SINHA, C. J. : This appeal in Letters Patent is by the plain­tiffs to an action for administration of the estate of some of the ancestors of the plaintiffs. (2) The facts giving rise to this appeal are briefly the following:- One Hira Mia Chaudhury left two sons, Umar Ali and Umed Ali, two daughters, Abjuna Bibi and Abira Bibi (defendants 2 and 3 respectively), and one Habija Bibi, his wife, as his heirs. After his death, one of his sons. Urned Aii, died leaving him surviving his widow, Maimunnessa Bibi, and a daughter, Ayatunnessa, besides his mother, Habi­ja Bibi, his brother Umar Ali, and two sisters, Abjuna Bibi and Abira Bibi (defendants 2 and 3 respectively). His daughter Ayatunnessa died leav­ing her mother and uncle Umar Ali as her heirs. After her death, Umar Ali died leaving two sons, Sikandar Ali (defendant No. 1) and Mayub Ali (de­fendant No. 1-ka) since deceased, and three dau­ghters, niameiy, Ajtarjan Bibi (plaintiff No. 1)> Sabarjan Bibi (plaintiff No. 2) and Nurjan Bibi (defendant No. 8). Umar Ali had two other daughters, namely, Sonabar Bibi and Merjan Bibi who died during their minority. Umar Ali also left his mother, Habija Bibi, and wife, Kutu Bibi, behind him. Sikandar Ali alone is his son by his first wife, Sakhina Bibi who predeceased Umar Ali. Accord­ing to the defence case, and which has been accepted, Maimunnessa Bibi, the widow of Umed Ali, had also married Umar Ali. Umar Ali had, therefore, three wives, namely, Sakhina Bibi, Kutu Bibi and Maimunnessa Bibi. He left no issue through Maimunnessa Bibi. The rest of the children of Umar Ali were through Kutu Bibi. Out of Umar's five daughters, Sonabar Bibi and Merjan Bibi died unmarried during their minority after their father's death and, therefore, their shares in the properties were inherited by the plaintiffs Nos. 1 and 2, defendant No. 8, Kutu Bibi (mother), and deceased Mayub Ali (defen­dant No. 1 (ka)). It appears that Mayub Ali was at first plaintiff No. 4 and thereafter he was trans­ferred to the category of defendants and numbered as defendant No. 1 (ka). After his death, his wi­dow, Khudeja Bibi, was substituted arid transferred to the category of the plaintiffs as plaintiff No. 3. Mayub, therefore, died leaving his wife Khudeja Bibi (plaintiff No. 3), his brother (defendant No. 1 Sikandar Ali) and three sisters, namely, plain­tiffs Nos. After his death, his wi­dow, Khudeja Bibi, was substituted arid transferred to the category of the plaintiffs as plaintiff No. 3. Mayub, therefore, died leaving his wife Khudeja Bibi (plaintiff No. 3), his brother (defendant No. 1 Sikandar Ali) and three sisters, namely, plain­tiffs Nos. 1 and 2 and defendant No. 8. After the death of Umar Ali, his mother Habija Bibi died leaving the plaintiffs Nos. I and 2, the deceased Mayub and the present defendants Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 8; and thereafter Kutu Bibi the wife of Umar Ali died leaving the plaintiffs Nos. 1 and 2, deceased Mayub Ali and defendant No. 8 as her heirs. Umed Ali's widow, Maimunnessa, who had later married Umar Ali, had relinquished her claim to the share of the properties by taking cash money before her death from the joint fund of the plaintiffs, and defendants Nos. 1 and 8. Defendants Nos. 2 and 3 also, after the death of Habija Bibi, took some definite area of land by amicable partition and relinquished all claims on other properties in favour of plaintiffs Nos. 1 and 2, defendants Nos. 1 and 8 and deceased Mayub Ali. It is- thus, according to the plaintiffs, that the properties left by Umar Ali, Umed Aii and Habija Bibi, except those' taken by defendants Nos. 2 and 3 by amicable arrangement, devolved upon the plaintiffs Nos. 1 and 2, deceased Mayub Aii and defendants Nos. 1 and 8, and on their behalf the defendant No. 1 used to manage the properties all along and the plaintiffs used to en­joy the benefit of their usufruct. It is further the plaintiffs' case that Hira Mia had left enough properties and subsequently Umar Ali and Umed Ali also acquired sufficient pro­perty, movable and immovable, during their life time, which they left on their respective demise. The plaintiffs, therefore, desire by the suit to have their shares of those properties ascertained and distributed. The defendant No. 1 has knowledge of all these properties and the source of their ac­quisition by inheritance and the income of the an­cestral properties as he has been managing the pro­perties throughout. The plaintiffs, therefore, desire by the suit to have their shares of those properties ascertained and distributed. The defendant No. 1 has knowledge of all these properties and the source of their ac­quisition by inheritance and the income of the an­cestral properties as he has been managing the pro­perties throughout. On these facts the plaintiffs brought the suit for ascertaining the properties and their shares therein and for their administration and distribution amongst the heirs, and for that purpose to appoint a Receiver, as the defendant No. 1 was not inclined to do so amicably when demand was made by the plaintiffs to have their shares separated. (3) Defendant No. 4 is the wife of defendant No. 1, and defendants Nos. 5, 6 and 7 are defen­dant No. 1's sons, and some properties having been acquired out of the joint fund might have been kept in their name in benami, and so they have been made parties to the suit. (4) Defendants Nos. 1 and 4 to 7 filed one written! statement and defendant No. 8, who was plaintiff No. 3 originally, filed a separate written statement. (5) The defence, for the purposes of the pre­sent appeal, is that the administration suit for the administration of the estates of more than one person is not maintainable. Defendant No. 8 sup­ported the defence taken in the written statement of defendants Nos. 1 and 4 to 7 and admitted that she had no claim over the properties over which the plaintiffs 1, 2 and 3 had laid their claims. Be­sides the defence which I have mentioned, there were other defences, namely, that the suit was time-barred, that no proper court-fee had been paid, and that the Court had no jurisdiction to try the suit, but those defences are of no importance now. (6) The trial Court, following the decisions in the cases "Essafally Alibhai v. Abdeali Gulam Hussain, AIR 1921 Born 424, "Sheikh Mahbub Alam v. Razia Begum, AIR 1950 Lah 12, and "Mt Amir Bi v. Abdul Ramiia Sahib, AIR 1928 Mad 760, held that the suit was maintainable. It also held that it had jurisdiction to try the suit. (6) The trial Court, following the decisions in the cases "Essafally Alibhai v. Abdeali Gulam Hussain, AIR 1921 Born 424, "Sheikh Mahbub Alam v. Razia Begum, AIR 1950 Lah 12, and "Mt Amir Bi v. Abdul Ramiia Sahib, AIR 1928 Mad 760, held that the suit was maintainable. It also held that it had jurisdiction to try the suit. It was further found that at the time of Umar Ali's death, he left behind three wives, namely, Sakhina Bibi, Kutu Bibi and Maimunnessa Bibi, and the Court, there­fore, held that the heirs of Umar Ali were his two 'soils, three daughters 'and three wives at the time of his death. It appears that after the death of Mayub Ali during the pendency of the suit, the plaintiffs claimed shares in the properties left by Mayub Ali also, and, therefore, when the judgment of the trial Court was given, the plain­tiffs claimed shares in all the properties left by Hira Mia, Umar Ali, Habija Bibi, and Mayub Ali, after ascertainment of the assets of the above de­ceased persons. The trial Court also held that, the defendants Nos. 2 and 3 had, by Exts. B and C, relinquished their claim in favour of defendant No. 1, Mayub Ali, the plaintiffs Nos. 1 and 2, and defendant No. 8; and so also Maimunnessa had relinquished her claim by Ext. F in the properties. In that view of the matter, it was held that their shares in the properties came t& the plaintiffs Nos. 1 and 2, the defendant No. 1, the deceased defendant Mayub Ali and defendant No. 8. Finally, the Court held that accounts of the assets of late Hira Mia, Umar Ali, Habija Bibi, and Kutu Bibi and Mayub Ali were to be taken, as also of the properties acquired with the help of such assets, and also that action had to be taken to ascertain the proper shares of the present plaintiffs therein according to the de­cisions of the issues already arrived at, excepting the assets taken by Abjuna and Abira Bibi (defen­dants Nos. 2 and 3 respectively) by amicable ar­rangement, and that the plaintiffs would be en­titled to separate possession of them according to their legal shares in those assets by distribution, and the issue was decided accordingly. 2 and 3 respectively) by amicable ar­rangement, and that the plaintiffs would be en­titled to separate possession of them according to their legal shares in those assets by distribution, and the issue was decided accordingly. The order portion of the judgment runs as follows:- "In view of the above decisions of the issues of this suit, it is ordered that an enquiry be made and account be taken what assets (movable and immovable) late Hira Mia and Umed Ali and Umar Ali and Habija Bibi and Kutu Bibi and Mayub Ali had left at the time of their deaths, and what pro­perties are acquired by the profits of these assets and what would be due share of the plaintiffs of these assets, and of these properties, what came to the hands of the defendant No. 1, keeping in view of the decisions of the issues regarding the relinquishment of the defendants Nos. 2 and 3's share, excepting some particular portion, and also of the share of Moimunnessa. It is also order­ed that it is to be ascertained whether the properties in the names; of the defendants Nos. 4 to 7 are self-acquired or acquired with the help of the profits of properties in which the plaintiffs would get a share, and after such ascertainment of the properties to which the plaintiffs would be entitled, their shares are to be distributed to them for separate possession. To do the above said acts as ordered, Jonab K. I. Laslcar, LL. B. is appointed a Receiver to administer the properties in the time indicated, on giving due notice to the parties and asking the defendant No. 1 to submit the accounts of all the properties, movable and immovable, in his hands, for the purpose of making enquiry to ascertain what are his self-acquired properties and what are the properties liable to be administered, within a specified time. It is further ordered that as the defendant No. 1 is in possession of the entire assets, he is to deposit Rs. 200/- for the cost of the Receiver within a month of this date, and, in default, attachment will have to be made of his movable and immovable properties to get this amount realised for the present to defray the other expenses of the enquiry and fees for the Receiver, so appointed. 200/- for the cost of the Receiver within a month of this date, and, in default, attachment will have to be made of his movable and immovable properties to get this amount realised for the present to defray the other expenses of the enquiry and fees for the Receiver, so appointed. The Receiver is to submit the accounts of the properties to which the plaintiffs will be entitled by the decree of this suit, within six months from this date, and the suit is decreed accordingly with costs against the defendant No. 1, and without costs against other defendants. Prepare preliminary decree accordingly." It is against this decree of the first Court that an appeal was preferred to the lower appellate Court which dismissed the appeal affirming the decision of the first Court except one little modification, namely, that instead of assuming the rights of plaintiffs Nos. 1 and 2 in the lands of Exts. B and F, the Commissioner should ascertain if the pro­perties were acquired with the profits of the plain­tiffs' share in the assets of the deceased persons concerned, and, if so, what would be the extent of plaintiffs' share in the properties of the said two kabalas. It was further ordered that the word 'Commissioner' be substituted for the word 'Recei­ver' in the judgment and decree. The appeal was partially allowed, as indicated above. The parties were ordered to bear their own costs of the appeal. (7) Against the aforesaid judgment of the appellate Court, Second Appeal No. 6 of 1958 was filed in this Court, which was heard and decided by the judgment of Hon'ble Mr. Justice Mehrotra on 15-6-59, by which ha dismissed the suit holding that the suit was not maintainable. His Lordship, however, gave leave to appeal, and the plain­tiffs have come up in this Letters Patent appeal. By his judgment His Lordship upheld the conten­tion of the defendants to the extent that the suit, which is a suit for administration of the estates, is not maintainable for the reason that by this one suit the administration of the estates of more than and deceased person has been prayed for, which, according to His Lordship, was not tenable. By his judgment His Lordship upheld the conten­tion of the defendants to the extent that the suit, which is a suit for administration of the estates, is not maintainable for the reason that by this one suit the administration of the estates of more than and deceased person has been prayed for, which, according to His Lordship, was not tenable. His Lordship, however, held that the contention of the defendants, so far as the valuation of the suit was concerned, wag without any force, and further their contention was negatived about the extent of the powers given by the Court below to the Commissioner. In effect, the appeal was allow­ed on the ground that the suit was not maintain­able. (8) The only question raised in support of the appeal on behalf of the plaintiffs is that this Court was wrong in holding that the suit was not maintainable. In my opinion, there is no bar to bring a suit for administration in respect of the assets of more than one person, and no authority' has been brought to our notice which held that such a suit was not maintainable. Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure says "The Courts shall (subject to the provisions herein contained) have jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil nature excepting suits of which their congnizance is either expressly or impliedly bar­red." There is no doubt that this is a suit of a civil nature and its cognizance by the Courts has not been expressly or impliedly barred. If there is no such restriction imposed by the law, the plaintiffs' suit cannot possibly be held to be not maintain­able. On the facts of this case, after the death of Hira Mia, the property came to the hands of the heirs, namely, his wife and two sons, and there-after the two sons died one after the other, leaving the plaintiffs, the defendants, and Habija Bibi the wife of Hira Mia. Thereafter Habija Bibi died, and after Habija Bibi's death, one of the sons of Umar Ali, namely, Mayub Ali, died. All the heirs were in joint possession of the estates left either by Hira Mia or by his two sons or his wife, or ,by Mayub Ali, one of the sons of Umar Ali, and all this time the properties were being managed, looked after and taken care of by the defendant No. 1. All the heirs were in joint possession of the estates left either by Hira Mia or by his two sons or his wife, or ,by Mayub Ali, one of the sons of Umar Ali, and all this time the properties were being managed, looked after and taken care of by the defendant No. 1. It is true that the dates of death of these several persons have not been mentioned, but, in my opinion, that is of no consequence, when the order of the deaths of these persons has been given. So, for all intents and purposes, although Hira Mia may have died a long time ago, the estate I left by him and which devolved upon his successive heirs and upon the heirs of his sons and wife, remained all the time intact in the sense that there was no distribution of the assets at any time. In this view of the matter, in my opinion, the suit cannot be held to be non-maintainable on the ground that it covers the estate of different persons who had died at different times. In the case of AIR 1921 Bom. 424, the facts were that the suit was instituted by the plaintiff, as the heir of his father and his mother, for an account and admi­nistration of the estate of one Gulam Hussein who' 'had died in 1.904 leaving as his heirs, according to Shia Mahomedan Law, his father and mother, and also his widow, his son and two daughters. His Lordship the Chief Justice repelled the conten­tion that the suit was not maintainable in these words: ''I cannot myself see why an administration •suit in this case cannot lie, considering that Gulam Hussein died in 1904; that his estate has never been distributed; and that his estate has never been administered. It is impossible for any one who could prove he was entitled to an interest in the estate to get that interest until the estate has been ascertained by proper administration. It is perfectly true that under the law, there is no need on the death of a Mahomedan for Letters of Administration to be taken out to his estate, and the result, as I have often pointed out, is that frequently the heirs live in harmony after his death without distributing the estate. It is perfectly true that under the law, there is no need on the death of a Mahomedan for Letters of Administration to be taken out to his estate, and the result, as I have often pointed out, is that frequently the heirs live in harmony after his death without distributing the estate. Some of them may die leaving their heirs, 'and it is only when disputes arise in the family that the trouble begins". The point is abundantly clear that if there is an estate, it can be administered, and it a party who has an interest in that estate has asked the Court to administer that estate, even if he "knows exactly what it consists of, he is entitled to come to Court and ask for a preliminary decree for the administration of that estate. He is not bound, even although he knows what the estate consists of, to file a suit for partition. He may do so or he may not. That is no reason why if he wishes to file an administration suit to get the estate ad­ministered in the proper way, he should not do so." Agreeing with the learned Chief Justice, Heaton, J. observed as follow : "From the circumstances which appear, such j SL suit is perfectly proper, and it may turn out to be an absolutely necessary thing for the plaintiff to sue for. Gulam Hussein died in 1904 leaving, amongst other heirs, his father and mother. They have since died, and their shares have passed to the plaintiff. He claims, therefore, that he is a sharer to the extent of 1/3 in the estate of Gulam Hussein, and I understand that what he claims is either to get 1/3 of the estate of Gulam Hussein as it was when he died; or else to get 1/3 of the estate as it was when the suit was brought. Which of the two he really sues for, and many other matters, can only be determined by going into the case on its merits. Unfortunately instead of doing this, the lower Courts dealt with the matter on a preliminary issue, and I am afraid they were some­what influenced by the fact that an administration suit is a very cheap suit to bring. Unfortunately instead of doing this, the lower Courts dealt with the matter on a preliminary issue, and I am afraid they were some­what influenced by the fact that an administration suit is a very cheap suit to bring. The court-fees on such a suit are small, whereas the court-fees on a partition suit vary with the value of the pro­perty to be partitioned. But it does not in the least matter to a Judge whether a suit is a cheap suit or a dear suit. The plaintiff could bring his suit in any form which the law allows. Seeing that he wants an inquiry into what is the estate of Gulam Hussein, and also apparently wants an inquiry into what that estate was when Gulam Hussein died, and what has become of it since, that is to say, seeing that he wants to trace the successive development of the estate from Gulam Hussein's death up to the present moment, it seems to me quite impossible to say that he is not entitled to bring an adminis­tration suit. Possibly his claim may be successful­ly met in a variety of ways, but it cannot be de­feated on the bare ground that the suit is bad in form." Some of the important expressions have been under­lined (here in ' ' marks - Ed.) by me. The facts of this case, as I have endeavoured to state, do show that the suit was instituted after the death of three persons, namely, Gulam Hussein, plaintiffs father and his mother, and as the es­tate left by Gulam Hussein had not till then been administered, it was held that the suit did lie. Again in AIR 1950 Lah 12, it was observed as follows: "And if the estate can be administered by the grant of letters of administration, there is no rea­son why it should not be capable of administra­tion by the Court following a decree in an ad­ministrative suit." In this case also the facts were that one Sheikh Danishmand Suqrat died in 1913 leaving conside­rable property, moveable and immovable. This property was inherited by the plaintiff, her Bro­thers, her sister and her mother. The manage­ment of the estate was in the hands of the bro­thers who gave the plaintiff her share up to the year 1944, but thereafter the brothers failed to pay the plaintiff her share. This property was inherited by the plaintiff, her Bro­thers, her sister and her mother. The manage­ment of the estate was in the hands of the bro­thers who gave the plaintiff her share up to the year 1944, but thereafter the brothers failed to pay the plaintiff her share. A suit was brought by the plaintiff in 1946 against her three brothers and a sister for the administration of the estate left by her father, who died in 1913, and by her mother, who died in August, 1945. The plaintiff had stated in the plaint that her father had left behind considerable property when he died in 1913, and after her father's death her mother, she herself, and the defendants had succeeded to the estate which had remained joint and which had been enjoyed jointly by all the heirs until August, 1944, that is to say, a year before the death of the plaintiff's mother. Thereafter the three brothers, defendants 1 to 3, had not given the plaintiff her share, and as they were liable to render to her an account of the estate, she had filed the suit praying that the estate left by her father in the first instance and by her mother in the second instance, should be administered by Court, and that an account thereof should be ren­dered. This case again, therefore, was brought for the administration of the estate of two de­ceased persons, namely, the father and the mother of the plaintiff. Then again a reference may be made to the case of Mt. Shafi-ul-Nisa v. Mt. Fazal-ul-Nisa, AIR 1950 EP 276, where it was held by Kanur, J., as he then was, that "if the main object of a suit is to administer the estate, and if the Court, in the suit, has to de­cide as to the existence or otherwise of an alie­nation, an administration suit will lie, but where; the main object of the suit is to have an aliena­tion, alleged to be made by the deceased, set aside, or to obtain possession of property illegally with­held by one of the heirs, an administration suit is not a proper remedy." I have taken the observation from the placitum which, in my opinion, correctly brings out the statement in the judgment. No case has been brought to our notice which has taken a contrary view. No case has been brought to our notice which has taken a contrary view. It is true that the suit has been brought long after the death of Hira Mia, but after his death the several heirs were in possession and their estate had never been administered, and all the heirs were enjoying the estate jointly without any dispute having arisen amongst them. The plaintiffs had to bring the suit when dif­ferences arose, not only after the death of Hira Mia but after the death of his heirs and the heirs of heirs. There being no bar in law to the bring­ing of an administration suit, the suit, in my opinion, is maintainable. In the view which I have taken it is not necessary to refer to any of the other cases mentioned in the judgment of Mehrotra, J., which throw no light on the ques­tion raised. (9) Mr. Lahiri on behalf of the defendants-respondents v/anted to challenge the findings of Mr. Justice Mehrotra in the Second Appeal re­garding the powers conferred upon the Commis­sioner by the Court below. In the first instance, in my opinion, he is not entitled as a respondent to do so, but he can support the judgment on any ground other than the grounds covered by the judgment itself. He was not supporting the judg­ment, namely, that the suit was not maintainable, but he wanted to submit that although the suit may be held to be maintainable, the powers given by the Court to the Commissioner were not war­ranted by law. In my judgment, this matter has been set at rest by the decision of his Lordship Mr. Justice Mehrotra who held that the powers that were conferred upon the Commissioner by the Courts below were powers within the ambit of a suit for administration and accounts, and in my opinion also that is the correct view in law. (10) In my judgment, therefore, the appeal succeeds and it is decreed with costs. The judg­ment of the learned Judge in Second Appeal is set aside, and the judgment of the Court below is restored, and the suit stands decreed. The Com­missioner should now proceed with the execution of the commission for which he was appointed by the Court of first instance. (11) DEKA, J. : I agree. GD/V.B.B. Appeal allowed.