JUDGMENT M.S. Menon, J. 1. The decree-holder in O. S. No. 44 of 1119 of the District Court of Alleppey filed an application for execution calculating interest as provided in the decree. The 9th defendant contended that only interest at 4 per cent per annum is admissible from the commencement of the Travancore Debt Relief Act, 1116. The contention was upheld by the execution court, and this appeal is from the order upholding the contention. 2. S.12 of the Travancore Debt Relief Act, 1116, reads as follows: "No future interest exceeding simple interest calculated at four per cent per annum in the case of money debts and six per cent per annum in the case of paddy debts shall be chargeable from the date of the commencement of the Act on any debt to which this Act applies." The expression "debt" is defined in S.2 (iv) of the Act as "any liability in cash or kind, whether secured or unsecured, due from any person whether payable under a decree or order of a Civil or Revenue Court or otherwise." 3. S.4 of the Act provides that nothing in the Act shall affect debts and liabilities falling under the heads enumerated in that section. One of the heads is "any liability arising out of a sale of immovable property in respect of the balance of purchase-money for which the vendor has a lien on the property sold." The first contention of the appellant before us is that the liability in this case comes under this head. 4. There is nothing on record, however, to show that we are concerned with any such liability. The decree seems to be no more than an ordinary decree based on a usufructuary mortgage. 5. Even if we assume that the liability is one "arising out of a sale of immovable property in respect of the balance of purchase money" the appellant has still to establish that the lien subsists and has not disappeared by efflux of time or otherwise. The submission of counsel for the appellant is not that there is a subsisting lien but that the subsistence of the lien is unnecessary to attract the provision 6. The question whether lien should be a subsisting one or not arose for consideration in 31 T.L.J. 978. The submission of counsel for the appellant is not that there is a subsisting lien but that the subsistence of the lien is unnecessary to attract the provision 6. The question whether lien should be a subsisting one or not arose for consideration in 31 T.L.J. 978. Sankarasubba Iyer, J. said: "The question is whether, at the time when exemption from the Act is sought for it must be possible to say that the vendor's lien subsists and remains available to him. The expression, "for which the vendor has a lien on the property sold," indicates that the intention of the Legislature was to apply the exemption, only when it can be said that the lien has not been given up and subsists. If the intention of the Legislature were to protect a liability merely because it comes under the category of liabilities in respect of which there is a vendor's lien, irrespective of the question whether the liability subsists or has been given up, the words, 'for which the vendor has a lien on the property sold,' would have been superfluous." We are in agreement with this view. 7. The second contention urged on behalf of the appellant is that S.12 should have been invoked in the suit itself, and having failed to do so at that stage (or in appeal), it should not be allowed to be raised in the proceedings in execution. We see no merit in this contention. 8. A similar contention was raised in 18 T. L. T. 581. The Court said: "S. 12 is in the nature of a restraint on usury. The provisions of the Act must prevail and though the court purported to award a higher rate of interest than 4 per cent, such award must be deemed incompetent and must be reduced to the rate of interest which was within its competence to award, viz., 4 per cent mentioned under S.12 of the Debt Relief Act." This decision was followed in 1950 K.L.T. 53. The Court said: "After the enactment of the Debt Relief Act a decree awarding nine per cent interest after the date of the Debt Relief Act was passed. In execution, the debtor contended that anything more than four per cent could not be realised. This objection was allowed by the lower court and the decree-holder has therefore brought the present appeal. In execution, the debtor contended that anything more than four per cent could not be realised. This objection was allowed by the lower court and the decree-holder has therefore brought the present appeal. Having regard to the mandatory provisions of S.12 of the Debt Relief Act, the decree awarding more than four per cent interest must be held to be without jurisdiction and on that ground unenforceable. This matter is covered by the authority of the decision in 18 T. L. T. 581." 9. In the light of what is stated above, this appeal has to be dismissed, and we do so with costs.