JUDGMENT Dhavan, J. - This is an appeal by the National English School and its head master against an order of Mr. Justice Tandon dismissing their petition under Article 226 of the Constitution directed against an order of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer, Allahabad dated 13-10-1958 releasing a certain house in favour of Dr. Patiram who is Respondent No. 2 in this appeal and the owner of that house. The facts very briefly are these. In the year 1938 a school for the education of little children was established in the Katra area of Allahabad under the name of the National English School. A gentleman by the name of Mr. IA Khan was one of its founders and its first head master. The school was established in 132 Katra which is the house in dispute. At that time the school was managed by a committee which was unregistered body. In 1952 the landlord Patiram filed a suit in the court of Munsif West Allahabad for the ejectment of the school on the ground of willful default in payment of rent. Needless to say, the school was sued through its secretary Beni Prasad Agarwal, A decree for ejectment was passed on 1-5-1954 which was confirmed on appeal both by the learned Civil Judge and by this Court in second appeal. 2. On 2-8-1958 Mr. IA Khan the head master of the school applied to the District Magistrate, Allahabad for the allotment of the house to him under the control of Rent and Eviction Act. In his application Mr. Khan stated that a decree for ejectment had been passed at the instance of the owner which if carried out would result in the closing down of the school. He also pointed out that nearly 200 students were receiving education at this school and therefore, it was in the public interest that it should continue to function in the same building. The District Magistrate acceded to Mr. Khan's request and passed the usual allotment order in his favour directing the owner to let the house to Mr. IA Khan. A few days later Mr. Khan wrote to the District Magistrate thanking him for the allotment of the house in his name. The District Magistrate acceded to Mr. Khan's request and passed the usual allotment order in his favour directing the owner to let the house to Mr. IA Khan. A few days later Mr. Khan wrote to the District Magistrate thanking him for the allotment of the house in his name. He undertook a personal liability to pay rent to the landlord and concluded his letter with this sentence, "I am now in possession of the said house and the National English School is located in the said building." 3. It appears that the owner Patiram who considered himself deprived of the fruits of his decree by this allotment order, made a representation to the State Government invoking its interference u/s 7F of the Rent Control and Eviction Act. The State Govt. in response to this representation wrote to the Rent Control and Eviction Officer that his order of allotment in favour of Mr. I.A. Khan "was not quite just and proper inasmuch as it rendered the decree of ejectment passed against the said school for default in payment of rent nugatory." Government however did not cancel the allotment order but suggested to the Rent Control and Eviction Officer that the need of the landlord Dr. Patiram should be considered under Rule 6 before considering the question of the allotment of the house. In August 1958 Mr. I.A. Khan died, on 13-10-1958 the Rent Control and Eviction Officer passed an order allowing Dr. Patiram's application under Rule 6 of the Control of Rent and Eviction Rules in which he held that Dr. Patiram's need for accommodation was bona fide. He therefore, permitted him to occupy the house in dispute, which had been according to him, vacated by Mr. I.A. Khan. The order pointed out that the allotment order had been made in favour of Mr. Khan, who died in the month of August 1958. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer took the view that his death resulted in a vacancy within the meaning of Section 7 of the Act and the accommodation was again available for allotment. 4. A revision was filed before the Commr. Allahabad against the release order, but the school was subsequently advised that this remedy was completely misconceived as no revision lay against an orcer passed under Rule 6 permitting an owner to occupy an accommodation. 4. A revision was filed before the Commr. Allahabad against the release order, but the school was subsequently advised that this remedy was completely misconceived as no revision lay against an orcer passed under Rule 6 permitting an owner to occupy an accommodation. Thereupon the school filed their petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of this Court It was argued before the learned Judge that the order releasing the accommodation in favour of the landlord was without jurisdiction as there was no vacancy at the time when it was passed. It was pointed out before him that though the actual order of allotment had been issued in the name of late Mr. I.A. Khan the real tenant was the school and therefore, Mr. Khan's death did not have the effect of terminating the tenancy or creating a vacancy. This contention was rejected by the learned Judge who held that the allotment being formally in the name of Mr. Khan, he was the tenant and that on his death the tenancy terminated and there was a vacancy. Taking the view that the order releasing the house in favour of the owner was valid he dismissed the petition. Aggrieved by this decision the School has filed this appeal. 5. Mr. S.N. Kaoker, learned Counsel for the Appellants urged before us that the view of the learned Judge that the death of Mr. Khan resulted in a vacancy is erroneous. After a perusal of the relevant documents placed before us by learned Counsel we are afraid we cannot accept this argument. It is conceded that on the date when the allotment order was passed, the school was not a registered society but a private institution run by the late Mr. Khan and others. An order u/s 7 of the Control of Rent and Eviction Act is nothing more than a direction to the owner that he should let the accommodation to a person specified in the order that is to say, to make an agreement of tenancy with that person. It is elementary that such an agreement requires two parties the landlord and the tenant. In this case the "school" whatever that word may mean was not a person capable of entering into any agreement enforceable at law a fact of which the controllers of the school were fully conscious. It is elementary that such an agreement requires two parties the landlord and the tenant. In this case the "school" whatever that word may mean was not a person capable of entering into any agreement enforceable at law a fact of which the controllers of the school were fully conscious. This is proved by the fact that in his application for allotment Mr. Khan requested the allotment order to be made in his name and subsequently wrote to the District Magistrate that he was in possession of the house and was liable to pay rent. The formal order of allotment also directed that the accommodation "shall be let to Sri I.A. Khan (Head Master) by the owner Dr. Patiram." In a foot note to the order Mr. I.A. Khan was referred to as the allottee and was informed that unless he intimated his refusal to accept the accommodation within seven days of the receipt of the order he would be liable to pay rent from the date of allotment. Mr. Khan wrote back accepting the allotment and the liability for rent. It is, therefore, clear that the landlord's agreement of tenancy was with Mr. I.A. Khan and no one else. 6. Mr. Kacker contended that, at any rate after 18 6-1958 when the school was converted into a registered society under the Societies Registration Act, it must be deemed to have become the tenant of the house. We cannot accept this contention because no material has been placed before us to show that the tenancy right were transferred by Mr. Khan to the school on its becoming a registered society. No material has been placed before us to show what properties or assets the new society acquired on the occasion of its legislation. In these circumstances it is not possible for us to hold that the tenancy rights were transferred to the school on 18-0-1958 or that the school became in law the tenant of the house. On the evidence before us we must hold that Mr. Khan continued to be the tenant till his death, which terminated the tenancy and created a vacancy. Mr. Kacker contends that the school, which by now had become a registered society, became the tenant alter Mr. Khan's death. In our opinion there is nothing to show that it did. On the evidence before us we must hold that Mr. Khan continued to be the tenant till his death, which terminated the tenancy and created a vacancy. Mr. Kacker contends that the school, which by now had become a registered society, became the tenant alter Mr. Khan's death. In our opinion there is nothing to show that it did. Under certain circumstances, on the death of a tenant his rights under a tenancy may be acquired by inheritance or otherwise by another person, but we cannot hold, in the absence of any evidence, that Mr. Khan's tenancy rights were acquired after his death by the school. The tenancy, in our opinion, came to an end on his death. 7. It follows that Mr. Khan's death resulted in a vacancy. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer was, therefore, competent to consider an application from the owner under Rule 6 and decide whether the accommodation was bona fide needed by the land lord for his personal occupation. In this case he took the view that the landlord's need was genuine and permitted him to occupy the house. The order is within jurisdiction and according to law. 8. Mr. Kacker contended that the order under Rule 6 is vitiated by the fact that the Rent Control and Eviction Officer was prevented by the State Government from applying his independent mind to the question of the genuineness of the landlord's need. He argued that the State Government in writing to this officer that he should consider the need of the owner before considering the question of the allotment of the house virtually fettered his discretion and left him with no option but to pass the order which he did. We do not think that this was so. The State Government had merely suggested to the Rent Control and Eviction Officer that when the premises became vacant the need of the landlord should be considered under Rule 6-which is no more than what the rule itself requires. The order of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer states that in his opinion Dr. Patiram's need for accommodation is bona fide and on that ground he permitted him to occupy the house. We do not agree that the Rent Control and Eviction Officer did not exercise his own discretion in the matter. 9. Mr. The order of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer states that in his opinion Dr. Patiram's need for accommodation is bona fide and on that ground he permitted him to occupy the house. We do not agree that the Rent Control and Eviction Officer did not exercise his own discretion in the matter. 9. Mr. Kacker then contended that the Rent Control and Eviction Officer should have heard the school before passing the release order in favour of the owner. This submission is based on a misapprehension, 'or it is stated in the Petitioner's own affidavit that both the owner and the occupier of the premises were called by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer and appeared before him on 6-10-1958. The order was thus passed after hearing the school authorities. 10. Lastly, Mr. Kacker contended that, even if there was a formal vacancy according to law, the house was not actually vacant but continued to be in the physical occupation of the school and the Rent Control and Eviction Officer could not pass any order under Rule 6. According to learned Counsel, the word 'vacant' in Rule 6 implies that no one should be even in occupation of the accommodation. Learned Counsel contended that such an order can be passed only when it would be possible for the landlord to resume possession of the accommodation and cannot be passed if some one else is already in occupation. We do not agree. The word 'vacant' in Rule 6 has the same meaning as in Section 7 and refers to a vacancy in tenancy. If learned Counsels interpretation is correct, it would be possible for any unscrupulous person to defeat in advance a landlord's application under Rule 6 for permission to occupy his own house by the simple device of occupying it illegally before the application is made or permission given. In our opinion the effect of permission granted under Rule 6 is that the District Magistrate will not allot it to any one and the owner may occupy it if he so desires. If someone ' is in illegal occupation, the owner can have him ejected according to law. But this is a matter between the owner and the trespasser and does not affect the District Magistrates power to release the house for the benefit of the owner. 11. If someone ' is in illegal occupation, the owner can have him ejected according to law. But this is a matter between the owner and the trespasser and does not affect the District Magistrates power to release the house for the benefit of the owner. 11. For these reasons we are of the opinion that the order of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer dated 13-10 1958 permitting the landlord to occupy the house in dispute is valid in law. The first of the two relief demanded by the Appellants was rightly rejected by the learned Judge. 12. Learned Counsel then pressed his second relief. He argued that, even assuming that the release order under Rule 6 is valid, the Rent Control and Eviction Officer had no jurisdiction to take proceedings against the school u/s 7A of the Control of Rent and Eviction Act. He pointed out that an order under that section can be passed only if an allotment order is made. He relied upon a decision of this Court that an order permitting the landlord to occupy his own house cannot be an allotment order-that is, an order directing him to let the accommodation to himself. In reply to this contention Mr. G.P. Bhargava, learned Counsel for the Respondent landlord, made an unequivocal statement that his client has not initiated ' any proceedings or applied for police help u/s 7A nor is it his intention at present to do so. In view of this statement it is not possible for the Appellants to contend that there is any imminent danger of their being evicted under the summary procedure provided by Section 7A and we cannot consider the prayer for the second relief. 13. This appeal must, therefore, fail. We would like to state that during the hearing we were of the opinion that it is not desirable that the school should be thrown out on the streets or close down for want of accommodation. The parties, on a suggestion from the Court, approached the Rent Control and Eviction Officer, Allahabad with a request that the school should be given alternative accommodation by the beginning of the next academic session. We were informed today that the Rent Control and Eviction Officer had directed that whenever a suitable vacancy in accommodation occurs this school will be given priority in allotment. 14. The appeal is dismissed. We were informed today that the Rent Control and Eviction Officer had directed that whenever a suitable vacancy in accommodation occurs this school will be given priority in allotment. 14. The appeal is dismissed. Learned Counsel for the Respondent has stated, with commendable generosity that as this is a matter relating to a school his client will not press for the costs of this appeal. We direct that the parties shall bear their own costs of this appeal.