JUDGMENT O.H. Mootham, C.J. - I agree that this appeal fails, but I think it unnecessary to express an opinion as to the binding force of the rules regulating the appointment, punishment, dismissal and discharge of Executive Officers of Municipal Boards printed at p. 446 of the Municipal Manual and I would prefer not to do so. 2. The respondent Board by a special resolution passed on the 4th December, 1954, appointed the appellant its Executive Officer. That appointment was under sub-Sec. (3) of Sec. 57 of the U.P. Municipalities Act, 1916, subject to the approval of the State Government. The State Government did not approve of the permanent appointment on the ground that the appellant was more than thirty-two years of age, but by a letter dated the 29th December, 1955, it informed the Board that the appointment of the appellant was approved as a temporary Executive Officer for such time as the Board is not able to get the services of a fully qualified man. The Board again advertised the post but no application from a suitable candidate being received the Board again wrote to the Government on the 13th November, 1956, recommending that the appellant's appointment to the substantive post of Executive Officer be approved. On the 21st February, 1957, the Government rejected this request and asked the Board to make a further attempt to obtain a suitable candidate. Fresh elections thereafter took place and the newly constituted Board at a meeting held on the 10th December, 1957, passed a resolution terminating the appellant's services on the ground that his appointment had not been approved by the State Government and we are informed by learned counsel that another Executive Officer was appointed with effect from the 1st March, 1958. 3. The appellant's appointment was an interim appointment and automatically came to an end on the appointment of his successor. The only claim which he would appear to have is in respect of his salary for the period from the 11th December 1957 to the 28th February, 1958, and that is a claim which, as my brother has pointed out, he can enforce in a civil court if so advised. Dhavan, J. - This is an appeal by Jagannath Dutt Tripathi against an order of Mr. Dhavan, J. - This is an appeal by Jagannath Dutt Tripathi against an order of Mr. Justice Jagdish Sahai dismissing his petition under Article 226 of the Constitution directed against a resolution of the Municipal Board, Padrauna, purporting to dispense with his services as Executive Officer. In his petition Tripathi claimed that his appointment as Executive Officer of the Padrauna Municipal Board should have been confirmed by the State Government on a proper interpretation of the relevant rules published in the Municipal Manual; and, therefore, being a confirmed officer, his services could not be dispensed with without a strict compliance with the rules governing such termination of service. The facts of the case as alleged in the affidavit supporting the petition are these. On 12th April 1954, the Municipal Board, Padrauna, advertised for the post of Secretary. Jagannath Dutt Tripathi was one of the applicants. Under a rule regulating the appointment of secretaries of a Municipal Board (published in the Municipal Manual, Uttar Pradesh, Chap. X page 447) no person can be appointed as secretary unless he is less than 32 years of age, but this condition may be waived with the approval of the State Government. Though a large number of candidates applied none except Tripathi was considered suitable. The Board, therefore, passed a resolution appointing him and wrote to the State Government that the age limit might be waived in his case. For some reason which is not relevant in this appeal, Government took no decision on the Board's request for a long time. Meanwhile Tripathi who had taken charge of the office of Secretary on 7th June, 1954 continued to function. In that month the status of the Padrauna Municipal Board was raised to that of a Board of the fourth class which gave it the right to have an Executive Officer instead of a Secretary. In the exercise of this right the Board passed a special resolution appointing Tripathi as its Executive Officer. As the age limit of 32 years applied to Executive Officers also, the Board wrote to the Government for the waiving of this condition. A letter was however not sent till 29th June 1955. It may be noted at this stage that the Government had not yet taken any decision on the Board's earlier request to waive the age limit in the matter of Tripathi's previous appointment as Secretary. A letter was however not sent till 29th June 1955. It may be noted at this stage that the Government had not yet taken any decision on the Board's earlier request to waive the age limit in the matter of Tripathi's previous appointment as Secretary. In fact that matter had become infructuous in view of his subsequent appointment as Executive Officer. On 29th December 1955 the State Government wrote to the Board refusing to waive the age limit for Tripathi's appointment as Executive Officer. The Board was however told that the Government "were pleased to approve the appointment of Sri Tripathi as temporary Executive Officer for such time as the Board is not able to get the services of a fully qualified hand." In pursuance of this letter the Board advertised the post of the Executive Officer again. Tripathi does not appear to have challenged either the refusal of the Government to exempt him from the age-limit or the Board's again advertising for the post. A large number of applications were received, but no candidate was considered suitable. On 13th November 1956 the Board wrote to Government recommending that Tripathi's appointment to the substantive post of Executive Officer be approved. On 21st February 1957 the Government wrote back rejecting this request and requesting the Board to make another try for the appointment of a candidate to fulfil of the requirements of the rules. On 20th March 1957 the Board again passed a resolution renewing their request to the State Government to approve Tripathi's appointment. 4. Meanwhile fresh elections to the Municipal Board took place as a result of which a new Board was constituted on 14th November 1957. Apparently the new Board took a different attitude to the question of Tripathi's appointment, and at a meeting of 10th December 1957 it passed a resolution terminating his services on the ground that his appointment as an Executive Officer had not been approved by the State Government which had asked the Board to appoint a duly qualified person to this post. The next day the President of the Board Communicated this decision to Sri Tripathi and informed him that his services were no longer required. The next day the President of the Board Communicated this decision to Sri Tripathi and informed him that his services were no longer required. Thereupon he filed his petition under Article 226 of the Constitution challenging the decision of the Board as well as the letter of the State Government dated 21st February 1957 withholding the approval of his appointment as Executive Officer. 5. In the grounds of petition it was contended (1) Tripathi's services could not be terminated unless the Board had appointed a new Executive Officer in accordance with the directions of the State Government; (2) That his services could have been terminated by the Board only in accordance with the provisions of R. 6 Chap. X page 447 of the Municipal Manual; (3) that the action of the Board in terminating his services was invalid because no special resolution to that effect had been passed by the Board in accordance with R. 6; and (4) that Tripathi having served the Board as secretary and Executive Officer for about 3 years with a record of efficient and approved service stood automatically exempted from the age limit and the Government could not, therefore, validly withhold their approval of his appointment. 6. The learned Judge did not consider the petition on merits as he took the view that it was misconceived. He was of opinion that the proper remedy for Tripathi was to file a civil suit. Accordingly, he dismissed the petition, but made it clear that he expressed no opinion on the merits of his case as it might prejudice either of the parties if such a suit is filed. Aggrieved by this decision Tripathi has filed this appeal. 7. Mr. S.C. Khare learned counsel for the appellant has advanced the following arguments against the correctness of the order of the learned Judge. First, he contended that this was a fit case for relief under Article 226. Secondly, he argued that the refusal of the State Government to sanction Tripathi's appointment is invalid as it is based on a wrong interpretation of the relevant rules. Thirdly he submitted that the resolution of the Board dated the 10th December 1959 purporting to terminate Tripathi's services is invalid as it was passed at a meeting not properly convened. Secondly, he argued that the refusal of the State Government to sanction Tripathi's appointment is invalid as it is based on a wrong interpretation of the relevant rules. Thirdly he submitted that the resolution of the Board dated the 10th December 1959 purporting to terminate Tripathi's services is invalid as it was passed at a meeting not properly convened. Lastly, he contended that this resolution is of no effect as it was not passed by a two-thirds majority as required by R. 6, printed on page 446 of the Municipal Manual. The appeal is opposed both by the Board and by the State Government. After hearing learned counsel for all the parties, I am of opinion that the appellant has made out no case for interference by this Court under Article 226. It is therefore not necessary to decide whether the petitioner has or has not an adequate alternative remedy by way of a civil suit. 8. It is conceded that under RR. 1 (b) and 2 of the rules (printed on page 446 of the Municipal Manual) the Government had the power to waive or not to waive the conditions as regards the age when the Board wrote to them for exemption after having appointed Tripathi as Secretary. It is also admitted that at the time of his appointment he had crossed the age limit, being 36 years old. But learned counsel has centred his attack on the subsequent decision of Government to withhold their approval of Tripathi's appointment as Executive Officer. He argues that Government's decision was based on a misinterpretation of the rules, the relevant part of which provides as follows:- "1. No person shall be appointed as executive officer of a Municipal Board unless - (b) he is less than thirty-two years of age or has previously served as executive officer or secretary of a board for not less than two years and has a record of efficient and approved service:" 9. Relying upon the words of Cl. (b) quoted above, learned counsel argued that Government could not have withheld their approval of Tripathi's appointment on the ground of his being over age and as he had his alternative qualification of having previously served as secretary for not less than two years with a record of efficient and approved service. Mr. Relying upon the words of Cl. (b) quoted above, learned counsel argued that Government could not have withheld their approval of Tripathi's appointment on the ground of his being over age and as he had his alternative qualification of having previously served as secretary for not less than two years with a record of efficient and approved service. Mr. Khare pointed out that by the time Tripathi was appointed Executive officer he had already served as a secretary for over two years and therefore the age limit did not apply to him. On the other hand, it is contended both by learned counsel for the Board and the State that Tripathi did not possess the alternative qualification as he had not served the Board as a permanent secretary, but had only been permitted by the Government to function in that capacity till a duly qualified person was appointed to that post. Learned Counsel for the respondents contended that the words "has previously served as ..............secretary" means service as a permanent official and not under a temporary arrangement as in the appellant's case. It is not necessary for us to decide whether these words refer to service by a permanent secretary or includes service under a temporary arrangement as in the petitioner's case. I am of the opinion that two views are possible as regards the meaning of the words "has previously served as secretary," and it was open to Government to take the view which they did. In any case I do not think that Government's view calls for any interference by this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. 10. Learned counsel next argued that the resolution dispensing with Tripathi's services as Executive Officer is invalid as it violates the provisions of R. 6 (printed on page 447 of the Municipal Manual). This rule provides as follows: "6. No executive officer shall be discharged from the service of the board - (a) except by a special resolution of the board setting forth clearly the grounds for discharge and supported by not less than two-thirds of the members constituting the board; and (b) unless he has been given by the board not less than three months' notice or a sum equal to three months' pay in lieu of notice." 11. Learned counsel pointed out that at the meeting at which the resolution was passed fifteen members were present, eight voting for and seven against the resolution. It was therefore not supported by two-thirds of the members constituting the board and is for that reason void. 12. This argument raises a question as to the legal effect of R. 6. It is common ground that the rule was made by the Government in the exercise of their rule making power under Sec. 296 of the U.P. Municipalities Act. That section provides as follows: "296. Obligation and power of State Government to make rules. (1) The State Government shall make rules consistent with this Act in respect of the matters described in Secs. 95, 127, 195 and 235. (2) The State Government may make rules consistent with this Act - (a) providing for any matter for which power to make provision is conferred, expressly or by implication, on the State Government by this or any other enactment in force at the commencement of this Act, and (b) generally for the guidance of a board or any Government officer in any matter connected with the carrying out of the provisions of this or any other enactment relating to Municipalities; (c) for the appointment of an ad hoc committee to advise the board on the preparation of master plan for the Municipality and its execution; and (d) providing for the layout of public streets, residential and non-residential areas." 13. It is clear that this rule has not been made under Sub-Sec. (1) as it does not deal with any matter described in Secs. 95, 123, 153 and 235 of the Act. It must have therefore been made under Sub-Sec. (2). The question is under which clause of that sub-Sec.? It is not Cl. (a) which empowers the State Government to make rules about any matter for which power to make provision is conferred, expressly or by implication by the Municipalities Act or by any other law. Learned counsel was asked to point out the sections of the Act which empowered the Government to make rules. He relied on Secs. 57, 58 and 71. I have however examined those sections and am satisfied that they confer no power on Government to make rules regarding matters dealt with in them. The rule obviously could not have been made either under Cl. He relied on Secs. 57, 58 and 71. I have however examined those sections and am satisfied that they confer no power on Government to make rules regarding matters dealt with in them. The rule obviously could not have been made either under Cl. (c) or (d) for the former relates to the appointment of an ad hoc committee for a specified purpose and the latter empowers Government to make rules providing for the lay out of public streets and areas. It has therefore been made under Cl. (b) which empowers the Government to make rules generally for the guidance of a board for carrying out the provisions of the U.P. Municipalities Act, or any other law governing the Municipalities. But a rule made under Cl. (b) of sub-Sec. (2) of Sec. 296 is "for the guidance of the Municipal Board," and does not confer any legal right on any person to compel its enforcement. If the Board does not follow a rule made under Cl. (b) this will be a matter between Itself and the Government. The latter may put pressure on the Board and insist on the observance of the rule or even take action against it, if this can be done under the powers conferred by the Act. But in my opinion, the rule is only "for the guidance of the Board" and confers no statutory right on any person to enable him to seek redress from this Court under Article 226. In Harnath Chaturvedi v. President, Municipal Board, Mainpuri, Writ petition no. 1187 of 1957 decided on 7-11-1958 precisely this question was considered. The petitioner in that case relied upon the rule fixing the age limit of 32 years to impugne the selection of a rival candidate to the office of the Executive Officer. He contended that the appointment was in contravention of the rule framed by Government. It was held by me that the rule was made under Sec. 296 (a) (b) and was for the guidance of the Board and is not mandatory in the sense that any appointment made in violation of it would render the appointment void altogether. In that case learned counsel conceded in the end that the rule could not have been made under Sub-Cl. (1) of Sec. 296. In that case learned counsel conceded in the end that the rule could not have been made under Sub-Cl. (1) of Sec. 296. However, I have considered the question afresh, and after an examination of the question and the other provisions of the Municipalities Act, am again of the opinion that the rules printed on pages 446 and 447 of the Municipal Manual were made under Sec. 296 (2) (b) of the U.P. Municipalities Act, and are "for the guidance of the Municipal Board." They are not mandatory in the sense that any particular action of the Board taken without complying with them is void and of no effect in law. 14. Thus the Rules relied upon by the petitioner did not confer upon him the right to have his appointment confirmed by the State Government nor do they invalidate the decision of the Board to dispense with his services which the Board considered as temporary. There is no allegation that the action of the State Government or of the Board was mala fide or that there has been any discrimination in his case in the interpretation or application of the rules made for the guidance of the Board. 15. It was next contended that the resolution of the Board terminating the services of Tripathi was passed at a meeting not properly convened, and is therefore void. It was also submitted that the resolution not having been supported by two thirds of the members of the Board is of no effect. Both these arguments can be taken together. Tripathi's appointment as a permanent Executive Officer was vetoed by the Government which, however, was pleased to "approve (his) appointment as temporary Executive Officer for such time as the Board is not able to get the services of a fully qualified hand (annexure `A' of the petitioner's affidavit). It is thus clear that Tripathi's appointment was to terminate automatically on the appointment of another person as permanent Executive Officer. We were informed by Mr. A. P. Pandey, learned counsel for the Board, that a permanent appointment was in fact made in March 1958. For that appointment Tripathi was no longer Executive Officer of the Board and no resolution of the Board was required to terminate his appointment. It is therefore not necessary for us to consider the validity of the resolution formally purporting to terminate his services. 16. For that appointment Tripathi was no longer Executive Officer of the Board and no resolution of the Board was required to terminate his appointment. It is therefore not necessary for us to consider the validity of the resolution formally purporting to terminate his services. 16. Lastly, learned counsel contended that the resolution terminating Tripathi's appointment was passed in December 1957 whereas the permanent Executive Officer was selected in March 1958. He therefore submitted that Tripathi is entitled to the quashing of the resolution as it may enable him to claim salary for the period between December and the following March. We do not think that this fact would justify our interference under Article 226. At best, Tripathi may be entitled to claim his salary for the period between December 1957 and March 1958. He can enforce his claim in the civil court if so advised. But he no longer has any right to the post which was meant to endure till the appointment of a permanent Executive Officer only. In these circumstances, I would dismiss the appeal, but direct the parties to bear their own costs throughout. 17. By the Court - This appeal is dismissed but there will be no order as to costs.