Judgment 1. In the suit which is the subject matter of this appeal the plaintiff prayed for a declaration that certain alienations made by Musammat Sidei Kuar (defendant No. 4) were not binding upon him and that since Musammat Sidei Kuar had remarried and had forfeited her right to the estate of her former husband, the plaintiff was entitled to recover possession of the alienated properties. The transactions with which we are concerned in this case are Exhibit H, a kebala dated 28-8-1936 executed by defendant No. 4 in favour of defendant No. 1, Exhibit D, a Rehan deed executed on 5-3-1937, by defendant No. 4 in favour of defendant No. 1 and Exhibit F, a Mukarrari deed dated 23-4-1937 executed by defendant No. 4 in favour of defendant No. 1. The case of the plaintiff is that Ratan Singh, the first husband of defendant No. 4, died on 4-10-1915, and defendant No. 4 remarried in the year 1940 or 1941. The lower appellate court has found that the plaintiff was the adopted son of the next reversioner of Ratan Singh and the suit was maintainable by the plaintiff as against the alienees of the widows estate. It has also been found by the lower appellate court that these transactions are not supported by legal necessity, and the suit was not barred under Article 141 of the Limitation Act. The lower appellate court has accordingly granted a decree in favour of the plaintiff, declaring that these transactions are not binding upon the plaintiff and that be was entitled to recover possession of these properties. 2. On behalf of defendant No. 1, who has preferred this appeal learned counsel did not dispute the findings of the lower appellate court with regard to the absence of legal necessity and also on the question that the plaintiff was the adopted son of the next reversioner. Learned Counsel, however, contended that the suit was barred under Article 125 of the Limitation Act, and the Period of limitation was twelve years from the date of alienation by the widow. We do not accept the contention as correct. In our opinion, the proper Article to apply to this case is Article 143 of the Limitation Act which provides a period of twelve years from the date of forfeiture of the estate. 3. We do not accept the contention as correct. In our opinion, the proper Article to apply to this case is Article 143 of the Limitation Act which provides a period of twelve years from the date of forfeiture of the estate. 3. It was contended by learned counsel on behalf of the appellant that Article 141 of the Limitation Act will not apply to this case and the expression death used in that Article refers to the natural death of the widow, and not civil death, which occurs when the remarriage of a widow takes place. In support of his contention learned Counsel referred to the decision of the Calcutta High Court in Tilottama Dasi V/s. Madhu Sudan Giri, AIR 1928 Cal 714. But learned counsel conceded that there are authorities which take contrary view, namely Ganpat V/s. Narayan, AIR 1930 Nag 204, Sawai Ram V/s. Arjan Singh, AIR 1930 Lah 294. We do not think it is necessary to decide this point. In our opinion, the suit is governed by Article 143 of the Limitation Act because there was forfeiture of the estate of the widow under Sec.2 of the Hindu Widows Re-marriage Act (1856) which reads as follows: "(2) All rights and interests which any widow may have in her deceased husbands property by way of maintenance, or by inheritance to her husband or to his lineal successors, or by virtue of any will or testamentary disposition conferring upon her without express permission to remarry, only a limited interest in such property, with no power of alienating the same shall upon her re-marriage cease and determine as if she had then died; and the next heirs of her deceased husband, or other persons entitled to the property on her death, shall thereupon succeed to the same". It is manifest that the present case is of forfeiture of the widows estate and is governed by Article 143 of the Limitation Act. If this view is correct, then the suit is not barred by limitation, and the argument of learned counsel for the appellant must be rejected. 4. But as regards two of the transactions, namely Exhibits D and H, the point taken on behalf of the appellant is that the plaintiff had attested these documents executed by the widow, and so the plaintiff was estopped from asserting that these documents are voidable for absence of legal necessity. 4. But as regards two of the transactions, namely Exhibits D and H, the point taken on behalf of the appellant is that the plaintiff had attested these documents executed by the widow, and so the plaintiff was estopped from asserting that these documents are voidable for absence of legal necessity. In our opinion, this argument is well founded and must prevail. It was pointed out by their Lordships of the Judicial Committee in Ramgouda Annagouda V/s. Bhausaheb, 54 Ind App 396 : (AIR 1927 PC 227), that a case of estoppel arises in these circumstances and the plaintiff having attested the document with full knowledge of the contents is precluded from disputing the validity of the alienations made by the widow. It was also pointed out in that case that alienations by the widow were not void but voidable at the instance of the reversioner, and that the plaintiff was estopped from questioning the validity of the transactions on the ground of absence of legal necessity. A similar principle was laid down by this High Court in Jankiram Sital Ram Firm V/s. Chota Nagpur Banking Association Ltd. 17 Pat LT 697 : (AIR 1937 Pat 169) in which the doctrine of estoppel has been elaborately explained. In our opinion the principle laid down in these two authorities applies to the present case, and the plaintiff is precluded by the doctrine of estoppel from questioning the validity of the two transactions, Exhibit H dated 28-8-1936 and and Exhibit D dated 5-3-1937. With regard to the question of attestation by the plaintiff it was pointed out by learned counsel for the appellant that D.W.9 Amir Singh has said in course of his evidence that the plaintiff attested these documents after they were read over to him. We have looked into the evidence of this witness and are satisfied that there is sufficient evidence on the record to show that the plaintiff did attest the two documents with full knowledge of their contents. We are of opinion that the principle of estoppel applies to the documents in question and the plaintiff is precluded from challenging the validity of these two documents on the ground of absence of legal necessity. We, therefore, hold that the plaintiffs suit must fail with regards to these two documents and must be dismissed with regard to those two documents. We, therefore, hold that the plaintiffs suit must fail with regards to these two documents and must be dismissed with regard to those two documents. As regards the other documents Exhibit F, the Mukarrari deed dated 23-4-1937, executed by defendant No. 4 in favour of defendant No. 1 no question of estoppel arises and the suit of the Plaintiff with regard to possession of the properties covered by the document will stand decreed. 5. For these reasons we allow this appeal to the extent indicated above and modify the decree of the lower appellate court accordingly. 6. We accordingly allow this appeal to the extent indicated above. Parties will bear their own costs throughout.