JUDGMENT This first appeal arises out of an arbitration matter. Facts material for the decision of this appeal are that in pursuance of an agreement dated July 17, 1957, four arbitrators and an umpire, namely, Shri Jagmo Lal Shrivastava were appointed. They made an award on April 23, 1954, and got it registered. It was filed in the Court of the District Judge, Gwalior, under section 14 of the Arbitration Act on July 6, 1954. Notice of the filing of the award was served on the appellant Shri Mauj Bihari on July 22, 1954. He filed objection on September 2, 1954. As regards Prakash Bihari appellant No. 2 notice of the filing of the award was served on him on November 22, 1954, by affixing a notice on his residence and on January 4, 1955, by advertisement. He appeared on January 10, 1955, in the Court of the District Judge and eventually he filed his objections on February 14, 1955. The objections which were filed by Shri Mauj Bihari on September 22, 1964 and by Prakash Bihari on February 14, 1955 were under section 30 of the Arbitration Act. The Additional District Judge, by his order dated July 4, 1955, held that both these objections were barred by time. In doing so, he applied Article 158 of the Limitation Act and took July 22, 1954 and January 10, 1955 respectively as starting points of limitation. Thereafter, on September 30, 1955, Mauj Bihari filed an application under section 33 of the Arbitration Act and on October 12, 1955, Prakash Bihari filed a similar application. The prayer in these applications was to 'declare' that the award was invalid. By his order dated February 27, 1956, the Additional District Judge held these applications also to be barred by time by applying Article 158 of the Limitation Act. On the following day, that is, on February 28, 1956, he passed a decree in terms of the award. This appeal was filed by Mauj Bihari from the judgment and decree passed on February 28, 1956. On the following day, that is, on February 28, 1956, he passed a decree in terms of the award. This appeal was filed by Mauj Bihari from the judgment and decree passed on February 28, 1956. It is obvious enough that the decree which was passed by the Additional District Judge on February 28, 1956 in terms of the award was under section 17 of the Arbitration Act and it is provided in the section that no appeal lies from such a decree except on the ground that it is in excess of, or not otherwise in accordance with, the award. No such objection was taken in the memorandum of appeal. As such this appeal was incompetent. Shri Swami Saran learned counsel for the appellant immediately realized this mistake at the hearing and he sought our leave to be heard as if this appeal was against the order passed on February 27, 1956, rejecting the applications of the appellants under section 33 of the Arbitration Act. Having looked into the grounds of appeal and having regard to the fact that a certified copy of the order dated the 27th February had also been filed by the appellants together with appeal petition, we were satisfied that it was only an inadvertent mistake in drawing the appeal petition and we did not think it proper to dismiss it on that technical ground. We, therefore, heard this appeal treating it as one from the order passed on February 27, 1956. Now, the first question that arises is whether this appeal is competent under section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Learned counsel for the appellants on being put this question, found himself on the horns of a dilema. If he took the stand that the applications which were filed under section 33 were not for 'setting aside the award' but were merely for a 'declaration', the appeal did not fall within the purview of section 39(1)(vi), nor under any other sub-clause of that section. If he admitted that the applications under section 33 were for setting aside the award there were two difficulties in his way: Firstly, these applications were hit by Article 158 of the Limitation Act, which would have knocked out the very bottom of his case; secondly, the earlier applications under section 30 having already been dismissed it was doubtful whether the subsequent applications were entertainable. By an ingenuity of argument, the learned counsel, therefore, endeavoured to distinguish between the nature of the applications and the nature of the order passed thereon. His argument was that the order under appeal was one refusing to set aside the award although the applications filed by the appellants under section 33 were not for setting aside the award, but were only for a declaration that the award was invalid. Before I proceed to consider these arguments, it must be mentioned that no appeal was filed from the order dated July 4, 1955 whereby the two applications under section 30 were held barred by time. On a perusal of the order of the 27th February, it is very clear that the trial Judge dismissed the applications under section 33 as barred by time. He did not in the order "refuse to set aside the award". As such the distinction drawn by Shri Swami Saran between the nature of the order and the nature of the applications under section 33, for what it is worth, deserves no consideration. We have really to examine the pith and substance of the applications under section 33. No doubt the prayer in those applications is that "the award be declared invalid" and the applications were studiously couched in that form evidently because of the dismissal of the earlier applications under section 39, but in essence they were applications for setting aside the award. If a strict distinction is to be made between a prayer for a 'declaration' and a prayer for "setting aside" under section 33, then the same distinction must also be adhered to while considering the appealability under section 39. I find that in some decided cases it has been held that an appeal does not lie under section 39 from an order passed under section 33. See for instance Abdul Karim v. Mani Ram AIR 1954 Pat 6 and Radha Kishen v. Bombay Company Ltd. AIR 1943 Lah 295. I do not propose to decide in this appeal the question whether an order passed under section 33 refusing to 'declare' an award invalid is essentially an order refusing to set aside the award within the meaning of section 39(1)(vi), nor do I propose to enter into the question whether an application under section 33 can be made even after the dismissal of the application under section 30 of the Act. For the purposes of this appeal, it is unnecessary to enter into those questions. The order of the 27th February is either an order refusing to set aside the award, or it is not so. There is no third proposition possible. If it is not an order refusing to set aside an award, then it is not appealable under section 39 and this appeal must be dismissed as such. If the subsequent applications under section 33 were really for setting aside the award, their dismissal tantamounts to a refusal to set aside the award and may for a moment be held appealable under section 39(1)(vi). But then the unsurmountable hurdle is that an application for setting aside the award must, as provided in Article 158 of the Limitation Act, be made within 30 days from the date of the service of the notice. The following Article runs thus: 158. Under the Arbitration Act, 1940 (10 of 1940) to set aside an award or to get an award remitted for reconsideration. Thirty days. The date of service of the notice of filing of the award. The first column does not make any distinction between the grounds on which the application may be made. It is immaterial under what section of the Arbitration Act the application is made. It is plain beyond doubt, and I am quite clear in my mind, that once an award is filed and its notice is served on a party, every application made under any of the provisions of the Arbitration Act seeking to avoid the award is governed by Article 158, which is not restricted by any conditions for its application. In this connection reference may be made to the decision in Kawal Singh v. Baldev Singh 1957 MPLJ 387 : AIR 1957 Nag 57, which was approved in Sheoram Prasad v. Gopal Prasad 1959 MPLJ 87 : AIR 1959 MP 102 . On these premises the applications made on September 28, 1955, by Shri Mauj Bihari and on October 12, 1955 by Shri Prakash Bihari were both barred by time. Shri Swami Saran then urged that there was no good and valid service on Prakash Bihari by advertisement or by affixing the notice on his residence. It is unnecessary to enter into that question because he appeared in the Court on January 10, 1958, and prayed for an adjournment on that day. Shri Swami Saran then urged that there was no good and valid service on Prakash Bihari by advertisement or by affixing the notice on his residence. It is unnecessary to enter into that question because he appeared in the Court on January 10, 1958, and prayed for an adjournment on that day. Even if limitation is computed from the last mentioned date, his application was time-barred. At the end, Shri Swami Saran faintly asked us to condone the delay under section 5 of the Limitation Act, but it is settled law that section 5 applied only to those applications which are mentioned in that section, or to which that section may be made applicable by or under any enactment for the time being in force. For these reasons this appeal is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed