ORDER T.C. Shrivastava, J. 1. Respondent, as landlord, obtained a decree against the Appellant for ejectment and for arrears of rent. He applied for execution claiming possession of the premises. The application was resisted on the ground that after the extension of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1955 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Accommodation Act'), the decree is incapable of execution. The executing Court accepted the contention and rejected the application. The lower appellate Court set aside the order holding that the decree can be executed. The tenant has now come up in appeal. 2. The Respondent had, with the permission of the Rent Controller, given a notice determining the tenancy on 25 9-1951. He instituted the present suit on 22-11-1951. The trial Court decreed ejectment and finally in 1998 the High Court confirmed the decree. Before the landlord could obtain possession, the Accommodation Act, which was formerly in force in Madhya Bharat region, was extended to Mahakoshal region also on 1-1-1959. The application of the landlord for execution, which was then pending, was resisted on the ground that under Section 16 of the Accommodation Act, the decree could not be executed "except on any of the grounds mentioned in Section 4". The executing Court held that no such grounds existed, but the lower appellate Court held that as the tenant had failed to pay the arrears of rent after the decree, the case fell within the exception in Section 4 of the Accommodation Act. 3. The first question raised in support of the appeal is that as the tenancy was terminated by notice in 1951, the Accommodation Act had no application at all. It was contended that under Section 6 of the Madhya Pradesh Extension of Laws Act, 1958, rights already acquired were not affected and therefore the decree could be executed irrespective of what was provided in Section 16 of the Accommodation Act. The very question come up before a Full Bench of this Court in Shyamlal v. Umacharan, 1960 JLJ 892 . The very question come up before a Full Bench of this Court in Shyamlal v. Umacharan, 1960 JLJ 892 . It has been held that A person whose tenancy has been determined but who continues to remain in possess on of the tenanted premises without the assent of the landlord after the determination of the tenancy is a tenant for the purposes of the Act and is entitled to the benefit of Sections 4 and 17 of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1955 This decision concludes the matter. I hold that the tenant was entitled to resist the execution so far as the decree related to ejectment under Section 16 of the Accommodation Act. 4. Section 16 reads as follows: No decree for the evidtion (sic) of a tenant from any accommodation passed before the date of commencement of this Act shall, in so far as it relates to the eviction to such tenant, be executed against him so long as this Act remains in force, except on any of the grounds mentioned in Section 4: Provided that the tenant pays to the landlord the rent payable under the decree. Under the Code of Code of Civil Procedure no grounds are required to be mentioned for executing a decree. All that is necessary is that the decree sought to be executed must not have been satisfied. It is, therefore, difficult to follow the exact implication of the words "except on any of the grounds mentioned in Section 4." 5. It is contended on behalf of the Respondent that no grounds have to be mentioned at the time of execution, these words must be ignored as being repugnant to the provisions in the Code of Civil Procedure Code. On this view, the section would be rendered meaningless and the protection which is intended to be given to the tenant will be completely lost. It spears that Section 16 has been enacted to bar execution of decrees for ejectment except where the ground mentioned in Section 4 can be made out. It has, therefore, to be interpreted in such a manner as to fulfil that intention Accordingly, I must hold that execution of decree for ejectment is completely barred under Section 16 of the Accommodation Act unless the decree-holder satisfies the executing Court that one of the grounds specified in Section 4 exists. 6. It has, therefore, to be interpreted in such a manner as to fulfil that intention Accordingly, I must hold that execution of decree for ejectment is completely barred under Section 16 of the Accommodation Act unless the decree-holder satisfies the executing Court that one of the grounds specified in Section 4 exists. 6. As regards the scope of the enquiry to the made by the executing Court, three alternatives have been suggested. The first is that the grounds must exist at the time of the original suit and must be alleged in the plaint. The second is that although the grounds need not be alleged in the plaint, they must exist at the time of filing of the suit or at most on the date of the decree. The third suggestion is that the grounds should exist on the date of the application for execution. 7. The first view that the grounds must exist at the time of the suit and must be alleged in the plaint appears to me as untenable. Before the extension of the Accommodation Act to Mahakoshal region, it was not at all necessary for the Plaintiff to state any grounds for ejectment in the plaint except that the tenancy had been determined by a valid notice in accordance with Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. Even if he did so, the Court would not have gone into them at all, as this would be irrelevant for the decision of the suit. It is, therefore, unreasonable to insist that the grounds should have been stated in the plaint. 8. Next, it has to be considered whether the grounds should have existed at the time of the suit or whether they should exist on the date of the application for execution. To me, the latter view appears to be more consisttent with the policy of the Accommodation Act. Section 16 creates a bar against execution of existing decrees for ejectment except when certain grounds exist. The existence of these grounds long before execution ten years ago in the instant case-seems wholly unconnected with the protection. If the landlord needed the house for his residence in 1951, but has no need for it in 1960 when the decree is sought to be executed, there is no necessity to give back the house to him now. The existence of these grounds long before execution ten years ago in the instant case-seems wholly unconnected with the protection. If the landlord needed the house for his residence in 1951, but has no need for it in 1960 when the decree is sought to be executed, there is no necessity to give back the house to him now. The same reasoning applies to most of the grounds mentioned in Section 4 9. It can be urged against this view that no such considerations arise in the case of decrees which are obtained after the commencement of the Act and which can be executed irrespective of circumstances existing at the time of execution. There is some force in the contention; but it appears to me that decrees obtained prior to the Accommodation Act are deliberately treated differently. In the case of suits (decided after the Accommodation Act, the parties are fully conscious of the legal position and are given an opportunity to litigate the grounds mentioned in Section 4. In the case of suits decided before the Accommodation Act, the parties could not base their claim or defence on the grounds. The provisions in Section 16 are intended to meet an extraordinary situation where protection is being given to the tenant against decrees based on a concluded litigation fought on a different basis. A chance has therefore to be given to them to prove the existence or non-existence of those grounds in executing Court. It appears reasonable that the relevant situation entitling the tenant to protection must exist on the date when his ejectment is sought and not at some distant date in the past before the Accommodation Act. This interpretation is justified on the plain language of the section which has nothing in it to indicate that the enquiry should be limited to grounds existing on the date of suit. 10. It is true that normally the executing Court has no power to go behind a decree. However, the Legislature may grant any powers to the executing Court and it has expressiy granted such powers under Section 16 of the. Accommodation Act. There is therefore, no force in the contention that the interpretation put by me on Section 16 would virtually convert the executing Court Into an original Court. The decision of the executing Court would be in the nature of the decision in a suit after trial. Accommodation Act. There is therefore, no force in the contention that the interpretation put by me on Section 16 would virtually convert the executing Court Into an original Court. The decision of the executing Court would be in the nature of the decision in a suit after trial. There would be no prejudice to anyone, as under Section 47 of the Code of Code of Civil Procedure the decision would operate as a decree and parties would have a right to challenge it in appeal in the same manner as a decree obtained in a suit. 11. It may be observed that a decree for ejectment obtained before the Accommodation Act is not rendered void by Section 16. It is only unexecutable while the Act remains in force. The decree becomes executable like any other decrees after the temporary Act expires That being so, if any grounds specified in Section 4 come into existence after the decree insistence upon a suit on the basis of those grounds appears unjust to the Plaintiff who already holds a decree for ejectment. If any such facts come into existence, the bar against execution of the existing decree is intended to be removed. The Legislature has considered the execution Court to be suitable forum to adjudicate on the existence of those facts and has given it the necessary power under Section 16. 12. Accordingly I hold that Section 16 entitles the executing Court to enquire into the existence of the grounds specified in Section 4 of the Accommodation Act and the relevant date for the existence of these grounds is the date of the execution application. In every case, the decree-holder must be given an opportunity to allege the grounds entitling him to relief and the judgment-debtor must likewise be given a chance to refute them. The executing Court should decide the question in accordance with the 'procedure followed in the trial of suits. 13. Shri M.L. Shrivastava for the Respondent pointed out that rent was not paid for a long time after the decree and contended that the Appellant was not entitled to the protection under section 16 of the Accommodation Act. I need only state that under Clause (2) of Section 4 mere existence of arrears is not sufficient as a ground for ejectment. I need only state that under Clause (2) of Section 4 mere existence of arrears is not sufficient as a ground for ejectment. A notice must be served on the tenant demanding the arrears and the tenant should fail to pay the amount within one month from the date of notice. This has not been done in the present case. 14. In the view that I have taken, it is necessary to remand the case to the executing Court to give the landlord a chance to put an application making out one of the grounds in Section 4. Accordingly, the order of the lower appellate Court is set aside. The case is remanded to the executing Court for disposal in accordance with law with advertence to what I have said in paragraph 12 above. The costs, so far incurred by the parties, shall abide the result.