J. M. SHELAT, J. ( 1 ) THE question that was raised in the trial Court and which has been raised before us by Mr. Thakkar is whether the accused was suffering at the time of the incident in question from such unsoundness of mind that be did not know that the act which he was doing was wrong or that it was contrary to law. In order to establish this defense Mr. Thakkar has relied upon certain portions in the evidence of these witnesses. Apart from what we have already narrated Keshav Ramji has stated that the accused was not on any hostile or incordial terms with the deceased Jamna and Natha. Police Patel Naran has deposed that the accused in the past used to murmur that he was Suryavansi Arjun and that the village people of Bhandarda used to consider and treat the accused as a person who was half mad. There is also the evidence of P. S. I. Jagjivan that about a year prior to the date of the incident the accused had run away from his house getting half mad and he had been brought back by his relations to Pipalia. Similarly Ravji Keshav has deposed that during the year prior to the date of the incident the accused had become like a mad man and the village children used to chase him shouting that the mad man has come. Mr. Thakkar has contended that this part of the evidence suggested that the accused was suffering from certain hallucinations or delusions under which he considered himself to be a Suryavansi and Arjun and regarded his wife Jamna as Bhangdi presumably meaning thereby a woman who had given birth to an illegitimate son and his eldest son Natha as Karna the inveterate enemy of Arjun Mr. Thakkar has submitted that suffering as he was from these delusions and hallucinations the accused killed his wife Jamna and his son Natha believing that Natha was Karna and he being Arjun there would be nothing wrong in causing the death of his inveterate enemy Karna. Likewise he would not consider killing his wife Jamna as anything wrong as he was suffering from a delusion and hallucination that she was a woman who had given birth to an illegitimate son and was therefore contemptible and regarded her and in fact called her Bhangdi. Likewise he would not consider killing his wife Jamna as anything wrong as he was suffering from a delusion and hallucination that she was a woman who had given birth to an illegitimate son and was therefore contemptible and regarded her and in fact called her Bhangdi. ( 2 ) THE learned Assistant Government Pleader however submitted that these facts assuming that the accused was suffering from these hallucinations were insufficient to constitute that unsoundness of mind by reason of which the accused could be said to be incapable of knowing the nature of his act or that what he was doing was either wrong or contrary to law and that therefore the accused would not be entitled to the benefit of the general Exception laid down in sec. 84 of the Penal Code He drew our attention to two other facts which according to him indicated that the accused could not be suffering from any hallucinations or any unsoundness of mind. These facts were the fact of the accused having purchased lands in the previous year as deposed to by witness Amrut Raghunath and the fact of the accused having cultivated these lands According to the learned Assistant Government Pleader these two facts showed that the accused was certainly no suffering from any defect or infirmity of mind which would entitle him to the benefit of sec. 84. Now it is clear that under sec. 84 it is not every person mentally deceased who ipso facto is exempted from criminal responsibility. Such exemption is allowed only where the insane person is incapable of knowing the nature of the act or that he is doing what is either wrong or contrary to law. Sec. 84 lays down the legal test of responsibility in cases of alleged unsoundness of mind and it is by that test as distinguished from the medical test that the criminality of an act is to be determined. The provisions of sec. 84 are in substance the same as those laid down by the House of Lords in Mc Naughtons Case. Sec. 84 thus provides that a man who is by reason of unsoundness of mind prevented from controlling his own conduct and deprived of the power of passing a rational judgment on the moral character of the act he meant to do cannot be legally responsible for the act. Sec. 84 thus provides that a man who is by reason of unsoundness of mind prevented from controlling his own conduct and deprived of the power of passing a rational judgment on the moral character of the act he meant to do cannot be legally responsible for the act. Also if a man suffers under a partial delusion only but insane in other respects he must be dealt with as if the facts with respect to which the delusion existed were real. The fact therefore that the accused had in the preceding year purchased lands and had cultivated those lands would not by itself mean that he would Dot be suffering from delusions or hallucinations on certain matters or aspects which would render him incapable of either knowing the nature of the act or that the act which he was doing was wrong or contrary to law. There can however be no doubt that to establish a defense on the ground of unsoundness of mind the accused must affirmatively prove that at the time of committing the act he was doing under such a defect of reason as not to know either the nature and the quality of the act that he was doing or if he did know it he did not realise that what he was doing was either wrong or contrary to law. If he did know it he would be responsible and would not have the benefit of sec. 84. The mere fact that on former occasions he had been occasionally subject to insane delusions or had suffered from derangement of mind and subsequently he had behaved like a mentally deficient person is per se insufficient to bring his case within the exemption. The antecedent and subsequent conduct of the man is relevant only to show what the state of his mind was at the time when the act was committed. In other words so far as sec. 84 is concerned the Court is only concerned with the state of mind of the accused at the time of the act As stated in Russell on Crime (10th Edition) p. 58 the function of the Court and jury in cases where insane but whether the prisoner is or is not in law criminally responsible for his deed. 84 is concerned the Court is only concerned with the state of mind of the accused at the time of the act As stated in Russell on Crime (10th Edition) p. 58 the function of the Court and jury in cases where insane but whether the prisoner is or is not in law criminally responsible for his deed. It is from this aspect that we have to decide whether on the facts and the circumstances of this case the accused is entitled to the benefit under sec. 84 of the Penal Code. ( 3 ) MR. Thakkar laid considerable stress on the subsequent conduct of the accused and there from sought to argue that that conduct sufficiently indicated that the accused was and must be suffering from unsoundness of mind so as to make him incapable of distinguishing between right and wrong and. of being unable to realise that what he had done was either wrong or contrary to law. There was as pointed out by him a complete lack of motive on the part of the accused to commit such an extraordinary brutal act of killing his own wife and son with whom he had been as the evidence discloses not on any hostile or unfriendly relations. In the second place the evidence disclosed that there was no attempt on the part of the accused to conceal from any one the fact that he had caused the death of his wife and his son. On his way home he had stopped near the house of the Sarpanch and in the presence of the other villagers he had openly declared that he had caused the death of his wife and his son Natha. Even after disclosing this fact there was no attempt on his part to run away from the village or to conceal the incriminating items of evidence namely the blood-stained crowbar and the blood-stained Chorna nor had he made any effort to abscond from the village so as to escape the penalties of the law for the acts that he had committed. Apart from this fact there was the evidence as to the eccentric and unusual behavior on his part testified by the Police Patel of the village which showed that even prior to the date of the incident the accused used to murmur in the presence of others that he was Suryavansi and Arjun. Apart from this fact there was the evidence as to the eccentric and unusual behavior on his part testified by the Police Patel of the village which showed that even prior to the date of the incident the accused used to murmur in the presence of others that he was Suryavansi and Arjun. The cumulative effect of all these circumstances contended Mr. Thakkar was that the accused could not have been aware either of the wrongness of his act or its criminality. This conclusion is fortified by the fact that when the accused disclosed that he had killed his wife and his son he had indicated neither the repentance nor remorse for the acts which he had committed. These facts therefore argued Mr. Thakkar constituted a set of circumstances which clearly indicated that the accused was suffering from that infirmity of mind by reason of his being subject to the aforesaid hallucination in consequence of which he was not in a position to realise that what he was doing was either wrong or contrary to law. ( 4 ) THE learned Assistant Government Pleader on the other hand relied upon Kalicharan. V Emperor A. I. R. 1948 Nagpur 20 where it has been observed:- A person is presumed to be responsible for his action and the natural consequences thereof unless he affirmatively proves that he is entitled to exemption from criminal liability. In order to bring the case within the exemption under sec. 84 Penal Code the accused must prove that at the time of committing the offence he was labouring under a defect of reason which had been caused by unsoundness of mind with the result that he was rendered incapable of knowing the nature of the act and that he was doing what was either wrong or contrary to law. The learned Assistant Government Pleader relied upon another passage in this judgment wherein it has been observed:- A crime is not excused by its own atrocity. From the fact that the accused killed four persons is succession without any motive no inference can be drawn that his reason must have been affected by insanity temporarily. One must look outside the act itself for the evidence as to how much the accused knew about it. From the fact that the accused killed four persons is succession without any motive no inference can be drawn that his reason must have been affected by insanity temporarily. One must look outside the act itself for the evidence as to how much the accused knew about it. ( 5 ) (5) Similarly in Queen-Empress v. Lakshman Dagdu I. L. R. 10 Bombay 512 the facts were that the accused had killed his two children in respect of which he was charged with the offence of murder. The evidence of his wife was that he was fond of these two children. The accused had fever for five days and had not been able to go to work. He had become very irritable sensitive to noise and confused in his thoughts but he had not become delirious. On the day in question his wife had left him at 2 p. m. leaving the two children in his charge as usual one aged three and the other aged one. After the wife left him the two children began to cry which it was alleged annoyed him. He killed both the children. The evidence however disclosed that he had not shown any symptoms of insanity previously. After the killing of the two children the accused had made no attempt to escape. He also expressed no sorrow or remorse and surrendered himself to the police making a full confession before a Magistrate. It was held that the accused was conscious of the nature of his act and must therefore be presumed to have been conscious of his criminality. He was therefore found guilty of murder. ( 6 ) IN comparing the facts this case with the facts before us we may observe that the accused in Lakshman Dagdus case had himself assigned a motive for his crime though it was found insufficient and even unreasonable. It was therefore held that the fact that the accused had fever as a result of which he had become very irritable and sensitive to sound the his thoughts were confused was not sufficient to hold that he was not conscious to the nature of his act. It was held that as the accused was conscious to the nature of his act he must be presumed to have been conscious of its criminality. It was held that as the accused was conscious to the nature of his act he must be presumed to have been conscious of its criminality. In both the Nagpur and Bombay cases the defence mainly was of a sudden irresistible homicidal impulse on the part of the accused which caused a temporary intellectual aberration tat the time of the perpetration of the crime. That argument was negatived on the ground that a court of law would look for some clear and distinct proof of mental delusion or intellectual aberration existing previously to or at the time of perpetration of the crime. In King Emperor v. Gedka Goala I. L. R. (1937) 16 Patna 333 a decision relied upon by the learned Assistant Government Pleader it was held that a person is not entitled to exemption from criminal liability in case in which it is only shown that he is subject to insane impulses while the cognitive faculties remain so far as can be judged from his acts and words unimpaired. It was also held that where the Sessions Judge drew an inference of derangement of brain from the very nature of the act done by the accused such a test was inadequate and one must look outside the act itself for the evidence as to how much the accused knew about it. In the case of Gedka Goala absence of any motive a sense of secrecy want of prearrangement and want of accomplices were not found sufficient to constitute a defence under sec. 84. It was held that these circumstances by themselves wore Insufficient to support the inference that the accused suffered from unsoundness of mind of the kind referred to in sec. 84. ( 7 ) (7) It should be remembered that in all these three cases what was herd was that the facts found therein were Dot sufficient for a conclusion that the accused was suffering from some delusion-or intellectual aberration which would deprive him of the faculty of appreciating the nature of his act there being no evidence as to the symptoms of any insanity or infirmity of mind previously or at the time of the crime in question. It is thus clear that it is only that unsoundness of mind which materially impairs the cognitive faculty of the mind that of form a ground for exemption from criminal liability. It is thus clear that it is only that unsoundness of mind which materially impairs the cognitive faculty of the mind that of form a ground for exemption from criminal liability. The nature and the extent of the unsoundness of mind required must reach that stage as would make the offence incapable of knowing the nature of his act or that he is doing what is wrong or contrary to law. Two illustrations commonly cited to distinguish the two different conditions of mind may here be set out. A person strikes another and in consequence of an insane delusion believes that he is striking a bird. In such a case he does not know the nature of his act. In the other case he may kilt a child under an insane delusion that he is saving him from sin and sending him to heaven. Here he is incapable of knowing by reason of his insanity that he is doing what is morally wrong though he is aware of the nature of the act. ( 8 ) (8) In Ashiruddin Ahmed V. The King A. I. R. 1949 Calcutta 182 the accused in his dream was commanded by someone in paradise to sacrifice his own son of five years. The next morning the accused took his son to a mosque and killed him by thrusting a knife in his throat. He then went straight to his uncle but finding a chowkidar nearby took the uncle to a tank at some distance and slowly told him the story. It was held that of the three elements necessary to be established under Sec. 84 any one of which must be established by an accused to obtain the benefit of the provisions the first the nature of the act was clearly known to the accused the accused also knew that the act was contrary to law but he certainly did not know that the act was wrong. The accused was clearly of unsound mind and acting under the delusion of his dream he had made the sacrifice of his son believing it to be right. He was therefore entitled to the benefit of sec. 84. ( 9 ) (9) The facts in the case before us are different from those to be found in tie aforementioned cases decided by the High Courts of Nagpur Patna and Bombay. He was therefore entitled to the benefit of sec. 84. ( 9 ) (9) The facts in the case before us are different from those to be found in tie aforementioned cases decided by the High Courts of Nagpur Patna and Bombay. There is evidence of symptoms of the accuseds mind suffering previously from infirmity and delusions. There is the evidence that in the preceding year the accused had left his home and family suddenly and had to be brought home by his relations. There is also the evidence that his behaviour was such that the children of the village used to chase him calling him `half mad; and as the Police Patel has deposed the accused used to regard himself as Suryavansi and Arjun. Thus it is clear that he was suffering from a delusion or a hallucination that he was a pure blooded Suryavansi and Arjun of the Mahabharat. Coupled with this evidence as to this delusion there is the evidence that nothing had happened on the day of the incident to provoke the accused to commit the brutal act of killing his own wife and his eldest son with whom his relations were by on means unfriendly or uncordial. Immediately after killing them he openly told the Sar Panch addressing the latter as Bhisma Pitamaha again a famous and significant name in Mahabharat that he had killed Bhangdi meaning his wife and Karna meaning his son. Since the accused thought him self to be Arjun he could not have regarded the deceased Jamna the mother of his eldest son Natha as his wife. He called her and presumably regarded her as Bhangdi a term of absolute contempt presumably considering her as a person who had given birth to a son before marriage. Likewise he thought himself to be Arjun and regarded Karna in the form of his eldest son Natha as his inveterate enemy whom he must kill in self-defence not only of himself hut of his imaginary family. It would seem therefore that under the impact of this delusion the accused came back to the village just after committing the brutal deed and declared before the Sar Panch his terrible acts and if he was conscious or capable of knowing that his act was wrong or contrary to law he could have well concealed it. It would seem therefore that under the impact of this delusion the accused came back to the village just after committing the brutal deed and declared before the Sar Panch his terrible acts and if he was conscious or capable of knowing that his act was wrong or contrary to law he could have well concealed it. There was however no attempt on his part to conceal what he had done. Instead of concealing the deed that he had committed he declared openly before the Sar Panch and the other villagers that he had killed the persons whom he then believed as Bhangdi and Karna. He did not even conceal the two incriminating pieces of evidence against him namely the blood-stained crowbar with which he obviously committed the crimes and the blood-stained Chorna on his person. He obviously felt no remorse nor repentance He must have believed that what he had done was neither wrong nor contrary to law. There can thus be no question that the accused at this time was suffering and was subject to delusions which incapacitated him from being conscious that what he had done was wrong though he was aware of the nature of the acts committed by him. These facts thus are not on the same footing as the facts in the cases before the High Courts of Nagpur Bombay and Patna where the defence was based merely on a sudden homicidal impulse said to have been suffered by the accused and the insanity which was sought to be traced from the criminal acts committed by the accused in those cases. Unlike those cases we have before us evidence to suggest that the accused was suffering from symptoms of unsoundness of mind as a result of the delusions and hallucinations suffered by him. In these circumstances we are of the view that the evidence on record clearly indicates one of the three alternative provided for in sec. 84 of the Penal Code namely that though conscious of the nature of the acts committed by him the accused was not in a position to appreciate and realise that the acts committed by him were either wrong or contrary to law. In these circumstances the accused is entitled to the benefit of the provisions of sec. 84. 84 of the Penal Code namely that though conscious of the nature of the acts committed by him the accused was not in a position to appreciate and realise that the acts committed by him were either wrong or contrary to law. In these circumstances the accused is entitled to the benefit of the provisions of sec. 84. ( 10 ) THE order of conviction and sentence passed therefore by the learned Sessions Judge Sorath on the accused must be set aside and the appeal must be allowed. Though we acquit the accused he cannot be discharged at this stage from the custody he is in. For his own security and that of others we propose that the accused should be continued in jail until Government gets him examined by the medical authorities of the State and till he is found by them sufficiently fit to be released from jail custody. Under sec. 471 Criminal Procedure Code the action that we have proposed and the order which we are making accordingly should be reported to Government. Order accordingly. .