduct in the presence of the court. There was a reference to the High Court on a report made under Sec.14 of the Legal Practitioners Act for disciplinary action against a Mukhtar who had an altercation with the accountant of the court in his office, in the course of which he had abused the accountant and it was heard by the presiding Judge himself who was holding his court in the adjoining room. It was held that the misconduct of the Mukhtar amounted to contempt of court and he was warned as a mark of the disapproval of his conduct. In the present case, however every tiling happened in the presence of the learned Additional Sessions Judge himself. Learned counsel then referred to the decision in the case of Parashu-ram Detaram Shamdasani V/s. Emperor, AIR 1945 PC 134. In that case it was held that words used or action in face of the court or in the course of the proceeding which are such as would interfere or tend to interfere with the course of justice do constitute contempt. It was observed that if a litigant or an advocate threatened or attempted violence on his opponent, or conceivably if he used language so outrageous and provocative as to be likely to lead to a brawl in court, the offence could be said to have been committed. An insult to counsel or to the opposing litigant was very different from an insult to the court itself or to the members of a jury who formed part of the tribunal. 11. An insult to counsel or to the opposing litigant was very different from an insult to the court itself or to the members of a jury who formed part of the tribunal. 11. Learned counsel then attempted to show that even if the contemner called the Public Prosecutor Jhutha, he did so as he had made wrong submissions and misquoted the evidence in course of his argument before the Munsif Magistrate, The basis for the criticisms levelled against the Public Prosecutor can be classified under the following heads :- - 1. He deliberately misquoted and misread the evidence on the vital factum of identification of Sushil Kumar Chaudhary at the test identification Parade. " 2. He produced the O. D. slip before Sri Shambhunath Sinha, Munsif Magistrate, and tried to use it although it was not taken in evidence by an earlier order passed by Sri Ramji Upadhya. 3. He made wrong submissions by telling the Munsif Magistrate that there was no objection by the accused to the confession being taken in evidence. 4. He suppressed the real first information report of the Acid Throwing Case. 5. At the time of opposing the prayer for bail, he submitted that Bhola Nath Chaudhary was responsible for withholding his son from appearing in court on the date fixed for judgment. The witnesses have been cross-examined on these lines and the learned counsel submitted that the contemner was entitled to point out those mistakes in the judgment before the learned Additional Sessions Judge while he was considering the prayer for bail. Coming to the first item, Pandey Narsingh Sahay has deposed that when he read the judgment of the Munsif Magistrate, he noticed the mistake committed by him (Magistrate) in so far he held that at the time of the identification of the accused at the test identification parade, the dress of the suspects was changed each time when at witness came to identify. He was surprised to find that error inasmuch as there was no evidence to that effect and he never argued the case on that basis. He examined the Magistrate who held the test identification parade and his evidence indicated that the place of the suspects was changed each time and not their dress. He was surprised to find that error inasmuch as there was no evidence to that effect and he never argued the case on that basis. He examined the Magistrate who held the test identification parade and his evidence indicated that the place of the suspects was changed each time and not their dress. He pointed out this mistake in the judgment of the Munsif Magistrate to the learned Additional Sessions Judge and conceded that ha could not support his observation on that point. In these circumstances it is difficult to come to the conclusion that the Public Prosecutor misquoted the evidence of the Magistrate who held the test identification parade. The second item relates to the production of the O. D. slip before the Magistrate who heard the argument. The grievance is that by an order dated 22nd September 1959 Sri Ramji Upadhya, Magistrate, had returned the O. D. book holding that it contained the carbon copy of the O. D. slips sent to Pirbahore Police Station and the defence had serious objection to its being referred to at the stage of the argument, but even then the Public Prosecutor held the O. D. slip in his hand and attempted to show it to Sri Sambhunath Sinha, the Munsif Magistrate at the time of argument. Pandey Narsingh Sahay has deposed that this book was referred to in the order dated 22nd September, 1959, but the Munsif Magistrate had not seen this book and in those circumstances he produced it pointing out that this was the book which was referred to in that order. The third item relates to the objection raised to the admissibility of the confession. It appears that the investigating officer (P.W. 16) stated in examination-in-chief that he did not know the name or the house of the other accused Sultan Jaffar before he examined Sushil Kumar Chau-dhary and that Sushil Kumar Chaudhary was ready to take him to the house of Sultan Jaffar, but the latter changed his mind and he thus went alone. The learned Munsif Magistrate, while referring to this piece of evidence in his judgment, made a note that no objection by defence was raised regarding the admissibility of those statements which amply showed that it was only upon the examination of Sushil Kumar Chaudhary that Sultan Jaffar was apprehended and acid burnt clothes were recovered. The learned Munsif Magistrate, while referring to this piece of evidence in his judgment, made a note that no objection by defence was raised regarding the admissibility of those statements which amply showed that it was only upon the examination of Sushil Kumar Chaudhary that Sultan Jaffar was apprehended and acid burnt clothes were recovered. He further treated it as "a very strong circumstance to show complicity of accused Sushil Kumar Chaudhary with the offence in question". Learned counsel has referred to orders dated 1st, 2nd and 18th September, 1959, the petition (Ext. B/2) dated 2nd September, 1959, filed by the Public Prosecutor and the petition (Ext, B/3) dated 18th September, 1959, filed on behalf of Sushil Kumar Chaudhary and has urged that objections were taken to the examination of the investigating officer with regard to the statement made by Sushil Kumar Chaudhary before him about the other accused. It was further urged that the Public Prosecutor made wrong submissions before the Munsif Magistrate which gave him the impression that there was no objection to the admissibility of the said statements amounting to confession by Sushil Kumar Chaudhary. Pandey Narsingh Sahay has stated that the deposition of the investigating officer (P.W. 16) in the Acid Throwing Case indicated that objection was raised on behalf of the defence regarding the confessional statement made by Sushil Kumar Chaudhary and a note of such objection was made by the Magistrate, It is not proper at this stage to express any opinion as to in what circumstances the Munsif Magistrate mentioned that there was no objection to the admissibility of those statements. Even if his observation was incorrect it is difficult to say how the Public Prosecutor was responsible for it. The fourth item relates to the suppression of the real first information report and this again has reference to the production of the Order D. slip which was not taken in evidence. I have already referred to it and it may be stated that in the first information report of the Acid Throwing Case no names of the accused were given. With regard to the last item learned counsel has referred to the order dated 19th December, 1959 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, refusing bail to Sushil Kumar Chaudhary. I have already referred to it and it may be stated that in the first information report of the Acid Throwing Case no names of the accused were given. With regard to the last item learned counsel has referred to the order dated 19th December, 1959 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, refusing bail to Sushil Kumar Chaudhary. In that order he observed that it appeared to him from the circumstances of that case that Sushil Kumar Chaudhary was purposely withheld on the date of judgment most likely because he or his father got scent of the judgment that he was going to be convicted. It has been contended that the Public Prosecutor had argued on those lines while opposing the prayer for bail. Pandey Narsing Sahay, however, has deposed that his main stand while opposing the prayer for bail was that bail should not be allowed in view of the antecedents, the attending circumstances and the fact that the charge had been brought home. The witness on behalf of the contemner deposed that his central stand while opposing the prayer for bail was that the Hon ble High Court had refused bail, the case had ended in conviction and there was every chance of the appellant absconding as his father would have a hand in that matter. The learned Additional Sessions Judge, however, used the expression "circumstances" while making that observation and it is not possible to come to the conclusion that the argument was on those lines. 12. Learned counsel referred to two other petitions, exhibit B and B/1, both dated 24th September, 1959 and the first one was filed on behalf of Sushil Kumar Chaudhary alleging that the case against him was prolonged indefinitely which had caused great harassment and the Public Prosecutor was responsible for it, whereas the second one was filed by Public Prosecutor refuting those allegations. 13. Learned counsel has urged that the allegations against the contemner even if true, had to be considered in view of the surrounding circumstances, the omissions and commissions of the Public Prosecutor and the infirmities in the judgment of the Munsif Magistrate. According to him, while moving for bail the findings had to be referred to and it was essential to point out that there was no evidence at all to justify one finding or the other. According to him, while moving for bail the findings had to be referred to and it was essential to point out that there was no evidence at all to justify one finding or the other. Learned counsel has fairly conceded that he could not take the plea of justification, but he has urged that there was a basis for the submissions made by the contemner before the learned Additional Sessions Judge. It is true that a judgment can be criticised but it should be done fairly and reasonably and should not exceed those limits, With regard to the extent of criticisms the observations in the case of Andre Paul Terence Ambard V/s. Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago, AIR 1936 PC 141, were as follows : "But whether the authority and position of an individual Judge or the due administration of justice is concerned, no wrong is committed by any member of the public who exercises the ordinary right of criticising in good faith in private or public the public act done in the seat of justice. The path of criticism is a public way; the wrong-headed are permitted to err therein; provided that members of the public abstain from imputing improper motives to those taking part in the administration of justice, and are genuinely exercising a right of criticism and not acting in malice or attempting to impair the administration of justice, they are immune. Justice is not cloistered virtue: she must be allowed to suffer the scrutiny and respectful even though outspoken comments of ordinary men." In the case of Brahama Prakash Sharma V/s. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1954 SC 10 , the observations were as follows : "It seems, therefore, that there are two primary considerations which should weigh with the court when it is called upon to exercise the summary powers in cases of contempt committed by scandalising the court itself. In the first place, the reflection on the conduct or character of a Judge in reference to the discharge of his judicial duties, would not be contempt if such reflection is made in the exercise of the right of fair and reasonable criticism which every citizen possesses in respect of public acts done in the seat of justice. In the first place, the reflection on the conduct or character of a Judge in reference to the discharge of his judicial duties, would not be contempt if such reflection is made in the exercise of the right of fair and reasonable criticism which every citizen possesses in respect of public acts done in the seat of justice. It is not by stifling criticism that confidence in courts can be created." The facts and the circumstances disclosed point to the irresistible conclusion that the contemner while addressing the learned Judge, which was unjustified, did not confine himself to fair criticism but went very much beyond that and, in fact, imputed motives to the Munsif Magistrate and the Public Prosecutor. 14. Mr. Verma for the State submitted that the contempt committed by the contemner could be classified under three heads : (1) Attacking the integrity of the Munsif-Magistrate, and (2) that of the Public Prosecutor and (3) Causing interruption in the course of the judicial proceedings of the Additional Sessions Judge and overawing him in various ways. On the evidence adduced I have no doubt that the contemner attacked the integrity of the Munsif-Magistrate saying that he was influenced by the Public Prosecutor who got the judgment of conviction written by him. The attack made on the Munsif-Magistrate disparaging in character and derogatory to his dignity would vitally shake the confidence of the public in him. The aspersions made against him were much more than mere insult and in effect they scandalised the court in such a way as to create distrust in the popular mind and impair confidence of the people in court. The attack brought the authority and administration of law into disrespect. The contemner went to the length of even threatening the Munsif Magistrate with personal violence. There seems to be no foundation for the attack made upon the Munsif Magistrate and there is hardly any room for making allowance in an aspersion of this kind. "Judges have to discharge responsible and often disagreeable duties and it is essential that they should be afforded the utmost protection if the administration of justice is to remain independent, clean, fearless, and impartial," vide, Sub-Judge, First Class, Hoshangabad V/s. Jawahar Lal Ramchand, AIR 1940 Nag 407. Mr. "Judges have to discharge responsible and often disagreeable duties and it is essential that they should be afforded the utmost protection if the administration of justice is to remain independent, clean, fearless, and impartial," vide, Sub-Judge, First Class, Hoshangabad V/s. Jawahar Lal Ramchand, AIR 1940 Nag 407. Mr. Verma for the State referred to a recent decision of the Special Bench of this Court in the matter of Basant Chandra Ghosh, Original Criminal Misc. No. 4 of 1959, decided on 29th January, 1960 : ( AIR 1960 Pat 430 ) wherein it was observed that while making comments the main criterion to be kept in view was not to exceed the limits of fair comments and the language in which the comment was couched should be objective, dignified and there should be no attempt at ridiculing the administration of justice by using language likely to shake the confidence of the public in the capacity and impartiality of Courts. It was further observed that the tone and phraseology used made a world of difference between innocence and guilt in a proceeding on a charge of contempt of court. 15. Turning to the remarks against the Public Prosecutor, evidence is clear to show that the contemner stated, while addressing the learned Judge that he (Public Prosecutor) exercised influence over the Munsif Magistrate and got the judgment written by him. Witnesses 1, 2 and 3 deposed about it and from the evidence of witness No. 2, it appears that the contemner had alleged that the Public Prosecutor went to the house of the Munsif Magistrate for getting the judgment written out. The other two witnesses, while referring to what was said by the contemner have deposed that he used the expression "Pandey Narsingh Sahay ...... Munsif Magistrate se kah kar bandhwa diya hai." The learned counsel tried to explain it by urging that these words did not mean exercise of influence and, on the other hand, they only meant that the judgment was given according to the submission made by the Public Prosecutor. It is difficult to accept the interpretation sought to be put by the learned counsel. The contemner threatened the Public Prosecutor as well with the result that he sought protection of the court, did not appear in court when the matter was again taken up that day and wrote to the authorities to relieve him of that case. It is difficult to accept the interpretation sought to be put by the learned counsel. The contemner threatened the Public Prosecutor as well with the result that he sought protection of the court, did not appear in court when the matter was again taken up that day and wrote to the authorities to relieve him of that case. The duties of a Public Prosecutor are onerous and he has to discharge them independently and fearlessly. Any interruption in the discharge of his duties by reason of an attack on his integrity and threat was likely to embarrass him and in fact in this particular case he felt so worried, unnerved and shocked that he wanted to give up the case. In the case of AIR 1945 P. C. 134, already referred to, the appellant had said: "I do not keep anything back at all. My fault is that I disclose every thing, unlike members of the Bar, who are in the habit of not doing so and misleading the Court". A question arose a.s to whether this statement constituted contempt. While dealing with it, it was observed that an insult to a counsel or a threat by using outrageous and provocative language likely to lead to a brawl in Court, could constitute contempt. Mr. Verma has referred to a decision in the case of Ananta Lal Singh V/s. Alfred Henry Watson, AIR 1931 Cal. 257. It was pointed out that if aspersions were cast upon an advocate of a party it might be that some of them had an effect intending to deter the advocate from continuing his duties for his client and in certain circumstances in embarrassing him in the discharge of those duties. It was observed that comment upon an advocate which had reference to the conduct of his cases might amount to contempt of court on exactly the same principle which was applicable with regard to the criticism of a judge or the judgment. The contemner here insulted the Public Prosecutor and threatened bun, and thus, on this score as well, he is guilty of contempt of court. The contemner here insulted the Public Prosecutor and threatened bun, and thus, on this score as well, he is guilty of contempt of court. He used the names of the High dignitaries by telling the learned Judge that the case against his son was to be withdrawn in accordance with the directions of Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, but he did not approve -of that course and in the event o£ the conviction of his son not being set aside, he would get him released by approaching those dignitaries. He went to the length of saying that justice was not being done and the learned Judge had not done justice in so far he refused bail to his son. Learned counsel submitted that after bail was refused, the contemner offered cash security and made a prayer for the classification of the prisoner and keeping him in the remand room attached to the Bankipore jail and the learned Judge gave audience to him. In those contexts it is submitted, the contemner recounted his services to the country, indicated his social status and used the names of the high dignitaries. The stand taken is that the learned Judge having heard the contemner directed the prisoner to be kept in the remand room and gave liberty to renew the prayer for bail before the Sessions Judge at the time of the admission of the appeal. It is unfortunate that the contemner went on making unwarranted and unjustified aspersions but no steps were taken to stop him and control the proceedings. The expressions used by the contemner had clearly the tendency to overawe the Additional Sessions Judge and the Public Prosecutor with regard to that pending case and it was a contempt committed in the face of the court itself. As Lord Bacon put it, "The place of justice is an Hallowed Place", quoted at page 71 by Mr. Tek Chand in his book on the Law of Contempt (2nd edition). The interruption in the proceedings of the court by the utterances of the contemner has been established by unimpeachable evidence, but they amounted to something more than mere interruption and the acts alleged constitute contempt. 16. In the present case the Munsif Magistrate had already decided the case, but this is of no consequence as the attack on him, even in respect of that case, had the tendency to shake the confidence of the people. 16. In the present case the Munsif Magistrate had already decided the case, but this is of no consequence as the attack on him, even in respect of that case, had the tendency to shake the confidence of the people. This proposition cannot be doubted. "Whether the attack on the fudge is with reference to a case about to be tried, or actually under trial, or recently adjudged, in each instance the tendency is to poison the fountain of justice, to create distrust, and to destroy the confidence of the people in the courts, which are of prime importance to them in the protection of their rights and liberties", vide In the matter of Amrita Bazar Patrika, ILR 45 Cal. 169: (ATR 1918 Cal 988) referred to in the case of Emperor V/s. Murli Mano-har Prasad, AIR 1929 Pat. 72 (FB). 17. After a careful consideration of the matter, I am of the view that the contemner Bhola Nath Chaudhary has brought himself clearly within the ambit of the offence of contempt of court and he is accordingly found guilty. 18. Learned counsel for the contemner tendered apology and in the show cause petition also it was clone so in the event of his being found guilty. He submitted that generosity, forgiveness and pardon should be the criteria in such cases and referred to the decision In the matter of Contempt of High Court, AIR 1935 Lah. 212 (S.B.). In that case apology was accepted as the writer of the article acknowledged that he was misled and in that view of the matter, he was dealt with leniently. It was, however, made clear that it should not be treated as a precedence and in future the Court would treat severely anything savouring of contempt of court and this warning was given to the public in that Province. He also referred to the decision In the matter of William Tayler, 44 Ind Cas 930: (AIR 1918 Cal 713). In that case it was held that a proper apology might mitigate the offence, but it could not wholly excuse or justify the contempt or form a ground for a total exemption from punishment. Learned counsel for the State relied on the decision in AIR 1940 Nag. In that case it was held that a proper apology might mitigate the offence, but it could not wholly excuse or justify the contempt or form a ground for a total exemption from punishment. Learned counsel for the State relied on the decision in AIR 1940 Nag. 407, already referred to, in support of the proposition that the apology in, the present case was of no avail and effect having regard to the fact that the authenticity of the reports submitted by the members of the Bar was denied, the case was contested, witnesses were cross-examined at length and arguments were advanced at great stretch. In order to avoid misconception about the apologies, Vivian Bose, J, observed as follows in the above mentioned case: "An apology is not a weapon of defence forged to purge the guilty of their offences. It is not an additional insult to be hurled at the heads of those who have been wronged. It is "intended to be evidence of real contriteness, the manly consciousness of wrong done, of an injury inflicted, and the earnest desire to make such reparation as lies in the wrong-doers power. Only then is if of any avail in a court of justice. But before it can have that effect, it should be tendered at the earliest possible stage, not the latest, and even if wisdom dawns only at the appellate stage the apology should be tendered unreservedly and unconditionally before the arguments begin and before the person tendering the apology discovers that he has a weak case and before the Judge (when that happens, as it did here) has indicated the trend of his mind. Unless that is done, not only is the tendered apology robbed of all grace but it ceases to be an apology; it ceases to be the full, frank, manly confession of a wrong done which it is intended to be", The question, however, as to whether the court should or should not accept the apology would depend upon the circumstances of each particular case and a court can refuse to accept an apology if it is not believed to be genuine and even if it is accepted it can commit the offender to prison or otherwise punish him. "The proposition is well settled and self evident that there cannot be both justification and an apology. "The proposition is well settled and self evident that there cannot be both justification and an apology. The two things are incompatible" vide, M. Y. Shareef V/s. Hon ble Judges of the Nagpur Higk Court, (S) AIR 1955 SC 19 . The view taken in the Nagpur case by Vivian Bose, J. with regard to the effect of an apology was referred to in the case of Lal Behari V/s. State, AIR 1953 All. 153 and was relied upon, and it was observed that an apology which did not seem to be so much the outpouring of a penitent heart moved by a feeling of remorse and overcome by a sense of ones own guilt, deserved to be given short shrift at the hands of the court. Their Lordships further observed that such an opology was, "a convenient device clutched up by a person driven and compelled by the logic of events to resort to a measure which seemed to him to provide the only mode of escape from the impending doom or as a last desparate throw in a game of chance hazarded by him at a time when all else had failed and everything seemed to be lost". "Apology must, in order to dilute the gravity of the offence, be voluntary, unconditional and indicative of the remorse and contrition and it must be tendered at the earliest opportunity", vide, Rah-mat AH V/s. Beni Madho Bajpai, fS) AIR 1957 All. 457 . The view taken by Vivian Bose, J. in the Napur ease has been followed in the case of First National Bank Ltd. V/s. Dr. Kali Charan, AIR 1959 Punj. 627 and it was held that an apology offered by the contemner while denying the act of contempt became an empty formality and an apology not expressive of remorse or penitence could neither counteract nor palliate the mischief that had already been done. There is great force in the contention of Mr. Verma that the apology in the present case was of no effect. In the present case the stand taken by the contemner in the show cause petition was that if this Court considered that contempt had been committed then he tendered an unqualified apology. This proceeding was hotly, contested and the further apology offered by learned counsel is robbed of all grace. In the present case the stand taken by the contemner in the show cause petition was that if this Court considered that contempt had been committed then he tendered an unqualified apology. This proceeding was hotly, contested and the further apology offered by learned counsel is robbed of all grace. I have thus no hesitation in treating the show of regret as unworthy of consideration and I cannot accept the so-called apology. 19. Learned counsel for the contemner referred io the decision in AIR 1929 Pat. 72 (FB) for the purpose that although the contempt committed in that case was of a very grave character, a lenient view was taken and the contemner was sentenced to fine only. The question of quantum of sentence depends upon the circumstances of each case. The conduct of the contemner was incomprehensible. He vilified the Munsif Magistrate, the Public Prosecutor and overawed the learned Judge as well. It displayed an utter disregard and disrespect for the dignity of the Court and its officer and the contemner scandalized the court. At the same time it cannot be lost sight of that there was a sudden outburst of an aggrieved and disappointed father after the conviction of his son and refusal of bail to him. 20. As a result of these considerations, I find Bhola Nath Chaudhary guilty of contempt of court and impose upon him under Sec. 4 of the Contempt of Courts Act a fine of Rs. 1,000.00 to be paid within two weeks from today and in default of payment of the fine he must undergo simple imprisonment for a period of six weeks. 21. He must be mulcted with costs as well which are assessed at Rs. 500.00 payable to the State. H.K.Chaudhuri, J. 22 I agree.