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Madras High Court · body

1960 DIGILAW 191 (MAD)

Parasatti Ammal v. Kuppuswami Iyengar, Proprietor of Sivaji Touring Talkies

1960-07-14

RAJAGOPALAN

body1960
Order.- The first respondent obtained a lease of S. No. 324/4 in Kummangalam village, and he applied to the Collector of Chingleput for the issue of a “No-objection Certificate” to locate a touring cinema in that plot. That ,was granted on 21st October, 1959. He followed it up by applying for a C-Licence for the cinema located in that site. The C-Licence was granted on 16th January, 1960, overruling the objections of the petitioner. The petitioner’s lands adjoined S.No. 324/4 on three sides. It is enough to note that one of those fields was S. No. 324/1, which belonged to the petitioner and which lay to the west of S. No. 324/4. The petitioner applied under Article 226 of the Constitution for the issue of a writ of certiorari to set aside the order of the Collector dated 16th January, 1960 under which a C-Licence was granted to the first respondent. The contention of the petitioner was that the grant of the C-Licence to the first respondent for the touring cinema in S. No. 324/4 contravened the provisions of rule 101 (1) of the Rules framed under Madras Act IX of 1955. Rule 101 (1) runs “The building shall be provided on all its sides with an open space, which in no part thereof shall be less than 20 yards in width. "Note :- The open space of 20 yards may comprise not only of the land of the licensee within the fence, but also the open space outside the fence, if any, whether it belongs to the licensee or not provided that it is open for the public to use the land without obstruction." The factual position has been set out in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the Government. There, it was pointed out that, at the south-western corner, the shed that the first respondent constructed to house the cinema was only 37 feet from S. No. 324/1. At the time of the grant of the "No-objection Certificate," S. No. 324/1 was vacant land. There, it was pointed out that, at the south-western corner, the shed that the first respondent constructed to house the cinema was only 37 feet from S. No. 324/1. At the time of the grant of the "No-objection Certificate," S. No. 324/1 was vacant land. Subsequent to the grant of the "No-objection Certificate" and, apparently, at some point of time before the C-Licence was granted, the petitioner planted some casuarina seedlings, encroaching 20 feet into S. No-324/4 with the result that, at the south-eastern corner, there was only 17 feet of clear ground between the cinema shed and the casuarina posts and casuarna seedlings which the petitioner had planted, partly in S. No. 324/1, and partly in S. No. 324/4. It is with reference to these facts that I have got to decide whether the grant of C-Licence contravened the requirements of rule 101 (1). Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that it was clear that, on the date when the C-Licence was granted, even ignoring the encroachment made by the petitioner in S. No. 324/4 there was only 37 feet of vacant land available in S. No. 324/4. The further submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner was that S. No. 324/1 belonged to the petitioner, which the public had no right to use, and that the petitioner had all along been objecting to any use of her land by the public. The acceptance of the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner requires some words being read into the Note appended to rule 101 (1). Learned counsel requires me to read it " Provided that it is open for the public to use as of right the land without obstruction." Considering the scheme of rule 101 (1) and also the object underlying that rule, I see no justification for reading those extra words into the statutory rule. The requirement of vacant space of 20 yards all around a cinema is a measure of safety in times of emergency like fire. The rule itself contemplates that the vacant land may belong to the licensee or to others. In a time of emergency like that, no question of right to use either the land of the licensee or the adjacent land belonging to others was apparently contemplated or provided for in the rules. The rule itself contemplates that the vacant land may belong to the licensee or to others. In a time of emergency like that, no question of right to use either the land of the licensee or the adjacent land belonging to others was apparently contemplated or provided for in the rules. The requirement of the rule would be satisfied if actually the land around the shed was vacant, so that, if necessity arose, people could escape into that vacant land from the shed without any real obstruction. If, for instance, there had been a building within 60 feet of a shed, obviously, that would prove an obstruction which would prevent the public or any member of the public from using the land, quite independent of any question of a right to use that. It is under these circumstances I am unable to read into the note the further words "as of right", qualifying the words "used by the public." As far as this case is concerned, the position was that, on the date when "No objection Certificate" was granted, there was vacant land all around S. No. 324/4 exceeding 20 yards, though part of it lay also in S. No. 324/1, which did not belong to the licensee. Even at the time of the grant of the G-Licence, what the petitioner did, did not make it any the less effectively available for use as vacant land without any obstruction. The Collector was therefore justified in coming to the conclusion that the requirements of rule 101 (1) were not violated by the conditions prevailing at the time when even the C-Licence was granted. Besides, it should be remembered that it is substantial compliance of the rules that is necessary. The rule nisi is discharged, and the petition is dismissed. R.M. ------------- Petition dismissed.