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1960 DIGILAW 151 (MAD)

Narasimhalu Naidu v. Chinna Chengama Naidu

1960-04-22

ANANTANARAYANAN

body1960
Judgment.- The appellants were the defendants in O.S. No. 144 of 1951, District Munsif’s Court, Tiruvallur, and the order now canvassed in appeal is that of the learned District Judge in I.A. No. 1761 of 1956 in that suit. The facts are very simple, and the point involved is also a simple question of the interpretation of section 4 of Act V of 1954. The appellants are admittedly agriculturists entitled to the benefits of this Act, and the question is whether the respondents (Plaintiff,) could institute a proceeding for the passing of a final decree in the suit, taking advantage of the extended period, of limitation which necessarily follows from the bar or moratorium declared under Act V of 1954. In brief, the appellants claim that the bar or moratorium declared under Act V of 1954 does not extend to such an application for the passing of a final decree in the suit, and that, though they are agriculturists entitled to the benefits of the Act, they could not have resisted this application for a final decree, had it been filed within the normal period of limitation, on the ground that the Legislature had declared a moratorium in respect of such proceedings in their favour. If this argument is to be sustained, it follows that the application for the passing of a final decree in the Court below was time-barred, and that it would have to be dismissed. The learned District Judge took the view that the application was not time-barred, and he set aside the order of the lower Court and remanded the application for disposal upon the merits. The present Civil Miscellaneous Appeal is from that order. The learned District Judge cites the decision in B. Narain Dutt v. B. P. Roy Chowdhry1, for the view that the word “suit” does not merely have the narrow significance attached to the word “action” in English law, but that it is a more comprehensive legal expression, embracing all contentious proceedings of an ordinary civil kind. I do not think that it is necessary to proceed into a discussion of this matter, for the simple reason that it seems very clear to me that the language of section 4 of Act V of 1954 is plain and unambiguous, and worded in such a manner as certainly to include such an application for a final decree. I do not think that it is necessary to proceed into a discussion of this matter, for the simple reason that it seems very clear to me that the language of section 4 of Act V of 1954 is plain and unambiguous, and worded in such a manner as certainly to include such an application for a final decree. The section runs as follows:- “All further proceedings in suits and applications of the nature mentioned in section 3 in which relief is claimed against an agriculturist, not being proceedings for the amendment of pleadings or for the addition, substitution, or the striking off of parties, but otherwise inclusive of proceedings consequent on orders or decrees made in appeals, revision petitions, or applications for review, shall, subject to the next succeeding sub-section, stand stayed........” It appears to be very clear, on this wording, that an application for the passing of a final decree, even if it is not to be construed as a ‘suit’ in the manner that the learned District Judge has done, will certainly be a ‘further proceeding in suit’ within the meaning of section 4 of Act V of 1954. As pointed out in Atulyadhan v. Sudhangsu1, the rule is well settled that where the words of a statute are precise and unambiguous, the meaning of the words must receive their full effect. On this principle, I am unable to see how an application for the passing of a final decree could be construed as otherwise than a ‘further proceeding in suit’ within the meaning of section 4. Even if it is to be construed as an execution application, which was the view taken by the Allahabad High Court with reference to an analogous kind of legislation in Umrao v. Beharl Lal2, the Act would still apply, because section 3 of the Act is specifically in bar of execution applications. Hence, in any view of the matter, the Act would have applied to this proceeding, and the respondents (plaintiffs) were entitled to include within the period of limitation the period of stay due to the moratorium. The decision of the Court below is correct, and the Civil Miscellaneous Appeal, which fails, is dismissed with costs. K.L.B. ------------- Appeal dismissed.