JUDGMENT : ANNA CHANDY, J. 1. This appeal and the reference for confirmation arise out of the judgment of the Additional Sessions Judge of Parur, whereby the 1st accused Aiyappan alias Kutty was sentenced to death for murdering one Thankappan aged 23, at 11.15 p. m. on 11-10-1959, when he was sleeping on the verandah of his house. 2. Pw. 4, Krishnan, a carpenter by caste, had five sons in eluding the deceased Thankappan. He partitioned his properties among his children and was living with his wife in the tarwad house along with his son Thankappan and his wife Pw. 1, Rugmini. His two sons, Pws. 2 and 8 were living quite close to the tarwad house while the other two sons, Pw. 6 and Kunhukuttan were living in separate houses about a furlong away. These carpenters and a family of Ezhavas headed by accused 1 and 2 were on inimical terms, with litigation civil and criminal between them. The Perumbavoor Police charged a case against Pw. 4, his sons Pws. 2 and 8 and the deceased Thankappan at the instance of accused 1 under Ss. 324, 323 and 34 IPC. in CC. No. 139 of 1959. The accused were later acquitted of these charges. This acquittal embittered the feelings all the more and Pw. 4 filed a complaint against the accused in the court of the Executive Magistrate, Moovattupuzha on 24-9-1959 which was forwarded to the Perumbavoor Police for investigation and report. The 1st accused in his turn filed Ext. D1 petition before the same Executive Magistrate against Pw. 4 & others and the mother of Pw. 7. This petition was sent to the Alwaye Circle Inspector on 8-10-1959 for enquiry. 3. At about this time Pw. 4 contracted typhoid fever and he was removed to a private hospital at Kuruppumpadi by his wife and son, Pw. 8 Narayanan keeping him company. In his absence Pw. 4 specially instructed his son Thankappan to sleep on the verandah of his house at night to guard against the possible theft of his cattle from the shed. Accordingly Thankappan and his wife Pw. 1 Rugmini used to sleep on the verandah. On 11-10-1959 at about 11.15 in the night when they were sleeping on the same mat in the verandah Pw. 1 heard a sound as of beating on mud-pots and felt that her blouse was getting wet. Accordingly Thankappan and his wife Pw. 1 Rugmini used to sleep on the verandah. On 11-10-1959 at about 11.15 in the night when they were sleeping on the same mat in the verandah Pw. 1 heard a sound as of beating on mud-pots and felt that her blouse was getting wet. She opened her eyes to see a person jumping down from the verandah to the courtyard. She followed and recognised in the moonlight accused 1 as the person who got out of the verandah. Accused 1 threatened her with death if she did not go back. She then saw accused 2 standing near accused 1. Pw. 1 returned and lighted a lamp when she saw her husband lying dead in a pool of blood from an injury on his neck and her own blouse wet with blood. She called out to her husband’s brother Pw. 2 who rushed up to be told by Pw. 1 that accused 1 stabbed Thankappan when they were sleeping. At the out-cry of Pw. 2 neighbours including Pw. 7 and Pw. 4 gathered on the scene. Pw. 2 then conveyed the information to the Perumbavoor Police Station where they recorded his statement. That statement is Ext. P2. The investigation was completed by the Circle Inspector of Police who filed the charge against the two accused. The learned Sessions Judge acquitted the 2nd accused and convicted the 1st accused as stated above. 4. The appellant raised a plea of not guilty basing it on a complete denial of everything. He admitted that enmity existed between his family and that of the deceased and stated that this ill-feeling was responsible for his false implication. He contended that he was arrested on 12-10-1959 and not on 15-10-1959 as stated by the police officers. He also added that one Panchayat Member, Paily bore a grudge towards him and he influenced his employee Pw. 3 to give false evidence. As against Pw. 7 the accused said that in Ext. D1 petition he had included Pw. 7’s mother as a counter-petitioner and because of that, Pw. 7 has now come forward to perjure against him. 5. The death of Thankappan & its cause are proved beyond any doubt. They are also not disputed. Pw. 5 who conducted the autopsy and issued Ext. 7 the accused said that in Ext. D1 petition he had included Pw. 7’s mother as a counter-petitioner and because of that, Pw. 7 has now come forward to perjure against him. 5. The death of Thankappan & its cause are proved beyond any doubt. They are also not disputed. Pw. 5 who conducted the autopsy and issued Ext. P6 post-mortem certificate opines that death of Thankappan must have been instantaneous and the cause of death is syncope from shock and haemorrhage resulting from the injury in the neck which had cut the main blood-vessels. 6. There are no eye-witnesses to the occurrence. The prosecution case therefore is made to rest only on circumstantial evidence. The main circumstances relied on by the prosecution are: (i) The evidence of Pw. 1 who saw a person jumping from the verandah who was identified by her as the appellant, (ii) The evidence of Pw. 7 that he saw the accused running away from the direction of Thankappan’s house, (iii) The finding of blood on M. Os. 4 and 6, blue shirt and white cloth worn by the 1st accused, (iv) The enmity that subsisted between Pw. 4 and his sons on the one side and the accused on the other and (v) The absconding of the accused. 7. Let us examine the evidence of Pw. 1, first Pw. 1. Rugmini aged 18, the wife of the deceased was sleeping on the same mat with her husband when he received the injury. She swears that her husband and herself retired to sleep at about 9 p. m. They both slept on the same mat in the verandah. At about 11 p. m. she got up to answer the call of nature and then lay down once again. A short time later, she heard a sound as of beating on mud pots. She also felt her blouse getting wet. When she opened her eyes she saw a person jumping into the courtyard from the verandah. She followed this person to the southern courtyard when be threatened her by saying that if she valued her life she should go back. There was moonlight and she recognised the person as the appellant whom she knew even from her school-days. Accused 2 was also found nearby. On returning to the verandah she lighted the lamp and found Thankappan lying dead with a bleeding injury on his neck. There was moonlight and she recognised the person as the appellant whom she knew even from her school-days. Accused 2 was also found nearby. On returning to the verandah she lighted the lamp and found Thankappan lying dead with a bleeding injury on his neck. She also saw that her blouse was wet with blood. She called out to Pw. 2 and when he arrived told him that Thankappan was killed by the accused. Pw. 2 cried out and hearing his cries a lot of persons gathered. Pw. 7 one of those who rushed up, told her that he saw both the accused in the lane to the east of her house. She also spoke of the enmity between her husband’s people and the accused. The learned Advocate for the defence attacked the evidence of Pw. 1 as incredible and utterly unnatural. Even if one is not prepared to denounce her evidence in such strong terms, it cannot be gainsaid that there are some improbabilities in her evidence which make it unsafe to be acted upon. It is extremely unlikely that on seeing a strange man jump down from the verandah, this young girl of 18 would have jumped down after him and chased him in the middle of the night. On the other hand one would expect that her first reaction to an alarm would have been to awaken her husband who was sleeping right next to her. There is nothing in her evidence to indicate that she made the slightest attempt to rouse her husband before chasing the stranger. Her subsequent conduct is equally strange. Even after she was threatened and sent back, she made no attempt to awaken her husband but instead coolly picked up a box of matches from underneath her pillow and lighted a lamp. Even when she saw the hideous sight of her husband lying in a pool of blood with his throat cut open and her own clothes drenched in blood she did not lose her head and cry out in alarm. Instead she called out her brother-in-law who lives in the neighbouring building to come there immediately. It was left to this man to raise a hue and cry that his brother was killed. Her claim to have identified the accused is also not free from doubt.She admitted that there were a number of trees overshadowing the courtyard. Instead she called out her brother-in-law who lives in the neighbouring building to come there immediately. It was left to this man to raise a hue and cry that his brother was killed. Her claim to have identified the accused is also not free from doubt.She admitted that there were a number of trees overshadowing the courtyard. Moreover, according to her the accused jumped down from the verandah and ran away while she was following him walking. If that was so, it is highly improbable that the accused who was running away from the scene of murder would have stopped in his tracks to enable the witness to come near and identify him. Yet another part of her evidence which does not appear probable is about the silence of her watch-dogs during the incident. She admitted in cross-examination that they had two ferocious dogs which were kept for guarding their cattle. These dogs were not chained during the night of the incident. Yet according to her they did not bark till the hue and cry was raised after the incident was over and the accused had escaped. In view of these improbabilities it is not safe to act on her evidence. It was suggested by the defence that she herself might have been responsible for the tragedy. It has come out in the case that she was suffering from puerperal mania some time after the incident. The defence suggestion is that she might have done this deed in a fit of hysteria. Yet another suggestion of the defence is that one of the brothers of the deceased who were not happy over the big share of the family properties which had gone to him under the partition, might have wanted to do away with him. The learned counsel for the appellant pointed out the silence of the dogs as an indication that it was not a stranger who came to the house in the middle of the night. Whatever may be the merits of these suggestions, the fact remains that the evidence of Pw. 1 is hardly of the type on which a conviction for murder can be based for it will be seen that if her evidence is rejected, the other circumstances, even if taken as proved, are not sufficient to hold the accused guilty of the offence. 8. Pw. 1 is hardly of the type on which a conviction for murder can be based for it will be seen that if her evidence is rejected, the other circumstances, even if taken as proved, are not sufficient to hold the accused guilty of the offence. 8. Pw. 7 Padmanabhan alias Pappu lives to the east of the scene of incident and south of the 2nd accused’s house. He swears that on hearing the alaram he hastened to Thankappan’s house via Kollakan’a purayidom. He saw two persons running from the lane to the east of Thankappan’s house. They were accused 1 and 2. The 1st accused was wearing a blue shirt and had a light with him. When the witness reached the house, he saw Pw. 2 and others. Pw. 1 then mentioned to him that the 1st accused stabbed her husband. In the Case Diary Notes of this witness he did not state anything about what Pw. 1 told him regarding the identification of the accused. His evidence is attacked as that of an enemy. Though it is seen that Pw. 7’s mother is a counter petitioner in Ext. D1 petition filed by the 1st accused, the witness is not prepared to admit it. He admitted having been told that his mother was abused and threatened to be kicked by the accused a month prior to the incident. His evidence is clearly tainted by animosity. His story of having met the accused in the Kollakan’s purayidom also looks improbable. The scene of incident is to the west of his house and it is in evidence that he could have gone straight from his house to the scene of incident instead of taking the round about route of going further east to the lane and then walk all the way westwards and southwards for the purpose. As admitted by the witness himself he had to cover almost a furlong and by this time the accused who were running from the scene could have safely reached the 2nd accused’s house which is within a few feet of the scene of incident. We are inclined to agree with the suggestion of the learned defence counsel that at best this witness might have seen the accused somewhere in the neighbourhood and the story that they were running away from the direction of the deceased’s house is only an embellishment. Pw. We are inclined to agree with the suggestion of the learned defence counsel that at best this witness might have seen the accused somewhere in the neighbourhood and the story that they were running away from the direction of the deceased’s house is only an embellishment. Pw. 1 had admitted in cross-examination that there was a political meeting that night and that a lot of people had passed by her house on their way to the meeting. Therefore, even if the accused were seen outside at that time of the night it would not be a circumstance which necessarily connects them with the crime. Perhaps it was this witness’s account that he saw the accused that is responsible for Pw. 1 coming out with the story of having chased the first accused and recognised him. 9. Another strange circumstance that induces us to disbelieve the prosecution story is that nobody made any attempt to follow the accused to their house which is in the immediate neighbourhood. When the wife so clearly recognised the murderer of her husband & narrated the story to all the brothers and neighbours who gathered there, nobody thought of going after the accused. Overwhelmed by grief, the natural impulse of the brothers would have been to get at the murderer who killed their dear relation. Evidently the recognition in the moonlight if any by Pw. 1 was not so clear as she later on tried to make out and that explains why the brothers did not rush on to the accused’s house. 10. Another circumstance which according to the learned Sessions Judge is the presence of human blood found on M. Os. 4 and 6 which admittedly belong to the 1st accused. The 1st accused was not arrested immediately after the incident. According to the police he was arrested 4 days later, on 15-10-1959. The accused is alleged to have been absconding till his arrest. It is strange why the absconder who went home to change his clothes should have left this tell-tale piece of evidence in his house without getting rid of it. There can be no doubt that blood spurted out with force and in large quantities when the main vessels in the neck were severed. When the clothes worn by Pw. It is strange why the absconder who went home to change his clothes should have left this tell-tale piece of evidence in his house without getting rid of it. There can be no doubt that blood spurted out with force and in large quantities when the main vessels in the neck were severed. When the clothes worn by Pw. 1 were drenched in blood it is strange that those of the accused who must have been stooping down at close quarters escaped with a few spots on them. Unless the stains are of considerable size, it is not possible to draw any “damning conclusion” against the man from the mere existence of slight bloodstains on his wearing apparel. Moreover in the absence of other evidence, the fact that some blood-stains were found on M. Os. 4 and 6 would not by itself provide sufficient basis for a conviction. In this connection we would like to bring to the notice of the Police Officers and Chemical Analysts the following observations made by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case reported in Prabhu Babaji v. State of Bombay, AIR. 1956 Supreme Court 51. It was observed therein: - “The Chemical Examiner’s duty is to indicate the number of blood stains found by him on each exhibit and the extent of each stain, unless they are too minute or too numerous to be described in detail. Merely to say that blood was detected on an exhibit is not enough. It may well lead to a miscarriage of justice compelling Judges to acquit when they would have convicted, had the report been more revealing”. In cases where blood-stained articles form an important part of the prosecution evidence, the police must ensure that the mahazar regarding these articles contains a detailed description of the alleged blood-stains including their number and extent. In Ext. P7 mahazar the accused’s dhoty is described as being stained with “spots of blood here and there” and the chemical examiner’s report does not indicate how many of these stains were caused by human blood. 11. The enmity of the accused against Pw. 4 and his children is relied on as another circumstance against the accused. It is admitted that owing to the criminal complaint - C. C. 139 of 1959 and Ext. D1 petition filed by Pw. 4 the parties were on inimical terms. 11. The enmity of the accused against Pw. 4 and his children is relied on as another circumstance against the accused. It is admitted that owing to the criminal complaint - C. C. 139 of 1959 and Ext. D1 petition filed by Pw. 4 the parties were on inimical terms. The enmity is admittedly between the accused and his people on the one hand and Pw. 4 and his children including the deceased on the other. It is not clear why the accused should have chosen the deceased to wreak his vengeance. It is not even suggested that there was any proximate cause for the crime. Inadequacy or absence of motive might not be very important in a case where the crime itself has been proved beyond doubt. However in a case of this nature, the existence of adequate motive is of the greatest importance. Petitions by Pw. 4 to the police against the accused cannot be considered adequate motive for the murder of Thankappan in his sleep. 12. The absconding by the accused is yet another circumstance relied on by the learned Sessions Judge. Pw. 16, the Sub-Inspector of Police says that he arrested the 1st accused on 15-10-1959 though the accused contends that he was arrested on the 12th. Be that as it may absconding even if it be true does not always indicate guilt. In this case the police records show that the 1st accused was denounced as the murderer on 11-10-1959 at 7-30 a. m. So his absconding out of fear is not inconsistent with his innocence. 13. In conclusion we have to state that neither anyone of the circumstances proved against the accused nor all the circumstances taken together bring home the guilt to the accused. The most that can be said of the prosecution evidence is that it has been successful in bringing out some suspicious circumstances against the accused. The proved circumstances are not such that they do not admit of explanations other than the one based on the accused’s guilt. In short we are convinced that in the nature of the evidence available it would be extremely unsafe to uphold the conviction. 14 In the result, the conviction and the sentence passed by the learned Sessions Judge are set aside and the appeal is allowed. The accused will be set at liberty forthwith. The reference is answered accordingly. Allowed.