JUDGMENT Mootham, C.J. :- This is an appeal from an order of Mr. Justice Vishnu Datta dated the 21st January, 1959. 2. The respondents had filed a suit against the appellants under Section 29 of the Indian Patents and Designs Act for an injunction to restrain the appellants and their servants or agents from infringing certain patents, relating to the manufacture of glass beads, registered in the name of the respondents. The appellants filed a written statement in which inter alia, they counter claimed for the revocation of the respondents' patents. The learned District Judge thereupon by an order dated the 23rd December, 1958, directed that pursuant to Section 29 (1) of the Act the suit be transferred to this Court. By the same order he granted the respondents a temporary injunction restraining the appellants from manufacturing, selling or using glass beads in infringement of the respondents' patents. An appeal against so much of this order as related to the grant of a temporary injunction was dismissed by Mr. Justice Vishnu Datta. It is against that order that the appellants have filed this appeal. 3. Two preliminary objections were taken to the hearing of this appeal. First it was contended that the order of Mr. Justice Vishnu Datta did not amount to a 'judgment' within the meaning of cl. X of the Letters Patent and R. 5 of Chap. VIII of the Rules of Court. That objection was referred to a Full Bench which has now answered the question in favour of the appellants. The second objection was that as the appellants counter-claim was not in law a counter-claim at all the District Judge ought not to have transferred the suit to this Court. This objection is not in our opinion, well founded. 4. That objection was referred to a Full Bench which has now answered the question in favour of the appellants. The second objection was that as the appellants counter-claim was not in law a counter-claim at all the District Judge ought not to have transferred the suit to this Court. This objection is not in our opinion, well founded. 4. Section 26 (1) of the Indian Patents and Designs Act enumerates the grounds upon which revocation of a patent in whole or in part may be obtained on petition to or on a counter-claim in a suit for infringement before a High Court; and Sub-Section (2) of this section reads thus : "(2) A petition for revocation of a patent may be presented - (a) by the Advocate General or any person authorised by him; (b) by any person alleging - (i) that the patent was obtained in fraud of his rights, or of the rights of any person under or through whom he claims; or (ii) that he or any person under or through whom he claims, was the true and first inventor of any invention included in the claim of the patentee; or (iii) that he, or any person under or through whom he claims an interest in any trade, busmen or manufacture, had publicly manufactured, used or sold, within India, before the date of the patent, anything claimed by the patentee as his invention." Sec. 29 of the Act provides that "29(1) A patentee may institute a suit in a District Court having jurisdiction to try the suit against any person who, during the continuance of a patent acquired by him under this Act in respect of an invention makes, sells or uses the invention without his license, or counterfeits it, or imitates it : Provided that where a counter-claim for revocation of the patent is made by the defendant, the suit, along with the counter claim, shall be transferred to the High Court for decision. (2) Every ground on which a patent may be revoked under Section 26 shall be available by way of defence to a suit for infringement." The averments relating to the appellants' counterclaim are set out in paragraphs 21 and 22 of then written statement. (2) Every ground on which a patent may be revoked under Section 26 shall be available by way of defence to a suit for infringement." The averments relating to the appellants' counterclaim are set out in paragraphs 21 and 22 of then written statement. In these paragraphs it is alleged (i) that the first respondent is not the true and first inventor of the process of manufacture, (ii) that the invention claimed by the respondents was not, at the date of the patent, a new process of manufacture, and (iii) that the patent was obtained fraudulently, 5. The contention is that these allegations do not amount to a counter-claim within the meaning of Section 26 of the Act as they are not (as is admitted) allegations on the basis of which the appellants would themselves be entitled t0 present a petition for revocation. The argument is that the alleged counter claim is in substance a cross action, and that as the defendants are not in a position to allege any of the facts referred to in clause (b) of Section 26(2) they could not bring a cross-action and therefore cannot counter claim. In our opinion Section 26(1) confers upon the defendant to a suit for infringement of a patent a statutory right to include in his written state-merit a counter claim for the revocation of the plaintiff's patent on any of the grounds mentioned in that Sub-Section. Sub-Section (2) specifies the person who may file petition for revocation; and had it been the intention of the Legislature to restrict the filing of a counter-claim to a person entitled to file a petition, it would have been a simple matter for it to include a provision to that effect in Section 26(2). Our attention has been invited to Section 32 of the Patents and Designs Act, 1907 (7 Edward VII, p. 29) which provides that : "A defendant in an action for infringement of a patent, if entitled to present a petition to the court for the revocation of the patent, may without presenting such a petition, apply in accordance with the rules of the Supreme Court by way of counter-claim in the action for the revocation of the patent". and we are asked to hold that this also is the law in India. Section 32 of the English Act was however amended by the Patents and Designs Act. and we are asked to hold that this also is the law in India. Section 32 of the English Act was however amended by the Patents and Designs Act. 1932 (22 and 23 Geo. V., Ch. 32), Section 5(1) of which enacted that the words "if entitled to present a petition to the court for the revocation of the patent" and the word such" shall be omitted in Section 32 of the 1907 Act. As a result of tint amendment the limitation imposed on the filing of a counter-claim by the English Act has been abolished, and we are of opinion that under the Indian Act, as under the English Statute, the filing of a counter-claim is not restricted to a defendant who is entitled to present a petition for revocation. This objection therefore fails. 6. Two submissions have been made on behalf of the appellants. The first is that the learned District Judge having ordered the transfer of the case to this Court by reason of the provisions of Section 29(1) of the Act had thereafter no jurisdiction to grant a temporary injunction; the second is that on the merits the order was not justified. In the view we take it is unnecessary for us to express an opinion on the .second of these submissions. 7. The proviso to Section 29(1) directs that upon the defendant making a counter-claim : "the suit, along with the counter-claim, shall be transferred to the High Court for decision." The expression "shall be transferred" in our judgment means "shall stand transferred" and the District Judge is left with no jurisdiction save to make such order as is necessary to secure the physical transfer of the records of the case to the High Court. If this meaning be not given to these words there will be an element of uncertainty both with regard to the time when the record of the case is to be sent to the High Court and to the powers of the District Court during the period which is allowed to elapse before the record is in fact transferred. That was not, in our opinion, the intention of the Legislature. We are accordingly of opinion that the order of the District Judge so far as it purported to grant an interim injunction is bad in law. That was not, in our opinion, the intention of the Legislature. We are accordingly of opinion that the order of the District Judge so far as it purported to grant an interim injunction is bad in law. The appeal accordingly succeeds and the order of the District Judge dated 23-12-1958, to the extent we have indicated and the order of Mr. Justice Vishnu Datta dated 21-1-1959, are set aside. The appellants are entitled to their costs.