JUDGMENT SHIVDAYAL, J. 1. This is plaintiff's second appeal arising out of a suit for the recovery of Rs. 698/8. The trial Judge passed a decree in favour of the plaintiff for Rs. 544/8/- and interest at annas four per cent per month on Rs. 398/8/-. The plaintiff took an appeal claiming a decree for the claim disallowed. The respondent filed cross-objections. The learned Additional District Judge, Gwalior, dismissed the plaintiff's appeal and, allowing the cross-objections, dismissed the plaintiff's suit as barred by time. 2. A preliminary objection is raised by Shri Raghunandan Swarup that a second appeal does not lie because, being a money suit, it was cognizable by Small Cause Court and the value of the suit as also of the appeal is less than Rs. 1,000. I find that the suit was instituted on April 21, 1954. The value of the suit exceeded Rs. 500. Section 102, C.P.C., as it stood on the date of the institution of the suit, was no bar to a second appeal to this Court. It is true that by a subsequent amendment of that section for the words "Rs. 500" the words "Rs. 1,000" were substituted, but this amendment cam into effect on January 1, 1957. This amendment obviously could not take away the vested rights which had accrued to the parties on the date of the institution of the suit. 3. Shri Raghunandan Swarup relied on the decision in Abir Chand Vs. Chhogalal (1956 MBLJ 253). That case is not at all in point here. There it is held that under section 102. C. P. C., it is the nature of the suit and not the Court in which it is tried that determines the right of appeal and that the words "any suit of the nature cognizable by a Court of Small Causes" mean any suit relating to a subject-matter in respect of which the Court of Small Causes would have jurisdiction if the claim was within the pecuniary limits of its jurisdiction. Here the question is quite different. It is to be seen precisely whether the amendment of section 102 takes away the right of second, appeal in a suit instituted prior to January 1, 1957. In my opinion, the preliminary objection must be overruled. 4. Here the question is quite different. It is to be seen precisely whether the amendment of section 102 takes away the right of second, appeal in a suit instituted prior to January 1, 1957. In my opinion, the preliminary objection must be overruled. 4. Regarding the question of limitation the short facts are that the bond on which the suit was based was dated October 28, 1948. Promise to repay the loan was within six months. Thus the money became payable on April 28, 1949. Thereafter, on April 25. 1952 as alleged by the plaintiff the defendant acknowledged the debt. This suit was instituted an April 21, 1955. The transaction took place in the territories of the farmer Gwalior State where the Gwalior State Limitation Act was in force and which provided six years period of limitation for a suit for money lent. When Madhya Bharat was formed, the Indian Limitation Act was adapted, and brought into force on July 16, 1949. In that Act it was provided in section 4 (2) that any suit, for which the period of limitation prescribed by the Indian Limitation Act was shorter than the period of limitation prescribed by the Gwalior State Limitation Act, could be instituted within the period of two years next after the coming into force of the Indian Limitation Act. This provision: was construed by the learned Additional District Judge, as has been pressed before me also, so as to put a dead line on the expiry of two years. In other words, all suits ought to have been instituted by July 16, 1951 and since the acknowledgment was made on April 25, 952, it was an acknowledgment of a time-barred debt Shri Raghunandan Swarup relied on 1953 MBLJ 754 in support of his contention that the debt became a time-barred debt on July 17, 1952. 5. In my opinion, this suit is clearly within time and the judgment of the first appellate Court is based on misconception and misconstruction of section 4 (2) which runs thus:- It is patent enough that two years time was allowed by that section only for those suits for which the period of limitation prescribed by the Indian Limitation Act was shorter than that prescribed in the Gwalior State Limitation Act and, further, the period of limitation prescribed in the Indian. Limitation Act was to expire before July 16, 1951. Limitation Act was to expire before July 16, 1951. This clearly means that in a case where the period of limitation even according to Indian Limitation Act was not going to expire before July 16, 1951, section 4(2) had no application whatever and the plaintiff could avail of the article of the Indian Limitation Act. In this case, the period of limitation started to run on April 28, 1949. Since according to the Indian Limitation Act, the suit could be instituted up to April 28, 1952, section 4 (2) of the Madhya Bharat Adaptation Act did not apply and the suit did not become barred by time on July 16, 1951. It follows that if on April 25, 1952, the debt was not a. time-barred debt and the acknowledgment of that debt gave a fresh start of limitation, computing limitation from April 25, 1952, this suit was clearly within, time on April 21, 1965. 6. In Mishrilal Vs. Mishrilal (1953 SCR 754) relied on by the learned counsel for the respondent it was not laid down that irrespective of whether a suit could be instituted after July 16, 1951 by application of the Indian Limitation Act, every cause of action became barred on the said date because of section 4 (2) of the Adaptation Act. This interpretation of the decision suggested by the learned counsel will be doing violence to it. In the fear of clear language of section 4 (2) that could never be the decision of the Madhya Bharat High Court. 7. This appeal is allowed with costs. The judgment and decree passed by the first appellate Court are set aside. The case shall now go back to it for disposal according to law. Appeal allowed