Judgment Raj Kishore Prasad, J. 1. This appeal, by the plaintiff, arises out of a suit for contribution, which has been dismissed by courts below. 2. The sole question, for determination in the appeal, is, whether the plaintiff is entitled to contribution from the defendants in respect of a decree for costs which was passed jointly against him and them? 3. In order to render plain the nature of the question involved in the present appeal, it is necessary to make a short reference to the history of the litigation: 4. Defendant 1, as plaintiff, brought a suit for partition against the present plaintiff and other defendants, including the present defendants. The plaintiff, then defendant in the suit for partition, alone contested the suit. The present defendants, then also defendants in the partition suit, did not at all appear at any stage or file any written statement and contest the suit. The suit for partition, was, however, decreed with costs in favour of the present defendant 1, and costs were awarded jointly against the contesting defendant, the present plaintiff, and, also against the non-contesting defendants, the present defendants. Defendant 1, the plaintiff decree-holder of the partition suit, executed his decree for costs and sought to realise his decree from the property of the present plaintiff alone, and put it up to sale, and, ultimately, auction purchased it. The present plaintiff, thereafter, got the sale of his property set aside, under Order 21 Rule 89, Civil Procedure Code, by paying up the entire decretal dues. 5. On the above facts, the plaintiff, here, claimed to be allowed a proportion of those costs from the defendants, representing their share, on the ground that they were also jointly liable for the decree for costs, and they got the benefit of that joint decree having been satisfied by the plaintiff alone. 6. The suit was contested by defendants 7,r 13 and 15 only. Their case was that as the defendants did not contest the partition suit, nor did they even file a written statement, and, as they had derived no benefit by the deposit of the decretal amount by the plaintiff, they were not liable. 7. 6. The suit was contested by defendants 7,r 13 and 15 only. Their case was that as the defendants did not contest the partition suit, nor did they even file a written statement, and, as they had derived no benefit by the deposit of the decretal amount by the plaintiff, they were not liable. 7. The court of appeal below, in agreement with the first court, held that it was the present plaintiff alone who contested the suit and allowed the cost of the litigation to increase, and, therefore, in equity the plaintiff alone should pay the cost so decreed; and it would be inequitable to allow a decree for contribution against the defendants. The plaintiff, accordingly, was non-suited. 8. Mr. Janardan Prasad Singh, appearing for the appellants, argued that when a joint decree for costs had been passed against the present plaintiff and the present defendants, the defendants were also certainly liable, and, as such, when the plaintiff discharged that joint liability, he was entitled to get a proportionate contribution of the cost, so paid by him, from them, and, as such, his suit should have been decreed. 9. It is now necessary to consider what are the rights of the plaintiff, and, if these rights, as contended by the appellant, are to be found in Sec. 69, Contract Act. That section runs as follows: "69 Reimbursement of person paying money by another in payment of which he is interested. A person who is interested in the payment of money which another is bound by law to pay, and who therefore pays it, is entitled to be reimbursed by the other." 10. There is a clear distinction between a claim for contribution and a claim for re-imbursement. A claim for contribution is based on the payment of a common liability of two or more persons by one of them. A claim for reimbursement, on the other hand, is based on the payment of the liability of one or more persons by another who is interested in making the payment but is not legally bound to pay. Sec. 69, therefore, does not apply to a suit for contribution; Gopinath V/s. Raghubans Kumar, AIR 1949 Fat 522 and Nandlal Singh V/s. Ram Kirit Singh, AIR 1950 Pat 212 : 11. Sec. 69, therefore, does not apply to a suit for contribution; Gopinath V/s. Raghubans Kumar, AIR 1949 Fat 522 and Nandlal Singh V/s. Ram Kirit Singh, AIR 1950 Pat 212 : 11. In Ramtuhul Singh V/s. Biseswar Lall Sahoo, 2IndApp 131 (PC), which is the leading case on the point, Sir James W. Colvile, who delivered the opinion of the Board, in dealing with the rights of parties making payments, at page 143, observed: ".....it is not in every case in which a man has benefited by the money of another, that an obligation to repay that money arises. The question is not to be determined by nice considerations of what may be fair or proper according to the highest morality. To support such a suit there must be an obligation, express or implied, to repay. It is well settled that there is no such obligation in the case of a voluntary payment by A. of B.s debt. Still less will the action lie when the money has been paid.....against the will of the party for whose use it is supposed to have been paid; Stockes V/s. Lewis, (1875) 1 T.R. 20. Nor can the case of A be better because he made the payment not ex mero mot", but in the course of a transaction which in one event would have turned out highly profitable to himself, and extremely detrimental to the person whose debts the money went to pay." Section 69, as such, has no application to cases where both plaintiff and defendant were liable for the money paid by the plaintiff. Sec. 69 deals with reimbursement, and, not with contribution at all, for the person who is interested in the payment of money which another is bound by law to pay "must be a person who is not himself bound to pay the whole or any portion of the money." 12. The words, "person who is interested in the payment of money", in Section 69, do not require that a person to be interested in a payment should at the same time have a legal proprietary interest in the property in respect of which the payment is made. The words, "person who is interested in the payment of money", in Section 69, do not require that a person to be interested in a payment should at the same time have a legal proprietary interest in the property in respect of which the payment is made. The expression "bound by law to pay, which occurs in Section 69, covers obligations of law which arise inter partes whether by contract or by tort and is not confined to those public duties which are imposed by statute or general law. Their Lordships of the Privy Council in Govindram Gordhandas Seksaria V/s. State of Gon-dal, AIR 1950 PC 99: 77 Ind App 156, expressed the view that the words "bound by law" extend to any obligation which is an effective bond in law, just as the Common Law in England gives a right of indemnity to one who has paid "under the compulsion of law" against the true obligator without limiting the circumstances in which the latiers liability had arisen. 13. Sec. 69, like Section 70, is part of a Chapter of the Contract Act devoted to what is called, "quas-contract". But the general purport of Section 69, however, is reasonably clear, it is to afford a person who pays money in furtherance of some existing interest an indemnity in respect of the payment against any other person who, rather than he, could have been made liable at law to make the payment. 14. In the instant case, the proceeding under Order 21, Rule 89, C. P, C., for getting the sale set aside by depositing the entire decretal dues, was taken by the present plaintiff for his own benefit, and without any authority, express or implied, from the defendants, and the fact that the result was also a benefit to the defendants, does not create any implied contract or give the plaintiff any equity to be paid a share of the costs by the defendants: Abdul Wahid Khan V/s. Shaluka Bibi, 21 Ind App 26 at p. 34 (PC). 15. Moreover admittedly the defendants had no interest whatsoever, in the property of the plaintiff which was auction sold for the satisfaction; of the joint decree for costs, and, therefore if the plaintiff paid up the entire decretal dues, he did so for his own benefit to save his own property and to satisfy his own liability. 16. 15. Moreover admittedly the defendants had no interest whatsoever, in the property of the plaintiff which was auction sold for the satisfaction; of the joint decree for costs, and, therefore if the plaintiff paid up the entire decretal dues, he did so for his own benefit to save his own property and to satisfy his own liability. 16. Here, in my opinion, it is an appropriate case, to apply the test, whether a person was interested in a payment by ascertaining whether he had a legal proprietary interest in the property in respect of which the payment is made. Lord Radcliffe, who delivered the opinion of the Board, in AIR 1950 PC 99, referred to earlier, while considering if the above test was a good test, at p. 104 said: "It may be a good test in appropriate circumstances" but, on the particular facts of that case there, the noble Lord, later on observed: "But it would be a sad fallacy to deduce from the circumstance that a person may be interested in a payment because he has an interest in the property to which it relates the conclusion that no one who has not an interest in a property can be interested in a payment made in respect of that property. In truth, Sec. 69, invites no such judicial limitation." 17. These facts, of the above case, however are not here, and, as such, the just reproduced latter observation of Lord Radcliffe will not apply. 18. In my opinion, therefore. Sec. 69 does not apply to the payment made by the appellant in this case. 19. The appellant, next, invoked to his aid, in support of his claim, Section 70, Contract Act, which. is in these terms: "70. Obligation of Person enjoying benefit of non-gratuitous act -- Where a person lawfully does anything for another person, or delivers anything to him, not intending to do so gratuitously, and such other person enjoys the benefit thereof, the latter is bound to make compensation to the former in respect of, or to restore, the thing sodone or delivered." 20. Section 70, like Sec. 69, is one of a fasciculus of sections dealing with what the Act calls. "certain relations resembling those created by contracts". 21. Section 70, like Sec. 69, is one of a fasciculus of sections dealing with what the Act calls. "certain relations resembling those created by contracts". 21. The three essential conditions necessary to establish a right of action under Section 70, at the suit of a person who does anything for another are (1) the thing must have been done lawfully, i.e., the act must be lawful; (2) the person who did it must not have intended! to act gratuitously; and (3) the person for whom the act is done must enjoy the benefit of it 22. The appellant can only succeed on this point if he establishes that he lawfully did the work for the defendants not intending to do so gratuitously, and, that the respondents enjoyed the benefit thereof. It may be conceded that the work, that is, the deposit was lawfully done by the appellant and also that he did not intend to do it gratuitously, because he might have been under the impression that as the decree was joint and the defendants were also jointly and severally liable to satisfy it, by satisfying it, he would receive the proportionate share of the cost from the defendants". But the deposit was not made for the respondents, nor did the respondents enjoy the benefit of it within the meaning of Section 70. The appellant deposited the decretal dues lor no other reason than that his property alone was auction sold for the satisfaction of the decree. 18 would put an extravagant construction upon Section 70, to quote the words of Lord Simonds, in Governor General-in-Council V/s. Municipal Council, Madura, AIR 1949 PC 39: 75 Ind App 213, to hold that, in such circumstances, the deposit was made by the appellant for the respondents, or that the res- pendents enjoyed the benefit of the deposit, if at all, except in an indirect sense; substantially the person who derived a benefit was the appellant himself. 23. In my opinion, therefore, Section 70, Contract Act, also does not assist the appellant. 24. As held by the Privy Council in Kanhaya Lal V/s. National Bank of India, 40 Ind App 56, at p. 66 (PC), neither Sec. 69 nor section 70 refers in any way to remedies against wrong-doers. Sections 69 and 70 deal with entirely different conditions and they cannot both apply to the same set of facts. 24. As held by the Privy Council in Kanhaya Lal V/s. National Bank of India, 40 Ind App 56, at p. 66 (PC), neither Sec. 69 nor section 70 refers in any way to remedies against wrong-doers. Sections 69 and 70 deal with entirely different conditions and they cannot both apply to the same set of facts. If one applies, the other cannot. 25. It was, then argued that even assuming that Sections 69 and 70, Contract Act, do not. apply here to the present case, the appellant was certainly entitled in equity to contribution from the respondents because of thei joint liability. 26. It is well settled that a wrong-doer cannot recover contribution from an innocent person whom he has led into the commission of a tort. In the leading case of Adamson V/s. Jarvis, (1827) 4 Bing 66, it was said: "From reason, justice, and sound policy, the rule that wrong-doers cannot have redress or contribution against each other is confined to cases when the person seeking redress must be presumed to have known that he was doing an unlawful act." 27. Let us now examine the authorities relied upon at the Bar on this point. 28. In Bal KMian V/s. Chidda, AIR 1929 All 654, which was relied upon by the Court of appeal below also, it was held, by Dalai, J., sitting singly, that, prima facie defendants, inter se are liable for contribution where a joint decree for costs has been passed against them; but the defendants who did not defend the suit or took no interest therein are equitably entitled to exemption. 29. In Sudhangshu Kumar Roy V/s. Banamalt Roy, AIR 1946 Cal 63, Henderson, J., sitting singly, also took a similar view. 30. There are two decisions of this Court also, which have been strongly relied upon by Mr. Ramanugrah Prasad, appearing for the respondents, and, they, in my opinion, furnish the key to the solution of the question under consideration, and fully meet the point raised in the present appeal. 31. 30. There are two decisions of this Court also, which have been strongly relied upon by Mr. Ramanugrah Prasad, appearing for the respondents, and, they, in my opinion, furnish the key to the solution of the question under consideration, and fully meet the point raised in the present appeal. 31. On a Letters Patent Appeal, in Mahabir Prasad V/s. Darbhangi Thakur, 4 Pat LJ 486: (AIR 1919 Pat 165), Sir Dawson-Miller, C. J., with whom Adami, J., agreed, while dealing with a suit for contribution between joint tort-feasors, at p, 499: (of Pat LJ): (at p. 171 of AIR) observed: "It seems clear, therefore, that the doctrine of contribution is well recognised, in this country, and that the only cases in which it will not be enforced are those in which a liability arises out of a joint wrong or where the equities of the case demand that the plaintiff should not recover as where the party sued was merely a formal defendant in the previous suit and not personally interested in the result of it. Again, there may be cases where it 19 just and proper that the liability should be apportioned in unequal shares." 32. The above view of the distinguished Chief Justice of this Court, Sir Dawson-Miller, C. J., was quoted with approval and adopted by Fazl AH, J., (as he then was), with whom Luby, J., agreed, for deciding the case of Panday Bisambhar-deo Narayan Singh V/s. Hitnarayan Singh, ILR 15 Pat 219: (AIR 1936 Pat 49). 33. In the above mentioned case, Fazl Ali, J., observed that it cannot be laid down as a general rule that s defendant can in no case recover costs from a co-defendant; but it is now well settled that a distinction should be drawn between cases where the tort-feasors were aware of the fact that they were acting without a semblance of right in themselves, and, cases where the tort is committed more or less innocently and in good faith with a semblance of ones rights, although these rights did not actually exist. His Lordship then further observed that there is a more vital distinction between cases of contribution for damages as between two joint tort-feasors and cases where contribution is claimed for costs or damages as between two co-defendants after a decree has been passed holding them both jointly and! severally liable. 34. His Lordship then further observed that there is a more vital distinction between cases of contribution for damages as between two joint tort-feasors and cases where contribution is claimed for costs or damages as between two co-defendants after a decree has been passed holding them both jointly and! severally liable. 34. It was held, in the just mentioned case, that the claim of the plaintiff of that, suit being based not upon any contract, as here, but upon the principle of equity, cannot be enforced against the person against whom it will be inequitable to enforce it. 35. The governing principles, which, therefore, emerge from the above authorities, are these: 36. The true rule is that prima facie a right of contribution exists between persons against whom a joint decree for costs has been passed, and it is for a defendant seeking to avoid the liability to show some equity which entitles him to exemption. 37. It is clear, therefore, that the only oases in which the doctrine of contribution will not be enforced are those in which a liability arises out of a joint wrong or where the equities of the case demand that the plaintiff should not recover as where the party sued was merely a formal defendant in the previous suit and not personally interested in the result of it. 38. Accordingly, also where a joint decree for costs is passed against A and B, but in the suit B did not at all appear at any stage of the suit, or, file even a written statement, or, contest it. whereas, A contested it and due to his contest alone, the cost of the suit has increased then if A satisfies the joint decree for costs, he is not entitled in equity to recover proportionate cost from B. In such a case, A only is liable, and, therefore, he must alone bear the entire burden. 39. As such, when the claim of the plaintiff is based not upon any contract, but upon the principle of equity, it cannot be enforced against a person against whom it will be inequitable to enforce it. 40. 39. As such, when the claim of the plaintiff is based not upon any contract, but upon the principle of equity, it cannot be enforced against a person against whom it will be inequitable to enforce it. 40. Keeping the above principles in view, It has now to be decided if there is any equity in favour of the plaintiff to claim contribution from the defendants, and, if the latter have proved any equity in their favour which can entitle them to claim exemption from liability. 41. On the fact of the case, as already indicated, it is reasonably clear that the only person who contested the partition suit of the present defendant 1 was the present plaintiff, and, as found by the court of appeal below, due to his contest alone the cost of the former litigation increased. The present defendants, then also defendants, did not appear in the former suit at any stage, nor, did they file any written statement, nor did they at any satge of the suit offer any contest. It has not been shown either that the present plaintiff and the present defendants, who were co-defendants in the partition suit of the present defendant 1, were all in the same boat pulling together, or, that their objects, aims and interests were ex necessitate identical and mutual, and, therefore, these defenlants, whether they liked it or not, Or whether they contested it or not, must be deemed to have been pushed into the same boat. It lay upon the plaintiff to show that there was either some contract between him and the defendants, or, some equity which created a duty on these defendants to contribute to the costs in question as between themselves. In the partition suit, the plaintiff apparently contested the right of the present defendant 1, the then plaintiff, to have a partition, whereas, the present defendants did not contest his claim at all. The plaintiff, therefore, in the former suit was setting up an independent defence for his own benefit, and, in doing so, he was not acting as servant or agent of these defendants. There is, therefore, no equity whatsoever on the part of the plaintiff to claim any contribution from these defendants, simply because they were co-defendants with him in the former suit, and, a joint decree for costs had been passed against both. 42. There is, therefore, no equity whatsoever on the part of the plaintiff to claim any contribution from these defendants, simply because they were co-defendants with him in the former suit, and, a joint decree for costs had been passed against both. 42. On the above facts, on the other hand, the defendants have proved that there was equity on their side, and, therefore, they were entitled to exemption from liability. 43. For these considerations, in my opinion, the appeal has been correctly decided by the court of appeal below, and, as such, its judgment in appeal is affirmed. 44. In the result, the appeal fails, and, is dismissed; but, in the circumstances of this case, there will be no order as to costs.