Judgment SAHAI, J. 1. The appellant has been convicted under S. 161 of the Penal Code, and has been sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year. He has also been convicted under S. 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act (2 of 1947), and has been sentenced to undergo the same term of imprisonment for that offence. Both the sentences have been ordered to run concurrently. 2. This case was first placed for hearing before a single Judge of this Court who has referred it to a Division Bench. Hence, it has come up before us. 3. The learned Special Judge of Darbhanga had given the facts of the case and the cases of both sides in detail. Briefly stated, the prosecution case is that Hardeo Narayan Thakur (P.W. 5), who will be henceforth referred to as Thakur, took contract in January, 1956, for construction of a Bandh in river Khiroi, which has been referred to as the Khiroi scheme, from mile 30 to mile 301/2. The appellant was then the Sectional Officer of Darbhanga Waterways Division No. 1. The contract was in form F-2 which meant that the contractor could not give up the work undertaken by him even if he suffered loss. It was the appellants duty to do the work of dag-belling, which, we have been told, means marking out the ends within which earth has to be filled; the work of profiling, which is said to mean fixing of the height and shape of the bandh; and the work of meansring the work done by the contractors, preparing their bills and arranging for payment to them. Thakur continued to do the contract work until July, 1956, when construction of the bandh was stopped due to flood. He and the other contractors complained to the Public Works Department that they should not be made to work on the contract in Form F-2, and this request was acceded to in September, 1956. Thakur resumed work on the 27th November on the understanding that the contract would be in form K-2 under which a contractor is entitled to abandon his work when he finds that he is likely to incur loss. From the very beginning the appellant demanded from Thakur a bribe at the rate of 5 per cent. of his bills. Thakur resumed work on the 27th November on the understanding that the contract would be in form K-2 under which a contractor is entitled to abandon his work when he finds that he is likely to incur loss. From the very beginning the appellant demanded from Thakur a bribe at the rate of 5 per cent. of his bills. Thakur went on promising to make payment at the rate demanded; but he did not actually pay the appellant anything for the work which he did from January to July, 1956. The appellant, however, prepared his final bill for that work, and, in January, 1957, Thakur received full payment for that work. When he resumed work on the 27th November, 1956, the appellant insisted upon payment of his percentage, and he also demanded payment of the arrears of bribe for the work done previously until July, 1956. Thakur told him that he could not pay him because he (Thakur) was not making any profit. Thereafter the appellant began to harass Thakur in various ways, viz., by noting correct measurements of the work done by Thakur in his private notebook but preparing on account bills on the basis of much lower measurements, and once also by making a slightly erroneous dag-belling and profiling which resulted in a loss of Rs. 700/- to Thakur. 4. It may be stated that it was on the 21st January, 1957, that Thakur executed the contract in form K-2. He had not been paid anything until then for the work which he did from the 27th November 1956. On the 23rd January, 1957, he filed a petition (exhibit 10) before the Executive Engineer of Waterways Division No. 1, in which he made a plea for prompt payment of on-account bills. The Executive Engineer passed necessary orders, acceding to Thakurs request. On the 29th January, 1957, the appellant took measurements of the work done by Thakur until that date; but it is alleged by the prosecution that he prepared the on-account bill on the basis of measurements lower than the correct ones. He prepared other bills on subsequent dates. On the 28th March, 1957, the appellant suggested to higher officers that Thakur should be ordered to fill earth by taking it from borrow pits (rate for which is Rs. 16/- per thousand cubic feet) and not from the river bed (rate for which is Rs. He prepared other bills on subsequent dates. On the 28th March, 1957, the appellant suggested to higher officers that Thakur should be ordered to fill earth by taking it from borrow pits (rate for which is Rs. 16/- per thousand cubic feet) and not from the river bed (rate for which is Rs. 35/- per thousand cubic feet). 5. Thakur felt rather frustrated due to the harassments caused to him by the appellant, and he saw the appellant in his office on the 4th April, 1957. The appellant then laughed at him, and said that he would now be able to make payment to Thakur for work already done by him at the rate of Rs. 16/- per thousand cubic feet. He further asked Thakur to calculate his loss. Thakur controlled himself and held out a promise to the appellant to pay Rs. 300/- as bribe in one lump and to pay the rest later. It was settled that the amount of Rs. 300/-should be paid on the 9th April, 1957. 6. The prosecution case further is that Thakur went on the 5th April to Patna where he met Mr. M. Hussain (P. W. 1), Special Magistrate attached to the Anti-Corruption Department of the Government of Bihar, P. W. 1 recorded his statement (exhibit 1), and also noted the numbers of the three hundred-rupee notes which Thakur showed him as those which he proposed to make over to the appellant. P. W. 1 reported the matter to the Deputy Secretary of the Anti-Corruption Department who deputed P. R. Das Gupta (P. W. 9), the Deputy Superintendent of Police attached to the Anti-Corruption Department, to take necessary action. P. W. 9 and Inspector, J. K. Singh (P. W. 2) of the Anti-Corruption Department left Patna in the afternoon of the 8th April. P.W. 9 had sent Upendra Jha (P. W. 8), Watcher of the Anti-Corruption Department, to Muzaffarpur to ask the officers of that Department to be at the railway station. Thus, P. W. 9 picked up Sub-Inspectors R. K. Pande (P. W. 4) and Bhubaneshwar Sinha (P. W. 13), Assistant Sub-Inspector Shivanand Tewary (P. W. 12) and P. W. 8 at Muzaffarpur Railway station. They reached Laheriasarai at night on the same date. P. Ws. 2 and 9 stayed at a place called Bengal Lodge in Mahalla Gudri Chauk of Laheriasarai. They reached Laheriasarai at night on the same date. P. Ws. 2 and 9 stayed at a place called Bengal Lodge in Mahalla Gudri Chauk of Laheriasarai. Thakur met P. W. 9 in the morning of the 9th April, and he deputed Shivanand Tewary (P. W. 12) to go with him. Thakur and P. W. 12 went to the appellants house, but he was out. Thakur told the appellants servant to ask him to meet him at the Bengal Lodge in the evening. At about 3 p.m., Thakur reported to P. W. 9 that he had met Akhileshwar Prasad Sinha, the Accounts Clerk, who was also demanding his percentage as bribe from him, and that he had told Akhileshwar Prasad Sinha also to come. At about 5.30 p.m., Thakur told P. W. 9 that the appellant was coming to Bengal Lodge a short time later. P. W. 9 told Thakur to stand in the compound of Bengal Lodge near the road, and deputed Shivanand Tewary (P. W. 12) to be with him in order to hear the conversation. He instructed Thakur to touch his head as a signal after the transaction was over. Thereafter, he himself and other members of his staff kept loitering in disguise close-by. At about 7 p.m., the appellant came and met Thakur, In the course of conversation between the two, the appellant demanded his percentage, and Thakur gave him Rs. 300/- saying that he had sent Rs. 200/- earlier through his man Sharmaji but he had spent the money on his own work and also saying that he would pay the balance later. In the meantime, Akhileshwar Prasad Sinha also arrived there, and Thakur gave him one hundred-rupee note. Thereafter, Thakur touched his head, and P. W. 9 came along with the other officers of the Anti-Corruption Department. They arrested the appellant as well as Akhileshwar Prasad Sinha. I am not concerned in this case with Akhileshwar Prasad Sinha. I understand that he has been placed upon his trial separately. P.W. 9 searched the appellants person, and recovered the three currency notes, numbers of which were already noted in exhibit 1, from the pocket of the appellants bushshirt in the presence of two search witnesses, Sitaram Lal (P. W. 2) and Ramkripal Pandey (P. W. 14). The appellant was dumbfounded on being arrested. P.W. 9 searched the appellants person, and recovered the three currency notes, numbers of which were already noted in exhibit 1, from the pocket of the appellants bushshirt in the presence of two search witnesses, Sitaram Lal (P. W. 2) and Ramkripal Pandey (P. W. 14). The appellant was dumbfounded on being arrested. Thereafter, P. W. 9 went with his officers as well as the appellant and Akhileshwar Prasad Sinha to Laheriasarai Police Station where he gave a detailed statement in writing (exhibit 15). Sub-Inspector B. P. Varma (P. W. 16) drew up a formal first information report (exhibit 17) but did not investigate the case. He, however, informed Upendra Prasad Chowdhary (P. W. 17), the Deputy Superintendent of Police at Darbhanga Sadar, who took over charge of the case at 10.30 a.m. on the 10th April, and started investigation. After completing the investigation, he submitted charge-sheet on the 18th March, 1958. 7. The defence case is that the appellant never prepared bills for Thakur on the basis of measurements lower than the correct ones, and did not cause any harassment to him. Thakur used to attempt to take advantage of the fact that he and the appellant are both Bhumihar Brahmans by caste, and are residents of the same district, and he used to ask the appellant to prepare his bills on the basis of inflated measurements. Possibly, Thakur bore a grudge against the appellant because he used to refuse such requests. Bindeshwar Prasad Singh (D. W. 4) a co-villager of the appellant, worked as work sarkar in the office of the Subdivisional Officer, Waterways, Laheriasarai, from February to October, 1956. In September, 1956, the appellant advanced a loan of Rs. 300 to him. After October, Bindeshwar went away to Muzaffarpur and joined as a typist in the office of the Flood Investigation Department. As work sarkar, Bindeshwar used to come into contact with Thakur as he used to pass the progress reports of Thakurs work. The appellant wrote several letters to Bindeshwar to send back his money; but Bindeshwar could not repay the loan before the 2nd April, 1957. Bindeshwar met Thakur at Muzaffarpur on that date and gave him Rs. 300 on the 3rd April with instruction to make over the amount to the appellant. The appellant wrote several letters to Bindeshwar to send back his money; but Bindeshwar could not repay the loan before the 2nd April, 1957. Bindeshwar met Thakur at Muzaffarpur on that date and gave him Rs. 300 on the 3rd April with instruction to make over the amount to the appellant. The appellant was away from his house on the 9th April, 1957, and, on his return, his servant told him that Thakur had come to his house and had left a message that he should see him, (Thakur) at the Bengal Lodge. The appellant concluded that Thakur was about to give him the money which Bindeshwar (D. W. 4), had made over to him, and so he went to Bengal Lodge. He met Thakur on the road in front of that lodge, and, after making some excuse for the delay in payment, Thakur made over the sum of Rs. 300 to him and he kept it in his pocket. Thereafter, the Anti-Corruption people caught hold of him. 8. The admitted facts are these. The appellant was at all material times the sectional Officer, Waterways Division No. 1, Darbhanga. As such, it was his duty to do dag-belling and profiling as well as to take measurements of work done by contractors, including Thakur, to prepare their bills and to arrange for payment of bills to them. Thakur was working on a contract to construct the bandh in the Khiroi scheme from mile 30 to mile 301/2. On the 9th April, Thakur went to the appellants house and left a message for him to come to Bengal Lodge. At about 7 p.m., Thakur and the appellant met near Bengal Lodge, and the appellant received Rs. 300 from him and kept that amount in his pocket. Thereafter, P. W. 9 and members of his staff arrested him and recovered the amount of Rs. 300 the money paid by Thakur to him. 9. In view of the admitted fact of payment of Rs. 300 by Thakur to the appellant, the presumption under section 4 of the Prevention of Corruption Act that he received the money "as a motive or reward such as is mentioned in the said section 161" arises against him. 300 the money paid by Thakur to him. 9. In view of the admitted fact of payment of Rs. 300 by Thakur to the appellant, the presumption under section 4 of the Prevention of Corruption Act that he received the money "as a motive or reward such as is mentioned in the said section 161" arises against him. It is unnecessary for me to discuss the effect of the presumption because the Supreme Court has already had occasions to deal with it, and their Lordships have laid down the true principles. I may refer to State of Madras v. A. Vaidyanatha Iyer AIR 1958 SC 61 . Capoor J. has observed in that case : "Therefore where it is proved that a gratification has been accepted then the presumption shall at once arise under the section. It introduces an exception to the general rule as to the burden of proof in criminal cases and shifts the onus on to the accused. It may here be mentioned that the legislature has chosen to use the words shall presume and not may presume, the former a presumption of law and the latter of fact....... It is a presumption of law and therefore it is obligatory on the court to raise this presumption in every case brought under section 4 of the Prevention of Corruption Act because unlike the case of presumption of fact, presumptions of law constitute a branch of jurisprudence. 10. In another case, C. I. Emden v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1960 SC 548 , an argument was advanced that the word gratification as used in section 4 (1) cannot mean mere payment of money. Their Lordships repelled this argument, and Gajendragadkar, J., who delivered the judgment stated : "Paragraph 3 of section 161 of the Code provides that the word gratification is not restricted to pecuniary gratification or to gratifications estimable in money. Therefore gratification mentioned in section 4(1) cannot be confined only to payment of money. Their Lordships repelled this argument, and Gajendragadkar, J., who delivered the judgment stated : "Paragraph 3 of section 161 of the Code provides that the word gratification is not restricted to pecuniary gratification or to gratifications estimable in money. Therefore gratification mentioned in section 4(1) cannot be confined only to payment of money. What the prosecution has to prove before asking the Court to raise a presumption against an accused person is that the accused person has received a gratification other than legal remuneration; if it is shown, as in the present case it has been shown, that the accused received the stated amount and that the said amount was not legal remuneration then the condition prescribed by the section is satisfied." His Lordship has further observed : "There is another consideration which supports this construction. The presumption has also to be raised when it is shown that the accused person has received any valuable thing. This clause has reference to the offence punishable under section 165 of the Code; and there is no doubt that one of the essential ingredients of the said offence is that the valuable thing should have been received by the accused without consideration or for a consideration which he knows to be inadequate. It cannot be suggested that the relevant clause in section 4(1) which deals with the acceptance of any valuable thing should be interpreted to impose upon the prosecution an obligation to prove not only that the valuable thing has been received by the accused but that it has been received by him without consideration or for a consideration which he knows to be inadequate. The plain meaning of this clause undoubtedly requires the presumption to be raised whenever it is shown that the valuable thing has been received by the accused without anything more. If that is the true position in respect of the construction of this part of section 4(1) it would be unreasonable to hold that the word gratification in the same clause imports the necessity to prove not only the payment of money but the incriminating character of the said payment." 11. In view of the principles laid down in the above two decisions, there can be no doubt that presumption referred to in section 4(1) must be raised against the appellant in the present case, and that it is a presumption of law. 12. In view of the principles laid down in the above two decisions, there can be no doubt that presumption referred to in section 4(1) must be raised against the appellant in the present case, and that it is a presumption of law. 12. The junior counsel for the appellant, Mr. Ramanand Sinha, who has also put forward a part of the arguments on behalf of the appellant in this case, has urged that the burden upon the appellant to prove that he did not receive the money as a motive or reward as mentioned in section 161 of the Penal Code is not as heavy as the burden upon the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused in any criminal case. In support of this argument, he has referred to two English decisions, viz., Rex v. Carr Briant, (1943) 1 KB 607 and R. v. Dunbar, (1957) 2 All ER 737 : (1958) 1 QB 1. The principle laid down in these cases is that, if there is an onus of proof upon an accused, the onus will be discharged if accused proves that there is a reasonable probability of his case being true. Both these decisions came to be considered by the Supreme Court in C. I. Emdens case, (1943) 1 KB 607, which I have already referred to. Their Lordships did not decide the question of the nature of the burden of proof upon an accused but assumed "in favour of the appellant that even if the explanation given by him is a reasonably probable one, the presumption raised against him can be said to be rebutted". In the present case also, it seems to me that the defence taken by the appellant is not even reasonably probable, and, therefore, it is unnecessary to decide whether the principle laid down in the two English cases is applicable in this country. 13-16. I have already given a substance of the appellants defence. (Discussing the defence evidence His Lordship proceeded). It was for the first time in his statement under section 342 on the 15th September, 1958, that the appellant said that he had sent post-cards to Bindeshwar, demanding his money, and that he had received a post-card from Bindeshwar on the 6th April, 1957, stating that the money had been sent through Thakur. It was for the first time in his statement under section 342 on the 15th September, 1958, that the appellant said that he had sent post-cards to Bindeshwar, demanding his money, and that he had received a post-card from Bindeshwar on the 6th April, 1957, stating that the money had been sent through Thakur. It is not at all difficult to obtain postal seal marks on post-cards with wrong dates, and, in my opinion, the post-cards (exhibits D and D(a)) are fabricated documents. The prosecution filed four blank post-cards (marked X-1 to X-4 for identification) with different postal seal marks of different places in order to show that such marks could be easily obtained. Mr. Sri Narayan Sahay has severely commented upon this action of the prosecution, and he has referred to the decision in Brannan v. Peek, (1947) 2 KB 572, in which their Lordships disapproved of the action of the police in sending a police officer to commit an offence in order to detect an offence by another person. It seems to me that it was not necessary for the prosecution to go to the length to which it has gone, and its action certainly deserves disapprobation. As I have already said however it is well known that there is not much difficulty in obtaining postal seal marks, and the blank post-cards with such marks were hardly necessary to prove this fact. 17. His Lordship further considered the evidence and proceeded. 18. On a consideration of the facts and circumstances mentioned above, I have no doubt at all that Bindeshwar (D. W. 4) and Satya Narayan Pande (D. W. 5) are both liars, and have come forward to support a false case set up by the defence. There is not even a reasonable probability of that case being true. 19-22 Even apart from the presumption, however, I am of opinion that there is sufficient evidence in this case to prove that the amount of Rs. 300 was paid by Thakur to the appellant on the 9th April as illegal gratification. (His Lordship discussed the evidence and continued). 23. Another argument which Mr. Sahay has advanced is that there was no motive for Thakur to have paid any bribe to the appellant. 300 was paid by Thakur to the appellant on the 9th April as illegal gratification. (His Lordship discussed the evidence and continued). 23. Another argument which Mr. Sahay has advanced is that there was no motive for Thakur to have paid any bribe to the appellant. In this connection, he has referred to an observation of B. K. Mukherjea, J. in Madan Mohan Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1954 SC 637 , which is as follows : "No doubt a public officer has no right to demand any bribe; but when he is hauled up before a criminal court to answer a charge of having taken illegal gratification, the question whether any motive for payment or acceptance of bribe at all existed is certainly a relevant and material fact for consideration." Learned counsel has made two points. He has first stated that, after the appellant made up on-account bills in favour of Thakur until the end of March, 1957, he could not make any change and could not arrange for payment of further amounts of money to Thakur subsequently. The second point is that the measurements made by the appellant were correct, and Thakur is wrong in saying that he prepared bills on the basis of lower measurements. 24. So far as the first point is concerned, the admitted position is that it was the appellants duty to measure the work done by Thakur, to prepare bills and to arrange for payment to him. The contract had not come to an end : Thakur was still executing it. In my opinion, there could be no difficulty in the appellant preparing bills on the basis of higher measurements and arranging for higher payments to Thakur after receiving bribe. Mr. Sahay has also pointed out that a certain percentage of the measurements made by the appellant was subject to being checked by higher officers. Such checking could hardly prevent the appellant from putting down higher or lower measurements than the correct ones. It is, therefore, clear that the appellant could show favour to Thakur, and Thakur had, therefore, motive to pay a certain percentage of his bills as bribe to the appellant. 25. The second point is based upon the evidence of measurements made by Mr. Vishwanath (P. W. 11), who was the Executive Engineer of the Flood Investigation Division, Darbhanga, at the time, and by Mr. 25. The second point is based upon the evidence of measurements made by Mr. Vishwanath (P. W. 11), who was the Executive Engineer of the Flood Investigation Division, Darbhanga, at the time, and by Mr. B. P. Sinha, the Superintending Engineer. (After reviewing the evidence in this respect, His Lordship held that the result of the measurements made by P. W. 11 and Mr. B. P. Sinha could not be accepted to show that the measurements made by the appellant at the end of March 1957, were right. His Lordship then continued). 26. It appears that the appellant wished to get Mr. B. P. Sinha examined on commission as he was ill. The learned Special Judge, however, refused to give time, and did not pass any order as to the issue of a commission for his examination as a defence witness. Mr. Ramanand Sinha has argued that the appellant has been prejudiced due to non-examination of Mr. B. P. Sinha, but Mr. B. P. Sinhas report (exhibit A) is on the record, and I am unable to hold that any prejudice has been caused to the appellant. 27. The next point which has been urged by Mr. Ramanand Sinha is that the sanction granted in this case for prosecution of the appellant is invalid. The sanction (exhibit 13) is quoted below : "60/57 Office of the Chief Engineer, Irrigation Department, North Bihar, Patna. Memo. No. 4607. Patna, the 20-2-1958. Whereas I, Chief Engineer, Irrigation, North Bihar, Patna, have considered the facts as mentioned in the letter of Shri U. P. Chaudhary, Deputy Superintendent of Police, dated ..................endorsed to me by .............. in his endorsement No. 1061/(2) CR dated 8th February, 1958 forwarding therewith a copy of F.I.R. of Laheriasarai Police Station Case No. 6 (4) 57 under section 161 I. P. C. read with section 5 of Act II of 1947 together with a copy of the list of witnesses and memo of evidence. And whereas I, Chief Engineer, Irrigation, North Bihar, Patna, have reasons to believe on consideration of the facts mentioned in the aforesaid documents that Shri Baidyanath Pd. Sinha Sectional Officer, Waterways Division No. I, Darbhanga (now under suspension), has committed an offence under section 161 of the I.P.C. read with section 5 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. And whereas I, Chief Engineer, Irrigation, North Bihar, Patna, have reasons to believe on consideration of the facts mentioned in the aforesaid documents that Shri Baidyanath Pd. Sinha Sectional Officer, Waterways Division No. I, Darbhanga (now under suspension), has committed an offence under section 161 of the I.P.C. read with section 5 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. Now, therefore, I, Chief Engineer, Irrigation, North Bihar, Patna, in exercise of the powers conferred by section 6 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 (Act II of 1947) accord sanction to the prosecution of the aforesaid Shri Baidyanath Pd. Sinha, Sectional Officer, Waterways Division No. I, Darbhanga, under the aforesaid section. The copies of the aforesaid letters and a copy of the F.I.R. of the case, stating the facts together with the memo. of evidence and a list of witnesses indicating the evidence in support of the offence are attached herewith. Sd./P. R. (Illg.) 13-2-58. Chief Engineer (Irrigation), North Bihar, Patna. Copy forwarded to the Superintendent of Police, Darbhanga, in duplicate for necessary action. (Illeg.) I, II/C.R. Sd. Illeg. 23/2. The ground taken by Mr. Sinha for attacking the validity of the sanction order is that it does not contain the facts on which the Chief Engineer has granted the sanction. That is so, but it has made reference, apart from other things, to the first information report which was placed before the Chief Engineer. The first information report contains all necessary facts. There is, therefore, clear evidence of the fact that the Chief Engineer granted the sanction on a consideration of all the facts of the case as mentioned in the first information report. In Gokulchand Dwarkadas Morarka v. The King, AIR 1948 PC 82, their Lordships observed : "But if the facts constituting the offence charged are not shown on the face of the sanction, the prosecution must prove by extraneous evidence that those facts were placed before the sanctioning authority." As I have said, there can be no doubt in the present case that the facts were placed before the Chief Engineer. Reference may also be made to Biswabhusan Naik v. State of Orissa, AIR 1954 SC 359 , in which the Privy Council decision has been followed. Reference may also be made to Biswabhusan Naik v. State of Orissa, AIR 1954 SC 359 , in which the Privy Council decision has been followed. Other decisions of the Supreme Court, which may also be referred to, are Jaswant Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1958 SC 124 , and Indu Bhusan Chatterjee v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1958 SC 148 . There is also an unreported decision of a Bench of tins Court in Bhagwat Prasad v. The State, Criminal Appeal No. 262 of 1956, disposed of on the 9th July, 1958 in which it was held in similar circumstances that, the first information report having been placed before the sanctioning authority in order to enable him to decide whether to grant or not to grant the sanction, the sanction order was not invalid. 28 Another point which has been urged against the validity of the sanction order is that it sanctions the prosecution of the appellant under section 5 of Act 2 of 1947, and does not indicate the clause of sub-section (1) of section 5 under which the case comes. It is said that the clause is also not mentioned in the charge. The offence is punishable under section 5(2), and the different clauses of section 5(1) merely describe the offences. If the sanctioning authority mentions section 5, I do not think that the sanction order can be held to be invalid merely on the ground that the clause of section 5(1), which describes the particular offence for which the accused is to be prosecuted, is not mentioned in the sanction order. It is unnecessary to enter into a discussion as to this point because it is covered by the decision of the Supreme Court in Biswabhusan Naiks case, AIR 1954 SC 359 . So far as the charge is concerned, it is clearly indicated therein that the offence alleged against the appellant is as described in clause (d) of section 5(1). There is, therefore, no illegality. 29. Mr. Sri Narayan Sahay has lastly urged that the sentence imposed upon the appellant is severe. I am unable to agree. The minimum sentence which may be imposed upon an accused for an offence under section 5(2) of Act 2 of 1947 is one year unless the Court gives some special reasons for imposing a lesser sentence. 29. Mr. Sri Narayan Sahay has lastly urged that the sentence imposed upon the appellant is severe. I am unable to agree. The minimum sentence which may be imposed upon an accused for an offence under section 5(2) of Act 2 of 1947 is one year unless the Court gives some special reasons for imposing a lesser sentence. I am unable to find any special reason for reducing the sentence. The sentences imposed under sections 161 and 5(2) being concurrent, the appellant will have to undergo a sentence of only one year. That being so, I am not prepared to interfere. 30. For the reasons given above, the convictions and sentences imposed upon the appellant are affirmed, and the appeal is dismissed. 31. I agree.