ORDER :- This is an application for the issue of a writ of certiorari or writ of a like nature quashing and setting aside the order of the Sub-Divisional Officer, Ukhrul dated 9-1-55 in Miscellaneous Case No. 225 of 1954-55, by which he directed the petitioners and others to vacate the land in their occupation in Ashang Khullen village. 2. The facts of the case are seen from Annexure-"F", the order of the Deputy Commissioner of Manipur, dated 11-3-58, by which he dismissed the appeal of the petitioners against the said order of the Sub-Divisional Officer, Ukhrul. The petitioners and other Tangkhuls were originally residents of the village of Ashang Khullen. They left the village in or about 1920 and it was then occupied by the Kukis belonging to the tribe of Ngulkhosie. In 1935, the Tangkhuls belonging to the tribe of the petitioner attempted to re-inhabit the village. There was litigation between the two parties and the petitioners and their tribe failed to get a verdict in their favour from the Sub-Divisional Officer, the Political Agent or the Minister in charge of Hill Administration. Then in 1954, there was an agreement between Ngulkhosie, the Kuki Chief and the first petitioner, Phungpohung Khullakpa of the Tangkhuls by which it was decided that the Tangkhuls will live in the village as the subjects of Nqulkhosie (Annexure-"A" dated 30-5-54). Then Ngulkhosie and Phungopohung Khullakapa made a joint application on 13-8-54 in Miscellaneous Case No. 81 of 1954-55 to the S. D. O., Ukhrul, for the registration of the said agreement. In that application it was stated that Phungpohung Khullakpa and the 10 families of Tangkhuls belonging to his tribe will be allowed to live in the village and that no Tangkhuls other than the said 110 families will be allowed to settle in the village and that the families of the Kukis and Tangkhuls will be the subjects of Ngulkhosie, the Kuki Chief. It was also provided that the Tangkhuls should render at least one Khutlang per family to the Kuki Chief every year. A report was submitted accordingly by Kashim Lambu on 28-8-54 (Annexure-"2"). It is not known under what provision of law the registration of such an agreement between the two Chiefs was at all necessary. 3. It was also provided that the Tangkhuls should render at least one Khutlang per family to the Kuki Chief every year. A report was submitted accordingly by Kashim Lambu on 28-8-54 (Annexure-"2"). It is not known under what provision of law the registration of such an agreement between the two Chiefs was at all necessary. 3. It would appear that earlier on 24-10-53, one K. Ngaphaikhui Lambu had sent a report to the S. D. O. that on checking the number of houses for census purposes in Ashang Khullen he had found 9 houses of Tangkhuls from the village of Kharnlang settling in the land of the Kuki Chief Ngulkhosie in Ashang Khullen and that Ngulkhosie, the owner of the land objected to the Tangkhuls coming under his patta land and he requested the Government to let them settle in some other land. On 26-10-53, the same Lambu submitted another report to the same effect. On these reports Miscellaneous Case No. 225 of 1954-55 was started by the S. D. O., Ukhrul. 4. It would appear that Atkhyam, the eldest son of Ngulknoise objected to the registration of the agreement between his father and Phungpohung. The S. D. O. found that the permission of the Government had not been obtained for the agreement as required under standing orders. We do not know which standing orders necessitated the permission of the Government for such an agreement. Any way on 8-1-55, the S. D. O. dismissed the application for registration in Miscellaneous Case No. 81 of 1954-55 (Annexure-"C"). On 9-1-55, he passed another order in Miscellaneous Case No. 225 of 1954-55 stating that Phung-pohung and the other Tangkhuls had settled in the land of Ashang Khullen without permission and he ordered them to move back to Khamlang within 3 months time failing which he stated that they would be criminally prosecuted. It is against the latter order that this writ petition has been filed. 5. The petitioners first attempted to get relief against the said order by filing an appeal to the District Court. But the learned District Judge dismissed the appeal stating that the order of the S. D. O. was not passed in any civil case. Then, they filed an appeal before the Deputy Commissioner who dismissed it observing that he had no jurisdiction to entertain the said appeal. But the learned District Judge dismissed the appeal stating that the order of the S. D. O. was not passed in any civil case. Then, they filed an appeal before the Deputy Commissioner who dismissed it observing that he had no jurisdiction to entertain the said appeal. It may be mentioned here that under the Manipur State Hill Peoples Regulation, 1947 disputes regarding the settlement of a village or involving village boundaries have to be enquired into by what is known as a Circle Bench and the Bench has to submit a report with its recommendation to the S. D. O. who had then to pass orders thereon. An appeal would lie from such an order of the S. D.O. to the Hill Bench. The Hill Bench under the Regulation consisted of a Judge of the Chief Court as Chairman sitting with two Hill-men as Judges. Such a Hill Bench ceased to exist when the Chief Court under the Manipur State (Courts) Act, 1947 ceased to exist on the integration of Manipur with the Indian Union. The order of the Chief Commissioner consisting the Deputy Commissioner as the Hill Bench on the abolition of the Chief Court was declared to be ultra vires by this Court. It was for this reason that the Deputy Commissioner held that he had no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal. Thus, the petitioners, finding no remedy in appeal have come to this Court by way of this writ petition for redress. 6. It was pointed out that the order of the S. D. O. dated 9-1-55 had to be treated as a quasi-judicial order as it purported to take away the rights of the petitioners to hold the property by virtue of the agreement which they had entered into with the Chief of the Kukis of Ashang Khullen and that the said order infringed the fundamental right guaranteed to the petitioners under Art. 19(f) of the Constitution, that the S. D. O., Ukhrul acted beyond jurisdiction in ordering the petitioners to vacate from the private land of Ashang Khullen which they had a legal right to enjoy and that such an order was against all principles of natural justice and that therefore a writ should issue quashing the said order. 7. 7. On behalf of the respondent no written counter statement was filed and it was stated that there being no dispute regarding the facts and the matter involved being a pure question of law as to the right of the S. D. O. to issue such an order under the Manipur State Hill Peoples Regulation, 1947, it was not necessary to file a formal counter statement. 8. Before we proceed to discuss the question of law let us be clear about the admitted facts. Ashang Khullen was originally in the occupation of the petitioners. It was vacated by them when they moved to the village of Khamlang in 1920 or so and the Kuki tribe under their Chief Ngulkhosie occupied Ashang Khullen. The petitioners attempt to return to Ashang Khullen was under dispute from 1935 between the tribe of Kukis and this tribe of Tangkhuls and the right of the Kukis was upheld by the Executive administration. Thus, Ashang Khullen village was recognised as the private land of the Kuki tribe under the Chief Ngulkhosie. It was under these circumstances that there was an agreement between Ngulkhosie representing the Kuki tribe on the one hand and Phungpohung Khullakpa representing the Tangkhuls on the other on 30-5-54 by which Ngulkhosie recognised the right of the ten families of Tangkhuls to remain as his subjects in Ashang Khullen. By virtue of that agreement that petitioners have been in occupation of the land in Ashang Khullen. It was when they were in such possession that on the report of a Lambu, the S. D. O. passed the order on 9-1-55 stating that the settlement of the petitioners in Ashang Khullen was without permission and that they should move back to Khamlang within 3 months, failing which they would be criminally prosecuted. 9. The order of the S. D. O. does not show under what provision of law he made it. A reading of the Sections 60 to 64 of the Manipur State Hill Peoples Regulation, 1947 which deal with cases regarding land and village settlement would show that the said order cannot come under Sections 60 to 62. Section 60 deals with a case where any dispute arose regarding the ownership of a land or right of cultivation over a land. There appears to have been no such dispute in the present case. Section 60 deals with a case where any dispute arose regarding the ownership of a land or right of cultivation over a land. There appears to have been no such dispute in the present case. On the other hand there was an agreement between the two tribes represented by their Chiefs. The S. D. O. took action on the reports of a Lambu dated 24-10-53 and 26-10-53. But ande agreement dated 30-5-54 being subsequent to the said report, we have to take it that there was no such dispute, though when an attempt was made for the registration of the said agreement the son of Ngulkhosie appears to have raised some dispute before the S. D. O. Thus, there was no scope for the S. D. O. to proceed under Section 60. Even if Section 60 would apply, the S. D. O. has no right to take original action. It was for the Village Authority to take action and try to effect a compromise and if no compromise was possible the Village Authority has to place the dispute before the Circle Bench which has to decide the case and the S. D. O. is only the appellate authority over the order of the Circle Bench. Thus, the order in dispute cannot be said to have passed under Sections 60 and 61 of the Regulation. 10. Nor can it be under Section 62. That Section deals with a dispute regarding the settlement of a village or involving village boundary. In the case of such dispute, the village authority has to place the matter before the Circle Bench and the Circle Bench has to enquire into the case and submit a report with their recommendation to the S. D. O. who has to pass orders on such recommendation. Thus this case did not come under Section 62. 11. The only other provision in the regulation is Section 64 which states that no new settlement nor the formation of any Machet shall be permitted without the authority in writing of the S. D. O. It is clear that Section 64 will apply only if any tribe wants to settle or to form a Machet in Government land. It will not apply where a settlement or formation of Machet is attempted or achieved in private land by an agreement between two tribes. It will not apply where a settlement or formation of Machet is attempted or achieved in private land by an agreement between two tribes. Admittedly, Ashang Khullen has been held to be the private land of the Kuki tribe under the Chief Ngulkhosie. It has been so specifically stated in the writ petition and it has not been controverted by the respondent. It cannot be said that where the owner of a private land allows another person or tribe to settle in his land, the S. D. O. will have any voice in the matter under Section 64. If he attempts to interfere with the right of a person to acquire, hold or dispose of property, it will be a clear infringement of Article 19(f) of the Constitution. The Chief of the Kukis has every right to dispose of his property and the Tangkhuls have equal right to hold the property which they got by agreement with the Chief of the Kukis. The Tangkhuls therefore cannot be asked by the S. D. O. to vacate such property and to go back to their village Khamlang on threat of criminal prosecution. I cannot understand under what provision of criminal law any prosecution can be launched by the S. D. O. against the petitioners. If any dispute over such land arose between the Chief of the two tribes over the agreement they have entered into, it hag to be decided in a civil Court. It is clear therefore that the order passed by the S. D. O. is without any kind of jurisdiction and is a clear infringement of Article 19(f) of the Constitution. 12. What was argued by the learned Government Advocate was that the S. D. O. passed the order in his capacity as a Revenue Officer and that it was a pure administrative order and not a quasi-judicial order and that a reading of Sections 60 to 64 of the Hill Peoples Regulation will show that all orders passed thereunder are purely administrative orders as opposed to the determination of civil rights of the parties which, according to him, are dealt with in Chapter IV(c) of the Regulation. He therefore argued that this Court should not interfere under Article 226 of the Constitution against a purely administrative order. He therefore argued that this Court should not interfere under Article 226 of the Constitution against a purely administrative order. In that connection the decisions "Province of Bombay v. Khushaldas S. Advani, AIR 1950 SC 222 , and Glaxo Laboratories (India) Private Ltd. v. A.V. Venkateswaran, AIR 1959 Bom 372 , were cited before me. I have perused the two decisions and I am satisfied that they do not help the respondent in contending that the order passed in this case is a purely administrative order. What is laid down in those decisions is that there must be a body of persons who must have legal authority to determine a question, and the question which they have determined must affect the rights of subjects and there must be a duty imposed on the body of persons to act judicially in order to make the order passed by the said body of persons a quasi-judicial order. The above tests laid down do not cover a case where a tribunal acts entirely without jurisdiction in contravention of all powers given to it and passes an order affecting the rights of parties. I have pointed out that under Sections 60 to 64 of the Hill Peoples Regulation, the S. D. O. had no right at all to pass an order of the Kind complained against where there was no dispute at all between the parties, on the report of a Lambu. Of course, if where there was a dispute between the two parties regarding settlement or boundary or ownership of land, Sections 60 to 62 of the Hill Peoples Regulation provide for decisions in such disputes. There was no such dispute at all in the present case. Thus, the result is that the S. D. O., Ukhrul arrogated to himself a jurisdiction which he did not possess and passed an order affecting the legal rights of the petitioners to hold the property which was in their possession and thereby infringed the fundamental rights of the petitioners under Article 19(I). In respect of such an order the respondent cannot take shelter under the cloak that it was a purely administrative order. Even if it was an administrative order it can only be passed within jurisdiction. In respect of such an order the respondent cannot take shelter under the cloak that it was a purely administrative order. Even if it was an administrative order it can only be passed within jurisdiction. In such a case even if a writ of certiorari quashing the order cannot be passed, a writ of mandamus can be issued by a High Court compelling the Authority to act in accordance with law. I have pointed out that the order of the S. D. O. was one clearly passed in contravention of law. It goes without saying that there was a clear duty on the S. D. O., Ukhrul under Article 31 of the Constitution of India to see that no person was deprived of big property save by authority of law. He cannot therefore deprive the petitioners of their property which, they were in possession of by virtue of the agreement entered into with Ngulkhosie, Chief of the Kukis except by authority of some power vested in him. Where he passes an order against Articles 19(f) and 31 of the Constitution, the High Court can certainly interfere and quash his order and direct him to act in accordance with law. 13. Even granting that this is an order passed by the S. D. O., Ukhrul, under Section 64 of the Hill Peoples Regulation, it will be seen that under that Section a party aggrieved by the order of such an authority has a right of appeal to the Member in charge of Hill Administration for redress under the said Regulation. There is no longer a. Member in charge of Hill Administration to whom the party could appeal against the order of the S. D. O. Where therefore a Section in a statute provides for right of appeal, which right of appeal ceases to exist by virtue of certain changes in the administrative set up., thereby depriving the aggrieved party of the right of appeal and making the order of the S. D. O. final, it would mean that the right of the S. D. O. to give a decision in such a case itself ceases to exist as otherwise valuable rights of parties are likely to be affected. 14. 14. For all these reasons, this is a fit case where a writ of mandamus should issue quashing the order of the S. D. O. dated 9-1-55 and directing him to act ill accordance with law. The petition is, therefore, allowed and the order dated 9-1-55 of the S. D. O., Ukhrul is set aside. The respondent will pay the costs of the petitioners. Advocates fee Rs. 100/-. Petition allowed.