ORDER This is an application under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution by Bhairavlal who has been ordered, under section 16(1) of the Madhya Bharat Municipalities Act, by the Inspector-General of Municipalities, to be removed from the office of the councillor of the Bhanpura Municipality, on the ground that his continuance as councillor is not desirable in the interest of the Municipality, and has further been declared under section 16(2) of the Act, ineligible to become councillor of a municipality for a period of four years. He prays that this order may be either set aside in exercise of supervisory powers or that the Inspector-General may be directed not to give effect to the order. The grounds alleged are that he did not have sufficient opportunity to show cause, and was in fact, refused permission to inspect certain documents in the office, and was hustled with the ulterior purpose of satisfying certain factions in the Municipal Council. In any event, he had been declared ineligible, without being called upon to show cause against such a declaration, the notice on him being only to show cause against the removal from the office of a councillor. During part of the relevant period, the petitioner was also the Vice-President; but the action complained against has been taken under section 16 of the Act in respect of membership of the council and not under section 24 in respect of the office of vice-president, the difference being that in one case, that is under section 16, as at present, he ceases to be a councillor while in the other, he may cease to hold the office of the vice-president but will not ipso facto cease to be a councillor. The proceedings were started by the Inspector-General of Municipalities as Bhanpura is a municipality other than a city municipality; a charge-sheet of five headings was served on the petitioner and he was given about a week to show cause; but he either made general denials or asked for more time to look at certain documents. Having considered the cause, the Inspector-General passed his order already set out. The first contention is that the order declaring him ineligible should in any event be set aside as the notice does not mention this as a proposed measure and does not call upon the petitioner to show cause against this. Having considered the cause, the Inspector-General passed his order already set out. The first contention is that the order declaring him ineligible should in any event be set aside as the notice does not mention this as a proposed measure and does not call upon the petitioner to show cause against this. Generally speaking, it is only fair and just that a disability or inconvenience should be imposed on an office-holder only after be is heard in regard to it. It may, however, happen that one disability may follow as a straight and direct consequence of another disability; if so, there is nothing unfair in imposing the consequential disability after the person concerned has shown cause against the original or primary disability. Any statute enabling this cannot therefore be held to be against what are called the principles of natural justice. Here, for example, section 16 of the Act has two sub-sections; the first provides for the removal of any elected or selected councillor in two separate circumstances, out of which, however, we are at present concerned with only the first (a) that is, "desirable in the interest of the public or the municipality". The proviso which is at the end of the section is to the effect that the Government or the Inspector-General of Municipalities, as the case may be, may not remove any councillor unless he has been given a reasonable opportunity of showing cause why he should not be removed from his office; it does not mention the declaration of ineligibility to become the councillor of a municipality for some period. It is in fact, the second sub-section of section 16 that empowers the Government or the Inspector-General, as the case may be, "while ordering the removal under section 15 or 16, also to order that he shall be ineligible". In other words, the declaration of ineligibility is not an independent disability for any act done by the councillor, but one, that may be the consequence or derivative of the order of removal. Once, the removing authority has ordered the removal, it has the discretion to impose or not to impose the consequential disability. In the present case, the Inspector-General has acted in accordance with section 16(2) of the Act. It is alleged that the Inspector-General had started proceedings with the ulterior purpose of satisfying the political faction opposed to the petitioner's own group. In the present case, the Inspector-General has acted in accordance with section 16(2) of the Act. It is alleged that the Inspector-General had started proceedings with the ulterior purpose of satisfying the political faction opposed to the petitioner's own group. I do not agree. The Inspector-General is unconnected with the factions and was solely interested in the proper functioning of the municipality. In fact, the headings of the charge show that he was concerned to certain acts and omissions on the part of the councillor altogether independently of the feelings of the factions. Some of them, in fact, need only to be stated to indicate the undesirability of a person committing such acts being a member. For example, the first charge is in regard to the purchase of certain lanterns valued at well over the maximum for which the petitioner as vice-president, could accord sanction. Before us, it was urged that he had not accorded sanction; but an examination of the cause shown by him, and of the record shows, that the order had been split up into two to evade the limits imposed by the rules. Similarly, the charge No. 5 is that this councillor took part in a proceeding concerning his own father without pointing out that he was interested and dissociating himself from the proceedings. Another charge is admitted negligence in securing the interest of the municipality in the matter of certain bills. The Inspector-General thought that these were serious and it is not for this Court to differ. In regard to one of the charges (No. 4) the petitioner's contention is that he was asked to get a report within four days and he was actually at Gwalior. I do not see why, as the notice was served, he did not even send a letter or telegram to the Executive Officer, and take steps to get the report. All things considered, without trying to re-examine the merits of the findings of the Inspector-General, I note that they are based on facts; the petitioner has been given a hearing and the findings do not all seem to have been actuated with any ulterior purpose. The petition is thus without substance and is dismissed summarily.