Sarjoo Prosad, C.J.—The plaintiffs have preferred this appeal, which arises out of a suit for declaration of title to certain lands and houses described in para-graphs 2 and 3 of the plaint. There was also a prayer for recovery of possession and damages for use and occupation. The lands consist of five different plots comprised in Khasra Nos, 742 to 745 of the Municipality, and are situated at Kesarganj in the town of Ajmer with a house known as Kothi and two small houses appurtenant thereto standing on the above lands. 2. The case of the plaintiffs is that on the 4th of November, 1897, the permanent lease hold rights in the lands in question were acquired by their father the late Munshi Lakshmi Narain, who was a lawyer and had set up practice at Ajmer. The said Munshi Lakshmi Narain very soon built up a lucrative practice, and after the acquisitions of the lands got the disputed house constructed thereon. The plaintiffs and the defendants 1 to 3 are all descended from a common stock, and to appreciate the case of the parties, it is necessary to bear in mind a small pedigree : Ramnarain Lakshmi Narain Swaroop Narain (Deft.1) Shri Narain Raj Narain (Defdt. 2) Ganesh Narain (Defdt. 3) Govind Narain(Pltf. 1) Harish Narain(Pltf. 2) Jagdish Narain(Pltf. 3) Shakti Narain(Pltf. 4) The other defendants 4 to 5 are tenants residing in the suit property. The case of the plaintiffs is that Munshi Lakshmi Narain, who practised for a time at Ajmer and then shifted to Beawar, purchased the leasehold rights in those lands at an auction sale, for which he paid the part premium of Rs. 46/5/- on the date of auction. Later when the settlement was approved by the Chief Commissioner of Ajmer, he paid the balance of the entire premium on the 7th of December, 1899 (vide Exs. P. 83 and P. 84), and the lease deeds were executed in his favour on the 31st of May, 1900, (vide Exs. P.77 P.81). He also obtained the sanction of the Municipality for construction of houses therein, and started constructions some time in May, 1901; and the constructions were completed by September, 1903 (vide Exs. P.1—p.10). P. 83 and P. 84), and the lease deeds were executed in his favour on the 31st of May, 1900, (vide Exs. P.77 P.81). He also obtained the sanction of the Municipality for construction of houses therein, and started constructions some time in May, 1901; and the constructions were completed by September, 1903 (vide Exs. P.1—p.10). The name of Munshi Lakshmi Narain was recorded in the Municipal records in respect of the suit lands, and he continued to pay the ground-rent for the same and exercised full rights of ownership thereon. Since Munshi Lakshmi Narain had been practising at Beawar, he allowed Munshi Shri Narain the father of the defendants 2 and 3, who was staying at Ajmer, to realise the house rent of the properties, and to manage the same under his instructions and on his behalf is his agent. On the death of Munshi Lakshmi Narain in 1927, the title of the lands and houses which were the self-acquisitions of their father devolved on the plaintiffs as his heirs, the defendants] having no interest therein. At the time of his death, the plaintiffs 2 to 4 were minors, while the first plaintiff Govind Narain had just attained majority, and was receiving education at Agra. Consequently Munshi Shri Narain, who acted as the plaintiffs de facto guardian looked after their affairs, and managed their immovable properties, and dealt with the case etc. He, further, for and on behalf of the plaintiffs, used to realise the rent from the tenants occupying the houses in question, and send the same to the plaintiff from time to time. The youngest brother Shakti Narain, plaintiff No. 4, attained majority on the 30th of September, 1943. Munshi Shri Narain suddenly died of heart failure on 27th November, 1942, and then the defendants started claiming certain rights of ownership in themselves in respect of the properties in question. The plaintiffs then learnt on enquiry that in July, 1939, the late Munshi Shri Narain taking advantage of his position had got his name and that of the defendant 1 inserted in the Demand and Collection Register of the Municipality on furnishing wrong information to the Municipal authorities in response to the notices which were received by him from the Municipality on behalf of the heirs of the late Munshi Lakshmi Narain. In consequence of that mutation on the death of Munshi Shri Narain, his sons, the defendants 2 and 3, also got their names mutated in the Demand and Collection Register of the Municipality, and when the plaintiffs protested against the mutation of the names of those defendants, the parties were referred to civil Court. The plaintiffs have, therefore, instituted the suit, impleading the tenants as well, and claiming to recover rent and damages from the defendants. 3. Separate sets of written statements were filed by the defendants Swaroop Narain and Raj Narain and Ganesh Narain. The defendant No. 5 also filed a written statement contesting the plaintiffs claim. The main contesting defendants, who are the defendants 1 to 3, have raised various pleas. In the first instance they claim that the acquisition of the lands as also the construction of the houses was made by Shri Ram Narain, the father of Munshi Lakshmi Narain, who was also flourishing lawyer at Beawar, and had similarly acquired a number of other properties. The houses and the lands were accordingly not the separate acquisition of Munshi Lakshmi Narain, the father of the plaintiffs as claimed by them, but were part of the ancestral joint family property in which the plaintiffs and the defendants were all interested ; and the plaintiffs could not have any exclusive right therein. The alternative pleas set up by the defendants were that in any case Shri Ram Narain, when he died, left sufficient nucleus of joint family property to enable the acquisition of the disputed lands and construction of the houses in suit, and that, therefore, all these properties should be held to be joint family properties. It was also pleaded that Munshi Lakshmi Narain had blended his own income with the income of the joint family treating these properties as properties of the joint family, and as part of the common stock which were managed even in his life time by Munshi-Shri Narain, the father of the defendants 2 and 3, who utilised the income of the property for the maintenance and benefit of the entire family. Finally, also they set up a claim of adverse possession over the properties in dispute as having been in possession thereof as owners for over 12 years. 4. The plaintiffs in their replication, controverted the above pleas of the defendants. Finally, also they set up a claim of adverse possession over the properties in dispute as having been in possession thereof as owners for over 12 years. 4. The plaintiffs in their replication, controverted the above pleas of the defendants. They asserted that the joint family nucleus was too meagre to enable the acquisition of the properties or the construction of the houses. Munshi Shri Narain was in service at Ajmer as clerk, and Swaroop Narain was in Shahpura Estate earning about Rs. 15/- or Rs. 30/- p.m. respectively. Their income was hardly sufficient even for the maintenance of their individual families, much less they could make any contribution to the acquisition of any property. In fact even the members of their family and the defendants were supported by Munshi Lakshmi Narain. Munshi Lakshmi Narain graduated in law in 1896 from the Allahabad University, and shortly therefore he set up practice at Ajmer, though some time later after the death of his father Shri Ram Narain on 27th November, 1897, Munshi Lakshmi Narain shifted to Beawar where he soon got into very prosperous and flourishing practice. 5. The learned Sub-Judge, Ajmer, who tried the suit, held that at the time of acquisition of the disputed lands, Munshi Lakshmi Narain had just commenced his practice, and was living with his father as a member of the joint family ; and that there was sufficient joint family nucleus out of which the lands could be acquired in the name of Munshi Lakshmi Narain and, therefore, the lands constituted joint family property. As to the construction of the houses, he found that at the time the constructions were put up Shri Narain was not an earning member, and the income of Swaroop Narain was also low. The only member of the family, who was then having substantial earnings was Munshi Lakshmi Narain. He was also unable to find that the money for the constructions came from any cash amount left by the father or from the income of the joint family properties, and that the manner in which the constructions progressed during the course of three years shows that the constructions were put up from the personal earnings of Munshi Lakshmi Narain. He was, however, of opinion that Munshi Lakshmi Narain treated these properties as joint family properties, and allowed the income thereof to be utilised for the purposes of the joint family. He was, however, of opinion that Munshi Lakshmi Narain treated these properties as joint family properties, and allowed the income thereof to be utilised for the purposes of the joint family. He accordingly held that there was an intention to blend these properties with the joint family properties on the part of Munshi Lakshmi Narain, and that, therefore, the defendants were also entitled to the properties in question. He accordingly dismissed the suit with costs. Shri Bhargava, the learned counsel appearing for the plaintiffs-appellants has challenged these findings of the learned Subordinate Judge in regard to the acquisition of the lands out of joint family nucleus or of any intention to blend his own income with that of the joint family on the part of Munshi Lakshmi Narain deceased. The main question, therefore, which we have to determine in this case is whether the disputed property is the self-acquired property of Shri Lakshmi Narain or part of the joint family stock in which the defendants 1 to 3 are also interested along with the plaintiffs. 6. The law is well-established that although there is presumption in law that a Hindu joint family continues to be joint, yet there is no presumption that because it is joint, it possesses joint property or any property for that matter. Where; therefore, a person claims that any particular item of the property is joint family property, the burden of proving that it is so, rests on the party asserting it, though circumstances may readily cause the onus to he discharged. Where, therefore, it is established or admitted that the family possessed some joint property, which from its nature and relative value may have formed the nucleus, from the income whereof the property in question could be acquired, a presumption may arise that the property was joint family property. The burden would then shift on the party alleging self-acquisition to establish affirmatively that the property was acquired without the aid of joint family funds. No such presumption would, however, arise if the nucleus was such that with its help the property claimed to be joint could not have been acquired All this of course is a question of fact to be determined on the circumstances of each case; but an important element for consideration is the income which the joint family nucleus yielded. No such presumption would, however, arise if the nucleus was such that with its help the property claimed to be joint could not have been acquired All this of course is a question of fact to be determined on the circumstances of each case; but an important element for consideration is the income which the joint family nucleus yielded. The finding in this case of the learned Judge below is that the acquisition of the lands was made during the life time of Babu Lakshmi Narains father Shri Ram Narain, and that this acquisition, as he presupposes, must have been made out of his income, because at that time there could be no intention on the part; of Munshi Lakshmi Narain to acquire any properties in Ajmer. In our opinion, the learned Subordinate Judge has ignored in this context some of the important probabilities of the case. Babu Lakshmi Narain passed his LL.B. Examination in 1896, and obtained his diploma in March, 1897. It appears that some, time in June of that year he joined the bar, and set up practice at Ajmer. Babu Ram Narain, the father, did not live in Ajmer, but was practising at Beawar. There was, therefore, nothing unusual in Shri Lakshmi Narain seeking to acquire some lands in Ajmer in his own right provided it could be shown that he had the means to make the acquisition. The evidence shows that there was also the joint family property adjacent to these lands on the east, which was acquired by Babu Ram Narain. The constructions on that land were started some time about 1894 and completed in 1896 (vide Exs. D-9— D 11), and Shri Lakshmi Narain was already staying in that family house. Babu Lakshmi Narain, therefore, could very reasonably think of having these plots which were adjacent to the joint family house for his own purposes. At that stage there is nothing to show that he had any idea of shifting his practice to Beawar which was necessitated on account of the death of his father Shri Ram Narain in December, 1897. The leasehold interest in these lands was sold in auction on the 4th of November, 1897, and Babu Lakshmi Narain appears to have offered the highest bid. The only premium which was deposited on that date is a sum of Rs. 46/5/-; the balance of the premium of Rs. The leasehold interest in these lands was sold in auction on the 4th of November, 1897, and Babu Lakshmi Narain appears to have offered the highest bid. The only premium which was deposited on that date is a sum of Rs. 46/5/-; the balance of the premium of Rs. 424/12/3 was paid on receipt of notice from the Municipality on the 7th of December, 1899, some two years later, when the sale was sanctioned by the Chief Commissioner of Ajmer (vide Exs. P. 82, 83, and 84 ), and then the lease deeds were executed in favour of Babu Lakshmi Narain in respect of these lands for building purposes with perpetual rights of occupancy on the 31st of May, 1900 ( vide Exs. P. 77 to 81 ). The question, which then arises, in whether Babu Lakshmi Narain could not afford to pay even that small premium of Rs. 46/5/- in November, 1897, out of his own earnings. The contention of the defendants is that he was then just a beginner at the bar seeking to establish himself in practice, and he could, therefore, neither have the intention to acquire the lands in Ajmer nor the means to pay the premium for the settlement of the lease-hold property. We find, however, that even in 1897 Babu Lakshmi Narain had started earning enough for a beginner; and although he may not have been very well settled in his practice at the time he could verily afford to pay the small premium which was paid on that date. There are various Vakalatnamas on record, which prove that Babu Lakshmi Narain had been engaged in 1897 in a number of cases on behalf of various clients : vide Ex. P. 39 dated 30th June, 1897, in connection with a civil suit pending in Ajmer; Ex. P. 40 dated 6th July, 189/, in connection with a case pending before the Sub-Judge, First Class, Beawar; and Ex. P. 41 dated 11th August, 1897, in connection with an appeal against the decree of the Assistant Commissioner Beawar. All these cases appear to be cases of fairly high valuation. Ex. 75 is a decree in appeal in which the claim was valued at Rs. 9,529/11/9, wherein we find that Munshi Lakshmi Narain appeared as a lawyer for the plaintiff-respondent. P. 41 dated 11th August, 1897, in connection with an appeal against the decree of the Assistant Commissioner Beawar. All these cases appear to be cases of fairly high valuation. Ex. 75 is a decree in appeal in which the claim was valued at Rs. 9,529/11/9, wherein we find that Munshi Lakshmi Narain appeared as a lawyer for the plaintiff-respondent. These documents leave no doubt in our mind that Babu Lakshmi Narain bad already started earning, and must have had the means to pay the small initial premium in order to enable him to acquire the lease-hold interest in the disputed land in November, 1897, in his own rights as such. It may be that these engagements were also due to the standing and influence of his father as a lawyer of repute at Beawar, but that would not make any difference as to the character of his earning.......... ...... 7. We have proceeded to discuss the evidence irrespective of any consideration of the onus of proof. In view of the fact that all the documents of title stand in the name of the plaintiffs father, the burden of proving that the property was joint family property and that Shri Lakshmi Narain had no independent means to make the acquisition or that the property was acquired out of joint family funds lay upon the contesting defendants ; but even if the onus lay upon the plaintiffs that burden has been fully discharged. The learned subordinate Judge appears to have acted on the assumption that since the acquisition was made at the commencement of his career and at a time when Shri Lakshmi Narain was living in a state of jointness with his father it must be presumed that the acquisition must have been made out of joint family funds or out of the income of the father. Any such assumption is clearly erroneous. If any property is purchased by the son in his own name during the fathers life time, with whom the son may be living in a stale of jointness and the son has independent means of income and sufficient resources (for the purpose, the presumption should be that the son acquired it for himself and that it was not joint family property. We will, however, soon discuss the relative value of the joint family nucleus and the relevant evidence of the defendants on the point of acquisition. We will, however, soon discuss the relative value of the joint family nucleus and the relevant evidence of the defendants on the point of acquisition. 8....... ......... 9. ............ ... 10......................We must, therefore, hold that both the lands as well as the houses built thereon were the self-acquisitions and separate properties of the plaintiffs father, and that as such, subject to our decision on the point of blending, the defendants will have no interest therein. 11. This leads us to a consideration of the alternate plea which has been taken on behalf of the defendants, namely, that these properties even though self-acquired must be deemed to have been blended with the joint family property, which admittedly continues to be joint. It should be observed here that all the ancestral properties acquired by Shri Ram Narain are still intact, except for the small house in Mohalla Teliyan, which has been sold and to which reference has been made earlier. There is no allegation that by selling the corpus of the joint family property Babu Lakshmi Narain raised any money either to pay for the premium on the lease hold or for the construction of the houses in question. The plea of blending is evidently in conflict with the plea that the disputed properties were joint family properties, and that the acquisitions were made either by, Shri Ram Narain himself or out of monies left by Shri Ram Narain. In any case, the parties have led evidence on the point, and the learned Subordinate Judge has accepted the defendants case that Babu Lakshmi Narain himself treated these properties and joint family properties as part of the common stock. A large number of decisions have been cited by either party in support of their respective arguments on the question of blending. It will not be necessary for us to discuss all these cases because the principles appear to be well established and the only question is of the application of these principles to given facts. A large number of decisions have been cited by either party in support of their respective arguments on the question of blending. It will not be necessary for us to discuss all these cases because the principles appear to be well established and the only question is of the application of these principles to given facts. It is no doubt true that an individual member of a coparcenary or a joint family who has acquired property out of his own earnings may impress it with the character of a joint family property, and throw it in the joint family stock so as to make it available for the benefit of the members of the joint family or the coparcenary ; but in order to enable the court to hold that the member concerned has actually done so, there must be clear and unequivocal expression of his intention by overt act or conduct to abandon his right to the property. The concept of blending carries with it a conscious and deliberate surrender of his interest in the self-acquired property in favour of the joint family, and that intention can be gathered only from unequivocal circumstances or ostensible acts on his part to treat the self-acquired property as part and parcel of the joint family hotchpot. The fact that he allows some members of the family to manage the property or to apply the usufruct thereof for purposes of the joint family will not necessarily imply the existence of any such unequivocal intention to throw his self-acquisition in the common stock so long as his conduct can be explained on other grounds: for instances, facilities of management; or, are attributable to acts of kindness, affection and generosity to the other members of the family. It is not unusual for a member of the joint family, who, on account of his individual earning, is comparatively in affluent circumstances and can well afford to educate and maintain the other members of the family, when the income of the joint family property itself is not sufficient for the purpose, to incur such expenditure out of natural love and affection for the other members or the family and for the sake of maintaining the social status and prestige of the family itself. This cannot entitle the other members of the family to take advantage of his kindness and generosity and to claim his self-acquisitions as their own. In order to do so, it will have to be shown by clear and cogent evidence that the person, who acquired the property by his own overt act intended to give it away to joint family. Indeed in a case from Patna (vide Sirdar Bahadur Indra Singh vs. Commissioner of Income-tax, Bihar & Orissa (1), it has been held that in order to prove any such conscious surrender of a coparceners or individual members interest in his self-acquired property, there must be a registered document to evidence the transfer as required by the Transfer of Properly Act. It may not be necessary for us to go to that length, in order to establish a case of blending where a joint family is concerned; provided there is unequivocal evidence to prove that all the time the member concerned, whose intention it was to treat the property as a part of the joint stock, allowed the other members of the family to have the benefit of the property and the income thereof just in the same manner as that of any other joint family property, and expressly held out to others by his act or conduct that the property was joint family property, and that he waived any individual interest therein. It would be, however, dangerous to come to any such conclusion on isolated facts, which we have said may be very well traced to acts of kindness, affection and generosity with a view to assist the other members of the family. In a decision of this Court in Mst. Govindi vs. Chhagan Lal (2) many of the older cases have been reviewed. The principles bearing on the point have been thus summed up by Mayne in his Hindu Law and Usage, 11th Edn. In a decision of this Court in Mst. Govindi vs. Chhagan Lal (2) many of the older cases have been reviewed. The principles bearing on the point have been thus summed up by Mayne in his Hindu Law and Usage, 11th Edn. : "The property which -was originally selfacquired may become joint property, if it has been voluntarily thrown by the owner into the joint stock, with the intention of abandoning all separate claims upon it.........The question whether he has done so or not, is entirely, one of fact to be decided in the light of all the circumstances of the case ; but a clear intention to waive his separate rights must be inferred from acts which may have been done merely from kindness or affection." 12. In Mullas Hindu Law, 1946, Edition, it is also observed that : "Property which was originally the separate or self-acquired property of a member of a joint family may become joint family property, if it has been voluntarily thrown by him into the common stock with the intention of abandoning all separate claims upon it. A clear intention to waive his separate rights must be established, and it will not be inferred from the mere fact of his allowing the other members of the family to use it conjointly with himself, nor from the fact that the income of the separate property was used to support a son." 13. The burden of proving that there was any such blending lies entirely on the defendants, and the evidence given on the point may be classified under three different heads : (i) The production of a Return of Income which is said to have been submitted by Babu Lakshmi Narain, and his statement before the Income tax Officer wherein it is said that he prescribed the disputed properties as joint family properties; (ii) The account (Ex.D.27) written by Babu Shri Narain and covering a period from 1910 to 1933 from which it appears that the income from rent of the disputed houses was mixed up with the income from some other sources of the joint family and spent for the needs of the family as also for the construction of the second storey on the ancestral house in Ajmer; and (iii) The evidence of some witnesses before whom it is said that Babu Lakshmi Narain admitted that the properties were joint family properties. We have to examine all these materials to see whether a case of blending has been actually made out. 14. Mr. Hingorani followed by Mr. P.N. Dutt, the learned counsel for the respondents have naturally laid very great stress upon the first two items of evidence in support of their plea of blending. The learned Subordinate Judge has been evidently impressed by that evidence and endeavoured to sustain his finding on that basis. Ex. D 28 is an Income-tax Return, said to have been submitted by Munshi Lakshmi Narain in the year 1918. The professional earnings in this return have been shown at Rs. 5,275/15/6; and against Serial No. 6 of the Return, which is meant for specification of the income from house property, the figure Rs. 269/5/4 has been mentioned. Further, the ground rent of Rs. 9/6/3 has been claimed as deduction. In the said proceeding it appears that the statement of Munshi Lakshmi Narain was also recorded. This statement has been marked Ex.D.29. In that statement Babu Lakshmi Narain admitted that the house property in respect of which the income had been shown was held by him jointly with his brothers Lala Swaroop Narain and Lala Shri Narain. On these documents it is contended, and not without some reason, that Babu Lakshmi Narain himself clearly purported to treat these properties, as joint family properties, and waived his right of self-acquisition in respect of them. For the appellants it is submitted that these documents are inadmissible in evidence. Our attention has been drawn to a decision of the Patna High Court in Smt. Banarsi Devi vs. Smt. Janki Devi (3). It was held in that case that any person other than an assessee was not entitled to inspect the documents characterised as being confidential in sec. 34(1) of the Income-tax Act and to obtain certified copies thereof under sec. 76 of the Evidence Act. Such documents, therefore, cannot be produced in evidence by any other person apart from the assessee, unless they come within the exceptions laid down in sub-sec. (3) of sec. 54 of the income tax Act. 34(1) of the Income-tax Act and to obtain certified copies thereof under sec. 76 of the Evidence Act. Such documents, therefore, cannot be produced in evidence by any other person apart from the assessee, unless they come within the exceptions laid down in sub-sec. (3) of sec. 54 of the income tax Act. Distinction has obviously been made between the position of an assessee and that of any third party, because the assessee, who is entitled to the advantage of matters mentioned in the Return being kept confidential, can waive that advantage; and if he so likes, he can make use of such document at the risk of disclosing those matters which were intended to be kept confidential for his sake; but any other person cannot have that privilege, and, therefore, cannot make use of the Return as such. It was further pointed out that sec. 76 of the Evidence Act provides that every public officer having the custody of a public document, which any person has a right to inspect, shall issue to that person a copy of that document on demand. It, therefore, follows that if the person who applies for a copy has no right to inspect that document, he cannot have a copy thereof, and if perchance he succeeds in obtaining a copy, it can only be assumed that he obtained it illegally and against the provision of the law. The copy, therefore, in such circumstances, would be inadmissible in evidence. The principle underlying sec. 54 is that as between the maker thereof and the Income-tax Department, the Income-tax Return is confidential, and that confidential document cannot be exhibited in evidence at the instance of a third party, nor is the public officer in custody of that document authorised to issue the same; and if that is done, in the eye of law no notice can be taken of that document. For the respondents, however, reliance has been placed on a Full Bench decision of the Madras High Court in Katikineni Venkata Gopala Narsimha Rama Rao vs. Chitluri Venkataramayya (4). In that case the assessee himself wanted to put in a certified copy of his statement showing the details of his net income, as mentioned in his Return furnished under sec. 22 of the Indian Income-tax Act. In that case the assessee himself wanted to put in a certified copy of his statement showing the details of his net income, as mentioned in his Return furnished under sec. 22 of the Indian Income-tax Act. It was held that the assessee was entitled to put the certified copy of the document referred to above in evidence. The case is, therefore, clearly distinguishable, because, as pointed out above, it was open to the assessee to waive the advantage given to him by sec. 54 of the Income-tax Act for treating the document as confidential. It was also recognised in the Madras case that under the law the assessee was entitled to inspect the documents, certified copies of which were obtained by him. The ratio of the Act prohibits the disclosure except on specified occasions of matters connected with an assessment to income-tax, and prohibits a Court from requiring a public servant to produce the documents mentioned in the section or to give evidence in respect of them. It does not, however, follow that the Court will not admit in evidence a document which falls within sec. 54 of the Act, where the document is admissible under the provisions of the Evidence Act. Sec. 54 does not make the issue of a certified copy of Income-tax Return to an assessee unlawful. The Return is a confidential document, and cannot be disclosed to a third party ; but there can be no objection to the maker of the Return having a copy for his own purposes if he so desires, and the maker is not bound to treat the document as confidential. We are, therefore, respectfully inclined to accept the view which has been taken in the Patna case, mentioned above. 15. It has been further contended for the respondents that since the Return was filed by Babu Lakshmi Narain, the maker of the Return, as a member of the joint family, it should be held that each member of the family is in the position of an assessee, and consequently entitled to the same privilege under the law as Babu Lakshmi Narain himself. Unfortunately the learned Subordinate Judge does not appear to have discussed this aspect of the matter. Unfortunately the learned Subordinate Judge does not appear to have discussed this aspect of the matter. If the assessment order was passed against Babu Lakshmi Narain as a Karta of the joint family, possibly there may be something to be said for the viewpoint urged by the learned counsel for the respondents. On the face of the Return itself there is nothing to show that Babu Lakshmi Narain had filed the Return as a Karta of the joint family. On the contrary his name alone appears in the column of assessee in that Return. Another thing which is to be noted is that the houses described in the Return refer to Osri Gate at Ajmer, and certain houses in Beawar and Nasirabad; but we find no mention of the houses and lands situated in Mohalla Kesarganj, which are the houses in dispute. It is, therefore, difficult to say that the Return and the statement in question have any-bearing on the disputed property ; but even if it is assumed that these documents are relevant and admissible in evidence, in our opinion, they do not very much advance the case of the defendants. It is quite possible that the statement in question may have been made by Babu Laxmi Narain in that Return for the purpose of getting some advantage under the law which might accrue to him as a member of the joint family. That cannot therefore, be evidence of any unequivocal intention on his part to waive his interest in the self-acquired property. 16. In the above context we may refer to a very typical case from Madras, which is illustrative of the matter. We mean the case of Naina Pillai vs. Daivanai Ammal (5) The dispute in that case referred to certain enfranchiseds grants of Karnam Service Inam lands which formed the separate property of the grantee or the person in whose name they had been enfranchised. Evidence showed that various portions of these properties bad been alienated in which they had been treated as joint family properties by the grantee himself. Evidence showed that various portions of these properties bad been alienated in which they had been treated as joint family properties by the grantee himself. During the period the law in respect of such Karnam grants was unsettled, and it was not until the decision of the Privy Council in Venkata Jagannadha vs. Veeradhadrayya{6) that the fluctuation in opinion as to whether such enfranchised lands formed the private property of the holder or the joint family property of the members of the family was settled. In the above circumstances it was held that by merely dealing with such property as joint family property the self-acquired property of the person who dealt with it as such did not lose its character of separate property. Reliance was placed upon the principle of law enunciated by Mr. Mayne as stated earlier, and the contention of blending was repelled. 17. Next we come to the accounts (Ex. D. 27), which are said to have been maintained by Babu Shri Narain. The book covers a period from 1910 to 1933. They have been written entirely by Babu Shri Narain, who is since dead. There can be no doubt that the accounts appear to be genuine as held by the learned Subordinate Judge. We cannot entertain the submission of the learned counsel for the appellants impugning the genuineness of the accounts and suggesting that they were fabricated for the purpose of supporting a false claim. The details of the accounts, both on external and internal evidence, belie any such contention. They cover a period from 1910 to 1933. These accounts are undoubtedly impressive, and go to show that during all this period Babu Shri Narain had been collecting rent from the tenants occupying the disputed houses as also utilising that income for purposes of maintaining those properties and for meeting other family requirements. If these accounts stood alone, there would have been much to be said for the argument urged by the defendants. They appear to have been kept in the regular course, from day to day, and also generally at the end of the day the balance has been struck carrying forward the amount in hand. If these accounts stood alone, there would have been much to be said for the argument urged by the defendants. They appear to have been kept in the regular course, from day to day, and also generally at the end of the day the balance has been struck carrying forward the amount in hand. It is also important to note that whatever may be said of the period after the death of Babu Lakshmi Narain, which event happened in 1927, even prior to that, from 1910 onwards, it appears that all the income went into the hands of the father of the defendants 2 and 3, the late Babu Shri Narain, and the tenants residing on the premises continued to pay rent to him. For instance, a scrutiny of the various entries in Ex. D. 27 goes to show that Abdul Gafoor, one of the tenants paid rent from 1912 to 1915; another tenant Jai Jai Ram paid rent from 1912 to 1923; a third tenant Karim paid rent for 1918 and 1919; and Bunda Hasan, another tenant, from 1924 to 1927. Similarly the Muslim Institute also paid rent from 1914 to 1927. It would, however, appear from the above accounts that from 191Q to 1914 or even a few years afterwards, there were constructions going on in the family house in Ajmer, and during all that period Babu Lakshmi Narain allowed not only all that rental income to go into the bands of Babu Shri Narain, but he even advanced large sums of money from his own pocket for the purpose of those constructions. After 1913, the advances from the income of Babu Lakshmi Narain appear to have dwindled and we find that whenever there was any appreciable accumulation thereafter in the hands of Babu Shri Narain, Babu Lakshmi Narain from time to time used to take away a large part of it. The family of course was not living at Ajmer, but at Beawar. Babu Lakshmi Narain was himself a busy practitioner staying at Beawar,and as the evidence shows Babu Shri Narain was working as a clerk in the Income-tax Office at Ajmer,. It was, therefore convenient for Babu Shri Narain to collect the rent from the tenants during all that period and to spend the same on the constructions in question or over some other family requirements. It was, therefore convenient for Babu Shri Narain to collect the rent from the tenants during all that period and to spend the same on the constructions in question or over some other family requirements. During the period the constructions were in progress, these incomes from rent and a few other sources were largely supplemented from contributions from the personal earnings of Babu Lakshmi Narain himself. The plaintiffs are not claiming the constructions on the family house at Ajmer as their exclusive property, inspite of the fact that large sums of money from the earnings of Babu Lakshmi Narain were invested in that construction. Can it be, therefore, argued that the conduct of Babu Lakshmi Narain in allowing Babu Shri Narain to collect the rent and spend it in the manner he did was so unequivocal that it must be assumed that he intended that these properties should be thrown in the joint family hotchpot and that he abandoned his rights to these properties ? In these accounts we even find mention of some other income from banks and insurance belonging to Babu Lakshmi Narain, about which there is no dispute at all that they were his personal property. At one place it has been mentioned that a certain amount was invested in the name of the wife of Babu Lakshmi Narain. All these facts, therefore, clearly go to indicate that for facility of management, and since Babu Shri Narain had been staying at Ajmer, Shri Lakshmi Narain allowed him to deal with all that income and money (on his behalf, and incidentally also to spend over the family needs and over the constructions in the family house at Ajmer. It is also significant that after 1927, that is after the death of Babu Lakshmi Narain, almost all realisation had passed into the hands of Babu Shri Narain, including dues payable to Babu Lakshmi Narain from various persons as also his fees recovered from certain clients. The entries in the accounts grow thicker after the period, when he continues to manage everything for the sons of Babu Lakshmi Narain deceased. This supports the case of the plaintiffs that the rents realised by Babu Shri Narain from these properties subsequent to the death of Babu Lakshmi Narain, were being regularly paid to them until Babu Shri Narain died, when the defendants started asserting their rights in the disputed property. This supports the case of the plaintiffs that the rents realised by Babu Shri Narain from these properties subsequent to the death of Babu Lakshmi Narain, were being regularly paid to them until Babu Shri Narain died, when the defendants started asserting their rights in the disputed property. In the lifetime of Babu Lakshmi Narain we do not find that the income from the other joint family properties has been included regularly in those accounts, nor the expenditure incurred over the family staying at Beawar, though off and on entries appear therein which may be possibly referable to occasional visits of the members of the family to Ajmer All these factors, therefore, lead to the conclusion that only for facility of management Babu Shri Narain was put in charge of these properties and collected rent from them and spent them for certain purposes including the benefit of the family under the instructions of Babu Lakshmi Narain. They cannot, in our opinion, support necessarily any case of blending in view of certain other important positive factors to which we shall presently refer. 18. Shri Raj Narain, the defendant No. 2, in his evidence says that from 1921 to 1928 he studied at different places, viz., Agra, Ajmer, Allahabad and Lucknow. In this period money for his expenses used to be remitted sometimes by his father Shri Narain and sometimes by Babu Lakshmi Narain; but he used to write mostly to Babu Lakshmi Narain for his requirements. Those monies did not find place in the accounts Exs. D.25 & D.27. He admits that his expenses were entered in the accounts of Babu Lakshmi Narain and that Babu Lakshmi Narain did not blend his entire income with the joint family income. It is thus clear that B. Lakshmi Narain maintained a separate account of his earnings, which is also borne out by the fact that in the accounts produced by the defendants, the details of his day to day earnings do not find place at all. Plaintiffs submit that those accounts were actually removed by Babu Shri Narain and the defendants, Shri Narain being in custody, except for two loose sheets thereof, which were inadvertantly left and which the plaintiffs have produced as evidence in this case. Plaintiffs submit that those accounts were actually removed by Babu Shri Narain and the defendants, Shri Narain being in custody, except for two loose sheets thereof, which were inadvertantly left and which the plaintiffs have produced as evidence in this case. The learned Subordinate Judge appears to think that the said accounts were in possession of the plaintiffs which they have deliberately kept back for some ulterior reason. We are unable to appreciate this view point. The record shows that on the death of Shri Lakshmi Narain Babu Shri Narain was acting as the de facto guardian of the plaintiffs, the eldest of them being only about 19 at the time and was receiving his education outside. Babu Raj Narain himself admits that the accounts for 1938-42 were with his father Babu Shri Narain, one of which he produced. The natural probabilities are that all the accounts must be with the defendants who have not produced the same. Even so the fact remains that Babu Lakshmi Narain kept a separate account of his own. That he intended to treat his earnings also separately is borne out by certain other unimpeachable facts on the record. 19. Shri Raj Narain admits that all the shares in Maha Lakshmi Mills and General Assurance Society were in the name of Babu Lakshmi Narain, and were subsequently transferred to his sons. He also admits that whatever money was left by Munshi Lakshmi Narain was handed over by Shri Narain to his sons, the plaintiffs. He also admits that he filed suits on behalf of the sons to recover fees due to Babu Lakshmi Narain from his clients and other debtors (vide Exs.P.67, P.68, P.69, P.70, P.71 and P.72). On the death of Babu Lakshmi Narain, the eldest son Govind Narain authorised his uncle Babu Shri Narain to operate on his Bank account in the Central Bank at Beawar (Ex.56). When it was put to Babu Raj Narain that Munshi Lakshmi Narain left the following deposits : (a) Rs. 15,000/- in Imperial Bank ; (b) Rs. 15,000 in Central Bank ; and (c) Rs. 18,000/- in the name of his wife in the Imperial Bank, The witness simply feigned ignorance. Even the account Ex. D. 27 shows entries of deposits in Bank in the name of Babu Lakshmi Narain and his wife. 15,000/- in Imperial Bank ; (b) Rs. 15,000 in Central Bank ; and (c) Rs. 18,000/- in the name of his wife in the Imperial Bank, The witness simply feigned ignorance. Even the account Ex. D. 27 shows entries of deposits in Bank in the name of Babu Lakshmi Narain and his wife. All these factors militate against the theory of blending and are proof positive of the fact that Babu Lakshmi Narain separately dealt with his own earnings and acquisitions though he also spent from his income over the maintenance and education of the other members of the family. Even in respect of the disputed property the record shows that all the documents of title stood in the name of Babu Lakshmi Narain, and it is the admission of Babu Raj Narain himself that until 1940 the defendants had not obtained any rent notes in respect of the suit property. There is some evidence to show that even Raj Narain sent the rent collected to the plaintiffs (vide Ex. P. 28). When the Municipal Committee served notice making enquiries about the heirs of Babu Lakshmi Narain deceased from Babu Shri Narain for corrections in the Register, the latter at first took time to consider the position on the pretext that the documents relating to the plots were not available. Till then the Municipal demands were being paid on behalf of Babu Lakshmi Narain. Later it appears to have been verbally represented to the Municipal authorities by Babu Shri Narain that there was some will and transfer deed executed by Babu Lakshmi Narain, and when the document was demanded it was eventually stated by him that the property was joint property in which the sons as also the brothers of Babu Lakshmi Narain were interested. All this appears from the correspondence which passed between the Municipal authorities on the one hand and Babu Shri Narain on the other, who used to deposit the Municipal dues on behalf of Babu Lakshmi Narain as usual (vide Exs. P. 19, P. 20, P. 21 and P. 22). The change of attitude from stage to stage on the part of Babu Shri Narain itself shows that he was not sure of his position and that the claim that the suit property was joint was a belated claim falsely set up by the defendants. 20. P. 19, P. 20, P. 21 and P. 22). The change of attitude from stage to stage on the part of Babu Shri Narain itself shows that he was not sure of his position and that the claim that the suit property was joint was a belated claim falsely set up by the defendants. 20. The oral evidence on the point of binding is altogether valueless and hardly worthy of credence...... ... ... ... 21. For the above reasons we regret to have to disagree with the learned Subordinate Judge. We hold that both the lands and the houses which were constructed thereon were the self-acquired property of Babu Lakshmi Narain, the father of the plaintiffs, and on his death they were inherited by the plaintiffs, his sons and rightful heirs. We further hold that the defendants have utterly failed to establish that Babu Lakshmi Narain ever abandoned his interest in the suit properties so as to blend them with the common stock of the joint family. The defendants, therefore, did not acquire any interest in them. On these findings the plaintiffs suit must succeed and the decree of the learned Subordinate Judge has to be set aside. 22. The question which remains is the question of damages claimed for the use and occupation of the premises. The claim for damages has been specified in paragraphs 11 and 12 of the plaint, and the entire amount comes to a sum of Rs. 770/-only. There is no doubt that a part of the house is in the occupation of the defendant No. 2 since August, 1941. In respect of that portion the plaintiffs have only claimed a rent of Rs. 10/- p.m. and valued their claim at Rs. 410/-. In our opinion this claim is not exaggerated. Similarly the defendants 4, 5 and 6 are occupying the properties specified in paragraph 3(b) and the upper portion of property described in paragraph 3(a) of the plaint, and have paid rent to the defendant No. 2, who has not handed over the amount to the plaintiffs. These defendants are, therefore, jointly and severally liable with defendant No. 2 to compensate the plaintiffs for the use and occupation of the properties referred to above at the rate of Rs. 9/- p.m. for each of the properties in paragraph 3(b) and Rs. These defendants are, therefore, jointly and severally liable with defendant No. 2 to compensate the plaintiffs for the use and occupation of the properties referred to above at the rate of Rs. 9/- p.m. for each of the properties in paragraph 3(b) and Rs. 12/- p.m. for the upper portion of the property in paragraph 3(a) from 1st January, 1944, to 3lst December, 1944. The total claim for mesne profits in these instances comes to Rs. 360/- only. Therefore, in respect of their respective portions in their occupation the defendants are liable jointly and severally with the defendant No. 2 for payment of compensation to the plaintiffs. This claim also appears to be fully justified. We also see no reason to think why the plaintiffs should not be entitled to their costs throughout. It would be for the plaintiffs to consider whether in view of their relationship with the defendants and for the purpose of restoring and maintaining goodwill in the family, they should desist from enforcing their rights under the decree for realisation of costs and damages as stated above ; but under the law we see no reason why a decree should not be granted to them in respect of the items claimed. 23. The appeal is accordingly allowed and the plaintiffs suit is decreed with costs throughout.