JUDGMENT HIDAYATULLA, J. 1. This appeal with special leave of this court is directed against the order of the High Court of Punjab dismissing in limine a petitioner under Art. 226 of the Constitution filed by the appellant Avtar Singh questioning his dismissal from the police force. The appellant joined the police force in 1943 and at the relevant time was working as a Foot constable in the force and was posted at Jullundur. On January 12, 1954 a report was made against him that he assaulted a girl in Rainak Bazar in the town of Jullundur whom he had kissed while under the influence of liquor. He was asked to appear on January, 13, 1954 before the Assistant Superintendent of P of Police Jullundur who explained to him the summary of the charge against him and asked him to explain his conduct. Thereafter eight witnesses were examined in support of the charge and he was also given a copy of the charge. He was asked to submit a list of defence witnesses within 48 hours together with a summary of what each witness was going to depose. It appears that he submitted a list of witnesses of whom 4 were not accepted by the Assistant Superintendent of Police, because the summary of their statement did not disclose that they had anything pertinent to say in the case. The other witnesses were to be examined on January 18 and 19, 1954. Of these only 8 witnesses eventually appeared, six of whom were examined on January 18, and the remaining two, on the next day. The appellant was then asked to file his written statement, if any and was given 7 days to do so. He filed a detailed written statement within that time. On February 9, 1954 the appellant was summoned before the Superintendent of Police. What transpired before that Office has been set down in the order incorporated in the affidavit filed by the respondent and may well be set out in the words of the affidavit. This is what happened. "Seen him in my office this evening. He was explained briefly the charge against him. The charge is of such a nature which warrants dismissal from service. He was asked to say anything in furtherance of his earlier statement in his defence and why he should not be dismissed from the force. This is what happened. "Seen him in my office this evening. He was explained briefly the charge against him. The charge is of such a nature which warrants dismissal from service. He was asked to say anything in furtherance of his earlier statement in his defence and why he should not be dismissed from the force. He has nothing to add." Eventually the appellant was dismissed fro the police force and Eventually the appellant was dismissed from the police force and was asked to return his kit. He appealed to the Deputy Inspector General of Police but his appeal failed. He then filed a petition under Art.226 of the Constitution for a writ of mandamus directing the Government of Punjab to re in state him in service. The petition was dismissed summarily by the High Court, and the present appeal has been filed with the Special Leave of this court against the order of dismissal. 2. In the writ petition the appellant has averred in paras 11 and 12 as follows: "11. That after the written statement was filed the enquiry Officer gave his finding on 29th January 1954 and sent the same to the S.P. Jullundur. (A copy of the findings forms annexure BB to this petition). These findings were not communicated to the petitioner, but the petitioner was summoned by the S.P. Jullundur on 9th of February 1954 to appear before him. "12. That in obedience to the orders of the S.P. Jullundur the petitioner appeared before him on the said day. When the petitioner appeared before the S.P. o rally told the petitioner that he proposed to dismiss the petitioner. On this the petitioner requested that he should be given a proper show cause notice along with the finding of the Enquiry office. So that the petitioner may be able to meet the findings of the Enquiry Office. When this appeal came before us on an earlier occasion it was pointed out by the learned counsel appearing for the respondent that in as much as the writ petitioner had been dismissed summarily by the High Court the respondent had no opportunity to meet the allegation in the writ petitioner and the affidavit supporting it. We accordingly gave the respondent an opportunity of denying those allegation, if they were untrue. An affidavit has now been filed before us and we have considered it along with the writ petition. We accordingly gave the respondent an opportunity of denying those allegation, if they were untrue. An affidavit has now been filed before us and we have considered it along with the writ petition. 3. It will be notice that the petition averred two separate facts. Para 11 of the petitioner stated that the findings of the Enquiry. Officer were not communicate to the appellant when he was summoned before the Superintendent of police and para 12 state that he was only orally told that it was proposed to dismiss him, and that no other fact was communicated to him. In reply to these two averments the affidavit has now been filed admits that the first of the allegations is correct. Para 11 of the affidavit of the respondent quite clearly admits that the findings were no communicated to the appellant. Para 12 of the petition which stated that he was only told that it was proposed to dismiss him has now been met by the quotation from the order sheet of the proceedings before the Superintendent of Police and does not advance the matter much further. 4. It was contended before us that what is meant by the word charge in the order sheet of the Superintendent of Police is very much the same as is meant by r.16.24, para 9 of the Punjab Police Rules Vol. 11 where it is laid down that the "defaulter" should be explained the "charged proved" against him but this is not what the order sheet of the Superintendent of Police shows. The superintendent does not say that the appellant was explained the nature of the findings on the charge against him. All that the order sheet shows is that the charge was explained to him. Now the Word charge in this context is something quite different from finding and it may be presumed that the Superintendent of Police knew this difference. In our opinion the affidavit filed in this court in reply to the petition does not show that there was any real attempt to explain to the appellant on what ground the finding proceeded and indeed what the finding themselves were. In view of this it is difficult to hold that there was due compliance with the requirement of Art. 311 (2) of the Constitution. In view of this it is difficult to hold that there was due compliance with the requirement of Art. 311 (2) of the Constitution. Every public servant, however bad he may be is entitled to have the whole of the matter brought to his notice before he was asked to show cause why a particular punishment should not be meted out to him. This does not appear to have been done and the affidavit which has been filed in this court is not the affidavit of the officer who had only the proceedings before him and quoted extracts there form in the affidavit and swore to their accuracy from information,. In this view of the matter, we find ourselves unable to accept the contention of the learned counsel for the respondent that due compliance with the requirements of Art.311 (2) was made in this case. In our opinion, this defect goes to the very root of the matter and the appeal must on this ground alone, succeed. 5. We may however, add that one argument which was raised before us, no opportunity was afforded to the appellant to examine some more defence witnessed, was not seriously pressed before us after we pointed out that the appellant had not asked for an opportunity to examine other witnesses and had closed his case and signed the order sheet of that day in token thereof. 6. In the result we allow the appeal and set aside the order of the High Court and the punishment of dismissal, which has been meted out to appellant. It shall, of course, be open to the Government to take proceedings in accordance with law against the appellant. The appellant shall be entitled to his costs in this Court Appeal allowed. For Citation : 1968 Ser LR 131