JUDGMENT K. Sankaran, C.J. 1. The tenant in occupation of a building on rent, has filed this petition to revise the order passed by the learned District Judge of Tellicherry, dismissing the application for cancellation of the order for eviction passed against him on 21-7-1958. When the order of eviction was passed, the rights and liabilities as between a landlord and his tenant were governed by the provisions of the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1949 (Act XXV of 1949). Under that Act, the tenant in occupation of a building could be evicted only under any of the special circumstances enumerated in S.7. That section permitted the landlord to get recovery of possession of the building from the tenant when the landlord in good faith requires the building for his own use. The landlord invoked this provision and filed a petition, R.C.P. 337/1955 before the Rent Controller at Tellicherry, for an order for evicting the tenant from the building. The Rent Controller did not accept the landlord's claim to be one supported by good faith and accordingly his petition was dismissed. Against that order the landlord filed C.M. Appeal 1324/1956 in the Sub-Court at Tellicherry. The decision in the appeal was also against him. He took up the matter in revision by filing C.R.P. 1/1958 before the District Judge of Tellicherry. The District Judge allowed that C.R.P. and, accepting the contentions of the landlord, passed an order in his favour to get the tenant evicted from the building. The tenant sought for a revision of that order by filing C.R.P. 731/1958 before the High Court and this Court refused to interfere and dismissed the C.R.P. Before the landlord could enforce the eviction order, the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1959 (Act XVI of 1959) came into force on 3rd April, 1959. By S.36 of that Act, the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1949 as the law in force in the Malabar area, was repealed. S.34 of the new Act gave an option to the tenants to avoid orders of eviction passed between the 12th of February 1958 and the 3rd of April 1953. The tenant in the present case was exercising this option when he filed I. A. No. 406/1959 before the District Judge, praying that the eviction order passed on 21-7-1958 may be set aside. The District Judge dismissed that application. The tenant in the present case was exercising this option when he filed I. A. No. 406/1959 before the District Judge, praying that the eviction order passed on 21-7-1958 may be set aside. The District Judge dismissed that application. Against that order, the tenant has filed the present C.R.P. No. 681/1959, praying for a reversal of that order. 2. The learned Single Judge who heard the revision petition in the first instance, felt that the points involved in the revision petition are of great importance and accordingly he referred the C.R.P. for decision by a Division Bench. 3. One of the objections raised by the respondent-landlord is that I.A. 406/1959 filed by the tenant could not be entertained in the District Court. According to the landlord, the proper forum for the tenant to agitate his alleged right under S.34 of the new Act, is either the Rent Court or the High Court where the tenant had filed C.R.P. 731/1958 against the eviction order. Sub-section (1) of S.34 of the Act merely states that an order falling under that sub-section shall be voidable at the option of the tenant. But the subsection is silent as to how, when and where the tenant is to exercise that option. When the right is conferred in such general terms without any specification as to the manner of exercising it, it would be open to the tenant to exercise his option by filing a separate application for avoiding the order in question or by objecting to the landlord's application for enforcement of the eviction order. If the option is exercised at a time when the tenant is attempted to be actually evicted from the building, he has necessarily to file his objections before the court where the eviction proceedings are pending and thus to indicate that he is exercising the option conferred on him by S.34. This view gains support from the provision contained in sub-section (2) of S.34 which enables the tenant to get re-delivery of possession of the building even after his eviction from it. This view gains support from the provision contained in sub-section (2) of S.34 which enables the tenant to get re-delivery of possession of the building even after his eviction from it. This sub-section states that: " If any tenant has actually been evicted in pursuance of an order referred to in subsection [1], the Accommodation Controller shall, on a petition presented to him for the purpose within three months of the coming into force of this Act, restore the tenant to the possession of that building: Provided that the tenant shall not be entitled to be restored to possession in cases where a lease has been granted bona fide to a third party and possession given in pursuance thereof before the 13th of December 1958." Where no steps have been taken for implementing the order of eviction the tenant choosing to exercise the option given to him by sub-section (1) of S.34, has to do so by filing an application to have the eviction order vacated, before the Court which passed that order. In the present case the order of eviction was passed by the District Court in C.R.P. 1/1958 on the file of that court. All the same, it is contended on behalf of the landlord that the tenant's application to have the eviction order vacated cannot be entertained by the District Court because the final order is that passed by the High Court in C.R.P. 731/1958 and that the order of the District court has become merged in the order passed by the High Court. If the High Court had accepted C.R.P. 731/1958 and had interfered with the order of the District Court, it could be said that the order of the District Court was superseded by the final order passed by the High Court. But as already pointed out, the High Court refused to interfere with the order of the District Court and thus dismissed C.R.P. 731/1958. The effect of such a dismissal order is to leave the order of the District Court as it stood and it will be wrong to say that the District Court's order has become merged in the order of the High Court. The order of the District Court was left intact as the final and effective order of the eviction of the tenant from the building. The order of the District Court was left intact as the final and effective order of the eviction of the tenant from the building. The exercise of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court under S.115 of the Code of Civil Procedure is not the same or similar to the exercise of the appellate jurisdiction. While acting under S.115, the High Court will interfere with the order of the subordinate court only if it is satisfied of the existence of one or more of the grounds specified in that section. If the High Court is not so satisfied, it will refuse to exercise its jurisdiction under that section. It will not be correct to say that the refusal to interfere in revision amounts to a confirmation of the order of the subordinate Court. The position is different in the case of an appeal. When once an appeal is entertained, the appellate judgment may be for confirming, varying or reversing the decree from which the appeal is preferred, as indicated by R.32 of Order XLI of the Code of Civil Procedure. The decision in the appeal will be the final decision, no matter whether it is one confirming, varying or reversing the decree or order appealed against. Even where the appellate court has merely confirmed the decree or order of the lower court, there will be a merger of the lower court's order in the order of the appellate Court. The dismissal of C.R.P. 731/1958 by the High Court on account of its refusal to interfere with the order of the District Court, cannot be equated to the dismissal of an appeal by the High Court against the order of the District Court and the consequent confirmation of that court's order. It follows, therefore, that the order passed by the District Court in C.R.P. 1/1958 ordering the eviction of the tenant from the building, remains the final order in the proceedings initiated by the landlord against the tenant. That is the proper Court where the tenant, in exercise of the option conferred on him by S.34 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1959 (Act XVI of 1959), has to file his application to have the eviction order vacated. 4. That is the proper Court where the tenant, in exercise of the option conferred on him by S.34 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1959 (Act XVI of 1959), has to file his application to have the eviction order vacated. 4. It has next to be considered whether the tenant is entitled to avoid the order of eviction passed against him by the District Court on the 21st July 1958 in C.R.P. 1/1958. The tenant is entitled to succeed if the conditions specified by sub-section (1) of S.34 of Act XVI of 1959 are satisfied. The sub-section runs as follows: "Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law any order of eviction passed between 12th February 1958 and the date of coming into force of this Act on grounds which would not have been available if this Act were in force during the said period, shall be voidable at the option of the tenant." Act XVI of 1959 came into force on 3rd April 1959. The eviction order dated 21st July 1958 was passed between 12th February 1958 and 3rd April 1959. It is not also disputed that the grounds on which the order of eviction was passed would not have been available if Act XVI of 1959 were in force during the period between 12th February 1958 and 3rd April 1959. If this Act were in force during that period, the landlord could not get an order of eviction of the tenant on the ground that the building is bona fide required for his own use. Thus all the conditions required by sub-section (1) of S.34 are satisfied in the present case. But the learned District Judge has taken the view that the order of eviction passed by the District Court on 21st July 1958 must be deemed to have been the order passed by the Rent Controller on 8-61956. The order passed by the Rent Controller on 8-6-1956 was an order dismissing the landlord's petition. The legal fiction introduced by the learned District Judge is that when the Rent Controller's order was reversed by the District Judge by his order dated 21-7-1958, the latter order for eviction must be deemed to have been the order passed by the Rent Controller on 8-6-1956. There is no justification for introducing such a legal fiction and to ignore realities. There is no justification for introducing such a legal fiction and to ignore realities. The decisions in Patel v. Ponnayya Nadar (72 Law Weekly 13) and in Krishnan Nair v. Velayudhan (1959 Kerala Law Times 812), relied upon by the learned District Judge do not also lend any support to the view taken by him. In the first of these cases, it was observed as follows: "The determination of the fair rent by the appellate authority was, no doubt, on 28th November, 1951. But the determination, in our opinion, will date back to the order of the Rent Controller because in effect the order of the appellate authority is the order which the Rent Controller ought to have passed." Similarly, in the second case it has been observed that: "The function of an appellate Court is to determine what decree the court below ought to have made as held by the Privy Council in Krishto Kinkur Roy v. Rajah Burroda Caunt Roy, [1872] 14 M. I. A. 465. If so, the decision is in law that of the Rent Court, though it was rendered or was sent right in appeal." All that is conveyed by these observations is that the order passed by the appellate court will be taken to be the correct order which ought to have been passed by the subordinate court and that in appropriate cases the appellate order will take effect from an anterior date that may be relevant to the matter in hand. All the same, it has not been ruled in the cases cited above that the date of the appellate order will be different from the actual date on which it was passed. It is an obvious impossibility. In the present case the order of eviction was passed for the first time by the District Court on 21-7-1958 and if cannot be said that this order was passed by the Rent Controller on 8-6-1956 when he dismissed the landlord's application for eviction of the tenant. To introduce such a fiction would be to defeat the purpose underlying sub-section (1) of S.34 of Act XVI of 1959. It is clear from sub-section (1) that the new Act was intended to have retrospective effect to a limited extent as specified in the section. To introduce such a fiction would be to defeat the purpose underlying sub-section (1) of S.34 of Act XVI of 1959. It is clear from sub-section (1) that the new Act was intended to have retrospective effect to a limited extent as specified in the section. The tenant was given the option to avoid orders of eviction passed against him during the period from 12th February 1958 and 3rd April 1959. Such orders contemplated by the sub-section are real and factual orders and the intention of the legislature in respect of that matter is manifest from the straight and simple language in which the sub-section has been enacted. The effect of the plain meaning of the sub-section cannot be nullified by introducing any legal fiction into it. The date of the eviction order passed by the District Court clearly falls within the period specified by sub-section (1) of S.34. The other conditions required by the sub-section are also satisfied in the present case and hence the tenant is entitled to avoid the order of eviction passed against him. The learned District Judge was wrong in refusing to exercise his jurisdiction in the matter of avoiding that order. 5. In the result, this revision petition is allowed with costs and in reversal of the order of the learned District Judge, I.A. No. 406/1959 filed by the petitioner-tenant under S.34 of Act XVI of 1959, is allowed and the order of eviction passed against him by the learned District Judge on 21-7-1958 is set aside.