JUDGMENT P. Govinda Menon, J. 1. This is an appeal by the 1st defendant in O. S. 180 of 1951 on the file of the District Judge of Anjikaimal, against whom a decree has been passed for recovery of damages suffered by the plaintiff as a result of the negligent driving of the 1st defendant's bus by the 2nd defendant. 2. The plaintiff's case was that he along with certain others were pulling a handcart loaded with timber through the Chittur Road, Ernakulam and while thus proceeding the second defendant in the case who was a driver of bus No. 3669, owned by the 1st defendant dashed against the handcart due to his rash and negligent driving. The plaintiff's case is that he was injured, was an inpatient for 27 days in the hospital and even after his discharge he had to continue the treatment and that he is even now not in a fit condition to work and earn his livelihood and that he is permanently disabled. The plaintiff was a cooly by profession and was living by his manual labour and occasionally he was going out for fishing and making some income. He was thus earning Rs. 2-8-0 to Rs. 3/- a day with which he was maintaining himself and his family. He claimed Rs. 3000/- as compensation for being permanently disabled due to the accident, Rs. 250/- for his medical expenses and Rs. 500/- for his mental pain and shock. A decree was claimed against the 1st defendant being the master of the 2nd defendant. The owner of the bus was insured against third party risks and the insurers the Travancore-Cochin State Insurance Officer was subsequently added as third defendant in the suit. Although it was originally contended by the 3rd defendant that there was no negligence or rashness, subsequently when the 2nd defendant was convicted by the criminal court for rash and negligent driving, the third defendant filed an additional written statement stating that he does not press his contentions against the plaintiff's claim for compensation but was questioning only the quantum to be awarded by way of damages. 3. 3. The important questions that arise for determination in this appeal are whether the accident was due to the rash and negligent driving of the second defendant and whether the plaintiff had sustained injuries on account of the accident, and secondly what is the correct amount of damages that should be awarded. It is not disputed that the 1st defendant was the owner of the Pioneer Motor Service which owned the bus in question. It is also not disputed that the second defendant was the driver of the bus under the 1st defendant, and that he was driving the said vehicle on 23-11-1947 when the accident occurred. Both the 1st defendant and 2nd defendant denied that the bus was driven negligently and recklessly and also that the vehicle was driven at a dangerous speed. Apart from the evidence of P. W. 5, who is the plaintiff, two other disinterested witnesses P. Ws. 2 and 3 have been examined. P. W. 5 would have it that on 8th Vrischigam 1125 himself and some other coolies were drawing a handcart along the Chittur Road from north to south, that they were proceeding on the extreme eastern side, that he was standing on the western side and drawing the handcart and when they had reached in front of the house of one Marayil Nanu Menon, the bus driven by the second defendant was coming at an excessive speed without even sounding the horn, that it struck against him and that he got jammed in between the bus and the cart and he says that the accident occurred because of the rash and negligent driving of the second defendant. He says that the second defendant could have easily seen the handcart and if only he was careful the collision would not have occurred. He says that due to this accident there was fracture of his ribs and that he had sustained other injuries. He says that he was an inpatient in the hospital for 27 days and he was treated by P. W. 1, the medical officer. No cross examination was directed challenging the fact that it was because of the rash and negligent act that the accident occurred. Cross examination was only to show that he was not permanently disabled, P. W. 3 is another workman who was drawing the cart. No cross examination was directed challenging the fact that it was because of the rash and negligent act that the accident occurred. Cross examination was only to show that he was not permanently disabled, P. W. 3 is another workman who was drawing the cart. He also supports the version given by P. W. 5 about the overspeed and that the accident was the result of the rash and negligent driving of the bus driver. P. W. 2 is a rickshaw puller who was at the spot and is an eyewitness to the incident. He also speaks about the overspeed and that the accident took place because of the rash and negligent driving of the second defendant, the driver. There was no serious cross examination of these witnesses and nothing has been shown as to why they should come and give false evidence. 4. The second defendant was charged by the Sub Inspector of Police, Ernakulam and convicted by the Second Class Magistrate of Kanayannor in C. C. 381 of 1125, Ext. D being the certified copy of the judgment in the case. Comment has been made that the learned Judge has relied on Ext. D the judgment to find that the second defendant had driven the bus in violation of the traffic regulation recklessly and negligently. No doubt the conviction evidenced by the judgment Ext. D does not by itself establish negligence and it is open to the defendants in this action to establish want of negligence. As stated earlier P. Ws. 2, 3 and 5 had clearly proved the rashness and negligence. There was no cross examination of these witnesses on this aspect of the case. When from the facts proved there is prima facie proof of breach of duty and negligence and the causal connection with the injury, then the burden is shifted to the defendant to rebut it. The second defendant or any other person on his behalf has not cared to enter the witness box and depose that the accident was not caused as a result of the rash and negligent driving It must therefore be taken that the plaintiff has succeeded in proving conclusively that the accident took place as a result of the rash and negligent drying of the second defendant. We find that the negligence of the driver has been established. 5. We find that the negligence of the driver has been established. 5. That the plaintiff had sustained injuries on account of the accident is also proved by P. W. 1 the doctor. Ext. A is the wound certificate. He noticed five injuries on the person of the plaintiff of which the first injury noticed was a fracture of ribs on the right side. The patient was X-rayed and fracture was evident from the examination. The doctor says that due to this accident the plaintiff's capacity to work would be seriously impaired. P. W. 5 has deposed that he is incapable of doing any serious work by reason of the injuries. Injuries noted in Ext. A are not temporary. If 3 or 4 ribs are fractured, it will be difficult or probably impossible to do any manual labour and if that is so, he must be deemed to have been permanently disabled by reason of the injuries sustained by him. 6. It is well established that a master is bound by the acts of his servant, even if the act was unauthorised or prohibited, provided the act was within the scope of the employment. The principle is that when a servant does any act does which he is authorised by his employment to do under certain circumstances and does it in a manner which is unauthorised or even improper even then the employer is liable for the wrongful act of his servant. As Kelly C. B. in Bayley v. Manchester Sheffield and Lincolnshire Rly. Co. ((1873) 8 CP 148) has observed : "Where a servant is acting within the scope of his employment, and in so acting does something negligent or wrongful, the employer is liable even though the acts done may be the very reverse of that which the servant was actually directed to do". To the same effect are the decisions in Goh Choon Seng v. Lee Kim Soo (1925) AC 550 and Mckean v. Raynor Bros. Ltd., (1942)2 All ER 650. Therefore the 1st defendant as the owner of the bus and the master of the 2nd defendant is vicariously liable for the negligence caused by his servant and the claim of the plaintiff cannot be disputed. The 3rd defendant is the State Insurance Officer. Ltd., (1942)2 All ER 650. Therefore the 1st defendant as the owner of the bus and the master of the 2nd defendant is vicariously liable for the negligence caused by his servant and the claim of the plaintiff cannot be disputed. The 3rd defendant is the State Insurance Officer. The bus was insured for third party risk and the state is liable to the injured to the extent of damages allowed by a court of law. Therefore defendants 1, 2 and 3 will be equally liable for the damages. The Government Pleader who appeared for the State Insurance Officer has fairly stated that the dispute was only to the quantum of damages and that the State is prepared to pay whatever compensation is awarded by the court. 7. So the only question that remains to be determined is the quantum of damages. The plaintiff had stated that he was earning between Rs. 2-8-0 and Rs. 3/- a day either by fishing or by pulling loaded handcarts. This fact is not denied. It cannot be seriously disputed that the usual wages of a handcart puller would be anything less than Rs. 2-8-0. It may be that he may not get employment every day. It was in consideration of this that the learned Judge decided that the wages may be taken at an average of Rs. 2/- a day. There is no contra evidence. The question then is whether he can be deemed to be permanently disabled due to the injuries sustained by him. No evidence was let in by the defence to show that the plaintiff is in a position to work or that he is actually doing work and is earning his livelihood. We do not therefore find anything to suspect the evidence of the plaintiff. On the ground that the plaintiff has not produced any vouchers to prove the purchase of medicine, the learned Judge has reduced the claim for medical treatment to Rs. 100/-. So also under the head 'mental pain' the amount claimed has been reduced to Rs. 250/-. We do not think that the estimate of the learned Judge is in any way wrong or excessive and the claim is not disputed. The main dispute between the parties is with regard to the damages to be allowed under the 3rd head, loss of earning capacity. 250/-. We do not think that the estimate of the learned Judge is in any way wrong or excessive and the claim is not disputed. The main dispute between the parties is with regard to the damages to be allowed under the 3rd head, loss of earning capacity. Interference by the appellate court in an award of damages in personal injury cases by the Trial Court must certainly be a rare thing. The onus lies heavily on the appellant seeking to interfere with the award of damages. It will have to be established by him that the trial Judge proceeded on a wholly erroneous estimate. Here it is pointed out that the learned Judge proceeded on the basis that the amount due under the Workmens Compensation Act would be Rs. 3000/- while for a person who is getting an income upto Rs. 60/- a month he is entitled only to a sum of Rs. 2,520. The learned Judge has not chosen to award the full amount but had deducted Rs. 500/- out of Rs. 3000/- fixed by him. Such being the case it is contended that some deduction ought to be made from Rs. 2, 520/- which is the maximum that is provided. There is no data to show on what basis the deduction was made. However, taking all the circumstances into consideration, we feel that Rs. 2,400/- would be a reasonable figure to be awarded as compensation. For these reasons we would modify the order of the District Judge by reducing the total amount of damages to be awarded from Rs. 2, 850/- to Rs. 2,750/-. With this modification the appeal is dismissed with costs to the first respondent.