Judgment :- 1. The facts, that have led to this petition, may be briefly stated. The petitioner had asked the respondent Municipality for a licence under S.283 of the Travancore District Municipalities Act, XXIII of 1116. The petitioner sells meat, and the section requires butchers, fish-mongers or poulterers, to carry their trade in conformity with the licence from the Municipal Executive authority. S.283 (2) confers on the above said authority the discretion to refuse such licence or to grant it, subject to such restrictions as to the supervision and inspection, as it thinks fit. The licence, if granted, would expire at the end of the year, in which it had been granted, unless, for special reasons, the Executive authority should direct its earlier expiration. The Travancore District Municipalities Act hereinafter called as the Act, authorises Rules being framed, and such Rules have been framed as well as published in the State Gazette of January 27,1959. These Bye-laws require all persons intending to conduct a butcher shop, to apply to the Executive Authority for a licence in the prescribed form, with a licence fee of Rs. 50/- and further directs the meat offered for sale to be of the animal slaughtered in the public slaughter house, to be wholesome, and devoid of materials unfit for consumption. The next requirement under the Bye-law, is about the stamped portion being preserved until all the meat is sold out. The Bye-law further authorises seizure and destruction by the Health authorities, should the meat be unwholesome, and the stall-holder will have no claim for compensation. There are other requirements intended to preserve meat being fit for human consumption and free from threatened contamination. There appears to have been earlier several proceedings between the petitioner and the Changanacherry Municipality, and one is still sub judice. We need not give details of such proceedings, though the petitioner complains, that because of the earlier litigations, the licence has been refused for this petition succeeds on a shorter ground. The petitioner had applied for a licence under S.283 of the Act for selling meat in room No. 43 in Ward No. 22, of the Changanacherry Municipality, and the application was dated on March 4,1959. It was rejected on March 25,1959, the rejection being by the Commissioner on the report of the Health Officer, which has been produced as Ext. B1 in the ease. It was rejected on March 25,1959, the rejection being by the Commissioner on the report of the Health Officer, which has been produced as Ext. B1 in the ease. It is a long document, and the argument on behalf of the petitioner is that, as some of the grounds contained there are irrelevant, the refusal to grant becomes vitiated. In these circumstances, we would quote it in extenso. 1. The building is situated in a thickly populated area where members of different communities reside. 2. It is situated on the side of the Changanacherry-Vazhoor road, where there is very heavy vehicular and pedestrian traffic. The premises are within 100 yards of the junction of the Vazhoor-Changanacherry road and the main central road where buses stop for taking passengers to various places and passengers from various places alight in Changanacherry. The premises are within 2 furlongs of the Changanacherry Railway station. Traffic in this area is considerably increased on account of the opening of the railway station last year. The atmosphere in this locality is dust-laden and will contaminate the exposed meat. The premises are situated in the midst of hotels, tea shops, grocery shops, etc. 3. The exposure of meat and flesh on the side of the thorough fare will cause annoyance to the general public. 4. The floor and walls are not kept in good condition and hence not washable." 2. The writ petitioner's learned Advocate has taken lour grounds for setting aside the order refusing the licence. These are that: (1) S.283 requires licence for selling meat, but there is no Bye-law requiring such a person to obtain licence, and in the absence of such a Bye-law the writ petitioner is not required to have a licence for purposes of carrying his trade. (2) S.283 and the Bye-laws under the Act, are violative of the petitioner's fundamental right, under Art.19 of the Constitution, of carrying trade, because the discretion for granting the licence is absolute and uncontrolled. (3) The fee required under the Bye-rule amounts to tax, as it is not in consideration of some service, which the Municipality does for the petitioner, and therefore, the provision requiring fee from those who carry the trade of butcher, fish-monger, etc., is void. (3) The fee required under the Bye-rule amounts to tax, as it is not in consideration of some service, which the Municipality does for the petitioner, and therefore, the provision requiring fee from those who carry the trade of butcher, fish-monger, etc., is void. (4) The refusal by the respondent Municipality is wrong partly because matters irrelevant for purposes of granting the licence have been taken into consideration, and partly because the licence has been mainly withheld because of the strained relation between the petitioner and the respondent, which is the result of the earlier litigations between them. 3. We feel no necessity of deciding the constitutional issues for it is a well-settled rule of practice not to decide constitutional questions unless these decisions be essential for the proper disposal of the particular litigation. It follows that, should any of the other grounds be sufficient for allowing the writ petition, the constitutional issues must wait adjudication in some other appropriate proceedings. Nor do we think the objection of the fee being charged without any adequate return for it, has any substance, for the Muncipality has, in its reply, denied the allegation of not doing some service in consideration of charging the fee, and their reply appears to be corroborated by the petitioner having deposited the necessary fee when applying for the licence. Nor do we think that a party should be allowed in a writ proceeding to take inconsistent position and repudiate what he has, by his own voluntary conduct, shown to be correct. The adjudication on the constitutionality of the demand for the fee should, therefore, be also postponed to another proceeding. 4. That leaves two grounds, and, of these, we are not impressed with the first. The dictionary meaning of the word 'butcher' and that word has been used in the Bye-law also covers a person who sells meat, and having regard to the context in which that word has been used, we think that the argument of a meat-seller not being covered by the Bye-law, must fail. 5. Coming to the last ground, it is well to emphasise that a statutory authority vested with power, whose exercise is discretionary, is treated as not acting properly where the exercise even partially, rests on irrelevant considerations; for the Rule is well-settled that a power granted for one purpose, cannot be validly exercised for a different one. 5. Coming to the last ground, it is well to emphasise that a statutory authority vested with power, whose exercise is discretionary, is treated as not acting properly where the exercise even partially, rests on irrelevant considerations; for the Rule is well-settled that a power granted for one purpose, cannot be validly exercised for a different one. In Sharp v. Wakefield, (1891) A.C. 173, Lord Halsbury has stated the legal position in these words: "An extensive power is confided to the justices in their capacity as justices to be exercised judicially; and "discretion" means, when it is said that something is to be done within the discretion of the authorities, that something is to be done according to the rules of reason and justice, not according to private opinion; according to law, and not humour. It is to be, not arbitrary, vague and fanciful, but legal and regular. And it must be exercised within the limit, to which an honest man competent to the discharge of his office ought to confine himself." The argument by the learned Advocate for the writ petitioner is that the order rejecting the application for the licence, is vitiated by being irregular and arbitrary, and should be vacated. It should be remembered that the Commissioner's order is based on the report by the Health Officer, which consists of 4 grounds. Of them, the first is hardly relevant for not giving licence to sell things, unless the sale of the commodity be injurious to the health of the persons living or visiting the locality and it cannot be that meat, with adequate safeguards against infection, is a commodity of this kind. The second, though relevant, is not such as would justify refusal, because licence can be granted with conditions guarding against contamination by dust. Apparently shops selling foods are not excluded from the locality, and they are allowed with adequate safeguards against contamination. We see no reasons why the petitioner is denied the right. In this connection it is necessary to emphasise that a statutory authority ought to bear in mind that, unless there be overriding reasons for curtailing the right, the citizen is entitled to earn his living by honest means within the locality where he feels his trade would best flourish, and permission should not be withheld from him where conditions would adequately guard threatened infections. Therefore, we respectfully agree with Stone, J., in Venkatachalam v. Corporation of Madras, A.I.R. 1934 Madras 70, that even if there was a substantial ground which would justify the Municipality in refusing a licence there should not be a blank refusal but only a refusal, should certain safeguards be not provided by the applicant. 6. The fourth ground of the Health Officer's report is also not free from objection, as the petitioner pleads - and it is not denied that there has been a blank refusal, and that the petitioner was given no opportunity to so improve the shop as to remove the objection. It follows that the licence has been improperly refused in this case. 7. Coming to the third ground of the Health Officer's report, it is clear that it is irrelevant for an average person visiting the locality, not occupied wholly by persons of his own belief, would expect shops selling commodities meant for people of different castes and beliefs, and such persons would not be annoyed on such commodities being offered for sale. It is equally clear that where part of the grounds for rejection be relevant, and the other irrelevant, the whole order becomes vitiated, for such mingling makes it impossible to separate the good from bad. Therefore the third ground, being irrelevant, would alone suffice to vitiate the order of rejection in this case. 8. The learned Advocate for the respondent Municipality, however has contended that all the grounds in the case were proper and the discretion was justifiably exercised. In connection with the third ground, he has argued that in exercising the power of issuing a licence, the Municipality is vested with the discretion which must be exercised, not only with a view to securing wholesome sale of materials but also to prevent nuisance. The latter has been threatened in this case because of the unexposed meat for sale, which would cause annoyance to a section of the public, and the third ground taken for refusal of the licence, is a good ground. The latter has been threatened in this case because of the unexposed meat for sale, which would cause annoyance to a section of the public, and the third ground taken for refusal of the licence, is a good ground. For this purpose, he has relied on the definition of 'nuisance' in S.3 (16) of the Act, which reads as follows: - "Nuisance" includes any act, omission, place or thing which causes or is likely to cause injury, danger, annoyance disturbance, or offence to the sense of sight, smell or hearing or to rest or sleep or which is or may be dangerous to life or injurious to health or property". He further relies on the decision in Govindji Vithaldas & Co. v. Municipal Corporation, Ahmadbad, AI.R. 1959 Bom. 26, where it has been held that the Municipality can properly refuse a licence for selling timber in a locality, where the danger to the public is imminent and that the Municipality was not only entrusted with the function of preserving the health, but with looking after the education and other welfare of the inhabitants. The same principle has been followed in S.D. Shetty v. K.D. Billimoria, A.I.R 1959 Bom. 346, though the question in the case arose at the exercise of the discretion under the Bombay Police Act. The learned Advocate has further relied on Shri Ismail v. The Municipal Commissioner, Bombay, I.L R.28 Bom. 253, where withholding a licence for keeping a shed for animals, was held to be justified on the ground of preventing nuisance, and it was further held that courts of jaw should not substitute their judgment for that of the Municipal Commissioner. We think the wide words in which'nuisance' has been defined in the Act, mean nothing more than the conduct which diminishes the use and enjoyment by another, of his right, and is bound to differ from place to place even in the same city. In other words, if the right of property, right of easement, right of personal comfort be impaired, nuisance would be caused, but what would be annoyance in residential locality, would not be so treated where factories be located, and what would be nuisance in a park would not be so held in a market. In other words, if the right of property, right of easement, right of personal comfort be impaired, nuisance would be caused, but what would be annoyance in residential locality, would not be so treated where factories be located, and what would be nuisance in a park would not be so held in a market. Clerk and Lindsell on Torts, defines 'nuisance' to be an act or omission which is an interference with, disturbance of or annoyance to, a person in the exercise or enjoyment of (a) a right belonging to him as a member of the public, when it is a public nuisance, or (b) his ownership or occupation of land or of some easement, quasi-easement, or other right, used or enjoyed in connection with land, when it is a private nuisance. In the present case, a private nuisance is out of the question, and in order to constituted public nuisance, the act must be obnoxious to the public as a whole. It is not disputed that the application for a licence to sell the meat, is in a shop which is situated in a locality that is neither a park nor residential, and, therefore the annoyance, the discomfort, in order to constitute a nuisance, must be the annoyance or discomfort to an average man, who comes to the locality in order to purchase things. Such a person would expect shops catering to the need of those who do not have the same 'taste and would not be annoyed if he finds-things sought for by other persons. We are afraid there is no analogy between hanging corpse on the adjoining land, which causes nuisance on the highway, on which the learned Advocate for the respondent Municipality relies and vending of meat in shops. It follows that the third ground for allowing the writ petition is not valid, and the order of rejection in this case is bad. It is stated, however, that the licence period, had it been given, would by now have expired, and in these circumstances we give the writ petitioner a declaration that his application had been wrongly refused. Accordingly the writ petition is allowed with costs, Advocate's fee Rs. 100/-.