Judgment Kanhaiya Singh, J. 1. Ram Babu Gupta, opposite party, was convicted by the magistrate under Section 406 of the I. P. C., and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for six months and to pay a fine of Rs. 500/-, or, in default, to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a further period of three months. On the relevant date the opposite party was the Joint Secretary of the Patna City Hosiery Industrial Co-operative Society. The allegation against him was that while employed in the Society as Joint Secretary, he defalcated a sum of Rs. 3,300/-. On appeal the learned Addl. Sessions Judge acting under Sec. 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, directed that the opposite party be released on probation subject to his executing a bond for being of good behabiour and to keep the peace for a period of three years and to revive the sentence when called upon during the said period. He further directed that during this period he would be under the supervision of Shree Rajendra Prasad, Probation Officer, Patna, and would execute a bond of Rs. 1000.00 with two sureties of like amount and further that he would not be permitted to leave Patna and would work in the cooperative regularly as recommended, if permitted by the Society to do so. He further ordered that on the bond being executed, he would not have to undergo the sentence of imprisonment and also to pay the fine imposed upon him. 2. Against that order the complainant has filed the present application in revision. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that it was not a fit case for release of the opposite party on probation of good conduct because it was not established beyond doubt that he was under twentyone years of age. 2. Against that order the complainant has filed the present application in revision. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that it was not a fit case for release of the opposite party on probation of good conduct because it was not established beyond doubt that he was under twentyone years of age. In this connection he referred to the provision of Sec. 6 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, which is in the following terms: "6(1) When any person under twentyone years of age is found guilty of having committed an offence punishable with imprisonment (but not with imprisonment for life), the court by which the person is found guilty shall not sentence him to imprisonment unless it is satisfied that, having regard to the circumstances of the case including the nature of the offence and the character of the offender, it would not be desirable to deal with him under Sec.3 or Sec. 4, and if the court passes any sentence of imprisonment on the offender, it shall record its reasons for doing so. (2) For the purpose of satisfying itself whether it would not be desirable to deal under Sec.3 or Sec. 4 with an offender referred to in Sub-section (1), the court shall call for a report from the probation officer and consider the report, if any, and any other information available to it relating to the character and physical and mental condition of the offender." 4. In order to appreciate the full implication of Sec. 6, it will be necessary to consider the scope and effect of the provision of Sec. 4 also of the said Act. In order to appreciate the full implication of Sec. 6, it will be necessary to consider the scope and effect of the provision of Sec. 4 also of the said Act. Sec. 4 provides as follows: "4(1) When any person is found guilty of having committed an offence not punishable with death or imprisonment for life and the court by which the person is found guilty is of opinion that, having regard to the circumstances of the case including the nature of the offence and the character of the offender, it is expedient to release him on probation of good conduct, then, notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, the court may, instead of sentencing him at once to any punishment, direct that he be released on his entering into a bond, with or without sureties, to appear and receive sentence when called upon during such period, not exceeding three years, as the court may direct, and in the meantime to keep the peace and be of good behaviour: Provided that the court shall not direct such release of an offender unless it is satisfied that the offender or his surety, if any, has a fixed place of abode or regular occupation in the place over which the court exercises jurisdiction or in which the offender is likely to live during the period for which he enters into the bond. (2) Before making any order under Sub-section (1), the court shall take into consideration the report, if any, of the Probation Officer concerned in relation to the case. (3) When an order under Sub-section (1) is made, the Court may if it is of opinion that in the interests of the offender and of the public it is expedient so to do, in addition pass a supervision order directing that the offender shall remain under the Supervision of a Probation Officer named in the order during such period, not being less than one year, as may be specified therein, and may in such supervision order impose such conditions as it deems necessary tor the due supervision of the offender. (4) The court making a supervision order under Sub-section (3) shall require the offender, before he is released, to enter into a bond, with or without sureties to observe the conditions specified in such order and such additional conditions with respect to residence abstention from intoxicants or any other matter as the court may, having regard to the particular circumstances, consider fit to impose for preventing a repetition of the same offence or a commission of other offences by the offender. (5) The court making a supervision order under Sub-section (3) shall explain to the offender the terms and conditions of the order and shall forthwith furnish one copy of the supervision order to each of the offenders, the sureties, if any, and the probation officer concerned." The appellate court in fact has released the opposite party on probation of good conduct in accordance with the provisions of Sec. 4. The provision of Section 4 vests in the court a discretion to release a person found guilty of having committed an offence not punishable with death or imprisonment) for life. It is really for the court, by which the person is found guilty, to determine, having regard to the circumstances of the case including the nature of the offence and the character of the offender, whether or not it will be expedient to release him on probation of good conduct. It is only when the court forms an opinion that in a given case the offender should be released on probation of good conduct that the court acts as provided in Sec. 4. Where, however, the court is not satisfied about the justification of a release on probation of good conduct, it will certainly impose upon the offender penalty as provided by the Indian Penal Code. In case of offenders under twentyone years of age, special provision has been made in Sec. 6. Where any person under twentyone years of age is found guilty of having committed an offence punishable with imprisonment (but not with imprisonment for life), the court by which he is found guilty shall not sentence him to imprisonment unless in its opinion his case is not deemed worthy of consideration either under Sec.3 or Sec. 4 of the Act. Where any person under twentyone years of age is found guilty of having committed an offence punishable with imprisonment (but not with imprisonment for life), the court by which he is found guilty shall not sentence him to imprisonment unless in its opinion his case is not deemed worthy of consideration either under Sec.3 or Sec. 4 of the Act. In other words, Sec. 6 imposes a duty upon the court not to subject such juvenile offenders to a sentence of imprisonment unless it is satisfied that his case docs not fall within the purview of Sec. 4 of the Act. Even in that case while passing any sentence of imprisonment on him, the court shall have to record its reasons for doing so. Sec. 6, therefore, lays down a special provision in respect of offenders under twentyone years of age. Section 4 is general. It applies to all kinds of offences, whether under or above twentyone years of age. The only limitation imposed by Sec. 6 is that in the first instance an offender under twentyone years of age will not be sentenced to imprisonment. He will be sentenced to imprisonment only when the court thinks, having regard to the circumstances of the case including the nature of the offence and the character of the offender, that it was not in the interest of justice to deal with his case under Sec.3 or Sec. 4 of the Act. In the instant case the appellate court dealt with the opposite party under Sec. 4 of the Act. Whether or not he was under twentyone years of age is, therefore, of little consequence. The contention of learned counsel, therefore, has no merit and must be rejected. 5. Another contention made by learned counsel is that in any event the appellate court had no jurisdiction under the provisions of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, to remit the sentence of line. This contention is not warranted on the express provisions of Sec. 4 of the Act. Sec. 4 empowers the court in appropriate cases to release any offender on probation of good conduct "instead of sentencing him at once to any punishment". Sec. 4 speaks of punishment and not of imprisonment. This contention is not warranted on the express provisions of Sec. 4 of the Act. Sec. 4 empowers the court in appropriate cases to release any offender on probation of good conduct "instead of sentencing him at once to any punishment". Sec. 4 speaks of punishment and not of imprisonment. The court will not punish him in any manner if on the facts it is satisfied that a particular person guilty of the offence of the nature enumerated in Sec. 4 should be released on his entering into a bond. The word punishment, therefore, is wide enough to comprehend both the punishment of imprisonment and the punishment of fine. Therefore, Sec. 4 empowers a court to remit the fine also and on the plain wording of the section it will be unreasonable to contend that remission of fine was not within the competency of the court. I think the appellate court had jurisdiction to remit both the sentence of fine and the sentence of imprisonment. 6. Next it was contended that the learned Addl. Sessions Judge should have allowed costs and compensation to the petitioner as provided in Sec. 5 of the Act. Sec. 5 no doubt empowers the court to grant in appropriate cases compensation and costs but this also is in the discretion of the court. The court will allow compensation and costs only when it thinks fit in any case. It seems [hat no prayer was made before the appellate court for directing the opposite party to pay to the petitioner compensation and costs of the proceeding. It is purely a question of discretion. When no such prayer was made or when the court in its discretion did not allow costs and compensation, this court sitting in revision cannot interfere with the discretion of the court which does not appear to have been exercised capriciously and unreasonably. This grievance also has no foundation. 7. There is no merit in this application which is accordingly dismissed.