Order.- By G.O. Ms. No. 687, Department of Industries, Labour and Cooperation, dated 17th February, 1958, the Government of Madras referred for adjudication by the Labour Court, Coimbatore, an industrial dispute between the workers and management of the Radhakrishna Mills Ltd., in regard to the question whether the dismissal of one Subbian was justified, and to what relief he was entitled. The facts that led to the reference were these. At about 8 a.m. on 14th August, 1955, Venkatapathy, the Assistant Welfare Officer of the Radhakrishna Mills Ltd., was waylaid, belaboured, and a number of injuries were inflicted on him by lethal weapons. The injured man was immediately taken to the hospital, where he gave a dying declaration. In the dying declaration he mentioned that Subbian was one of the persons who had assaulted him. Venkatapathy, however, got well, though it is stated that some time afterwards he was murdered by some other person. Subbian was arrested on 14th August, 1955. In due course, the police charged him under section 324 read with section 148, Indian Penal Code, and the case was taken on file as C.C. No. 280 of 1955, by the Additional First Class Magistrate, Coimbatore. The Magistrate found him guilty of the offence charged, and sentenced him to three months rigorous imprisonment. That was on 31st October, 1955. There was an appeal against the conviction to the Sessions Judge, Coimbatore, in C.A. No. 14 of 1956. The learned Sessions Judge, by his judgment, dated 25th February, 1956, held that the charges against Subbian were not proved, and acquitted him. In the meanwhile, that is on 19th September, 1955, the management issued a notice to Subbian, charging him with the misconduct above said, and directing him to show cause why disciplinary action should not be taken against him. Subbian was also suspended pending enquiry. The enquiry followed. On the 26th of January, 1955, the management came to the conclusion that Subbian was guilty of the offence of assaulting an Officer of the mill, and that he was no longer fit to continue in service. No action, however, was taken by the management in pursuance of the finding, as an industrial dispute, I.D. No. 13 of 1952, was then pending before the Industrial Tribunal. No action, however, was taken by the management in pursuance of the finding, as an industrial dispute, I.D. No. 13 of 1952, was then pending before the Industrial Tribunal. Under section 33 of the Industrial Disputes Act then in force, it was not open to the management by themselves to take any disciplinary action against the worker during the pendency of the proceedings before a Tribunal. The management, therefore, stated that they would apply to the Industrial Tribunal for permission to affect the dismissal of the worker. On the 10th of February, 1956, the management applied to the Industrial Tribunal for permission to dismiss Subbian. That application did not come up for disposal before the Tribunal during the pendency of the Industrial Dispute. An award was passed in I.D. No. 13 of 1952 on the 25th of July, 1957. No orders however, were passed on the application under section 33 filed by the management. The result was that the ban imposed by section 33 was removed by the the termination of the industrial dispute in I.D. No. 13 of 1952 in July, 1957. In September, 1957, the management issued an order, dismissing Subbian from service. An industrial dispute arose as a result of such dismissal, and the same was referred to the Labour Court, Coimbatore, for adjudication, as stated above. The Labour Court considered afresh the question whether Subbian was guilty of the offences charged, and came to the conclusion that he was not guilty of the same. The Court also held that the management had acted mala fide, and victimised Subbian in awarding the punishment. But, having regard to the strained relationship between the parties, the Court held that it was not a case for reinstatement of the worker, and permitted the management to discharge the worker by paying of his gratuity, the other discharge benefits to which he was entitled by reason of the services he had put in, and the back wages during the period of suspension. The validity of this award is questioned in the petition on behalf of the management. The worker does not complain against the refusal of the Labour Court to direct his reinstatement. Mr. Narayanaswami, the learned counsel for the management, contended that the Labour Court was in error in adjudicating upon the question whether factually Subbian was guilty of the offences charged against him. The worker does not complain against the refusal of the Labour Court to direct his reinstatement. Mr. Narayanaswami, the learned counsel for the management, contended that the Labour Court was in error in adjudicating upon the question whether factually Subbian was guilty of the offences charged against him. According to the learned counsel, the Additional First Class Magistrate, Coimbatore, had found the worker guilty of the offence as early as December, 1955, and when the Management made its own enquiry and came to a conclusion which was consistent with that arrived at by the Additional First Class Magistrate in C.C. No. 280 of 1955, it could not be said that the management acted mala fide for even erred. Reliance was placed, in support of this contention, on the decision in Balipara Tea Estate v. Its Workmen1, where the Supreme Court held that an Industrial Tribunal, while adjudicating on an industrial dispute relating to dismissal of a workman for misconduct, would have no power to decide for itself whether the charge framed against the workman had been established to its satisfaction, and that the Court had only to be satisfied that the management was justified in coming to the conclusion (in a bona fide and proper domestic en-enquiry) that the charge against the workman was well founded. At page 249, Sinha,J. (as he then was) observed:- “It has been contended on behalf of the appellant, and in our opinion, rightly, that the Tribunal has misdirected itself in so far as it has judged the case against the workman concerned afresh on its merits as if it were a trial for a criminal offence for the falsification of accounts and misappropriation of funds and that in so doing, the Tribunal was not only sitting as a Court of appeal on the order of dismissal passed by the management, even though it did not find any mala fides or want of good faith or any irregularity in the proceedings taken by the management against the workman concerned, but it had also laid down a wrong line of approach to the case. The Tribunal misdirected itself in so far as it insisted upon conclusive proof of guilt to be adduced by the management in the inquiry before it. The Tribunal misdirected itself in so far as it insisted upon conclusive proof of guilt to be adduced by the management in the inquiry before it. It is well-settled that a Tribunal has to find only whether there was justification for the management to dismiss an employee and whether a case of misconduct had been made out at the inquiry held by it.” There can be no doubt that the contention of the learned counsel is well-founded, and that the Labour Court had no jurisdiction in the instant case to decide itself whether Subbian was or was not guilty of the offences charged and on the basis of such a finding set aside the dismissal directed by the employer. But this does not, however, dispose of the matter. In the judgment, of the Supreme Court referred to above it was observed that if there had been a finding by the Tribunal that the mangement had been actuated by any sinister motives, or had indulged in unfair labour practice, or that the workman had been victimised for any activities of his in connection with the trade union, the Tribunal might have had reasons to be critical of the inquiry held by the management. This is what the Laour Court found in the present case. The Court expressly found that the management was actuated by improper motives when it came to the conclusion in the enquiry conducted by it that Subbian was guilty of the offences charged and in awarding the punishment therefor. The Labour Court further held that Subbian was singled out by virtue of the position he occupied among the labourers for victimisation. This conclusion is fortified by the circumstances to which I shall presently refer. As stated already, the management did not pass any orders for discharge on 26th January, 1956, when it concluded the enquiry. It may be that it could not pass such order of discharge on account of pendency of I.D. No. 13 of 1952. On 25th February, 1956, the Sessions Judge, on an elaborate consideration of the evidence, had acquitted Subbian of the offences charged. It was nearly one year and six months after the acquittal by the Sessions Judge that the management resurrected the disciplinary proceedings initiated against Subbian, and passed the order of dismissal. On 25th February, 1956, the Sessions Judge, on an elaborate consideration of the evidence, had acquitted Subbian of the offences charged. It was nearly one year and six months after the acquittal by the Sessions Judge that the management resurrected the disciplinary proceedings initiated against Subbian, and passed the order of dismissal. It does not appear that the management ever paid any regard to the finding arrived at by the Sessions Court. It is needless to say that the action of the management in dismissing Subbian even after his acquittal by the criminal Court was anything but mala fide. In Jerone D’Silva v. Regional Transport Authority2, a Bench of this Court held that a quasi-judicial Tribunal could not ignore the findings and orders of competent criminal Courts in respect of an offence when the Tribunal proceeded to take any action on the basis of the commission of that offence, and that, as primarily the criminal Courts of the land were entrusted with the enquiry into offences, it was desirable that the findings and orders of the criminal Courts should be treated as conclusive in proceedings before quasi-judicial Tribunals. In my opinion, that rule would apply to domestic Tribunals, like the present one where the employer was taking disciplinary action against his employee. The learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the decision of the Supreme Court in The Delhi Cloth &38; General Mills Ltd. v. Kushal Bhan1, was to the contrary effect. I do not agree. That was a case, where criminal proceedings were pending against an employee. In the meanwhile, the employer initiated disciplinary proceedings against the former. The employee did not produce any defence, as, in his opinion, that was likely to prejudice him in the decision of the criminal case. He did not even answer the questions put to him during the course of the enquiry by the employer. The latter completed the enquiry, and directed the dismissal of the employee, on the ground that the misconduct alleged against him had been proved. An application was filed under section 33 (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act by the employer to the Tribunal for approval of the action taken against the employee. By the time the matter came up before the Tribunal the employee was acquitted by the criminal Court. An application was filed under section 33 (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act by the employer to the Tribunal for approval of the action taken against the employee. By the time the matter came up before the Tribunal the employee was acquitted by the criminal Court. It was contended that the action taken by the employer was vitiated, in that the employer had not waited till the trial in the criminal Court was over, and that principles of natural justice required that the employer should at least wait for the decision of the criminal Court before taking disciplinary action. The Supreme Court negatived the contentions and observed: “It is true that very often employers stay enquiries pending the decision of the criminal trial Courts and that is fair ; but we cannot say that principles of natural justice require that an employer must wait for the decision at least of the criminal trial Court before taking action against an employee .......... We may, however, add that if the case is of a grave nature or involves questions of fact or law, which are not simple, it would be advisable for the employer to await the decision of the trial Court, so that the defence of the employee in the criminal case may not be prejudiced. The present, however, is a case of a very simple nature and so the employer cannot be blamed for the course adopted by him.” In my opinion, there is nothing in the decision of the Supreme Court which, in any way, militates against the decision in Jerone D’ Silva v. Regional Transport Authority2. The only question before the Supreme Court was whether the employer could proceed with domestic enquiry, while the criminal proceedings were pending. No question arose in that case as to the binding nature of the judgment of a competent Court in an enquiry which was completed after such judgment. In the present case, by the time the employer completed the enquiry by inflicting on the employee the punishment, the Sessions Judge of Coimbatore had acquitted the employee of the offences charged. That decision would be binding on the employer. Even otherwise, failure to accept that decision or at least to consider it would show that the employer did not act bona fide in the matter. That decision would be binding on the employer. Even otherwise, failure to accept that decision or at least to consider it would show that the employer did not act bona fide in the matter. I am, therefore, of opinion that the Labour Court did less justice to the worker in denying him reinstatement and awarding him only the compensation. Rule nisi is discharged. The writ petition fails, and is dismissed with costs. Advocate’s fee Rs. 100. R.M. ---------- Petition dismissed.