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1960 DIGILAW 15 (GAU)

Kamaleswar Barua v. Dilip Barua

1960-03-22

C.P.SINHA

body1960
ORDER : This is an application purporting to be one under the provisions of Sec. 522(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 2. The facts briefly are that the petitioner filed a complaint against the opposite party on the allegation that the opposite party on 12-9-58, broke the fencing of the complainant's land and forcibly ploughed the same and thus dispossessed him. On these facts, the opposite party was prosecuted under Sec. 447, Indian Penal Code. After perusing the evidence in the case, the trial Court came to the finding that there was no evidence that the opposite party Dilip was possessing the land, and that if he wanted to claim title over the land, he should have gone to the Civil Court, and without doing so, it he took the law in his own hands, it definitely became a case of trespass. Upon these findings, the learned Magistrate convicted the opposite party under section 447 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced him to pay a fine of Rs. 70/-, in default, to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one month. This order was passed on 17-1-59. Within a month from that date the petitioner moved the District Magistrate, Darrang, to refer the case to this Court for orders under Sec. 522 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. This petition for reference was rejected by the learned District Magistrate on 6-5-59. It is against this order that the present petition has been filed. 3. The application which was made to the Court of the District Magistrate, Darrang, was disposed of in the following manner on 6-5-59 :- "Seen report of T. N. As there was no element of force or show of force in the act of trespass, orders under Sec. 522, Cr. P. C. were not rightly passed. Reference rejected." In my opinion, this finding of the learned District Magistrate is fatal to this application, apart from anything else. Section 522, Cri. P. C. were not rightly passed. Reference rejected." In my opinion, this finding of the learned District Magistrate is fatal to this application, apart from anything else. Section 522, Cri. P. Code, has now to he read, and I am quoting only the relevant portion of it : "Whenever a person is convicted of an offence attended by criminal force or show of force or by criminal intimidation, and it appears to the Court that by such force or show of force or criminal intimidation, any person has been dispossessed of any immovable property, the Court may, if it thinks fit, when convicting such person or at any time within one month from the date of the conviction, order the person dispossessed to be restored to the possession of the same. * * * (3) An order under this section may be made by any Court of appeal, confirmation, reference or revision." It is true that the learned Magistrate convicted the opposite party under Sec. 447 of the Code for an offence of trespass, which is defined by section 441 of the Indian Penal Code, Criminal trespass is defined by that section as follows :- "Whoever enters into or upon property in the possession of another with intent to commit an offence or to intimidate, insult or annoy any person in possession of such property or having lawfully entered into or upon such property, unlawfully remains there with intent thereby to intimidate, insult or annoy any such person, or with intent to commit an offence, is said to commit 'criminal trespass'." This will show that the use of criminal force or show of force or criminal intimidation is not necessarily one of the ingredients of 'criminal trespass' as defined in Sec. 441 of the Code. On the other hand, Sec. 522, Cr. P. Code, gives power to the Court convicting an accused person to pass an order restoring the complainant to possession, only if the offence is attended by criminal force or show of force or by criminal intimidation, and unless criminal force or show of force is used against a person or there has been use of criminal intimidation against a person, the powers under Sec. 522, Cr. P. Code, cannot possibly be exercised. P. Code, cannot possibly be exercised. In the present case, if does not appear from reading the judgment that any criminal force or show of force or criminal intimidation was used against any person. What I get from the judgment is that on 12-9-58, the accused Dilip Barua broke the fencing of the land and forcibly ploughed over the land, and nothing beyond that. In my opinion, therefore, the Court below was quite correct in stating that as no element of force or show of force was used in the act of trespass, an order under Sec. 522, Cr. P. Code, could not have been made by the trial Court or by the District Magistrate. 4. The view which I have taken is supported by a number of authorities, if any authority was needed. In "Narain Singh v. Panna Lal," reported in AIR 1940 Lah 460, - a case of a Division Bench, - it was held that the only force that was contemplated by Sec. 522 was force as applied to a human body. In Aswatha Narayana v. Muneppa, reported in AIR 1943 Mad 257 , the same view was taken, and upon a review of a number of authorities, it was held that an order for restoration of possession could not be made under Sec. 522 where the criminal force attending the dispossession complained of was used not against the person dispossessed but against the property in his absence. In Nani Gopal Deb v. Bhima Charan Rakshit, reported in 39 Cal WN 688 : ( AIR 1956 Cal 32 ), the same view was reiterated. In my judgment, therefore, even if this Court had jurisdiction to interfere by way of giving relief to the petitioner under Sec. 522(3), Cr. P. Code, which position is also not free from doubt as no criminal force or show of force or criminal intimidation was used against any person in the present case, that section is not at all attracted. 5. Mr. Lahiri the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner submitted that it was the fault of the Magistrate who tried the case in not coming to a finding about criminal force or show of force or criminal intimidation having been used against a person and, therefore, this case should be sent back to him to write a proper judgment. In my opinion, this prayer is absolutely uncalled for. In my opinion, this prayer is absolutely uncalled for. The original case was decided by the Magistrate on 17-1-59, and by the judgment of that date the opposite party was convicted under Sec. 447, Indian Penal Code, and sentenced to a pay fine of Rs. 70/-, in default, to suffer rigorous imprisonment for one month. That was a final judgment. No party went in appeal or revision against that judgment. In my opinion, therefore, the prayer of Mr. Lahiri cannot possibly be granted. 6. Mr. Lahiri then argues that he has got no other remedy. That may be true so far as the Criminal Court is concerned, but he can have his remedy in the Civil Court. If recourse is taken to particular provisions of Law, those provisions must be fully satisfy before a Court can have jurisdiction to give relief to the party concerned. In the present case, as I have said already, the provisions of section 522, Cr. P. Code, are not attracted and, therefore, apart from any infirmity from which this application might be suffering, I decline to interfere. The application is, therefore, rejected. The Rule is discharged. Application rejected.