Union of India v. Bikaner Textiles — 1960 DIGILAW 124 (RAJ)

BHARGAVA, J.—This first appeal is filed on behalf of the defendants in a suit for recovery of Rs. 12, 913/3/-and is directed against the judgment and decree of the District Judge, Bikaner dated 7th December, 1954. 2. The Bikaner Textile Merchants Syndicate Ltd., through its liquidators instituted a suit on 27.5.53 against the Union of India and the Northern, Western and Central Railways for recovery of Rs.12913/3/- as compensation for non-delivery, shortage and damage to their goods which were booked from Bori Bundar Railway Station to Bikaner. It is alleged that out of a consignment of 265 bales of cloth which were booked on 19.1.48,261 bales were delivered to the plaintiff on 15.3.48. Out of the remaining 14 bales, 4 were delivered to the plaintiff on 18.10.49. The remaining 10 bales were not delivered at all. It is alleged that the cloth in 14 bales out of the lot delivered on 15.3.1948 had become wet and damaged and the loss is assessed at Rs. 2911/10/-. In seven bales out of the same lot it is alleged that there was a shortage of cloth worth Rs.1299/14/9. In 4 bales which were delivered on 18.10.49 there was a shortage of cloth in two bales worth Rs. 871/12/6. Rs.7830/7/3 are claimed as compensation representing the price of 10 bales of cloth which were not delivered to the plaintiff. According to the plaintiff the cause of action for filing the suit arose on 30th May, 1952 when the defendants finally refused to give delivery of the goods. 3. Many pleas were taken in the written statement. It was contended that the liquidators had no right to file the suit. Notice under Sec. 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure was not valid. The suit was not filed within limitation and that the non-delivery of the goods was due to a running train theft and not on account of any negligence or carelessness on the part of the Railway Administration and the plaintiff is not entitled to the amount of compensation claimed by it. 4. The learned District Judge decided all the issues in favour of the plaintiff and decreed the plaintiffs full claim. 5. 4. The learned District Judge decided all the issues in favour of the plaintiff and decreed the plaintiffs full claim. 5. Aggrieved by the said decision the defendants have come in appeal and it has been contended before us: (i) that the learned District Judge was in error in holding the suit to be within limitation, (ii) that the non-delivery of 10 bales was due to a theft in the running train and no; due to any default on the part of the Railways. (iii) that the plaintiff has not proved the price of the goods claimed by it by any satisfactory evidence. Though the questions regarding the validity of notice under Sec. 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure and the plaintiffs right to institute the suit were raised by the learned counsel at the time of arguments, yet finally they were not pressed before us and it is therefore not necessary to discuss them. 6. Before taking up the question of limitation which has been mainly argued before us we would like to dispose of the other two points urged on behalf of the appellant. It is urged by the learned counsel for the appellant that the plaintiff has in this case failed to prove that there was any negligence or carelessness on the part of the Railway Administration for the loss of 10 bales which were not delivered to it. On the contrary there is sufficient evidence on the record to show that the loss was due to theft in the running train. He has relied upon the evidence of D. W. 2 Devisingh and D. W. 3 Ramchander. D. W. 2 Devi Singh is a district police constable who was on escort duty with the goods train which carried the disputed bales of cloth. He deposed that the train started from Bori Bundar Station on 21st March, 1948 at 1.50 A. M. and that he had checked the label seals and rivets and had found them intact. D. W. 2 Devi Singh is a district police constable who was on escort duty with the goods train which carried the disputed bales of cloth. He deposed that the train started from Bori Bundar Station on 21st March, 1948 at 1.50 A. M. and that he had checked the label seals and rivets and had found them intact. The train stopped at a place between Thana and Dabra station for about 2 minutes at about 2.30 A. M. and when it had passed Dabra station he witnessed one bale falling down from the wagon near the cabin and then another bale falling down on which he asked the guard to stop the train, and saw that one door of the 6th wagon in which the bales were loaded was open. He then informed the Sub Inspector of Police, Kalyan Railway Station on phone. On a further search he found three more bales at little distance from that place. In his cross-examination he admitted that at the place where the train had stopped for two minutes he had checked the wagon and had found that the seals were intact. He further admitted that at the place where the bales were found no foot marks were noticed. According to his statement there were no locks on the wagon. Rivets can easily be broken. If there is pressure of the bales from inside the rivets can give way. D. W. 8 Ramchander who was a Sub Inspector of police at Kalyan Station has deposed that a report was received that an account of the opening of the door of wagon No. 5696, 15 bales of cloth have been stolen therefore he reached the place of occurrence and made some investigations in connection with that report. According to the statement of this witness four persons were challened in connection with this theft and were convicted to two months imprisonment under Sec. 411 of the Indian Penal Code. In cross-examination he has admitted that near the place where the bales were found no foot marks could be discovered on account of the rains. He also admitted that the rivets of the right side of this wagon were found broken and there was no lock on the left side. In cross-examination he has admitted that near the place where the bales were found no foot marks could be discovered on account of the rains. He also admitted that the rivets of the right side of this wagon were found broken and there was no lock on the left side. There was another witness examined on behalf of the defendants viz., D.W. 1 Vishwanath who was a booking clerk at Bori Bunder Railway Station in 1948 and who admitted in cross-examination that no locks were put on the wagon. It is significant to note that the first report about the theft of the bales in question having taken place had not been placed on the record. The telephonic message which was sent by I}. W. 2 Devisingh and which is Ex. A. 11 does not make any mention of any theft having ! taken place. Mr. Ghogali who was the guard of the goods train has not been examined and his report which is of course on the record remains unproved. Neither the police report nor the judgment of the Magistrates court who convicted the four persons accused of theft has been placed on the file of this case. It is curious that the defendants did not take proper steps to prove the plea of theft by producing material documents and witnesses who were easily available to them. We are not impressed by the evidence of D. W. 2 Devisingh and we entertain serious doubts about any theft having taken place in the running train. He admits that the labels and the seals were intact when the train started at 1.50 A.M. from Bori Bunder Station. He further admits that these labels were intact even at the place where the train had stopped for two minutes between Thana and Dabra and then a little while after he saw bales falling down from the wagon. Neither any man was found inside the wagon nor were any foot marks indicating the entry or escape of any person from the wagon were found near that place. The weight of each bale was about 4 maunds and they could not have been carried by the thieves unless some arrangement for their transport was near at hand. No such arrangements were found at the time. The weight of each bale was about 4 maunds and they could not have been carried by the thieves unless some arrangement for their transport was near at hand. No such arrangements were found at the time. Another important factor which heavily weighs against the defendants is that inspite of the fact that after the delivery of 251 bales in March, 1948 plaintiff had been repeatedly asking the Railway authorities to deliver the rest of the bales, but in none of their replies the fact of theft was disclosed. It is only after four years that in Ex. 4 dated 30th May, 1952 this fact is revealed. This creates a serious doubt about the defendants case regarding theft having taken place on the night of 21st March, 1948. No explanation is forthcoming as to why this fact was not disclosed to the plaintiff earlier. In view of these circumstances and of the meagre evidence which has been placed on record on behalf of the defendants we cannot hold that the loss occurred on account of any theft in the running train. In this state of the evidence the learned District Judge was justified in giving his finding that the defendants have not satisfactorily proved that the goods were stolen. Learned counsel at the close of his arguments submitted an application for allowing him to produce further evidence to prove the fact of theft. No such request was made before the trial court. The application is not supported by an affidavit to explain the reasons for production of the documents at this last stage. Even the particulars of the documents which are now sought to be produced are not mentioned in the application. We do not see any reason to allow any additional evidence to be produced at this stage of the case, particularly when no such application was made before the trial court. As stated earlier the wagon in which these bales were loaded had only rivets on either side and no locks were put on the wagon as admitted by D. W.I and D.W. 3. The question that arises is as to whether the defendants as bailee had acted prudently in not putting locks on the wagon specially when its contents were very heavy and as admitted by Devisingh the rivets on the wagon could easily give way on account of the bales from inside. The question that arises is as to whether the defendants as bailee had acted prudently in not putting locks on the wagon specially when its contents were very heavy and as admitted by Devisingh the rivets on the wagon could easily give way on account of the bales from inside. The degree of care which a bailee is required to take is given in sec. 151 of the Indian Contract Act which runs thus:— "In all cases of bailment the bailee is bound to take as much care of the goods bailed to him as a man of ordinary prudence would, under similar circumstances, take of his own goods of the same bulk, quality and value as the goods bailed". Now looking to the bulk and the value of the goods failure on the part of the railway administration to put any locks on the wagon is certainly an act which a man of ordinary prudence would not do under similar circumstances and in our opinion it amounts to wilful neglect on their part. Reference in this connection may be made to Bengal North-Western Railway vs. Bansidhar (1), and Jainarain, Lachminarain Vs. G. I. P. Rly. Co.(2). This contention has therefore, no force. As regards the compensation for the loss of 10 bales the plaintiff has claimed Rs. 7830/7/3 as the price of the cloth contained in them. In para 6 of the plaint the price of these bales was specifically mentioned by the plaintiff but the defendants did not plead that it was not valued correctly by the plaintiff. In Ex. 4 which is the defendants reply Rs. 760/3-have been accepted as price of one bale. The contention raised by the learned counsel is that the plaintiff should have proved the price of the cloth on the date on which the loss occurred to it. What the plaintiff has done in this case is that it has proved the value of the goods on the date they were despatched from Bori Bandar. In our opinion this contention has no force. It does not appear from any evidence on the record that the price or the cloth bad gone down after the date of consignment. The plaintiff has produced the Beejaks to prove the price for which these goods were purchased and we do not think why it should not be accepted as its correct value. It does not appear from any evidence on the record that the price or the cloth bad gone down after the date of consignment. The plaintiff has produced the Beejaks to prove the price for which these goods were purchased and we do not think why it should not be accepted as its correct value. There is no substance in the above argument and "we hold that the amount of compensation claimed by the plaintiff for the loss of 10 bales has been correctly assessed by the trial court. 7. Now we come to the question of limitation which has been argued at considerable length on both sides before us. The compensation claimed is firstly in respect of 10 bales which were not delivered to the plaintiff and secondly in respect of the shortage or damage to the cloth which occurred in some of the bales delivered to the plaintiff. Learned counsel at first argued that Art. 30 would apply to the suit claim including the claim for 10 bales which were not delivered to the plaintiff and relies upon Union of India Vs. Amarsingn (2), Gangadhar Ramchandar, a firm, Vs. Dominion of India(4), Oudh and Tirhut Railway Vs. Mrs. Karamchand Parasram(5), and the Dominion of India Vs. Batehuramiah Chetty & sons(6). 8. In Union of India Vs. Amar Singh, (3) their Lordships did not finally decide the point whether Art.30 or Art.31 applied but it was assumed that Art. 30 applied. 9. In Gangadhar Ram Chandars case, (4) the facts were that 240 bags of rape seed were booked and all the 240 bags were delivered but out of these 7 had been cut and there was a resultant shortage of 3 maunds and 35 seers. This case is quite distinguishable as it was not a case of non-delivery of goods. 10. In Oudh and Tirhut Railways case (5), Desai J on facts found the loss of goods proved and therefore held that Art. 31 was applicable while Beg J. with whom Mukerjee J. agreed held that loss of goods was not proved and Art. 31 applied to the circumstances of the case. This case also is of no assistance to the appellant. 11. The Dominion of India Vs. Batchu Ramaials Chetty and sons (6), is also a case in which all the packages were delivered to the plaintiff but the contents were short and damaged. 12. This case also is of no assistance to the appellant. 11. The Dominion of India Vs. Batchu Ramaials Chetty and sons (6), is also a case in which all the packages were delivered to the plaintiff but the contents were short and damaged. 12. In our opinion Art.30 applies to those cases where there is a loss or injury to the goods while Art.31 refers to cases of non-delivery or delay in delivery of the goods. As we have already observed that the appellants have failed to show that there was any of goods so far as the 10 undelivered bales are concerned. We hold that Art.31 would, properly apply to the plaintiffs claim for non-delivery of these bales. 13. The next contention of the learned counsel is that the plaintiffs claim is beyond time even if Art.31 applies to it. Art.31 of the Indian Limitation Act reads:— Description of suit. Period of Limitation. Time from which period begins to run. Art. 31. Against a carrier for compensation for non-delivery or delay in, delivering goods. One year. When the goods ought to be delivered. The argument proceeds on the ground that in cases falling under this Article time would begin to run from the date when the goods ought to be delivered, a phrase occurring in the third column of the Article. According to him the phrase ought to be delivered denotes a period within which the goods in the normal course are delivered by the carrier where no date of delivery is fixed by contract. According to him the normal period which is required for a consignment to reach Bikaner from Bori Bundar is one moth to if months according to the statement of P. W. 4 Durga Shanker who was a goods clerk at Bikaner. 14. Learned counsel further urges that in cases where a part of the goods consigned have been delivered to the plaintiff it should be presumed that the part undelivered ought to have been delivered on the same date. According to him in such cases there is no room for extension of the period of Imitation simply because some correspondence goes on between the plaintiff and the Railway authorities and the latter finally tells the former that the goods will not be delivered. He relies upon the following cases in support of his argument. Balli Ma1 and others Vs. According to him in such cases there is no room for extension of the period of Imitation simply because some correspondence goes on between the plaintiff and the Railway authorities and the latter finally tells the former that the goods will not be delivered. He relies upon the following cases in support of his argument. Balli Ma1 and others Vs. Dominion of India(7) Dominion of India Vs. Amin Chand Bholanath(8) Gajanand Rajgoria and another Vs. Union of India (9) Shambhuram Agarwala Vs. Union of India,(1) Darjeeling Himalyan Rly. Col. Ltd. and others Vs. Jethmul Bhojraj and another, (11). Union of India Vs. Meghraj Agarwal, (12). Gajadhar Shaw Vs. Union of India, (13). Secretary of State Vs. The Dunlop Rubber Co. Ltd., Delhi, (14). Lal Chand Vs. The Union of India, (15). Ram Ratan Vs. Union of India, (16) Gopi Ram Gouri Shankar Vs. G. I. P. Ry. Co. (17). Rajmal Pahar Chand Vs. Dominion of India (18). 15. On behalf of the respondent it is submitted that the starting point of limitation under Art. 31 is when the Railway authorities finally refuse to deliver the goods and this principle equally applies to cases where part of the consignment has been delivered to the plaintiff. Reliance is placed on the following decisions. The Union of India Vs. Girraj Prasad (19), Bengal and North Western Ry. Co. Vs. Kameshwar Singh Bahadur(2o), The Governor General in Council Vs. Kasiram Marwari(21), Mutsaddi Lal Vs. Governor-General in Council(23) M.A.P. Palanichami Nadar Vs. Governor-General in Council (24), The Governor General in Council Vs. Messrs, Khadi Mandali(2 5), Lalchand Chowdhury Vs. Union of India (26), Dominion of India Vs. S. G. Ahmed(27), Governor of Mysore Vs. Kapur Chand and Bros (26), Manassarovar Agencies Vs. Governor General in Council(29), Union of India Vs. Adam Hajee Peer Mohammad Essack(3o), Muhammdi Steamship Co. Vs. Kesenshih Vallaab Das (31) and Dominion of India Vs. Amin Chand Bholanath(32). 16. It is not necessary to discuss each case separately but an examination of the cases cited on behalf of the parties reveals that there is a considerable divergance of opinion regarding the starting point of limitation under Article 31. Even in the same High Court the opinion is not uniform. Amin Chand Bholanath(32). 16. It is not necessary to discuss each case separately but an examination of the cases cited on behalf of the parties reveals that there is a considerable divergance of opinion regarding the starting point of limitation under Article 31. Even in the same High Court the opinion is not uniform. One view is that the time begins from the date when the goods ought to have been delivered in the normal course of business and where there is a part delivery of the goods it should be presumed that the undelivered part ought to have been delivered on the same date. The other view is that in cases of non-delivery either of the whole consignment or a part of it where there is a demand for the delivery of the goods by the plaintiff and the Railway authorities hold out a promise to deliver the goods after they have made enquiries and then finally tell the plaintiff that the goods can not be delivered, time begins to run when delivery of the goods is finally refused. Yet another view is that it is a question of fact in each case as to when the goods ought to be delivered and there is no hard and fast rule of fixing the starting point of limitation. The phrase ought to be delivered used in Art. 31 does not mean ought to be delivered in the normal course. If the Legislature wanted to give that meaning to this phrase it could have said so by adding the words in the normal course after the words ought to be delivered. It is again a matter of common knowledge that the goods often do not arrive at the destination within the normal time due to several intervening factors. It may be that the wagon in which the goods are loaded is detained at a particular station or the goods are missent or a strike takes place or a breach occurs on the line. If this view were to be accepted then the plaintiff will have to file a suit in such cases after the expiry of the normal time required for the delivery of the goods even though the chances of delivery may still be there. There will thus be a great risk of the suit being thrown out as premature. If this view were to be accepted then the plaintiff will have to file a suit in such cases after the expiry of the normal time required for the delivery of the goods even though the chances of delivery may still be there. There will thus be a great risk of the suit being thrown out as premature. Again it may be that the plaintiff after the expiry of the normal time of the delivery enquires from the Railway authorities as to why the goods have not reached the destination and he is told that investigations are going on and after their completion goods will be delivered to him. Would it be justifiable for the plaintiff even in such cases to rush to the court as soon as the normal period for delivery of the goods expires? In our opinion this could not be the intention of the legislature in using the phrase ought to be delivered in Art.31 of the Indian Limitation Act. It is true that in cases where no time of delivery is fixed the carrier is bound to deliver the goods within a reasonable time but what is reasonable time is a question of fact and depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. With regard to cases where the view taken is that where part of the consignment has been delivered the time for filing a suit for compensation for the undelivered part would begin to run from the date of the part delivery we may say with great respect that this rule also cannot be universally applied. In cases where the goods are carried in several wagons or where the railway authorities promise to deliver the remaining part after holding enquiries, this rule will obviously have no application. In our opinion the correct view is that it is a question of fact in each case as to when the goods ought to be delivered depending upon the circumstances of each case. In our opinion the correct view is that it is a question of fact in each case as to when the goods ought to be delivered depending upon the circumstances of each case. This would apply to those cases also where upon a demand being made by the plaintiff correspondence ensues and the Railway authorities hold out the promise to deliver the goods and in the end refuse to deliver or express their inability to deliver the goods because due to those circumstances plaintiffs right to bring an action is postponed by an act of the defendant and if he brings a suit he will be non-suited on the ground that there is still a chance of the goods being delivered to him. To us that appears to be the correct interpretation of the phrase ought to be delivered used in Art. 31 of the Indian Limitation Act. The same view was taken in a Bench Decision of this Court in the Union of India Vs. Girraj Prasad(19) which unfortunately was not brought to the notice of the learned Judges who decided Lok Chand Vs. The Union of India,(15) and Ram Ratan Vs. Union of India,(16). In Lokchand Vs. The Union of India,(15) in fact it was not the plaintiffs case that any promise was held out to him for the delivery of the part of the consignment and the case is distinguishable on this ground too. In Ramratan Vs. Union of India it was in fact a case where the whole consignment had been delivered and some short-gage of goods was discovered and the observations made in that case appear to be obiter although in the earlier part of the judgment it was observed by the learned Judge that "a question when the goods ought to be delivered in a case where there is no fixed time for delivery will be a question of fact depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case and which have to be established by the evidence." If we may say so with respect we agree with these remarks and this is exactly what was said in earlier cases of this Court in The Union of India Vs. Girraj Prasad (19). Girraj Prasad (19). In Mutsadi Lals case (24) it was held: The phrase when the goods ought to be delivered means the point of time at which the carrier undertakes to deliver the goods or the date when the carrier informs the consignee that it would be delivered or when the carrier communicates to the consignee its inability to deliver the goods on a reasonable date that may be fixed on a consideration of events subsequent to the handing over of the consignment to the carrier for carriage." 16. In Dominion of India Vs. Amin Chand Bhola Nath on which both the parties rely on the view taken in the earlier cases of that court in Dominion of India Vs. Messrs. Khurana Bros(33) and Rajmal Pahar Chand Vs. Dominion of India(18), — was overruled and it was observed that: — "Now when goods are handed over to a carrier there is no stipulation that the entire consignment will be carried in the same wagon. The consignment may be carried in different wagons. Even if the goods are loaded at the starting station in one wagon they may be split up enroute in view of traffic conditions. It is also possible that in case of accident, for example, flood, fire or collusion etc. part of the goods salvaged may be delivered earlier than the remaining portion and yet both the portions may be delivered within reasonable time. It appears to me that the carrier is under an obligation to deliver the whole of the consignment as well as part of the consignment within reasonable time and this must be computed according to the circumstances or each case." "It may be and it can be said that generally it is that in many cases the fact that part of the consignment was delivered within certain time has ample bearing in deciding this matter, but it cannot follow as a matter of law that that time must be held to be reasonable time also for the undelivered part I am therefore of the opinion that in cases of partial non-delivery or partial late delivery of the consignment also limitation under Art.31 starts on the expiry of reasonable time when the goods ought to have been delivered and I say so with due respect to the Judges who have come to different conclusions in this matter." 17. The same view has been expressed in other cases which have been relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondents and also in some of the cases relied on behalf of the appellant. With great respect we prefer to accept the view which was expressed by the learned Judges of this Court in The Union of India Vs. Girraj Prasad (19). 18. In the present case as we have observed above 251 bales were of course delivered on 15th March,1948 but on further correspondence 4 bales were again delivered on 18th October, 1949 i.e., after one year and seven months. The plaintiff still persisted in his demand for the delivery of the remaining bales and the defendants reply vide Ex. 21 dated the 18th of January, 1950 was that the matter is under correspondence with the railway concerned and he would be advised in due course. On 3rd April, 1950 vide Ex. 22 he was informed that the matter is receiving attention. On 3rd May, 1950 vide Ex. 23 he was again informed that the matter is receiving attention. On 16th May, 1950 vide Ex.24 he was informed that the matter is under correspondence with the railways concerned. On 26th June, 1950 vide Ex. 25 he was informed that the matter is still under inquiry with the foreign railways. It is by their letter Ex. 4 despatched on 30th May, 1952 that for the first time the defendants repudiated their liability. The plaintiff in the plaint has specifically mentioned that the cause of action for filing the suit arose on the receipt of the defendants letter Ex.4. On these facts where part of the goods consigned was delivered one year and seven months after the delivery of the 251 bales and even after that the plaintiff was being consistently told that the matter was still under inquiry with the foreign railways it would be quite reasonable and in consonance with the language used in Article 31 that the cause of action for filing of suit arose to the plaintiff when the railway authorities finally refused to deliver the goods. We, therefore, hold that the plaintiffs suit for compensation with regard to the delivery of 10 bales of cloth is within time having been filed within one year from the date of Ex. 4 as that is in the circumstances the reasonable time the goods ought to have been delivered. We, therefore, hold that the plaintiffs suit for compensation with regard to the delivery of 10 bales of cloth is within time having been filed within one year from the date of Ex. 4 as that is in the circumstances the reasonable time the goods ought to have been delivered. 19. We may here note that it was argued on behalf of the appellant that the plaintiff had not asked the railway authorities through its letters to give him the delivery of the goods but had only claimed compensation, and therefore, the correspondence and the final refusal on the part of the railway authorities would not extend the period of limitation. It would be sufficient to say in this connection that the defendant has not produced these letters and in their absence we can not hold that no demand for the delivery of goods was made by the plaintiff. No request to plaintiff for these documents was made by the defendants at the time when Exs.18, 25 were admitted in evidence or at any later stage of the case. We are now on this stage asked to permit the defendant to put-in these letters. As we already observed there are no sufficient grounds to allow the defendants to put-in additional evidence in appeal when no such request was made before the court. That apart we do not see any difference where instead of a demand for delivery of the goods a demand for compensation is made to the railway authorities. A demand for compensation only means that either the goods may be given or else compensation may be paid. 20. As regards the loss suffered by the plaintiff on account of shortage and damage to the goods by wet in other bales received by it on 15th March, 1948 and 18th October, 1949 it is urged by; the learned counsel for the appellant that the proper article applicable would be Art. 30 of] the Indian Limitation Act and the court below was in error in applying Art. 31 of the limitation Act to this part also. On the other hand learned counsel for the respondents contends that to this part of the compensation also Art. 31 would be applicable or at any rate this suit is within limitation on the basis of Ex. On the other hand learned counsel for the respondents contends that to this part of the compensation also Art. 31 would be applicable or at any rate this suit is within limitation on the basis of Ex. 4 in which the defendant made a promise to pay him the compensation in respect of this loss. 21. In our opinion on the principle set out above proper article applicable to this part of the claim would be Art. 30 of the Limitation Act. This being so claim for Rs. 2911/10/-. Rs. 1,299/14/9 and 871/12/6 is clearly beyond the period of limitation prescribed under the said Article as the less or injury to the goods occurred more than a year before the suit was filed, 22. As regards the respondents contention that their suit should be taken to be within time on the basis of Ex. 4 it is to be noted that in this letter the railway authorities only offered to pay compensation on certain terms which were not acceptable to the plaintiff. This is not a promise of the kind mentioned in Sec. 25(3) of the Indian Contract Act. In our opinion the plaintiff cannot base his claim on this document. 23. The result is that this appeal is partly allowed. The judgment and decree of the learned District Judge is modified. The plaintiffs suit would now stand decreed for a sum of Rs. 7830/7/3 instead of Rs. 12930/13/6 as decreed by the court below. The plaintiff will get proportionate costs of both the courts. The defendants will pay this amount within a period of three months from today. Plaintiffs suit for rest of the amount is dismissed.