JUDGMENT P.V. Dixit, C.J. This is an appeal under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent from a decision of Chaturvedi J. in Second Appeal No. 504 of 1955 whereby the judgment and decree of the District Judge of Chhindwara were reversed and the decision of the Civil Judge, Second Class, Chhindwara, decreeing the Plaintiff-Respondent Kanhaiyalal's claim for possession of certain agricultural land was restored. The Plaintiff's case was that the land in suit was held in occupancy rights by one Narayanrao; that after his death his widow Kalawati allowed that land to remain uncultivated, did not tilt the land, and left the village where the land was situated; that thereupon he, that is the Plaintiff, as lambardar commenced proceedings under Section 35 of the Central Provinces Tenancy Act, 1920, for treating the land as abandoned and for taking possession of it; that on publication of the notice under Section 35(2) of the Act no objection was raised by Kalawati or by anyone; and that, therefore, he took possession of the land. The Plaintiff proceeded to aver that he remained in possession of the holding till 6th August 1951 when the Defendant-Appellants claiming to be the reversioners of Narayanrao forcibly dispossessed him from the land. The suit was filed in October, 1951, and the Plaintiff claimed a decree for possession of the land. In answer, the Defendants pleaded, inter alia, that notice as required by Section 35 of the C. P. Tenancy Act was not duly published; that they entered into possession of the land in 1946 and had acquired occupancy rights by prescription; and that after the enactment of the Madhya Pradesh Abolition of Proprietary Bights (Estates, Mahals, Alienated Lands) Act, 1950 (No. 1 of 1951), the Plaintiff could not claim the land which had vested in the State. The trial Court found that the land was abandoned by Kalawati after the death of Narayanrao; that the Plaintiff duly entered into possession of the land after complying with the provisions of Section 35 of the C. P. Tenancy Act; that he was dispossessed by the Defendants on 6th August 1951; and that the M. P. Abolition of Proprietary Rights Act vesting the land in the State did not affect the Plaintiff's right to possession of the land. Accordingly the Plaintiff's claim was decreed. Accordingly the Plaintiff's claim was decreed. The learned District Judge of Chhindwara, however, took the view that the Plaintiff was not entitled to succeed as though he entered into possession of the field in 1949-50 pursuant to the proceedings under Section 35 of the C. P. Tenancy Act he did not cultivate the land; and that he was not entitled to possessory title as whatever title he had by virtue of Section 35 of the Act had vested in the State under Act No. 1 of 1951. The learned District Judge overruled the contention of the Plaintiff that under Section 4(2) of Act No. 1 of 1951 and the definition of 'home-farm' given in Section 2(g) of that Act he was entitled to the possession of the land in suit as his home-farm land as the effect of proceedings under Section 35 of the C. P. Tenancy Act was that there was surrender of the land from the tenant. On this reasoning, the Plaintiff's suit was dismissed by the District Judge of Chhindwara. 4, The Plaintiff then preferred a second appeal in this Court urging that the suit land was his home-farm land within the meaning of Section 2(g)(1)(ii) of Act No. 1 of 1951. This contention found favour with the learned single Judge who, relying on Murlidhar v. Hazarilal 1941 NLJ 612 : ILR 1942 Nag 703 : AIR 1942 Nag 108, held that the word "surrender" as used in Section 2(g)(1)(ii) of Act No. 1 of 1951 was wide enough to include "surrender by operation of law" and that abandonment of land under Section 35 of the C. P. Tenancy Act was nothing else but implied surrender of land from the tenant. On this view, the Plaintiff's claim was decreed by the learned single Judge. The only question that arises for determination in this appeal is as to the meaning of the word "surrender" as used in Section 2(g)(1)(ii) of Act No. 1 of 1951. It is whether land acquired by a proprietor by surrender from the tenants after the year 1948-1949 means only the land acquired by express surrender under Section 89 of the C. P. Tenancy Act or whether it includes land acquired by implied surrender. It is whether land acquired by a proprietor by surrender from the tenants after the year 1948-1949 means only the land acquired by express surrender under Section 89 of the C. P. Tenancy Act or whether it includes land acquired by implied surrender. Shri Padhye, Learned Counsel for the Appellants, urged that the word "surrender" occurring in Section 2(g)(1)(ii) of Act 1No. 1 of 1951 had to be construed in the light of section 2 (b) of that Act and that so construed it meant only surrender effected according to Section 89 of the C. P. Tenancy Act. 6. In our opinion, the question raised in this appeal is fully concluded by the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Murlidhar v. Hazarilal 1941 NLJ 612 : ILR 1942 Nag 703 : AIR 1942 Nag 108. The M. P. Abolition of Proprietary Rights Act does not contain the definition of the word "surrender". Section 2(b) says that "in relation to the Central Provinces, any expression not herein defined but used or explained in......the Central Provinces Tenancy Act, 1920,.........shall have the meaning therein assigned to it;". The C. P. Tenancy Act also does not define the word "surrender". Section 89 of the C. P. Tenancy Act does not define surrender. It only prescribes the procedure that has to be followed if the tenant wishes to surrender his holding expressly. Now, it has been pointed in Murlidhar v. Hazarilal 1941 NLJ 612 : ILR 1942 Nag 703 : AIR 1942 Nag 108 that the Legislature itself has provided in the Tenancy Act an alternative method of surrender and that Section 89 only prescribes the procedure for an express surrender. In that case Stone C. J. and Bose J. considered the effect of proceedings under Section 35 of the Tenancy' Act and the meaning of the word "abandonment'' and held that abandonment under Section 35 was an implied surrender which had the same basis as an express surrender and further that "abandonment" had not been used as a term of art in Section 35 but was intended to have its ordinary legal meaning. It is thus plain that for the purposes of the Tenancy Act 'surrender' was taken to mean not only an express surrender under Section 89 of the Tenancy Act but also an implied surrender under Section 35 of that Act. It is thus plain that for the purposes of the Tenancy Act 'surrender' was taken to mean not only an express surrender under Section 89 of the Tenancy Act but also an implied surrender under Section 35 of that Act. Now, as the word "surrender" has not been defined in Act No. 1 of 1951, it must have, according to Section 2(b) of the Act, the same meaning which has been attributed to it for the purposes of the C. P. Tenancy Act. If, as held in Murlidhar v. Hazarilal 1941 NLJ 612 : ILR 1942 Nag 703 : AIR 1942 Nag 108, "surrender" for the purposes of the Tenancy Act includes an implied surrender under Section 35, then it follows that for purposes of Section 2(g)(1)(ii) of the Act of 1951 land acquired by a proprietor by surrender would mean land acquired by a proprietor whether under Section 89 or Section 35 of the Tenancy Act. If, after the word "abandonment" used in section 35 had received judicial construction in Murlidhar v. Hazarilal 1941 NLJ 612 : ILR 1942 Nag 703 : AIR 1942 Nag 108 so as to mean implied surrender, the Legislature intended to exclude from "home-farm" land acquired by a proprietor under Section 35 of the Tenancy Act and to restrict the meaning of the word "surrender" to surrenders effected under Section 89 only, then it would have used appropriate language to give effect to its intention. But no such language of exclusion has been used. On the other hand, Section 2(b) of Act No. 1 of 1951 expressly says that any expression not defined in that Act but used or explained in the C. P. Tenancy Act shall have the meaning therein assigned to it. It is well established that where certain words in a statute have received a clear authoritative judicial construction and the Legislature has incorporated them in a similar context without any alteration in a subsequent statute, then such words must be interpreted according to the meaning that has previously been assigned to them by judicial decisions [see Barras v. Aberdeen Steam Trawling and Fishing Company 1933 AC 402 at pp. 411-412; and Webb v. Outrim 1907 AC 81 at page 89]. 411-412; and Webb v. Outrim 1907 AC 81 at page 89]. The learned single Judge was, therefore, right in taking the view that the word 'surrender' must be interpreted so as to include an implied surrender under Section 35 of the C. P. Tenancy Act and in coming to the conclusion that the land in question which the Plaintiff acquired under Section 35 of the C. P. Tenancy Act became his home-farm land after the enactment of Act No. 1 of 1951 and that under Section 4(2) of that Act he was entitled to the possession of that land. Before us an application under Sections 151 and 152, Code of Civil Procedure Code, praying for correction in the description of the land in suit was made. This application shall be considered and duly disposed of by the single Bench. The result is that this appeal fails and is dismissed with costs of the Plaintiff-Respondent No. 1. Appeal dismissed