This is an appeal against the order of the Commissioner, Jodhpur dated 31.3.59. We have beard the learned counsel for the parties and examined the record also. The learned Commissioner has reversed the order of the learned Asstt. Collector Sojat dated 23.9.56 allowing the amendment of the plaint by adding a further prayer for possession to the original prayer for injunction alone and rejected the application for amendment on the following grounds:— "In a suit for permanent injunction possession is a pre-requisite and a suit for possession would mean that he was out of possession. The two contradictory pleas cannot be taken together. It has been held in AIR 1922 Cal. page 255 that a suit for permanent injunction cannot be converted into a suit for possession. Besides the amendment, if allowed, would mean alteration of relief which will change the character of the suit from that of a suit for injunction to that of possession. It would appear that the plaintiff has not been acting in good faith in not filing a suit for possession, to be in truth." 2. The learned S.D.O. trying the suit had allowed the amendment with the following observations : "In this connection I am very much convinced by the judgment given in Mst. Dedri vs. Mst. Khatji and another as cited in AIR 1954 J. & K. 63 and referred to by the counsel for plaintiffs, the facts of which are too much similar with that of the present suit. It was held the main object of the amendments is to get at the rights of the parties and to avoid multiplicity of suits. But there is one condition, and that is that it should be possible to settle the dispute in the suit already instituted without unfairness or injustice to the opposite parties." It was further held in the very case, In a suit for permanent injunction to restrain the defendants from interfering in the plaintiffs possession and application for seeking permission to amend the plaint was made stating that the defendants took forcible possession of the land in dispute during the pendency of the suit and the plaintiff be permitted to seek further relief of possession. The defendants resisted it on the ground that it would change the nature of the suit; held that if the amendment was allowed, it would mean that the plaintiff should bring another suit. The defendants resisted it on the ground that it would change the nature of the suit; held that if the amendment was allowed, it would mean that the plaintiff should bring another suit. Such a state of affairs could be easily avoided by an amendment. It should therefore be allowed. "The judgment as cited in AIR 1954 Nagpur p. 200 and referred to by the counsel of the plaintiff I know of no kind of error or mistake which if not fraudulent or intended to over reach, the court ought not to correct if it can be done without injustice to the other party. Courts do not exist for the sake of discipline, but for the sake of deciding mattery in controversy and I do not regard such amendment as a matter of favour or of grace. This was an observation by Boweh, L.J. in Cropper vs. Smit and referred to in this case." 3. The point for determination therefore is whether the addition of the prayer for possession would change the nature and character of a suit for an injunction only or not, and if it would so change an amendment can be allowed or not. Or, it would be necessary for the determination of real question in controversy between the parties or not. Parcha Lagan Settlement of Parcha Khatedari stand in the name of the appellants and they are entered as Khatedar therein. The title is thus in their favour. That they honestly believed and asserted their possession on the disputed land at the time of the institution of the suit, even though contended by the opposite party, is supported by the fact that the trial court granted an ad-interim injunction in their favour and also appointed the Patwari to act as receiver when it was represented by the applicants that the opposite party had stepped to violence and Were not caring for the injunction. When the receiver was withdrawn by the trial court; it was not so done because it found the possession to be that of the opposite party, but because it found it to be a disputed one. This withdrawal of receiver positively transferred the possession to the opposite party. The suit was twice dismissed for default in the meanwhile. As soon as it was restored, the applicants applied for an action against the opposite party for acting in defiance of the injunction order. This withdrawal of receiver positively transferred the possession to the opposite party. The suit was twice dismissed for default in the meanwhile. As soon as it was restored, the applicants applied for an action against the opposite party for acting in defiance of the injunction order. The learned trial court after hearing the parties passed an elaborate order on 20.8.57 that the injunction had become inoperative with the withdrawal of the receiver on 27.10.56. It was also stated in this order that the Patwari handed over possession to the defendants. It is not clear from the record as to from whom he had taken possession. Nor has this point been raised or decided as yet. Nor may it be necessary to decide it. What would be necessary to decide is whether or not the applicants were in cultivatory possession of the suit land oh the date of the institution of the suit; and this matter is covered by issue No. 1 framed by the trial court. The amendment sought to be made is not about the factum of possession on the date of the institution of the suit. But it is about the change of possession since. It purports to pray only that if the court may find at the time of decision that the land was in possession of the opposite party a decree for restoration of possession be also granted. This in no way alters the character and nature of the suit, which remains essentially the same. It is simply an adding of a consequential relief; and it is necessary for the purpose of determining the real matter in controversy between the parties too. 4. Such a question came in for a full examination and decision before the Full Bench of the Hyderabad High Court in Maruti vs. Ranganathan (AIR 1955 Hyd. 1). It was a case for declaration and injunction to which an additional prayer of possession was sought to be added on the ground that the plaintiff had been dispossessed sometime after the institution of the suit. 1). It was a case for declaration and injunction to which an additional prayer of possession was sought to be added on the ground that the plaintiff had been dispossessed sometime after the institution of the suit. The observations of Their Lordships of the Privy Council in AIR 1922 P.C. 249 : All rules of courts are nothing but provisions intended to serve the proper administration of justice, and it is therefore essential that they should be made to serve and be subordinate to that purpose so that full powers of amendment must be enjoyed and should always be liberally exercised but nonetheless no power has been given to enable One distinct cause of action to be substituted for another, nor to change, by amendment the subject matter of the suit"; and of Bramwell, L.J. in Jildesely vs. Haiper (1879) 10 Ch. D. 393 (D) at page 396, 347. "My practice has always been to give leave to amend unless I have been satisfied that the party applying was acting malafide, or that, by his blunder he had done some injury to his opponent which could not be compensated for by cost or otherwise. "However negligent or careless may have been the omission and however late the proposed amendment, the amendment should be allowed if it can be made without injustice to the other side. There is no injustice if the other side can be compensated by cost", along with Mullahs commentary in C.P.C. (11th edition) P. 591 that an amendment should be allowed where it would not matter that the original omission arose from negligence or carelessness and that there is no injustice if the other party can be compensated by costs". were referred to in this case. So was considered the principle followed in Lekshniah Naidu vs. Krishna Swami Naidu, AIR 1935 Mad. 286 , that where the only result of refusing an amendment would be to drive the plaintiff to fresh suit while the title remained the same the permission for amendment should be given. It was observed that: "The principle on which an amendment will ordinarily be allowed is that the proposed amendment should not alter the nature of the suit. 286 , that where the only result of refusing an amendment would be to drive the plaintiff to fresh suit while the title remained the same the permission for amendment should be given. It was observed that: "The principle on which an amendment will ordinarily be allowed is that the proposed amendment should not alter the nature of the suit. In this case we do not find the nature of the suit will be altered in any way", and "The correct principle is as stated above which has been laid down by the Privy Council and the rule of practice adumbrated by Bramwell L.J. He has no doubt referred to the question of mala fide but that principle has been toned down by the latter decisions wherein it has been observed that however negligent or careless the plaintiff may have been in committing the first omission and however late the proposed amendment may be, the amendment should be allowed if it can be made without injustice to the other side. Thus the real criterion will be injustice to the other side while considering the question of amendment of plaint and the question of malafides has receded to the back ground to that extent and whether injustice could be compensated by costs where amendment should freely be allowed. As already observed the plaintiff should not be allowed to make out a new case by way of amendment." The facts of this case are very very similar to the present case. 5. In this connection may be referred AIR 1957 S.C. 363 —Pirgonda Hongonda Patial vs. Kalgonda Shidgonda Patial In that case the question arose, whether where a right that has occurred to another party is affected by an amendment, it should be allowed or not. Amongst other cases (809) 33 Bom. 644; 4 Indian Cases 726, Kishendas Rupchand vs. Rachappa Vithoba, was specially referred to in that case. The learned Judges deciding that case had expressed different opinions. Learned Beaman, J. had observed. "In my opinion, two simple tests, and two only, need to be applied, in order to ascertain whether a given case is within the principle. First, could the party asking to amend obtain the same quantity of- relief without the amendment ? The learned Judges deciding that case had expressed different opinions. Learned Beaman, J. had observed. "In my opinion, two simple tests, and two only, need to be applied, in order to ascertain whether a given case is within the principle. First, could the party asking to amend obtain the same quantity of- relief without the amendment ? If not, then it follows necessarily that the proposed amendment places the other party at a disadvantage, it allows his opponent to obtain more from him than be would have been able to obtain but for the amendment, second, in those circumstances, can the party thus placed at a disadvantage be compensated for it by costs ? It not, then the amendment ought not, unless the case is so particular as to be taken out of the scope of the rule, to be allowed." With reference to the observations Their Lordships of the Supreme Court were pleased to observe: "We do not agree with this contention. First, it is not feasible nor advisable to encase a discretionary power within the strait jacket of an inflexible formula. Secondly we do not think that the "quantity of relief," an expression somewhat difficult of appreciation or application in all circumstances, was in any way affected by the amendments allowed to be made in this case. What happened in this case......... We think that the correct principles were enunciated by Bachelor J. in his judgment in the same case, viz. 33 Bom. 645 at page 654(c), when he said at pp. 649-650 : "All amendments ought to be allowed which satisfy the two conditions (a) of not working injustice to the other side, and (b) of being necessary for the purpose of determining the real questions in controversy between the parties.........But I refrain from citing further authorities, as, in my opinion, they all lay down precisely the same doctrine. That doctrine, as I understand it, is that amendment should be refused only where the other party cannot be placed in the same position as if the pleading had been originally correct, but the amendment would cause him an injury which could not be compensated in costs. That doctrine, as I understand it, is that amendment should be refused only where the other party cannot be placed in the same position as if the pleading had been originally correct, but the amendment would cause him an injury which could not be compensated in costs. It is merely a particular case of this general rule that where a plaintiff seeks to amend by setting up a fresh claim in respect of a cause of action which since the institution of the suit had become barred by limitation, the amendment must be an injury which could not be compensated in costs by depriving him of a good defence to the claim. The ultimate test therefore still remains the same; can the amendment be allowed without injustice to the other side, or can it not". 6. The test thus approved by the Supreme Court also in such cases is whether the amendment would cause an irreparable, loss or cause injustice to the other party or not ? We have already seen in the Hyderabad case quoted above that another test was whether the refusal of amendment would result in making the plaintiff run for a fresh suit or not. The third test is whether the purpose of amendment alters the nature of the character of the suit or not. 7. Applying all the above tests to the present case it would appear that the proposed amendment does not alter the character and nature of the suit. Rather, it saves the appellants from the necessity of running in for a fresh suit on the same title and thus serves to avoid simplicity of suits. It would also enable the setting of real matters in controversy between the parties. It does no injustice to the opposite party as may not be compensated by costs. The amendment, was therefore, correctly allowed by the learned trial court and has been erroneously disallowed by the learned lower appellate court. Of course, the learned trial court has not been correct in leaving the costs to be followed by the event. The costs of amendment are special costs and are necessary to be awarded, irrespective of the result of the suit, to the other party to compensate him for the extra burden cast on him as a result thereof. 8. Of course, the learned trial court has not been correct in leaving the costs to be followed by the event. The costs of amendment are special costs and are necessary to be awarded, irrespective of the result of the suit, to the other party to compensate him for the extra burden cast on him as a result thereof. 8. We would, therefore, allow this appeal, set aside the orders of the Commissioner Jodhpur and restore that of the trial court with the addition that the appellants would pay the opposite party as special cost of Rs. 25/- not to be reckoned as the costs in the suit.