ORDER These are applications in revision by the witnesses against whom, it has been ordered, by the Sessions Judge, under Sec. 479-A Cri. Pro. Code, after hearing their cause, that complaints should be filed in respect of certain statements by them in Sessions Court and in the Committing Court, both of which could not be true, and one of which was necessarily false, and that within the knowledge of the deponent. 2. These arise out of Sessions Case 35 of 1959 of Indore District. The learned Sessions Judge has referred to passages in their evidence before the committing court and before the Sessions Court itself, and has described them as "blatantly contradictory". These very passages will form part of the respective complaints. In effect, they stated in the Court of commitment that they saw one of the accused persons at the scene of the murder with a weapon in his hand, and that he asked them not to come near as they were paying off old scores. In the sessions Court they said that they did not see this accused at that place, and he did not tell them that they should proceed no further. Each of the applicants stated in the Sessions Court that what he was telling there was the truth, and what he had told the committing Magistrate was false, and that he had been persuaded under threats by the police. They seem also to have filed applications to that effect. The learned Sessions Judge remarks in his judgment (Paragraph 31) : "On their own admission, they have gives intentionally false evidence before the committing Court. In my view, they have done so here. Whatever may be the truth, their guilt is certain." In all such cases of a flagrant incompatibility between two statements, both on oath and at two stages of the same judicial proceedings the question is not which of them is true and which of them is false. But it is, whether both of them can be true. In the present case, both of them cannot be true and one of them necessarily false and by the very nature of the statements, false to the knowledge of the witness. But it is, whether both of them can be true. In the present case, both of them cannot be true and one of them necessarily false and by the very nature of the statements, false to the knowledge of the witness. The learned Sessions Judge has also given a finding that it is necessary in the interest of justice that there should be firm action and they should be prosecuted for the offence of perjury, words that have the same effect as the relevant part of Section 479-A (1) Cri. Pro. Code. 3. Having delivered the judgment with this decision in regard to these two witnesses, the learned Sessions Judge gave them an opportunity to show cause; having considered the cause for what it is worth, directed that complaints should be filed, this being after the judgment in Sessions Case. 4. Besides urging that on the facts, it is not expedient in the interest of justice that these two witnesses should be prosecuted under section 193 for the offence of giving false evidence, and that one of them Rameshwar is aged 15, certain points of law have been raised. I note that similar as is the case against either of the witnesses there is one difference. The applicant Rameshwar is a boy of about 15 years. The learned Sessions Judge has not in his order considered the effect of this fact His application (No. 53/60) is admitted only on that ground; otherwise the reasoning in this judgment will apply equally to the applications. 5. In both, the point of law sought to be raised is that though the learned Sessions Judge has proceeded ostensibly under the new S. 479-A Criminal Procedure Code, he has not really conformed to its provisions. It is urged, to begin with, that Sec. 479-A excludes Sec., 476 of the Code. In a case in which it was possible for the Court to proceed under the new Section, and it has failed to do so, it can no more proceed under Sec. 476 after the delivery of judgment. Something to this effect being implied in Sub-section (6) of Sec. 479-A and we can proceed on the assumption that this contention by the applicant is correct. The question, therefore is, whether the learned Sessions Judge has acted really under Sec. 479A. 6. Something to this effect being implied in Sub-section (6) of Sec. 479-A and we can proceed on the assumption that this contention by the applicant is correct. The question, therefore is, whether the learned Sessions Judge has acted really under Sec. 479A. 6. The second ground urged by the applicants is that the order under Sec. 479-A (1) that the complaint should be filed, has been made after the delivery of the judgment in the Sessions Case. It is argued that the criminal court loses the jurisdiction to act under Sub-section (1), the moment it delivers the judgment; this complaint having made later on, is one without jurisdiction, and should as such be quashed in exercise of revisional powers. In my opinion, this is based on a misunderstanding and also a failure to appreciate the real effect of certain rulings which have been cited and will be examined presently. All that Sub-sec. (1) requires is that at the time of the delivery of the judgment the Court should record a finding with reasons that "for the eradication of the evils of perjury and the fabrication of false evidence and in the interests of justice," it is expedient that the witness should be prosecuted for the offence which appears to have been committed by him. But this is only a provisional order. An opportunity to show cause has to be afforded to the witness, and the final order directing the complaint may be made only after giving due regard to the cause, if any, shown by him. This means a notice (and hearing on it) which will necessarily take place, after the delivery of the judgment in the criminal case, unless, of course, having decided that there should be a prosecution for perjury, the Court postpones the delivery of the judgment itself. But there is nothing in sub-sec, (1) calling upon the Court to do this and synchronise the judgment in the case, with the order under Sec. 479-A Cri. P. C. In the judgment itself, the Court should record its finding in regard to the witness and his evidence in the manner already mentioned; then it would be delivered thereby terminating the proceeding in the original case. P. C. In the judgment itself, the Court should record its finding in regard to the witness and his evidence in the manner already mentioned; then it would be delivered thereby terminating the proceeding in the original case. Simultaneously with the delivery of judgment, a new proceeding should be opened, calling upon the witness to show cause why in view of what has already been recorded in the judgment, a complaint should not be filed against him, in regard to the evidence; after giving due regard to the cause the appropriate order should be made. This is exactly the position in the present case and there has been no irregularity. 7. In the case reported in Dr. B. K. Pal Chaudhary v, State of Assam, AIR 1960 SC 133 the direction for complaint had been made by the appellate Court (High Court) under S. 479-A (5). The Supreme Court has ruled : "In a case governed by sub-sec. (5) of S. 479-A the terms of both sub-secs. (1) and (5) have to be complied with. The combined effect of these sub-sections is to require the court intending to make a complaint to record a finding that in its opinion a person appearing as a witness has intentionally given false evidence and that for the eradication of the evils of perjury and in the interests of justice, it is expedient that such witness should be prosecuted for the offence and to give the witness proposed to be proceeded against, an opportunity of being heard as to whether a complaint should be made or not....... Where therefore in the order passed by the High Court directing complaint to be filed against a witness there was no finding recorded by it that the witness had intentionally given any false evidence or that it was expedient to proceed against him for the eradication of the evils of perjury and in the interests of justice, and further the High Court did not give the witness a proper hearing to which he was clearly entitled under the terms of sub-section (5) of Sec. 479-A...... the order was made in breach of the express provisions of the Section and could not be allowed to stand." Here, the objection was not that the complaint itself was made after the delivery of the appellate judgment but the requirements of sub-sections (1) and (5) in regard to the recording of the reasons and the opportunity to show cause have not been followed. There is nothing in this suggesting that the Court filing the complaint, whether original or appellate, should, having recorded the appropriate reasons under sub-sec. (1), suspend the judgment in the original case till the disposal of the show cause proceeding. 8. In (In re, S. Abdul Jabbar, AIR 1958 Andh Pra 469), the position was that there was no recording of the reasons in the judgment of the original case as required by sub-section (1) and the proceedings for prosecution for perjury were started quite afresh afterwards. In Jai Bir Singh V. Malkhansingh, AIR 1958 All 364 , the Sessions Judge actually and expressly proceeded under Sec. 476 Cri. Pro. Code. So, these rulings have no application. In the present case, the reasons required by sub-section (1) have been given substantially to the same effect, though not in exactly the same words, in paragraph 31 of the Sessions case judgment. The show cause proceedings, however, were taken up after delivery of that judgment and the final order directing the complaint was made, very naturally, sometime after the disposal of the original case, which is inevitable, unless the judgment in the original case is suspended meanwhile. But this is not a requirement of the section 479-A (1) Cri Pro. Code. 9. The third ground is that the Sessions Judge has found that what the witness stated in the committing Court was false and what he stated in his own court was true. Thus, as far as the Sessions Court is concerned, there was no perjury, and if any court was to file complaint, it was the committing Court. Code. 9. The third ground is that the Sessions Judge has found that what the witness stated in the committing Court was false and what he stated in his own court was true. Thus, as far as the Sessions Court is concerned, there was no perjury, and if any court was to file complaint, it was the committing Court. In my opinion, this argument is based on a misunderstanding of the Sessions Judge's opinion and of the requirements for a prosecution under Sec. 193 I. P. C. In the passage already quoted, the Sessions Judge says in so many words that while the witness asserted that his statement in the committing Court was false and that in the Sessions Court is true, he, for his part, was of the opinion that the statement in the Sessions Court was false. But this is not the real point. The real point is that for a prosecution under Sec. 193 I. P. C. it is not necessary, and it would be in most cases impossible, to assert in the complaint, or to find in the judgment, which of the two statements is true and which is false. All that is necessary is that there should be two statements so flagrantly contradictory that both cannot possibly be true, and this impossibility of both being true should be such as to lead to an inference, that the maker of the statements should necessarily have known this. The complaint would mention the statements made on the two different occasions, the evidence would prove that they were so made, and the finding should be that one of them was necessarily false to the knowledge of the deponent. In this state of affairs, if the two statements have been made in two different Courts, at two different stages of the proceedings each of the two would, subject to the other requirements of law, be competent to file the complaint. 10. In the result, I find no substance in any of the three grounds urged by the applicant. The application No. 67 of 1960 by witness Ramchandra is dismissed summarily. The other application numbered 53 of 1960 is admitted for the consideration only of the question, whether in view of his age, it is really just and expedient that a complaint should be filed against this witness.