JUDGMENT : Barman, J. - This Miscellaneous Case arises out of an Execution Case No. 8/54, instituted by Official Liquidator, Purl Bank Ltd. (in liquidation),-hereinafter referred to as the decree-holder against the judgment-debtors for realisation of Rs. 7118/15/3 including interest and costs, by attachment and sale of judgment debtors? immovable properties as enlisted in the schedule to the decree-holder?s petition in the said Execution Case. In the said Execution Case the judgment-debtors filed an objection-petition on November 22, 1956 which has been registered as the present Misc. Case No. 5/56, where the judgment-debtors seek relief under the Orissa Money Lenders Act (Act III of 1939). 2. The only question, in this case, is whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case hereinafter stated the judgment-debtors are entitled to reliefs under the Orissa Money Lenders Act. The material facts are these On April 14, 1909 a mortgage bond was executed by the father of the judgment-debtors for Rs. 1200/-. Thereafter from time to time on different dates the judgment-debtors are stated to have made payments, the total amount so paid being Rs. 2,300/- and odd. The balance of the dues having not been paid, a suit was filed on the mortgage bond and eventually on January 12, 1927 a final mortgage-decree was passed for Rs. 2200/-. On December 14, 1928 the judgment-debtors executed another mortgage bond for Rs. 1,920/- after fully satisfying the dues on the previous mortgage decree. On November 11, 1930, a suit was filed on the 2nd mortgage bond for recover of Rs.2,882/6/5. It is said that a sum of only Rs. 20/- was paid as interest towards the said second mortgage-bond. On November 24, 1931 a preliminary decree was passed in the said mortgage suit. Thereafter on August 6, 1932 a final mortgage-decree was passed for recovery of the said sum, including costs and future interest. It further appears that the mortgaged properties were sold for Rs. 648/- in execution of the said mortgage decree and the said sale proceeds were adjusted towards the decretal amount leaving the balance due to the decree-holder. On May 18, 1936 a personal decree under Order 34, Rule 6 CPC for Rs. 3,365/1/5 was passed against the judgment-debtors. Since then the judgment-debtors have only paid Rs. 48/- on different dates. 3. The decree-holder?s point, as urged by Mr. On May 18, 1936 a personal decree under Order 34, Rule 6 CPC for Rs. 3,365/1/5 was passed against the judgment-debtors. Since then the judgment-debtors have only paid Rs. 48/- on different dates. 3. The decree-holder?s point, as urged by Mr. J. Rath, is, that the Orissa Money-Lenders Act has no application inasmuch as the transaction related to the pre-Act period prior to the relevant date, namely, April 1, 1936 that the preliminary decree, in the present case, having been passed on November 24,1935, that is to say, before the relevant date April 1, 1936, the provisions of the Orissa Money Lenders Act are not applicable and hence the said preliminary decree cannot be reopened. 4. That apart, the decree-holders further point is that the judgment-debtors? present objections are barred judicata, by reason of the previous Judgment by a Division Bench of this Court in Harekrushna Mohanty and Ors. v. Puri Bank Ltd., decided on December 14, 1944, which arose out of an application by the present judgment-debtors against the decree-holder before the executing Court for reliefs under the provisions of the Orissa Money Lenders Act. In the said application, the executing Court held that both Sections 10 and 11 of the Act applied and the judgment-debtors were entitled to reliefs under the provisions of the said two sections. Thereupon, the executing Court held that the decree-holder was not entitled to anything on account of the said personal decree, inasmuch as the judgment-debtors had already paid more than what was due. There was an appeal to the District Judge who reversed the said decision of the Executing Court. The learned District Judge held that the provisions of Sections 10 and 11 of the Act did not apply; he further held that even if the sections did apply the transaction could not be reopened beyond December 14,1928 the date on which the second mortgage bond in suit was executed for Rs.1,920/-. From the said order of the learned District Judge, the judgment-debtors went up in appeal to the High Court being M. A. No. 14 of 1941 as aforesaid. It appears from the judgment of the High Court in the said M. A. No. 14 of 1941 that it had been conceded by the judgment-debtors that they will get no relief, unless the transaction is reopened up to April 14, 1909 when the original loan was given. It appears from the judgment of the High Court in the said M. A. No. 14 of 1941 that it had been conceded by the judgment-debtors that they will get no relief, unless the transaction is reopened up to April 14, 1909 when the original loan was given. The High Court decided that the judgment-debtors are clearly not entitled to any relief u/s 10 of the Act. With regard to Section 11 of the Act it was also contended in the said M.A. No. 14 of 1941, before the High Court, that the decree which is under execution and which remains unsatisfied is a personal decree passed in May 1936; that inasmuch as the said personal decree was passed after April 1, 1936 the Court can exercise the powers specified in Section 11(1) of the Act, with regard to the loan on the basis of which the decree was passed. For the reasons fully given in the said judgment, which I need not repeat, the High Court held that the judgment-debtors can get no relief u/s 11 of the Act. That was a decision, in the said previous M. A. No. 14 of 1941, where the same matter was directly and substantially in issue between the same parties and had been heard and finally decided by the High Court as aforesaid. Accordingly the said same objections cannot be agitated over again herein, by reason of res judicata. Mr. M.S. Ray, learned Counsel for the judgment-debtors, however, urged that since that decision in M. A. No. 14 of 1941 by the High Court decided on December 14, 1944, there was a Full Bench decision of this Court in Siba Prasad Misra and Ors. v. Mst. Nurabati and Kholli Das, decided on September 7, 1948 where the Full Bench expressed the opinion that the "loan advanced" with reference to the subject dealt with in Section 10 and in consideration of the context in which it appears, means nothing more and nothing less than the sun actually advanced and that the act of attributing its primary meaning to the word "advanced" does not bar the remedy of the debtors who have entered into transactions and undertaken fresh liabilities in renewal of past ones. The learned Counsel relied on this decision in support of his argument that in spite of the said previous Division Bench decision of this Court in M. A. No. 14 of 1941, in view of the subsequent Full Bench decision, the previous Division Bench decision is not to operate as res judicata. I do not think that this argument is tenable in law, having regard to the mandatory provisions of Section 11 of the CPC in that when exactly the same matter was directly and substantially in issue between the same parties and was heard and decided by a Court in a previous proceeding no Court shall try any such issue in any subsequent proceeding between the same parties. 5. Mr. M.S. Ray also relied on the position that the said Division Bench decision decided in 1944, was prior to the amendment of the Orissa Money Lenders Act by Act XVIII of 1947 where the new Sub-section (3) was inserted in Section 10 and further more that in Section 11(2) the word "shall" in italics was substituted for the word "may" and that by reason of the subsequent amendment in the statute the previous Division Bench decision is not binding and is not to operate L as res judicata. This argument is also not acceptable. Once the previous decision was given and there was no appeal from that decision the said decision between the same parties must be binding and operate as res judicata, notwithstanding that there may have been any subsequent charge in the law. Besides, the subsequent changes in w by the amending Act XVIII of 1947 in Sections 10 and 11 and not materially affect the position so far as this case is concerned. The undisputed legal position is that the Court has no jurisdiction to reopen a pre-Act preliminary decree which, in this case was passed as early as November 24, 1931, and thus cannot be re-opened. 6. I do not accept the argument that a personal decree under Order 34, Rule 6 CPC is a new decree as contended for by the judgment-debtors. Order 34, Rule 6, CPC runs as follows: Rule 6. 6. I do not accept the argument that a personal decree under Order 34, Rule 6 CPC is a new decree as contended for by the judgment-debtors. Order 34, Rule 6, CPC runs as follows: Rule 6. Where the net proceeds of any sale held under the last proceeding rule are found insufficient to pay the amount due to the Plaintiff, the Court, on application by him may, if the balance is legally recoverable from the Defendant otherwise than out of the property sold, pass a decree for such balances. Rule 6 must, therefore, be read with the proceeding Rule 5 which relates to final decree in a suit for sale. It is clear that a personal decree passed under Rule 6 is only incidental or consequential to all the proceedings which precede the personal decree which, only under certain conditions-may be passed under Rule 6. It is only when the net proceeds of the sale are found insufficient to pay the decretal dues that the Court may pass a decree for such balance as a personal decree against the mortgagor. In no sense, can it be said that Rule 6 is new or independent of the decree preceding it. The personal decree under Rule 6 is only made as a last resort when the mortgaged properties are exhausted and found insufficient to satisfy the dues of the mortgagee. Considered from this aspect, I do not accept the contention that a personal decree under Rule 6 is a new decree. If, therefore, the decree passed on May 18, 1936 was not a new decree but only a decree in Continuation of the proceedings, preceding the same, then the only decree which is to be taken into consideration is the preliminary decree which was passed on November 24, 1931, that is to say, before the relevant date, April 1, 1936, under the Orissa Money Lenders Act. In this view of the legal position, I do not think that the judgment-debtors are entitled to any relief under the Orissa Money Lenders Act. 7. The result, therefore, is that the objection of the judgment-debtors dated November 22, 1956 in Execution Case No. 8 of 1954 which was registered as the present Misc. Case No. 5 of 1956 is disallowed and the same is, accordingly, dismissed. 7. The result, therefore, is that the objection of the judgment-debtors dated November 22, 1956 in Execution Case No. 8 of 1954 which was registered as the present Misc. Case No. 5 of 1956 is disallowed and the same is, accordingly, dismissed. I allow the decree-holder?s application for execution of .the said decree and direct that the total- amount of Rs.7,118/15/3 together with the interest on the decretal amount up to the date of payment and the costs of taking out this execution be realised by attachment and sale of the judgment-debtors immovable properties as enlisted in the schedule to the decree-holder?s petition in Execution Case No. 8 of 1954 filed in this Court; failing which the same may be realised by attachment and sale of the movable properties as given in Schedule ?B? to the said petition. The judgment-debtors are to pay the costs of this Misc. Case. Hearing fee is assessed at Rs. 50/-. Final Result : Dismissed