ORDER Shiv Dayal, J. This is a revision from an order refusing to grant leave to Jagannath Prasad to amend his plaint. The suit is for ejectment and arrears of rent against his tenant Prag Narain. Initially it was alleged in the plaint that the Defendant had executed a rent-note in favour of the Plaintiff on July 31, 1956, for a shop and the portion over it, for Rs. 250 per year and the rent-note was registered. It is unnecessary to mention the either allegations made in the plaint as they are not relevant for this revision. The Defendant admitted the execution and registration of the rent-note, but alleged that he was under no obligations because the possession of the premises was never given to him. Thereupon the Plaintiff made an application for leave to amend the plaint in which he stated these facts: The disputed premises formed part of a larger building which was originally rented out to Laxmichand. Subsequently some open land and a portion of the whole property was sold to Laxmichand on July 31, 1&56. Laxmichand paid rent upto that day. But as regards the remaining portion he got a rent-note executed from the Defendant and also got it registered. Laxmichand is an old man and the Defendant is his nephew (sister's son) and resides with him, He (Laxmichand) had also said that the Defendant would succeed him. The Defendant looks after and maintains Laxmichand's business. Since in his written statement the Defendant asserts that Laxmichand's possession continues, the Plaintiff believes that there is a collusion between them. On the above averments, the Plaintiff prayed that Laxmichand be made Defendant No. 2 in this suit and in the alternative a decree may be passed against him in case the Court finds itself unable to pass a decree against Prag Narain. The main ground for rejecting the Plaintiff's application for leave to amend is that the suit is based on a rent-note, the execution of which is admitted by the Defendant, and by seeking the amendment the Plaintiff is making his plaint "inconsistent, totally different and untenable". In my opinion, this revision must be allowed. Order 1, Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure enables a Court to allow addition of parties. In my opinion, this revision must be allowed. Order 1, Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure enables a Court to allow addition of parties. Order 1, Rule 3, C.P.C. enables the Plaintiff to bring a single suit against more Defendants than one, provided two conditions are satisfied:- (1) A right of relief against them arises in respect of the same act or transaction or series of acts or transactions; and (2) If separate suits were instituted against the Defendants, any common question of law or fact would arise. Both these conditions must exist together. There must be some nexus or common lie. This condition is not fulfilled if the case against each Defendant is entirely distinct and separate in its subject-matter from that of the other Defendants. If no connection or conspiracy is alleged to exist between the various persons joined as Defendants, the suit will be bad for multifarious ness. The intention of the Legislature which is visible in Order 1, Rule 3 read with Order 2, Rule 3, C.P.C. is that, on the one hand, the trial of suit must not be embarrassed, and on the other, needless multiplicity of suits should be avoided. Applying these principles to this case I find that according to the Plaintiff's allegations contained in the application for leave to amend, the sale in favour of Laxmichand and the rent-note executed by Prag Narain are closely connected, and further a conspiracy is alleged between Prag Narain and his maternal-uncle Laxmi Chand to defeat the Plaintiff's suit by asserting possession of each other. I see a clear nexus, and it will only further the ends of justice if both the Defendants are joined in this suit. The relief's against them can legitimately be claimed in the alternative, as permitted in Order 1, Rule 3, C.P.C. The case of Mewji Mouji v. Kuwarji Manoji ILR 31 Bom 516 becomes apposite. In Kodiva Gopal v. Mestrengaen AIR 1928 Bom 91 it is held that the Defendant cannot object to the addition of a Defendant when he is added in view of his own objection. Here it was the Defendant who alleged that the possession had not been given to him and that Laxmichand was actually in possession. As such he cannot object being joined in the suit. In Kodiva Gopal's case (supra) the contention of Mt. Here it was the Defendant who alleged that the possession had not been given to him and that Laxmichand was actually in possession. As such he cannot object being joined in the suit. In Kodiva Gopal's case (supra) the contention of Mt. Jinnah that before a person could be added as a Defendant it was to be shown that that all questions of law or fact which would arise were common, was rejected. The language of Order 1, Rule 3 is very clear that if there is any common question of law or fact, the Defendants can be joined in the same suit. The case of Thompson v. London County Council (1899) I QB 840 applies where injury arises from two distinct acts and there is no link whatever between the two Defendants. Shri Garde relies on my decision in Kanaiyalal v. Keshaodas Civil Revision No. 123 of 1959 (1960 JLJ SN 171) where I have held that "common" question of law or fact does not mean "same or similar" question of law or fact and that the distinction is 'real'. and in that case I have also held that a suit would be bad for multifarious ness, if there is no nexus or common link. Since in the present case a nexus or connection is set out in the application for amendment, that decision of mine does not apply here. All this apart, the Plaintiff's case as now formulated shows that he is in doubt as to which of the Defendants is really in possession of the property, and against whom an effectual decree can be passed for ejectment and possession. This legitimately attracts the provisions of Order 1, Rule 7, Code of Civil Procedure. It seems clear to me that the learned trial Judge rejected the Plaintiff's application in a very slip-shod manner without applying his mind to the intents and object of Rules 3, 7 and 10 of Order 1, Code of Civil Procedure. The manner in which he reached the conclusion is erroneous and in my view the irregularity in the exercise of his jurisdiction is material. It calls for interference in revision. For these reasons this revision is allowed. The order passed by the trial Judge on July 2, 1959 is set aside. Leave to amend the plaint, as prayed in the Plaintiff's application dated 24 February, 1959, is granted. It calls for interference in revision. For these reasons this revision is allowed. The order passed by the trial Judge on July 2, 1959 is set aside. Leave to amend the plaint, as prayed in the Plaintiff's application dated 24 February, 1959, is granted. In the circumstances of the case I do not allow the Plaintiff costs in this revision, nor do I allow the Defendant costs for amendment. Petition allowed