JUDGMENT T.P. Naik, J. 1. The plaintiff respondent sued the defendant appellant for price of certain cloth. The defence was that there was no completed sale and hence he was not liable for the price of the cloth sent to him. He however, offered to return the cloth provided he was paid the godown charges in respect of them. The trail court held that the sale was not completed and consequently the defendant was not liable for the price, but as the cloth alleged to have been sold to the defendant was in the latter's custody, it directed the defendant to return it to the plaintiff and if the cloth was not returned, it further decreed that the plaintiff was in that event entitled to Rs. 2998/12-, the price of the cloth, Rs, 851/9/6, interest on it, and-/9/- cost of the notice, totaling Rs. 3850/14/6. No godown charges were decreed as none were proved. 2. The first contention of the learned counsel for the defendant-appellant is that interest could not be awarded. The contention is correct. The decree was being passed against the defendant-appellant on the basis that he was a bailee of the goods as the sale in respect of them had not been completed. What the plaintiff was therefore entitled to on the date of the decree was the cloth of its price on that date. All that could be decreed under the circumstances was the return of the cloth, or in the event of the defendant's default in returning it, its price, subject to his paying to the defendant godown charges in respect of it, if proved. The claim for interest shall therefore have to be disallowed. 3. It is then contended that the goods had been destroyed by fire after the date of the decree, and consequently the defendant; was not laible for their price. There is no evidence how and when the fire occurred and whether it was through the negligence of the defendant. The claim for interest shall therefore have to be disallowed. 3. It is then contended that the goods had been destroyed by fire after the date of the decree, and consequently the defendant; was not laible for their price. There is no evidence how and when the fire occurred and whether it was through the negligence of the defendant. But that apart, under Section 161 of the Indian Contract Act, "If, by the default of the bailee, the goods are not returned, delivered, or tendered at the proper time, he is responsible to the bailor for any loss, destruction or deterioration of the goods from that time." In the instant case, the defendant became responsible for their return from the date of the decree and consequently if he did not return them to the bailor thereafter he was responsible to the bailor-plaintiff for their loss, provided the failure to return was not due to the 'default of the bailor'-'Default' is not defined in the Act, but according to the Oxford English Dictionary it means failure to perform some legal requirement or obligation so that unexplained failure to return the goods bailed would be presumed to be due to the default of the bailee. 4. So far as the liability of a bailee is concerned, Holt C. J, said in Coggs V. Bernard 92 E. R. 107. The borrower is bound to the strictest care and diligenee, to keep the goode, so as to restore them back again to the lender, because the bailee has a benefit by the use of them, so as if the bailee be guilty of the least neglect, he will be answerable: as if a man should lend another a horse, to go westward or for a month; if the bailee goes northward, or keep the horse above a month, if any accident happens to the horse in the northern journey, or after the expiration of the month, the bailee will be chargeable; because he has made use of the horse contrary to the trust be was lent to him under, and it may be that if the horse had been used not otherwise than he was lent, that accident would not have befallen him......But if the bailee put this horse in his stable, and he were stolen from thence, the bailee shall not be answerable for him. But if he or his servant leave the house or the stable door open, and the thieves take the opportunity of that, and steal the horse, he will be chargeable; because the neglect gave the the thieves the occasion to steal the horse but yet he shall not be chargeable where there is such a force as be cannot resist. This is, however, during the period the bailment continues, but once the purpose is accomplished or the time for their return has passed he is responsible as an insurer i. e. he becomes absolutely liable even without any negligence on his part if the goods are lost or destroyed. While they are so detained, "If a bailee elects to deal with the property entrusted to him in a way not authorised by the bailor, he takes upon himself the risks of so doing, except where the risk is independant of his acts and inherent in the property itself" per Grove J. in Lilley vs. Doubleday (1880) 7 QBD 510 at p. 511. In Shaw & Co. vs. Symmons & Sons (1917)1 KB; 799, the plaintiff entrusted books to the defendant, a bookbinder, to be bound under a contract to deliver them when bound to the plaintiff within a reasonable time as and when required by him. The plaintiff having required the defendant to deliver the whole of the books then bound, the defendant failed to deliver them within a reasonable time, and they were subsequently burnt in an accidental fire on his premises. It was inter-alia argued that there was no breach of the contract to deliver within a reasonable time and that, even if there was a breach, the defendants were not insurers, and further were protected by the notice upon their invoices and letter paper that they would not be answerable for loss or damage by fire. But Avory J. held:- ...I find as a fact, that a reasonable time for delivery had expired on January 20, and that the defendants committed a breach of contract in not delivering before that date Upon this finding of fact I think that the decisions in Davis vs. Garrott (1830) 6 Bing. 716, 724. and Lilley vs. Doubleday (1881) 7 QBD 510, approved in Royal Exchange Shipping Co. vs. Dixon & Co: (1886) 12 App. Cas. 11, 19 and more recently in Morrison & Co. vs. Shaw. Saviu and Albion Co. 716, 724. and Lilley vs. Doubleday (1881) 7 QBD 510, approved in Royal Exchange Shipping Co. vs. Dixon & Co: (1886) 12 App. Cas. 11, 19 and more recently in Morrison & Co. vs. Shaw. Saviu and Albion Co. (1916) 2 K. B. 783 are conclusive against the second and third contentions of the defendants. To quote the words of Tindal C. J. in Davis vs. Garrett (1830) 6 Bing. 716, 724, 'as a loss has actually happened whilst his wrongful act was in operation and force', they cannot set tip as an, answer to the action the bare possibility of a loss if their wrongful act had never been done. It is suggested that the principle of these decisions, does not apply to an act of omission as in the present case, but I am unable to appreciate the distinction for this purpose between a breach of contract in not delivering at another place. The reason is obvious. Till the date of the decree, the judgment debtor was liable as a bailee as he had a fight to be in possession of the goods as long as his godown charges were not paid. But once a decree was passed ordering him to return the goods unconditionally, he had no option but to return them to the decree-holder immediately. The purpose of bailment had been accomplished and the time for the return of the goods, had been unconditionally fixed as the date of the decree. If, therefore, he continued in possession of the goods even after the decree, he did so at his peril, because from, the date of the decree his possession was wrongful. If the judgment-debtor chose to continue in possession of the cloth because he had gone up in appeal against the trial Court's decree, he cannot plead his wrongful act as a defence to the plaintiff's claim. The defendant cannot thus escape his liability for the price of the cloth by simply stating at the bar that the goods have been destroyed by fire. 7. In the result, the appeal in partly allowed by disallowing the plaintiff's claim for interest. The appeal as to the rest is dismissed. There shall be no order as to the costs of this appeal. Appeal allowed