JUDGMENT : Narasimham, C.J. - This is an appeal from the a ward of the Arbitrator of the Hirakud Land Organization, challenging the quantum of compensation allowed to the Appellant in respect of his ryoti lands in village Talpadar which were acquired by Government for the Hirakud Dam Project. 2. The Appellant's lands in village Talpadar were acquired by Government by two notifications viz, (i) Notification No. 11500 L.A. 130/R- dated 26th October, 1948 and, (ii) Notification No. 979 dated the 9th April, 1949. Actual possession was however taken by Government-only on the 25th January 1949 the Orissa Development of Industries, Irrigation, Agriculture, Capital Construction, and Resettlement of Displaced Persons (Land Acquisition) Act, 1943 (Orissa. Act No. XVIII of 1948)- hereinafter referred to as the Act) came into force in what was then known as the Province of Orissa, By virtue of Sub-section (2) of Section 3 and Sub-section (2) of Section 4 of the Act the notification issued under the Land acquisition Act were deemed to be notifications under the Act. For the purpose of this appeal therefore it may be assumed that the acquisitions were made under the provisions of the Act. Sub-section (1) of Section 5 of the Act says that when a notice of acquisition is served or published u/s 4, the land shall vest absolutely in the Provincial Government free from all encumbrances. It is thus admitted that the lands of the Appellant vested absolutely in the Provincial Government by the 9th April 1949 at the latest Sub-section (2) of Section 5 of the Act enables Government to take possession of the lands which have so vested. Here possession was actually taken sometime later. But the delay in taking possession is not material because the title to the lands passed to the Government absolutely on the dates of notification the later of which was 9th April 1949. This must be considered to be the relevant date for the purpose of ascertaining the law relating to payment of compensation to, the deprived owner (Appellant). 4. Section 7 of the Act authorises the Government to appoint an Arbitrator to secret in the amount of compensation payable if there is no agreement between the Government and the previous owner. In pursuance of this section Shri B.C. Das retired District Judge was appointed arbitrator. The parties filed their written statements before him sometime in June and August 1956. Section 7 of the Act authorises the Government to appoint an Arbitrator to secret in the amount of compensation payable if there is no agreement between the Government and the previous owner. In pursuance of this section Shri B.C. Das retired District Judge was appointed arbitrator. The parties filed their written statements before him sometime in June and August 1956. His award was actually given on the 31st August 1957. 5. Clause (e) of Sub-section (1) of Section 7 of the Act says that the Arbitrator in making an award shall have due regard to the provisions of Sub-section (1) of Section 23 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. There are three provisos to that clause. The first proviso was declared ultra vires by a Bench of this Court in the well known State of Orissa Vs. Bharat Chandra Nayak, and this view was re-formed by a later Division Bench decision of this Court reported in State of Orissa v. Satyabadi ILR 1960 Cutt 87. The second proviso is of Some importance and I am therefore quoting it below: Provided further that where under any law or custom having the force of law the lands are not saleable, the market value of such lands shall be such multiple as may be prescribed of the deduced rent to be calculated in the prescribed manner, with the addition of 50 percent. This proviso thus limits the scope of an enquiry as regards the amount of compensation payable in respect of lands that are not saleable. It says that the market value of such lands shall be such multiple of the deduced rent-as may be prescribed in the Rules made under the Act, with the addition of 50 percent. It further says that the deduced rent of such lands shall be calculated in accordance with the Rules made under the Act. In substance, therefore, this proviso leaves it to the rule-making authority to provide for (i) the manner of calculating the deduced rent and (i) the multiple of deduced rent that may be taken into consideration in fixing the compensation payable for lands which are not saleable. In substance, therefore, this proviso leaves it to the rule-making authority to provide for (i) the manner of calculating the deduced rent and (i) the multiple of deduced rent that may be taken into consideration in fixing the compensation payable for lands which are not saleable. But for this proviso the main portion of clause (e) would apply with full force and the deprived owner may legitimately claim complexation in accordance with the market value of the lands, whether saleable or not, in accordance with the principles laid down in Sub-section (1) of Section 23 of the Laud Acquisition Act But the Rules under that Act were actually made by the State Government only on the 19th June 1950. Vide notification No. 6416-R of the Revenue Department, of that date. The Rules were not expressly given retrospective effect. On the other band, in Sub-rule (1) of Rule 1 it was stated that the Rules shall come into force at once, thereby unambiguously indicating that they would come into force on the date of publication of the Rules, i.e. 19th June 1950. The admitted position, therefore, is that prior to that date, there were no rules made under the Act providing for the method of calculating the deduced rent of lands which were not saleable or the multiple of such deduced rent of such lands which would be taken into consideration in fixing compensation. 6. The lands of the Appellant that were acquired consisted of (i) a house and (ii) 9.23 acres of Bhogra lands (iii) 55.49 acres of ryoti lands and (iv) some trees. The Appellant has challenged the quantum awarded by the Arbitrator in respect of ryoti lands only. The present appeal will therefore be confined to this question only. In the connected appeal (M.A. 167 of 1957) the compensation awarded by the Arbitrator for Bhogra lands and for mango and mahul trees is under challenge and that will be dealt with in a separate judgment. 7. The learned Arbitrator rightly pointed out that the ryoti lands in Sambalpur district though not saleable freely, were not wholly unsaleable, inasmuch as Sub-section (3) of Section 46 of the Central Provinces Tenancy Act, 1898 authorised the free sale of ryoti lands to certain classes of people. Moreover, that sub-section does not render sales to other persons wholly void but only voidable to the limited extent permitted by Section 47. Moreover, that sub-section does not render sales to other persons wholly void but only voidable to the limited extent permitted by Section 47. Thus ryoti lands in Sambalpur district are of a peculiar type neither wholly non-saleable nor freely saleable. The Arbitrator however assumed such lands to b non-saleable for the purpose of applying the proviso to clause (e) of Sub-section (1) of Section 7 of the Act. Mr. G.K. Misra for the Appellant has challenged this view of the Arbitrator. It is however unnecessary to decide that point now because I accept Mr. Misra's contention that the said proviso has no application to the present case. 8. As already pointed out, the second proviso is by itself quite unworkable because it leaves every important matter to be prescribed by rules. Hence, until the rules are framed that proviso is ineffective, for all practical purposes. Doubtless, the Legislature did not expect that there would be such a long interval between the date of coming into force of the Act and the date of framing of Rules thereunder. On the other hand it appears that though the Act was published in the Orissa Gazette on 11th January 1949, Government were authorised by Sub-section (3) of Section 1 of the Act, to bring it into force on such future date as they may, by notification, appoint. This power to postpone the coming into force of the Act was obviously given with a view to enable the State Government to make the Rules, in the meantime, and to complete the necessary administrative set-up so that when the Act actually came into operation, there may be no difficulty in working it. Hence, if the Government had immediately taken up the question of marking the Rules, after the publication of the Act in the Gazette on the 11th January 1949 and brought it into force as soon as the Rules were ready, then by virtue of Section 22 of the Orissa General Clauses Act, the Rules and the Act would have come-into force on the same day, and the peculiar difficulty experienced in the present case would not have arisen. But for some inexplicable reason Government brought the Act into force on 26th January 1949 even though the Rules were not ready till 19th June 1950. But for some inexplicable reason Government brought the Act into force on 26th January 1949 even though the Rules were not ready till 19th June 1950. The result is that during this interval some of the provisions of the Act were unworkable, though Section 5 of the Act was fully operative and title vested absolutely in the Government on the date of publication of the notification u/s 4 of the Act. 9. Mr. Misra contended that when the Appellant's title to the ryoti lands was completely extinguished on the 9th April 1949 he was entitled to compensation in accordance with the law relating to compensation as it stood on that date, and not in accordance with the law relating to compensation that was in force on the date on which reference was made to the Arbitrator in 1956. Developing this point further he urged that as admittedly the second proviso to Clause (e) of Sub-section (1) of Section 7 was ineffective and unworkable in 19B, the main provision of that clause would alone apply and the Appellant was entitled to compensation in accordance with the market value of the ryoti lands bearing in mind the principles laid down in Sub-section (1) of Section 23 of the Land Acquisition Act. 10. The Advocate-General, to the other hand, contended that the law relating to compensation applicable in this case would be the law as it was on the date on which reference was made to the Arbitrator namely 1956. As admittedly by that time the Rules had come into force the second proviso to Clause (e) of Sub-section (1) of Section 7 became workable and the Appellant was not entitled to compensation in accordance with the main provision of Clause (e) but only in accordance with the principle laid down in the second proviso to that clause, read with the Rules. 11. I am unable to accept the Advocate-General's contention. The general principle is that if a person's title to the property is completely extinguished he must get compensation in accordance with the law as it stood on the date of such extinguishment. 11. I am unable to accept the Advocate-General's contention. The general principle is that if a person's title to the property is completely extinguished he must get compensation in accordance with the law as it stood on the date of such extinguishment. It may be that, due to some reason or other, there may be considerable difficulty referring the case to the Arbitrator and if, in the meantime; the law relating to compensation undergoes amendment and that amendment is not expressly given retrospective effect, it will not be proper to say that the Jaw as it stood on the date of reference to the Arbitrator should be the relevant law for the purpose of fixing such compensation. Such an argument would in sublicense amount to giving retrospective effect to the Rules, but; when Government made the Rules they did not expressly give retrospective effect to them. On the other hand, they expressly stated in the commencement clause Rule 1(2) that the Rules shall come into force only on the 19th July 1950. Hence the Rules cannot affect the rights which had been vested in certain persons prior to the date of coming into effect of the Rules. I must therefore hold that Appellant was entitled to compensation in accordance with the law relating to compensation that was effectively in force on the date which title to the ryoti lands was extinguished, namely 9th April 1949. At that time the second proviso was incomplete as the legislature did not expect that proviso to come into operation until it was supplemented by the Rules made under the Act. Hence the Appellant can justifiably claim compensation according to the Market value determined in accordance with Sub-section (1) of Section 23 of the Land Acquisition Act. In this connection I should point out that the first clause of Sub-section (1) of Section 23 of the Land Acquisition Act expressly says that the market value of the land should be determined as it was on the date of publication of the notification u/s 4(1) of that Act, which by virtue of Sub-section (2) of Section 4 of the Act must be deemed to be service of notice on the owner of the land under Sub-section (1) of Section 4 of the Act. In this connection I may quote the following observations of the Supreme Court in The Special Land Acquisition Officer, Bangalore Vs. In this connection I may quote the following observations of the Supreme Court in The Special Land Acquisition Officer, Bangalore Vs. T. Adinarayan Setty, : It is not disputed that the function of the Court in awarding compensation under the Act is to ascertain the market value of the land at the date of notification u/s 4(1). There is thus authority for the view that the law relating to compensation at the date of the notification when title vested absolutely in the Government is the relevant law, and not the law as it stood when the reference was subsequently made to the Arbitrator. 12. Mr. Misra further contended that the second proviso amounted to excessive delegation by the Legislature and as such was invalid. It is however unnccessry to decide this point here. 13. Disagreeing with the Arbitrator therefore, I must hold that in respect of ryoti land, lands also he ought to have awarded compensation having due regard to the provisions of Sub-section (1) of Section 23 of the Land Acquisition Act and he should not have applied the second proviso to Clause (e) of Sub-section (1) of Section 7 of the Act. 14. No evidence was led before the Arbitrator as regards the market value of the ryoti lands. The principles on which the market value should be fixed in regard to these lands cannot obviously be laid down here. As pointed out already, their character is somewhat peculiar-they being neither wholly non-saleable nor freely saleable. Mr. Misra invited my attention to AIR 1938 Nagpur P. 208, where it was pointed out that in estimating the market value of land the element of non-transferability should not be considered. He therefore urged that for these ryoti lands also the capitalised value of the net income should be taken as the market value and the restriction on the right of transfer of these ryoti lands was not at all material. This however is a matter for the Arbitrator to consider and it will not be proper for me to say anything on this question now. The Arbitrator is free to follow the principles laid down in Sub-section (1) of Section 23 of the Land Acquisition Act-bearing in mind the aforesaid decision under that section. 15. This however is a matter for the Arbitrator to consider and it will not be proper for me to say anything on this question now. The Arbitrator is free to follow the principles laid down in Sub-section (1) of Section 23 of the Land Acquisition Act-bearing in mind the aforesaid decision under that section. 15. The appeal is therefore allowed to the limited extent of setting aside the award of the Arbitrator fixing the compensation payable in respect of the ryoti lands of the Appellant amounting to 53.49 acres in village The tapadar, and the case is remitted to him (or to his successor in office), for estimating the market value of such ryoti lands and for disposal of the reference according to law in respect of those lands only. Costs will bide the result. Final Result : Allowed