JUDGMENT 1. THIS is an application under Article 227 of the Constitution relating to interpretation of section 6 of the Thika Tenancy Act. The Petitioner is a tenant. The landlord opposite parties filed an application for ejectment of a thika tenant under section 8 of the Thika Tenancy Act which provides that a thika tenant is liable to be ejected on ground of failure to pay an arrear of rent. But section 6 provides for the relief against a decree on the ground of failure to pay arrears of rent. The relief is that if the arrears together with interest is deposited within a particular time, the decree shall not be executed. 2. IN this case there is no dispute that there was failure to pay an arrear of rent. There was also an order for ejectment, but the question is whether in considering the arrears of rent referred to, in sections 3 and 6 of the Act, arrears of rent, which were barred either at the date of the application or at the date of the relief, should be taken into consideration or not. It has been held by the Controller that all arrears whether they were barred or not must be taken into account. There was an appeal and the Appeal Court below made a slight modification so far as the interest is concerned, but otherwise, maintained the order of the Controller. The present petition under Article 227 of the Constitution is against that order and the only point that has been raised is whether arrears of rent, which were barred at the date of the application can be included by making an order under section 6 of the Thika Tenancy Act. Before I go further the words of the statute may be referred to. Both sections 3 and 6 are in Chapter II of the Thika Tenancy Act. Chapter II is a chapter, which deals with incidents of Thika Tenancies. The first section of that Chapter is section 3 and the marginal note is grounds on which a thika tenant may be ejected. In section 3 after the non-obstinate clause it has been indicated "a thika tenant shall. . . be liable to ejectment. . . on one or more of the following grounds. (i) on the ground that he has failed to pay as arrear of rent due to the landlord in respect of the holding. In section 3 after the non-obstinate clause it has been indicated "a thika tenant shall. . . be liable to ejectment. . . on one or more of the following grounds. (i) on the ground that he has failed to pay as arrear of rent due to the landlord in respect of the holding. ' section 6 is also in the same chapter relating to incidents of thika tenancies. The marginal note is "stay of ejectment for arrears of rent if the amount of arrears and damages are deposited with the Controller." The section is as follows:- "every order made under section 5 allowing an application for ejectment of a thika tenant on the ground that he has failed to pay an arrear of rent due to the landlord in respect of his holding and directing the thika tenant to vacate the holding and put the landlord in possession thereof shall specify the amount of the arrear and of the interest, if any, due thereon, and no such order shall be executed if that amount, the costs of the proceedings arising out of such application and such damages as the Controller may allow, are deposited with the Controller within thirty days from the date of the order." 3. THE Advocate for the tenant, Mr. Bhattacharyya, says that section 6 refers to failure to pay arrears of rent due to the landlord and that arrear together with interest has to be deposited. The words "to pay an arrear of rent due to the landlord" under section 6 must have the same meaning as under section 3 where the same words are used. Mr. Bhattacharyya then proceeds to say that, if we look into the statutes, which are 'parimateria', we will find that the word 'due' has been understood to mean legally due or, in other words, legally recoverable. Mr. Bhattacharyya has referred to the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956. He has also referred to a decision of Mr. Justice Banerjee between Nashiban Bibi v. Parul Bala Dutta (1) reported in 62 C. W. N. at page 778. According to Mr. Bhattacharyya, section 17 of the Act XII of 1956 directs the tenant "to deposit in Court or pay to the landlord an amount calculated at the rate of rent at which it was last paid, for the period for which the tenant may have made default, etc. According to Mr. Bhattacharyya, section 17 of the Act XII of 1956 directs the tenant "to deposit in Court or pay to the landlord an amount calculated at the rate of rent at which it was last paid, for the period for which the tenant may have made default, etc. " According to Mr. Bhattacharyya the statute says 'the period for which the tenant may have made default' and does not say 'the period for which the tenant made default and the sum is recoverable'. But in interpreting that section Mr. Justice Banerjee held 'the payment or deposit referred to above is in respect of all arrears of rent legally recoverable in payment of which the tenant may have made a default". Mr. Bhattacharyya, therefore, says that the words 'legally recoverable' must always be understood even though those words are not used in a particular statute. According to him, the words 'legally recoverable' were not used in section 17 (1) of Act XII of 1956; but Mr. Justice Banerjee construed it to mean arrears of rent legally recoverable. Mr. Bhattacharyya further refers to section 44 of the Bengal Tenancy Act read with section 66 of the same Act and, according to him, what is not recoverable in law is not due. Therefore, the landlord is not entitled to get anything which is not recoverable. Mr. Das Gupta, on the other hand, has referred to section 114 of the Transfer of Property Act, which also relates to relief on ground of fore-feature on account of non-payment of rent and there also the words 'arrears of rent' have been used; but, according to authoritative interpretation, the word 'due' means all that was payable or, in other words, that was not paid and ought to be paid. In substance, according to Mr. Bhattacharyya on behalf of the tenant, the word 'due' must be given to mean 'due and recoverable in law' and, according to Mr. Das Gupta, the word 'due' is 'due and payable'. 4. I have to consider the interpretation of these words. In order to consider that the first question is what are the principles of interpretation regarding this matter. The matter is the interpretation of a word in a statute. The statute is for the better protection of thika tenants. The object is to give more effective protection to thika tenants. 4. I have to consider the interpretation of these words. In order to consider that the first question is what are the principles of interpretation regarding this matter. The matter is the interpretation of a word in a statute. The statute is for the better protection of thika tenants. The object is to give more effective protection to thika tenants. These tenants were liable to be ejected on service of notice in terms of section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. Therefore, they were completely at the mercy of the landlord. The present Act gives them better right. In protecting them from ejectment except on certain grounds specified and even in cases where the property is required by the landlord for his own purpose he is entitled to certain compensation for the structures he raised. On the other hand, there is protection of the landlord so far as payment of rent is concerned. It cannot be doubted that the whole taken together the object is to protect the tenants without jeopardizing the landlord so far as payment of rent is concerned. The next thing that I have to consider is that the words ordinarily be read in their ordinary natural grammatical meaning. That is what the Supreme Court has held in Nabin Chandra Maffat Lal v. C. I. T. Bombay City (2) reported in 1955 (1) S. C. R. page 829 at p. 836. The other thing that I have to remember is that the same word appearing in the same section or in the same set of rules must be given the same meaning unless there is anything to indicate to the contrary. This has been held by the Supreme Court in K. N. Gurusmamy v. State of Mysore (3) reported in 1955 (1) S. C. R. 305 at p. 311. Subject only to this that where the language of a statute in its ordinary meaning and grammatical construction leads to manifest contradiction of the apparent purpose of the enactment or to some inconvenience or absurdity or hardship or injection presumably not intended, a construction may be put upon which modifies the meaning of the word and even the structure of the sentence. [tirath Singh v. Bachittar Singh (4) 1955 (2) S. C. R. 457 at 464]. [tirath Singh v. Bachittar Singh (4) 1955 (2) S. C. R. 457 at 464]. The last thing on the question of interpretation that I have to consider is what is the meaning of such words used in statutes, which are parimateria with these words, and further to consider the position when there is some contradiction with regard to the statutes which are parimateria. 5. THE words that we have to construe as stated above are the words "fail to pay an arrear of rent due to the landlord." First of all, the natural, ordinary and grammatical meaning of the void 'due' is that 'ought to be paid'. If I accept the natural meaning, then that would mean "fail to pay an arrear of rent' that the tenant ought to pay to the landlord. If that meaning is to be accepted, then evidently all arrears whether recoverable or not must be paid and, as I have stated above, the ordinary meaning has to be accepted as held by the Supreme Court in the case between Nabin Chandra Maffat Lal v. C. I. T., Bombay City (2) reported in 1955 (1) S. C. R. page 829 at 836. The next thing that I have to consider is, if that ordinary and grammatical meaning is attributed, will it lead to manifest contradiction to the apparent purpose of the enactment or to some inconvenience or absurdity, hardship or injustice, presumably not intended. 6. WITH regard to this matter, the apparent purpose of the Act is to protect the tenant on payment of rent. The Act does not expressly consider the landlord has allowed the amount to be barred. It is stated that it ordinarily considers the cases where there is some money due that is still recoverable. It is difficult to say that when the Legislature used the words, they were not aware that some of the money might become barred. If they had so intended, they could have used the 'recoverable' instead of the word 'due'. It cannot, therefore, be said that the Legislature contemplated only cases where rent would not be barred. If it was their intention to mean recoverable, they would certainly have used the word. That word has been used in various other statutes of West Bengal and I find no reason why they would not have used the word 'recoverable', if they meant recoverable. If it was their intention to mean recoverable, they would certainly have used the word. That word has been used in various other statutes of West Bengal and I find no reason why they would not have used the word 'recoverable', if they meant recoverable. The word 'due', therefore, is not a case of omission, but a definite provision that all that is due to be paid and, if the word 'due' is given its ordinary meaning, it means 'what ought to be paid'. I have stated that, if that meaning is given, will there be manifest contradiction to apparent purpose of the enactment. The apparent purpose is to protect the tenant. But there is also protection of the landlord so far as rent is concerned; and I do not find any manifest contradiction of the apparent purpose of the enactment. Then comes whether by that interpretation of the words some inconvenience, absurdity, hardship or injustice presumably not intended will be forced upon the tenant. So far as inconvenience and hardship, everybody has some amount of hardship or inconvenience to pay to anybody else; but that is not the question. The question is whether such inconvenience or hardship was not intended or, in other words, whether the Act intended that payment of rent for use and occupation by itself would amount to hardship or injustice. I am afraid, that can never be said. So faxes absurdity or injustice is concerned, I have no doubt that there is no absurdity-no injustice. The contract between the parties is that during the time of use and occupation the person using will have to pay rent. There is no absurdity in it and that is not also injustice. On the other hand, to deny rent to the landlord would be some inconvenience, hardship or injustice to the landlord, which were not intended. There is nothing in the Act which shows that the payment of rent would be excused under any circumstances. It is the law of limitation, which comes in, and bars the remedy of the landlord to recover rent; but there is nothing in the Thika Tenancy Act, which bars its recovery or excuses the tenant from payment. There is nothing in the Act which shows that the payment of rent would be excused under any circumstances. It is the law of limitation, which comes in, and bars the remedy of the landlord to recover rent; but there is nothing in the Thika Tenancy Act, which bars its recovery or excuses the tenant from payment. In my view, therefore, if the word 'due' means 'recoverable', then that would be given a meaning to the word, which would cause injustice and hardship to the landlord far from being any service of hardship or injustice to the tenant. In that view of the matter on simple construction of the statute, I must agree with the courts below that they were right to interpret the word 'due' to mean 'ought to be paid but not paid'. Before leaving this I would refer to the meaning of the word 'due' as referred to in Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, Vol. I where it has been stated "a debt is still due notwithstanding that the statute of limitations may have run against it, for that statute only bars the remedy and does not extinguish the debt. " But that also refers to the meaning of the word 'due' as given by Darlin, J. in Moss in (5) 1905 (2) K. B. page 307 where he said "i think in a legal sense that money can only be said to be due, which may be recoverable by action. That which man is under no legal obligation to repay for whatsoever reason is, in my opinion, no longer due". The former was in reference to a case where there was a suit for account. The" latter was in a matter of bankruptcy. If these two facts are kept in mind, then, reason for the difference of meaning is clear. In the former case it was held on taking accounts, the debtor cannot avail himself of the bar of limitation and in the second where, in the case of insolvency, the debtor was an insolvent, so nothing was due from him because he was an insolvent. The decisions clearly show that in order to consider the meaning we have got to refer to the Act in question,-the object and purpose of the Act. The decisions clearly show that in order to consider the meaning we have got to refer to the Act in question,-the object and purpose of the Act. The Supreme Court has also held that in order to understand the Act the object and reasons can be referred to for ascertaining the conditions prevailing at the time which actuated the sponsor of the Bill to introduce the same. That was decided by the Supreme Court in the case between Ranganathan v. Government of Madras (6) 1955 (2) S. C. R. page 374 at p. 385. The substance is, in my opinion, that the true meaning and the true intent of the Legislature has to be understood from the words used and not from the words which might have been used. The Supreme Court has also held that the primary duty of a Court is to give effect to the intention of the Legislature as expressed in the words used by it and no outside consideration should be called in it to find that intention (Piece Goods Bazar Co. Ltd. v. C. I. T. Bombay, (7). 1950 S. C. R. page 553 at p. 561). I may also refer to the case between Darsan Singh v. State of Punjab, (8) 1953 S. C. R. page 319 at 328, where it has been held "the language used by the Legislature in an enactment is the true depository of the legislative intent. If it is the true depository, then it is clear that when they used the word 'due', they did not mean recoverable in law. 7. IN the aforesaid case Mukherjea, J. was of opinion that the words and phrases occurring in a statute are to be taken not in isolated or detached manner dissociated from the context, but are to be read together and construed in the light of the purpose and the object of the Act itself. I have already considered the purpose and the object of the Act and that purpose and object is to protect the tenant against ejectment without jeopardizing the landlord's right to get rent. The context, as I have stated, is the incidents of a thika tenant i. e., Chapter II. With this title of the Chapter the marginal note is, as I have stated above, stay of ejectment for arrears of rent if the amount of arrears and damages are deposited with the Controller. The context, as I have stated, is the incidents of a thika tenant i. e., Chapter II. With this title of the Chapter the marginal note is, as I have stated above, stay of ejectment for arrears of rent if the amount of arrears and damages are deposited with the Controller. In the case between Bengal Immunity Co. Ltd. v. State of Bihar, (9) reported in 1955 (2) S. C. R. at page 603, the Supreme Court held that the marginal note to an Article furnishes some clue to the meaning and purpose of the Article. Here the marginal note does not use the word 'due', but refers to all an ears. Therefore, the marginal note supports the view of literal interpretation and does not contradict it. In that view of the matter, taking the whole thing together, the object of the Act, the Chapter to which it relates, the marginal note and the words actually used, I come to conclusion that the word 'due' means 'payable' and does not mean 'recoverable' and statutes in parimateria may be referred to but cannot control the meaning. 8. COMING now to the precedents, the decision reported in 62 C. W. N. is a decision on the interpretation of section 14 (1) of the West Bengal Premises Rent Control Act of 1950. In that sub-section 1 the words are 'rent legally payable' and in that context it has been held that what was not recoverable was not legally payable. In fact, the Legislature used the word 'legally' to modify the meaning of the word 'payable' and, therefore, clearly what was meant was all that the tenant was liable in law to pay. When the West Bengal Premises Rent Control Act of 1950 expired, the next Act of 1956 on a permanent basis was introduced. It is needless to add that the Act of 1950 was a temporary statute. When the permanent Act came, the same words 'legally payable' were not used. But it cannot be denied that the Act of 1956 was substantially a reenactment of the Act of 1950 with slight modifications. In that context Mr. Justice Banerjee in (1) 62 C. W. N. at page 779 referred to 'arrears of rent' to mean 'arrears recoverable'. In that case Mr. Justice Banerjee was not considering the meaning of the words 'arrears of rent' but was considering another point. In that context Mr. Justice Banerjee in (1) 62 C. W. N. at page 779 referred to 'arrears of rent' to mean 'arrears recoverable'. In that case Mr. Justice Banerjee was not considering the meaning of the words 'arrears of rent' but was considering another point. But while considering that point he proceeded on the basis that the words 'arrears of rent' would ex-hypothesis mean 'arrears legally recoverable'. Therefore, the difference in language in the previous Act and the present Act was not a matter which was directly determined by Mr. Justice Banerjee. Secondly, the fact that the new Act is a substantial re-enactment of the old Act amply supports the view taken by Mr. Justice Banerjee. But there is nothing in the Thika Tenancy act, which would derogate from the ordinary meaning and I must say the precedents referred to are not precedents on the Thika Tenancy Act. Mr. Bhattacharyya has further referred to section 44 read with section 66 of the Bengal Tenancy Act and a decision with reference to the interpretation of that Act. The decision specifically refers to the language of that Act and the language of that Act limits it to the arrears of rent for one year. If that is so, no question of earlier arrears arises. I therefore, hold that there is no precedents so far as the interpretation of this section is concerned viz. section 6 of the Thika Tenancy Act. There being no precedents I hold on principle of interpretation of statute the word 'due' in that context means 'payable' i. e., the same thing as ought to be paid or should be paid, in that view of the matter, I discharge the rule but make no order as to costs particularly because the tenant has deposited the entire arrears and proved his bona fide. The result is that the application under section 5 should be dismissed and the decree-holder should be entitled to withdraw the money now in deposit with the court.