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1960 DIGILAW 142 (ORI)

CHINTAMANI KHUNTIA v. MANILAL MADANLAL FIRM

1960-10-21

G.C.DAS

body1960
JUDGMENT : G.C. Das, J. - This is a petition by the decree-holders in execution case No. 71 of 1956, filed against an order of the learned Subordinate Judge of Cuttack, allowing a petition for rateable distribution by another decree-holder in Execution Case No. 214 and 215 of 1957. 2. The facts are short and simple. The decree-holder in Execution Case No. 71 of 1956 obtained a decree for a lakh and odd and put the decree to execution. The properties of the judgment-debtor were put to court auction on March 31, 1958, and the decree-bolder was permitted to bid at the auction. Eventually the properties were purchased by the decree-holder himself for a sum of Rs. 43,000/-. On that very day the Executing Court passed an order allowing a set off of the said amount towards the decretal dues. The other decree-holder in Execution Case Nos. 214 & 215 of 1951, against the same judgment debtor filed an application on April 28, 1958, within one month from the date of sale for reteable distribution of the assets u/s 73 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The objection of the former decree-holder was that the application for rateable distribution was filed after the assets were realised and his decree was satisfied. Accordingly, the application was not maintainable. 3. The learned Subordinate Judge relying upon a decision of the Patna High Court reported in Ganga Ram Gulraj Ram Vs. Muktiram Marwari and Others, came to the conclusion that the application for rateable distribution was maintainable and accordingly he allowed the petition. It is against this order that the present Civil Revision is directed by the decree-holder, as stated earlier, in. Execution Case No. 71 of 1956. 4. The same argument as was contended before the learned Subordinate Judge was also raised before this Court, and reliance was placed upon certain decisions of Madras High Court to which I will presently refer. Before, however, referring to the said decisions, I would like to state that the application contemplated under the provisions of Section 73 is an application for execution which must be filed before the sale. Admittedly in this case, the application for execution of the decree of the latter decree-holder was filed long before the sale took place. It is also admitted that the sale held in execution case no 71 of 1956 had not been confirmed yet. Admittedly in this case, the application for execution of the decree of the latter decree-holder was filed long before the sale took place. It is also admitted that the sale held in execution case no 71 of 1956 had not been confirmed yet. Where the decree-holder purchases the property after a bid with the sanction of the Court, the decree-holder may be permitted to set off the bid-amount towards his decretal dues. Sub-rule (1) of Rule 72 of Order 21 of the CPC states that no holder of a decree in execution of which property is sold shall, without the express permission of the Court, bid for or purchase the property, whereas Sub-rule (2) of Rule 72 lays down that where a decree-holder purchases with such permission, the purchase-money and the amount clue on the decree may, subject to the provisions of Section 73, be set off against one another, and the Court executing the decree shall enter up satisfaction of the decree in whole or in part accordingly. Thus, the law is quite clear that any set off ordered by the Court is subject to Section 73 of the Code. Thus, while taking the application for rateable distribution into consideration, all that the Court has to see is whether the purchase-money at the auction sale was under control of the Court. Sub-rule (2) of Rule 72 of Order 21 being subject to the provisions of Section 73, it is needless to say that although the Executing Court had passed an order for set off of the bid-money:, towards the decretal dues, it was nevertheless subject to the provisions of Section 73, that is, it is available for rateable distribution when the occasion arises. A contrary view appears to have been taken by the Madras High Court, where the learned Judges took the view that the application for rateable distribution must be filed in the Court before the sale is concluded With great respect, I must state that the learned Judges have overlooked the provisions of Sub-rule (2) of Rule 72 of Order 1 of the Code. What actually was decided in the case of Sait Punnamchand Chatraban, Firm of Marwadi Bankers Vs. Vijjapu Satyanandam. What actually was decided in the case of Sait Punnamchand Chatraban, Firm of Marwadi Bankers Vs. Vijjapu Satyanandam. is that when a decreeholder has been given permission to bid and set off, and when the amount of the successful bid is less than the decree-amount, the whole of the set off must be deemed as made en the date of sale and the whole of the amount must be deemed to have been received or released on same date the sale is made, and Section 73 will give no benefit to other decree-holders who apply for rateable distribution after conclusion of the sale however soon after its conclusion. Their Lordships do not appear to have referred to Order 21, Rule 72 (2) of the Code of Civil Procedure. The other decision referred tois a case of the same High Court reported in Vishnubhotla Ramayya Vs. Sajja Namayya and Others, wherein the view expressed was that a decree-holder cannot apply for rateable distribution u/s 73 after the assets have been realised,and the learned Judges for coming to this conclusions relied in AIR 1940 Mad 385 . The decision in B. Nana Rao Vs. M.U. Arunachalam Chettiar and Others, was in respect of Section 64 of the CPC and did not relate to Section 73. Section 64 is in respect of private alienations of properties after attachment and the Legitslature says that such alienations are to be declared void u/s 64. 5. The Patna High Court in the case of Gangaram Gulraj v. Muktiram Marwari had taken the contrary view relying upon a decision of the Privy Council in the case of Thakur Barmha and othen v. Juban Ram Marwari and Ors. 41 I.A. 38. The facts in that case were A filed an application for execution of a money-decree against B on 19th July, 197. B's property was hold in execution of the decree and purchased by a on 14th August 1929. In the meantime obtained a decree against B and took out execution on 23rd March, 1929. B's properties including that purchased by A were sold in execution of C's decree and were purchased by C on 24th June, 1929, that is some weeks before the sale in favour of A took place. C set off the purchase money towards the satisfaction of the decree. B's properties including that purchased by A were sold in execution of C's decree and were purchased by C on 24th June, 1929, that is some weeks before the sale in favour of A took place. C set off the purchase money towards the satisfaction of the decree. A then releasing B bad no saleable interest in property sold to him on the day of the sale, applied for rateatae distribution of the assets realised by a sale in execution of the decree. While the application was pending the Court confirmed the same in favour of and also the sale in favour of C. In the circumstances, it was held that on the day of application for rateable distribution there was an unsatisfied decree in favour of A and that although there was no cash in the hands of the Court, the assets were within the control of the Court and the sale not being confirmed till some months after the application for rateable distribution, the Court could order C to pay the amount in Court and it was in the power and the disposal of the Court. The two conditions necessary for Section 73 being present A had made out a good case for the interference of the High Court. Their Lordships however, observed that when situation was brought to the notice of the Court, he (Court) ought not to have confirmed the second sale. If however, his attention was drawn on this fact after he had confirmed the sales he ought to have cancelled the order of confirmation for rateable distribution 15 months later. Thereby he would have avoided the abuse of the process of the Court. He had full power to do so. In taking this view, their Lordships bad referred to the Privy Council decision referred to above. Thus, the principle underlying this decision was that an application for execution of the decree against the same judgment-debtor was filed long before the actual sale and the sale was not confirmed before the application for rateable distribution was filed. In view of this position in law, I could not persuade myself to agree with the Madras view. Thus, the principle underlying this decision was that an application for execution of the decree against the same judgment-debtor was filed long before the actual sale and the sale was not confirmed before the application for rateable distribution was filed. In view of this position in law, I could not persuade myself to agree with the Madras view. Accordingly, with great respect, I would agree with the view taken by the Patna High Court and hold that the application for reteable distribution u/s 73 was an application made when the money was in the control of the Court because by that date the sale had not been confirmed. In tile result, I would agree with the view taken by the learned Subordinate Judge and dismiss this application, but there would be no order for costs of this Court. Final Result : Dismissed