These two revisions against the one and the same decision of the learned Additional Collector, Kota, dated 28.4.59, have been heard together and shall be disposed of by this single judgment. 2. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and examined the record as well. Circumstances leading to these revisions are that one Shri Krishna, a minor Khatedar, died in April 1954 leaving an agricultural holding of 40 bighas and 16 biswas of land in village Bamoolia and 39 Bighas and 19 biswas in village Takhu in Jagir of Shri Ap Ajitsinghji of Thikana Palayatha. The Thikana applied for mutation of the same in their name on grounds of escheat, Mst. Bheri also came forward as claimant in her capacity as the mother of the deceased. Moti also put forward his claim as the nearest reversioner as the brother of the deceaseds father. The Tehsildar after holding an enquiry decided in favour of Mst. Bheri, the mother. Both Thikana Palayatha and Motilal went up in appeal to the Additional Collector, Kota, who also confirmed the orders of the learned Tehsildar. The claim of Motilal was rejected for want of proof. The claim of Thikana was turned down because Mst. Bheri was found to be the heir of the deceased, and the plea of the Thikana that she had lost her rights to inherit as mother because of remarrying was rejected as being not warranted by the then prevalent law, Kota State Circular No. 3 Sigha Mal sec. 46(1), as well as Hindu Law and it was also held that she had not remarried but had only kept a "Mazrakha" (etj[kk). 3. In this revision, it has been urged on behalf of Motilal that a question of proprietory right was involved in the matter and so it should have been referred for decision to the Civil Court and not have been disposed of by the revenue courts. The argument was that under sec. 39 of Kota State Circular No. 3 Sigha Mal the rights of a Khatedar were heritable and transferable and as it was held by the Rajasthan High Court in 1954 R.L.W. 385 that this heritable and transferable right was found to vest in Jagirdars, Muafidars, Bapidars etc. and a holder of land in Mewar should possess heritable and transferable rights to claim a proprietary title, the mutation of Khatedari rights became a question of proprietary rights. and a holder of land in Mewar should possess heritable and transferable rights to claim a proprietary title, the mutation of Khatedari rights became a question of proprietary rights. Nothing could be more unreasonable than an argument like this. The rights of a Khatedar are so clearly a tenancy right, and could never be confused with the rights of a proprietor. In the very ruling cited by the learned counsel for Motilal referred to above it has been observed that Khatedars, etc. must be treated as tenants, and where the dispute is about their right it cannot be said to be a dispute of proprietary rights. The observations of the High Court were only that the minimum necessary before a holder of land can claim proprietary title was that he had a heritable and transferable right, and not that the having of such a right would make the holder a proprietor. The learned counsel has not also been able to show cause, even though pointed out and asked specifically as to why the concurrent findings of the court below against him that he had not been able to prove his title be accepted and refused to be interfered with in this revision. Nor any material irregularity or grave illegality has been pointed out or found to have been committed by the learned lower courts in the exercise of their jurisdiction. The claim of Motilal has therefore been rightly rejected. 4. Now, about the revision preferred by Ap Ajit Singhji of Thikana Palayatha questioning the inheritance by Mst. Bheri, the mother of the deceased. The learned counsel for the Thikana has urged that the Hindu Widows Re-marriage Act XV of 1856) had been made applicable to Rajasthan on 26.1.58 by the Central law Adaptation Ordinance 1950, and a sec. 2 thereof laid down (so far as it was relevant to this case) that "all rights and interests which any widow may have in her deceased husbands property by way of maintenance, or by inheritance to her husband or to his lineal successor,.........shall, upon her re-marriage, cease and determine as if she bad then died......" and therefore Mst. Bheri, the mother, who had re-married could not be the heir to the deceased. He has cited AIR 1952 Bombay 243, AIR 1959 M.P. 429 and AIR 1960 M.P. 51 , and AIR 1953 S.C. 201 , in support of his contention. Bheri, the mother, who had re-married could not be the heir to the deceased. He has cited AIR 1952 Bombay 243, AIR 1959 M.P. 429 and AIR 1960 M.P. 51 , and AIR 1953 S.C. 201 , in support of his contention. AIR 1952 Bombay 243 and AIR 1953 Supreme Court 201 have got nothing in common with the present case and so it would be unnecessary to discuss them here. AIR 1959 M. P. 429 also lays down regarding a Hindu widow only that her life interest in her husbands estate is founded on the theory so basic in Hindu thought that she continues her husbands personality by not marrying even after her husbands death, and it is for her to choose to exercise her right of re-marriage also recognised by Hindu Widows Re-marriage Act or to continue her interest in husbands estate, but she cannot do both. This clearly concerns only a Hindu widow and has nothing to do about the right of a mother. AIR I960 M. P. 51, however, lays down that a Hindu widow is upon her re-marriage divested of the husbands property which she has already obtained by inheritance to her son. This ruling is based on words "by inheritance to her husband or to his lineal successors",used in sec.2 Hindu Widows Re-marriage Act, 1856. This was held in answer to a reference whether the property inherited by a Hindu widow from her son is divested on account of her subsequent marriage. It is also, however, distinguishable from the present case. For here, the point for determination is not of divesting of inheritance because of a subsequent marriage, but whether a mother already re-married would inherit the property of her deceased son or not. Sec. 2 of the Hindu Widows Marriages Act also does not deal with this question. This point came for determination of the Allahabad High Court in 1910 ILR Vol. XXXII Allahabad Series page 155 on December 16, 1909 in Hal Singh vs. Mst. Dini, and it was held after examining all available original texts on the subject that there was no authority for holding that a Hindu lady who after her husbands death lives with another commits an act of unchastity or Vice and is thereby excluded from inheritance to the estate left by her son. Dini, and it was held after examining all available original texts on the subject that there was no authority for holding that a Hindu lady who after her husbands death lives with another commits an act of unchastity or Vice and is thereby excluded from inheritance to the estate left by her son. The facts of that case appear to he on all fours with the present one. In that case the particular unchastity alleged and found was that some six or seven years after her husbands death the mother had eloped with a Brahman, and relying upon the text of Narad Mahrishi allowing Hindu widows to take to another husband in certain circumstances it was held as above. Such a woman was regarded neither an viikf=dk^^] nor ^^viikf=dk^^]. In the present case also the utmost proved against Mst. Behri was that she had kept a man as MAZRAKHA "MAZRAKHA" according to the custom of the community long before she became entitled to this inheritance from the deceased. Keeping a mazarkha was not the same thing as re-marriage, and she could not be excluded or deprived of her right of inheritance to her deceased son on this account, nor even on account of her re-marrying as held in the Allahabad case referred to above. Besides, the property under claim was an agricultural land; and it was a common ground between the parties that when Shri Krishen, the last holder, died it was sec. 46 of the Kota Circular No. 3 Sigha Mal, which governed the succession. Mother, without any restrictions, as had been laid down in case of a widow or a daughter, was the ninth heir prescribed therein by sec. 46(1). Re-marrying or taking a mazarakha (MAZRAKHA) had not been laid down therein as a bar to succession by a mother to her son. The limitations prescribed by sub-sec. (2) of this section relates to succession only to female Khatedar and not male Khatedars and contingency of marriage or re-marriage prescribed therein can relate only to a female Khatedar succeeding to a male Khatedar before the occurrence of such an event. As the plain reading of the language of the section would go to show it cannot be treated to operate as a bar to the succession by a mother already re-married or having a mazarkha (MAZRAKHA) husband even. Mst. As the plain reading of the language of the section would go to show it cannot be treated to operate as a bar to the succession by a mother already re-married or having a mazarkha (MAZRAKHA) husband even. Mst. Bheri was, therefore, not dis-qualified in any way from inheriting the holding of the deceased Khatedar Shri Krishna, her minor son, and the learned lower courts have rightly decided in her favour. The claim of Ap Ajit Singhji on behalf of Thikana Palayatha has therefore naturally no basis, and has been rightly rejected. For a Khata can escheat only when no heir was left by the deceased Khatedar. There is thus no force in these revisions, and they are hereby rejected.