JUDGMENT M.S. Menon, J. 1. The petitioner has been assessed to agricultural income tax for the assessment year 1958-59 under the Agricultural Income Tax Act, 1950. This petition challenges the validity of that assessment under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. 2. The assessment order concerned is Ext. P1 dated 10-3-1959. The notices demanding the tax and surcharge are Exts. P. 4 and P. 5 dated 21-3-1959. 3. The State's power to impose taxes on agricultural income is derived from Entry 46 in List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. According to Article 366(1) of the Constitution "agricultural income" means "agricultural income as defined for the purpose of the enactments relating to Indian Income Tax". The definition of "agricultural income" in S.2(1)(a) of the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922, is "any rent or revenue derived from land which is used for agricultural purposes, and is either assessed to land revenue in the taxable territories or subject to a local rate assessed and collected by officers of the Government as such". 4. S.2(a)(1) of the Agricultural Income Tax Act, 1950, defines "Agricultural Income" as "any rent or revenue derived from land which is used for agricultural purposes". The definition does not contain the words "and is either assessed to land revenue in the taxable territories or subject to a local rate assessed and collected by officers of the Government as such" occuring in S.2(1)(a) of the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922, and the first contention before us is that the omission of those words of restriction is fatal to the validity of the Agricultural Income Tax Act, 1950 5. We are not inclined to accept the contention. In AIR 1941 F. C. 72 it was contended that the word "property" used in the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act, 1937, did not distinguish between agricultural land and other property, that it was not limited in terms to the latter and that as a result the Act was beyond the competence of the Indian Legislature in so far as its operation might affect agricultural land in the Governors' Provinces. It was also contended that if the Act were held to be in part beyond the competence of the Indian Legislature, its provisions were not severable and so could not even affect property other than agricultural land. It was also contended that if the Act were held to be in part beyond the competence of the Indian Legislature, its provisions were not severable and so could not even affect property other than agricultural land. Gwyer C. J. said : "No doubt, if the Act does affect agricultural land in the Governors 'Provinces, it was beyond the competence of the Legislature to enact it; and whether or not it does so must depend upon the meaning which is to be given to the word 'property' in the Act. If that word necessarily and inevitably comprises all forms of property, including agricultural land, then clearly the Act went beyond the powers of the Legislature; but when a legislature with limited and restricted powers makes use of a word of such wide and general import, the presumption must surely be that it is using it with reference to that kind of property with respect to which it is competent to legislate and to no other. The question is thus one of construction, and unless the Act is to be regarded as wholly meaningless and ineffective; the Court is bound to construe the word 'property' as referring only to those forms of property with respect to which the Legislature which enacted the Act was competent to legislate; that is to say, property other than agricultural land."; and: "On this view of the matter, the so - called question of severability on which a number of Dominion decisions, as well as decisions of the Judicial Committee, were cited in the course of the argument does not arise. The Court does not seek to divide the Act into two parts, viz., the part which the Legislature was competent, and the part which it was incompetent, to enact. It holds that, on the true construction of the Act, and especially of the word 'property' as used in it, no part of the Act was beyond the Legislature's powers. The Court does not seek to divide the Act into two parts, viz., the part which the Legislature was competent, and the part which it was incompetent, to enact. It holds that, on the true construction of the Act, and especially of the word 'property' as used in it, no part of the Act was beyond the Legislature's powers. There is a general presumption that a Legislature does not intend to exceed its jurisdiction; and there is ample authority for the proposition that general words in a statute are to be construed with reference to the powers of the Legislature which enacts it." In AIR 1959 SC 1002 the Supreme Court cited this decision with approval and said: "It is now well settled that there is a general presumption that the legislature does not intend to exceed its jurisdiction, and it is a sound principle of construction that the Act of a sovereign legislature should, if possible, receive such an interpretation as will make it operative and not inoperative". 6. Counsel for the petitioner drew our attention to the following passage in AIR 1950 SC 124 : "Where a law purports to authorise the imposition of restrictions on a fundamental right in language wide enough to cover restrictions both within and without the limits of constitutionally permissible legislative action affecting such right it is not possible to uphold it even so far as it may be applied within the constitutional limits, as it is not severable. So long as the possibility of its being applied for purposes not sanctioned by the Constitution cannot be ruled out, it must be held to be wholly unconstitutional and void". This passage came up for discussion in AIR 1952 Bombay 16. Chagla C. J. said: "The case was not of the Legislature using an expression of wider import, but a case where the Legislature had used two different expressions and the attempt was to approximate those two expressions to the expression used in the Constitution. Further, the Supreme Court was not considering the competence of the Legislature at all. What it was considering was whether the Act offended against the fundamental rights guaranteed to the citizen. It was in this connection that Mr. Justice Sastri made the observation". and: "It was the test of severability that Mr. Justice Sastri was applying. Further, the Supreme Court was not considering the competence of the Legislature at all. What it was considering was whether the Act offended against the fundamental rights guaranteed to the citizen. It was in this connection that Mr. Justice Sastri made the observation". and: "It was the test of severability that Mr. Justice Sastri was applying. As we said before, on the view that we take, we are not dealing with a case of severability but with a case where we have to put a particular construction upon the expression used by the Legislature." 7. In the Bombay case the contention was that the words "any purpose" in Bombay Act No. II of 1950, would include "purposes of the Union" and the Act was hence ultra vires of the State Legislature. Chagla C. J. said : "There is no doubt that if the State Legislature by Act II of 1950 conferred power upon the Government to requisition land for any purpose without any limitation or qualification, then the Act would be ultra vires the Legislature. But there is a very important principle which must be borne in mind in construing a statute. It must always be presumed that a Legislature knows the limits of its competence and that it is acting within the limits set up by the Constitution and not outside those limits. If possible a construction should be placed upon a statute which would put it within the limits of the competence of the legislature rather than outside those limits". 8. Judged in the light of the principles mentioned above, we must hold that the words, "and is either assessed to land - revenue in the taxable territories or subject to a local rate assessed and collected by officers of the Government as such", in S.2(1)(a) of the Indian Income tax Act, 1922, are implicit in the definition of "agricultural income" in S.2(a)(1) of the Agricultural Income Tax Act, 1950, and that the Act is not ultra vires the powers of the State Legislature. 9. Apart from all these considerations, it has also to be noted that the petitioner has not been assessed in respect of any income which does not come strictly within the ambit of the definition of "agricultural income" in S.2(1)(a) of the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922. 9. Apart from all these considerations, it has also to be noted that the petitioner has not been assessed in respect of any income which does not come strictly within the ambit of the definition of "agricultural income" in S.2(1)(a) of the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922. Nothing has been done to his detriment as a result of the definition of "Agricultural income" in S.2(a)(1) of the Agricultural Income Tax Act, 1950, and in such a case we do not see why we should be called upon to pronounce upon the validity or otherwise of that definition. The powers conferred on this Court by the Constitution are intended not for an academic review of the Statute Book, but for the redress of substantial grievances actually suffered and specifically brought up for consideration. 10. Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the legislative history of the Agricultural Income Tax Act, 1950, will rebut the presumption that the Legislature did not intend to exceed its jurisdiction. The Act before its extension to the whole of Kerala by the Travancore-Cochin Agricultural Income Tax (Amendment) Act, 1957, with effect from 1-4-1957, was called the Travancore - Cochin Agricultural Income Tax Act, 1950. The definition of "Agricultural Income" in the Bill that became that Act contained the words of restriction. It would appear that those words were deleted by the Select Committee and the Bill was passed into law without those words. We are unable to spell from the omission, however, any deliberate attempt on the part of the Legislature to transgress the limitations imposed by the Constitution or a rebuttal of the presumption that it did not intend to do so. 11. The second contention urged before us is that S.2A of the Agricultural Income Tax Act, 1950, violates the equality before the law, guaranteed by Art.14 of the Constitution. The provision embodied in the section was first introduced into the Act by the Agricultural Income Tax (Amendment) Ordinance, 1959, as S.2(oo) with effect from 1-4-1957. It became S.2A when the Ordinance was replaced by the Agricultural Income Tax (Amendment) Act, 1959, with effect from 1-4-1957. 12. The Ordinance and the Act were necessitated by the decision of this Court in 1958 KLT 1144 = 1958 KLJ 1286 . It became S.2A when the Ordinance was replaced by the Agricultural Income Tax (Amendment) Act, 1959, with effect from 1-4-1957. 12. The Ordinance and the Act were necessitated by the decision of this Court in 1958 KLT 1144 = 1958 KLJ 1286 . It was held therein that the income derived from lands in Malabar prior to the formation of Kerala on 1-11-1956 cannot be the subject of a levy under the Act. In that case the learned Advocate - General also raised the contention that at least the income which accrued subsequent to 1-11-1956 could be assessed in the assessment year 1957-58. The contention was negatived on the ground that "the period is less than the 12 months required to constitute a previous year under the definition in S.2(o) of the Act and no assessments under the Act could be validly had for the income during such period". 13. The contention was negatived on the ground that "the period is less than the 12 months required to constitute a previous year under the definition in S.2(o) of the Act and no assessments under the Act could be validly had for the income during such period". 13. S.2(o) of the Act defines the expression "Previous year" as follows: " 'Previous year' means” (i) the twelve months ending on the 31st day of March preceding the year for which the assessment is to be made or, if the accounts of the assessee have been made up to a date within the said twelve months in respect of a year ending on any date other than the said 31st day of March, then at the option of the assessee the year ending on the day to which his accounts have so been made up : Provided that, if the option has once been exercised by an assessee, he shall not exercise it again so as to vary the meaning of the expression 'previous year' as then applicable to him except with the consent of the Agricultural Income Tax Officer and upon such conditions as he may think fit; or (ii) such period as may be determined by the Commissioner in the particular case of any person or class of persons." S.2A which was introduced subsequent to the decision in 1958 KLT 1144 = 1958 KLJ 1286 with effect from 1-4-1957 is in the following terms : "Notwithstanding anything contained in clause (o) of S.2, 'previous year' for the assessment for the financial year commencing from the 1st day of April, 1958 and in so far as such assessment relates to the agricultural income derived from lands situated in the Malabar District referred to in sub-s.(2) of S.5 of the States Reorganisation Act, 1956 (Central Act XXXVII of 1956), shall be the whole period commencing on the 1st day of November, 1956 and ending on the 31st day of March, 1958, or, if the accounts of the assessee have been made up to a date within the financial year ending on the 31st day of March, 1958, then, at the option of the assessee, the period commencing on the 1st day of November, 1956 and ending on the aforesaid date to which the accounts have been so made up: Provided that (i) notwithstanding anything contained in S.3 and 56, the agricultural income tax and supertax chargeable on the total agricultural income of the previous year as reckoned in the section shall be at the rates applicable to the 'average annual income' according to the Schedule; Such 'average annual income' shall be an amount bearing to the aforesaid total agricultural income the same proportion as the period of twelve months bears to the period of the previous year as defined in this section; and (ii) the limit for exemption from chargeability to tax shall be determined with reference to the 'average annual income'." 14. It is not disputed that as a result of S.2A the previous year for assessment in the financial year 1958-59 can vary from 5 months and a day to 17 months and that only in the case of those assessees whose accounting year commenced on 1-11-1956 will it form a full period of 12 months as in the case of assessees of income from lairds in the Travancore - Cochin area of the State where the levy was in force since 1-4-1951. There can be no doubt that the previous year determined under S.2A can in certain cases act to the detriment of the assessees as it ignores the fact that agricultural income is essentially seasonal in character and is apparently based on the assumption that it is the same in every month throughout the year. 15. Various examples as to how S.2A will act to the detriment of the assessees were mentioned before us by counsel for the petitioner in this and the other petitions heard along with it. The detriment varied, quite naturally, with the previous year visualised and the month in which the crop was gathered. The question before us, however, is not whether a better formula should not have been evolved but whether there is discrimination within the meaning of Art.14 of the Constitution either as between assessees of agricultural income from Malabar lands or between them and the recipients of such income in the Travancore-Cochin area of the State. 16. The general principles that should be borne in mind in adjudging on the constitutionality of any law attacked as discriminatory should now be considered as beyond controversy. 17. As pointed out by the Supreme Court in 1960 (1) SCA 25 "the meaning, scope and effect of the provisions of Art.14 of our Constitution have been fully dealt with, analysed and laid down" by the Supreme Court in AIR 1955 SC 191 and AIR 1958 SC 538 . In the former case the Court said: "It is now well - established that while Art.14 forbids class legislation, it does not forbid reasonable classification for the purposes of legislation. In the former case the Court said: "It is now well - established that while Art.14 forbids class legislation, it does not forbid reasonable classification for the purposes of legislation. In order, however, to pass the test of permissible classification two conditions must be fulfilled, namely, (i) that the classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons or things that are grouped together from others left out of the group and (ii) that that differentia must have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the statute in question. The classification may be founded on different bases; namely, geographical or according to objects or occupations or the like. What is necessary is that there must be a nexus between the basis of classification and the object of the Act under consideration. The classification may be founded on different bases; namely, geographical or according to objects or occupations or the like. What is necessary is that there must be a nexus between the basis of classification and the object of the Act under consideration. It is also well establised by the decisions of this Court that Article 14 condemns discrimination not only by a substantive law but also by a law of procedure." In the latter case the Court quoted the above passage with approval and added: "The decisions of this Court further establish:-- (a) that a law may be constitutional even though it relates to a single individual if, on account of some special circumstances or reasons applicable to him and not applicable to others, that single individual may be treated as a class by himself; (b) that there is always a presumption in favour of the constitutionality of an enactment and the burden is upon him who attacks it to show that there has been a clear transgression of the constitutional principles; (c) that it must be presumed that the Legislature understands and correctly appreciates the need of its own people, that its laws are directed to problems made manifest by experience and that its discriminations are based on adequate grounds; (d) that the Legislature is free to recognise degrees of harm and may confine restrictions to those cases where the need is deemed to be the clearest; (e) that in order to sustain the presumption of constitutionality the Court may take into consideration matters of common knowledge, matters of common report, the history of the times and may assume every state of facts which can be conceived existing at the time of legislation; and (f) that while good faith and knowledge of the existing conditions on the part of a Legislature are to be presumed, if there is nothing on the face of the law or the surrounding circumstances brought to the notice of the court on which the classification may reasonably be regarded as based, the presumption of constitutionality cannot be carried to the extent of always holding that there must be some undisclosed and unknown reasons for subjecting certain individuals or corporations to hostile or discriminating legislation". 18. 18. The Legislature in enacting S.2A has proceeded on the basis that the assessees could be classified for the purposes of that section according to the accounting periods adopted by them. It is not contended, quite correctly, that the section permits any discrimination as between assessees having the same accounting period. It must follow that the second contention also has to be negatived. 19. The learned Advocate - General emphasised the fact that the infirmities alleged related solely to the rate applicable to the income of 5 months in one particular year (1-11-1956 to 31-3-1957) and submitted that the sole reason for S.2A was the fortuitous circumstances of the Kerala State coming into being on 1-11-1956. The following passage from 51 American Jurisprudence 240 was quoted with approval by a Full Bench of this Court in 1958 KLT 1144 = 1958 KLJ 1286 : "The principle appears to be deductible from the decisions that discriminations due to fortuitous circumstances arising out of the peculiar situation in which one or some particular tax payers find themselves are generally not invalid under requirements as to equality and uniformity in taxation, where it appears that such taxpayer or taxpayers are not singled out for special treatment and not taxed by a method which is not uniformly applied to other taxpayers of the same class". 20. We were told that there can be certain cases of assessments to which S.5(m) of the Act will not apply and that the assessments in such cases will be made on the gross income of the assessee without any deduction for the expenses incured. According to the learned Advocate - General this contention is unsustainable in law. He submitted that the expenses in all such cases can and will be taken into account under S.5(j) of the Act. We record the submission. 21. The third and last contention urged before us is that the surcharge levied under the Kerala Surcharge on Taxes Act, 1957, is a tax on a tax and such a tax is unsustainable under the Constitution. We record the submission. 21. The third and last contention urged before us is that the surcharge levied under the Kerala Surcharge on Taxes Act, 1957, is a tax on a tax and such a tax is unsustainable under the Constitution. S.2 of the Act reads as follows: "The income tax or supertax payable by any person assessed to such tax under the Agricultural Income Tax Act, 1950, shall be increased by a surcharge at the rate of five per centum of the tax payable each year, and the provisions of the Agricultural Income Tax Act, 1950 shall apply to the levy and collection of the said surcharge." The surcharge contemplated by the section is certainly not a tax on a tax. The "base" of the tax -- the object to which the tax applies -- is not the tax assessed under the Agricultural Income Tax Act, 1950, but the agricultural income itself. It is hence unnecessary to consider whether a tax on a tax is possible under the Constitution. 22. Our attention was invited to Art.271 of the Constitution: "Notwithstanding anything in Art.269 and 270, Parliament may at any time increase any of the duties or tax referred to in those articles by a surcharge for purposes of the Union and the whole proceeds of any such surcharge shall form part of the Consolidated Fund of India". Such a provision cannot possibly mean that the States cannot increase a tax which they can levy under the Constitution by the imposition of a surcharge as has been done by the Kerala Surcharge on Taxes Act, 1957. 23. In the light of what is stated above the petition has to be dismissed though in the circumstances of the case without any order as to costs. Judgment accordingly. 24. It was submitted that the other points raised in this petition and the petitions heard along with it may be left open for decision in the appeals filed by the assessees. We do so.