Patna Municipal Corporation v. Ram Bachan Lal — 1960 DIGILAW 195 (PAT)

Judgment Sahai, J. 1. This appeal by the defendant Municipal Corporation arises out of a suit for declaration that the order dated the 28th September, 1951, passed by the Special Officer of the Patna Municipality (as it then was) enhancing the valuation and assessment of Holding No. 137, Circle No. 44, of Mahalla Ranighat, under Section 107(1)(c) of the Bihar and Orissa Municipal Act, VII of 1922 (which will hereafter be referred to as the Act), is illegal and ultra vires; and also for a decree for refund of Rs. 102/8/- said to have been realised from the plaintiff by the Municipality in excess of the legitimate quarterly tax. It has come before this Bench as an important question of law arises for decision. 2. The facts, which are relevant for the purposes of this judgment, may be briefly stated. The plaintiffs case is that, at the time of the general assessment of 1950, the house standing in the holding was unoccupied, and one Mr. Iftakhar Ahmad, a Deputy Magistrate, assessed it to a quarterly municipal tax of Rs. 48/12/-. The plaintiff, thereafter, made improvements in the house by providing water and electric connections. He then let it out on rent to Shri Pratapdhari Sinha, an Advocate, on a-monthly rental of Rs. 75/-. On the 8th January, 1951, he received a notice from the municipality under Section 7(2) read with, section I07(1)(c) of the Act, stating that it was proposed to enhance the valuation of the holding, and that the plaintiff could file an objection. The plain-tiff, accordingly, filed an objection which was heard by the Special Officer of the municipality, who by his order dated the 28th September, 1951, rejected his objection and assessed the holding on the basis of a monthly rental of Rs. 155/- to a tax oi Rs. 151/4/- per quarter. The plaintiff paid under protest a sum of Rs. 151/4/- as quarterly tax for October to December, 1951, which amounted to a payment of Rs. 102/8/- in excess of the tax legally payable as having been assessed at the general assessment. 3. The defendants case is that the holding was let out to Pratapdhari Sinha on a monthly rental-of Rs. 155/- and not Rs. 75/~. The Special Officer himself inspected the holding, and he came to the conclusion that an incorrect valuation and assessment had been made by reason of fraud and misrepresentation. 4. 3. The defendants case is that the holding was let out to Pratapdhari Sinha on a monthly rental-of Rs. 155/- and not Rs. 75/~. The Special Officer himself inspected the holding, and he came to the conclusion that an incorrect valuation and assessment had been made by reason of fraud and misrepresentation. 4. The Additional Munsif, 3rd Court, Patna, who tried the suit, held that Fratapdhari Siriha paid a rent of Rs. 75/- per month, that there was ncn fraud, misrepresentation or mistake at the time o± the general assessment of 1950, and that the municipality was not justified in taking action under Section 107(1)(c). He, therefore, decreed the suit with costs. 5. The defendant took an appeal to the District Court, and that appeal was heard by the Additional Subordinate Judge, 4th Court, Patna. The learned Subordinate Judge agreed with the findings of the learned Munsif, and held that the defendant had not made out a case of fraud or misrepresentation which alone would have entitled it to revise the assessment, and that it had not even pleaded any mistake. He further held that the plaintiffs objection should have been disposed of by a committee constituted under Sec.117 of the Act and not by the Special Officer alone who could, under Sec.386, merely exercise and perform the powers and duties of the commissioners. On these findings, he dismissed the appeal. 6. This appeal was placed for hearing, in the first instance, before a learned single Judge of this Court. It was argued before him that the authority of the decisions of this Court in Darbhanga Municipality V/s. Jyotindranath, ILR 23 Pat 862: (AIR 1945 Pat 153), Arrah Municipality V/s. Jatendra Chandra, ILR 24 Pat 668: (AIR 1946 Pat 167) and Ram Chor Prasad V/s. Bakshi Rani Krishna Sinha, ILR 28 Pat 276: ( AIR 1951 Pat 536 ) had been weakened by the decision of the Supreme Court in Brij Raj Krishna V/s. Section K. Shaw and Brothers, AIR 1951 SC 115 . As the learned Judge thought that this raised an important question of law, he referred the case to a Division Bench, which, in its turn, referred it to a larger Bench. 7. The learned Advocate General, who has appeared on behalf of the appellant, has urged two points: 1. As the learned Judge thought that this raised an important question of law, he referred the case to a Division Bench, which, in its turn, referred it to a larger Bench. 7. The learned Advocate General, who has appeared on behalf of the appellant, has urged two points: 1. That it was entirely within the jurisdiction of the municipality or the Special Officer, who was in charge of it, to decide all the facts which required determination for exercise of the power to enhance the valuation or assessment of any holding under Sec.107(1)(c), and that his decision on those facts is final. The Civil Court has no jurisdiction to investigate, those facts or to interfere with the decision. 2. That an objection filed in pursuance of a notice issued under Sub-section (2) of Sec.107 has, under Sub-section (3), to be disposed of by a committee constituted as provided in Sec.117; but the Special Officer appointed under Sec.386 alone takes the place of the committee referred to in that section when the municipality is superseded under Sec.385 of the Act. 8. As to the first point, the learned Advocate General has contended that the provisions of the Act make it quite clear that the decision of the municipality on the facts arising for consideration is final. He has referred to Sub-section (4) of Sec.117 of the Act which runs : "(4) The decision of the Committee, or of a majority of the members thereof, in such cases shall be final." He has also drawn our attention to Sec.119 which is as under : "No objection shall be taken to any assessment or valuation in any other manner than in this Act is provided." He has further referred to the observations of Lord Esher in R. V/s. Commrs. for Special Purposes of Income-tax, (1888) 21 QBD 313, which are often quoted, and has submitted that the present case falls within the second category of cases mentioned by his Lordship. In my judgment, these arguments are without substance, and cannot be accepted. 9. The first principle which must be kept in view is that the Civil Court is a Court of plenary jurisdiction, and is competent under Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure "to try all suits of a civil nature excepting suits of which their cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred". 9. The first principle which must be kept in view is that the Civil Court is a Court of plenary jurisdiction, and is competent under Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure "to try all suits of a civil nature excepting suits of which their cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred". I may also refer in this connection to the observations of Lord Thankerton in the decision of the Judicial Committee in Secy. of State V/s. Mask and Co., AIR 1940 PC 105 at 110 which are as follows : "It is settled law that the exclusion of the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts is not to be readily inferred, but that such exclusion must either be explicitly expressed or clearly implied. It is also well settled that even if jurisdiction is so excluded, the Civil Courts have jurisdiction to examine into cases where the provisions of the Act have not been complied with, or the statutory tribunal has not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure." Their Lordships decided in that case that the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts was excluded by the order of the Collector of Customs on appeal under Section 188 of the Sea Customs Act (1878); but that has no bearing on the facts of the present case. 10. Another principle which is firmly established is that a local authority, an administrative authority or any tribunal of limited jurisdiction cannot assume jurisdiction to do anything or to pass any order by arriving at a wrong decision on facts. Such facts have been referred to in various decisions as preliminary or collateral facts or as jurisdictional facts. The Civil Court or the High Court, in exercise of its power to issue an appropriate writ in suitable cases, can investigate the correctness of the decision of the inferior tribunal of limited jurisdiction relating to such facts. To hold otherwise would create a curious and illogical situation because a tribunal of limited jurisdiction would have unlimited power to assume jurisdiction in any case in which, on a correct decision on the jurisdictional facts, it cannot possibly have any jurisdiction. There is a long line of decisions of English Courts which may be relied upon in support of this view. 11. In Bunbury V/s. Fuller, (1853) 9 Ex. There is a long line of decisions of English Courts which may be relied upon in support of this view. 11. In Bunbury V/s. Fuller, (1853) 9 Ex. 111 at p. 140, Coleridge, J. has, while delivering the judgment of the Court, of Exchequer Chamber, observed: "It is a general rule that no Court of limited jurisdiction can give itself jurisdiction by a wrong decision on a point collateral to the merits of the case upon which the limit to its jurisdiction depends; and however its decision may be final on all particulars, making up together that subject matter which, if true, is within its jurisdiction, and however necessary in many cases it may be for it to make a preliminary inquiry, whether some collateral matter be or be not within the limits, yet upon this preliminary question its decision must always be open to inquiry in the superior Court. Then, to take the simplest case -- suppose a Judge with jurisdiction limited to a particular hundred, and a matter is brought before him as having arisen within it, but the party charged contends that it arose in another hundred, this is clearly a collateral matter independent of the merits; on its being presented, the Judge must not immediately forbear to proceed, but must inquire into that preliminary fact and for the time decide it, and either proceed or not with the principal subject-matter according as he finds on that point; but this decision must be open to question and if he has improperly either forborne or proceeded on the main matter in consequence of an error, on this Court of Queens Bench will issue its mandamus Or prohibition to correct his mistake." Luxmoore, L.J. has quoted these observations with approval in White and Collins V/s. Minister of Health, (1939) 2 KB 838 at p. 856, and Sir James Colville has quoted the first sentence in Colonial Bank of Australasia V/s. Willan, (1874) 5 PC 417 at page 444 as laying down the general rule, Sir James Colville has, however, made it clear that the rule relating to matters which are within the jurisdiction of the inferior Court are different. He has stated at p. 443: "Objections founded on the personal incompetency of the Judge, or on the nature of the subject-matter, or on the absence of some essential preliminary, must obviously, in most cases, depend upon matters which, whether apparent on the face of the proceedings or brought before the superior Court by affidavit, are extrinsic to the adjudication impeached, ..... "Accordingly, the authorities, of which R. V/s. Bolton, (1841) 1 QB 66 and R. V/s. St. Olave, (1857) 8 E. and B. 529, may be taken as examples, establish that an adjudication by a Judge having jurisdiction over the subject-matter is, if no defects appear on the face of it, to be taken as conclusive of the facts stated therein; and .that the Court of Queens Bench will not on certiorari quash such an adjudication on the ground that any such fact, however essential, has been erroneously found." 12. In the decision of the Court of Appeal in R. V/s. Shoreditch Assessment Committee, (1910) 2 KB 859, Lord Farwell has laid down the rule relating to a jurisdictional fact in a very forceful manner at page 880 as follows: "No tribunal of inferior jurisdiction can by its own decision finally decide on the question of the existence or extent of such jurisdiction; such question is always subject to review by the High Court, which does not permit the inferior tribunal either to usurp a jurisdiction which if does not possess, whether at all or to the extent claimed, or to refuse to exercise a jurisdiction which it has and ought to exercise. Subjection in this respect to the High Court is a necessary and inseparable incident to all tribunals of limited jurisdiction; for the existence of the limit necessitates an authority to determine and enforce it; it is a contradiction in terms to create a tribunal with limited jurisdiction and unlimited power to determine such limit at its own will and pleasure --such a tribunal would be autocratic, not limited--and it is immaterial whether the decision of the inferior tribunal on the question of the existence or non-existence of its own jurisdiction is founded on law or fact; a Court with jurisdiction confined to the city of London cannot extend such jurisdiction by finding as a fact that Piccadilly Circus is in the ward of Chepe." With the greatest respect, his Lordship has, in these observations, very clearly and succinctly laid down the true principle as well as the reasons therefor. 13 In another decision of the Court of Appeal, Associated Provincial Picture Houses, Ltd. V/s. Wednes-bury, Corporation, (1947) 2 All ER 680 at p. 685. Lord Greene, M. R. has stated: "The power of the court to interfere in each case is not that of an appellate authority to override a decision of the local authority, but is that of a judicial authority which is concerned, and concerned only, to see whether the local authority have contravened the law by acting in excess of the powers which Parliament has confided in it." 14. In R. V/s. Fulham, Hammersmith and Kensington Rent Tribunal, (1950) 2 All ER 211, the Rent Tribunal had power under Sec.1 of the Landlord and Tenant (Rent Control) Act, 1949, to fix the standard rent of any dwelling house. Under paragraph 1 of Part I of Schedule I to the Act, the tribunal could issue a certificate, if it came to certain conclusions including that any premium had been paid by the tenant. Under paragraph 10, it had power, in cases in which it had issued a certificate, to determine the rental equivalent of the premium. Thereafter, the rent payable was not to exceed the standard rent fixed by the tribunal after deducting the rental equivalent of the premium. The tribunal fixed (he rental equivalent, and the landlord made a prayer for issue of certiorari to bring up and quash the certificate and determination of the rental equivalent by the tribunal. Thereafter, the rent payable was not to exceed the standard rent fixed by the tribunal after deducting the rental equivalent of the premium. The tribunal fixed (he rental equivalent, and the landlord made a prayer for issue of certiorari to bring up and quash the certificate and determination of the rental equivalent by the tribunal. Parker, J., who delivered the judgment of the Kings Bench Division, has held at p, 215; "It seems to us, therefore, that the fact that such a premium has been paid is a condition precedent to the exercise by the Tribunal of its. jurisdiction under the first schedule. In other words, before the tribunal can be said to have jurisdiction, it must not merely appear to them that such a premium has been paid, but such a premium must have been paid." He has further said that a tribunal of the kind under consideration in that case belonged to the first type of tribunals referred to in the observations of Lord Esher in (1888) 21 QBD 313 at pages 319-20, which may now be quoted: "When an inferior court or tribunal or body, which has to exercise the power of deciding facts, is first established by Act of Parliament, the legislature has to consider what powers it will give that tribunal or body. It may in effect say that, if a certain state of facts exists and is shown to such tribunal or body before it proceeds, to do certain things, it shall have jurisdiction to do such thing, but not otherwise. There it is not for them conclusively to decide whether that state of facts exists, and, it they exercise the jurisdiction without its existence, what they do may be questioned, and it will be held that they have acted without jurisdiction. But there is another state of things which may exist. The legislature may instruct the tribunal or body with a jurisdiction, which includes the jurisdiction to determine whether the preliminary state of facts exists as well as the jurisdiction, on finding that it does exist, to proceed further or do something more, When the legislature are establishing such a tribunal or body with limited jurisdiction, they also have to consider, whatever jurisdiction they give them, whether there shall be any appeal from their decision for otherwise there will be none. In the second of the two cases I have mentioned it is an erroneous application of the formula to say that the tribunal cannot give themselves jurisdiction by wrongly deciding certain facts to exist, because the legislature gave them jurisdiction to determine all the facts, including the existence of the preliminary facts on hich the further exercise of their jurisdictionw depends; and if they were given jurisdiction so to decide, without any appeal being given, there is no appeal from such exercise of their jurisdiction," 15. The first type of cases referred to by Lord Esher in the observations quoted above is the ordinary type in which the jurisdiction of a local authority or a tribunal of limited jurisdiction depends upon the existence of some preliminary or jurisdictional facts. While the tribunal must arrive at its own conclusions on those facts for the purpose of deciding whether it is necessary for it to exercise the jurisdiction vested in it, its decision on those facts is not final. The Civil Court or the High Court can undoubtedly enquire into the correctness of its decision in order to determine whether the tribunal has acted in excess of its powers or has refused to exercise its jurisdiction where it was necessary for it to exercise it, When once it is held that the tribunals decision on the jurisdictional facts is correct, the Civil Court cannot enquire into the correctness of its decision on the merits of the matter within its jurisdiction. Even the High Court can only interfere by issue of a writ with a decision on a matter exclusively within the jurisdiction of the tribunal only in some special circumstances like the existence of a manifest error apparent on the face of the record. 16. The second type of cases envisaged by Lord Esher is that in which the tribunal of limited jurisdiction has not been given jurisdiction to do a certain thing or to pass a certain order but has also been given the power exclusively to decide the facts on which its jurisdiction depends. It is manifest that, in such cases, the decision of the tribunal on the existence of the facts which attract its jurisdiction is also final and is not open to enquiry by the Civil Court. It is manifest that, in such cases, the decision of the tribunal on the existence of the facts which attract its jurisdiction is also final and is not open to enquiry by the Civil Court. I may add that such a tribunal is happily rare because it would, in the words of Lord Farwell, be an autocratic tribunal and not a tribunal of limited jurisdiction. 17. I proceed now to examine the provisions of the relevant sections of the Act in the light oi the principles referred to above. Sec.107 gives power to a municipality to alter or amend the assessment list between two general assessments. I may first read the first four clauses of Sec.107(1): "107. (1) The Commissioners may from time to time alter or amend the assessment list in any of the following ways: (a) by entering therein the name of any person or any property which ought to have been entered, or any property which has become liable to taxation after the publication of the assessment list under Sec.116; (b) by substituting therein for the name of the owner or occupier of any holding the name of any other person who has succeeded by transfer or otherwise to the ownership or occupation of the holding; (c) by enhancing the valuation of, or assessment on, any holding which has been incorrectly valued or assessed by reason of fraud, misrepresentation or mistake; (d) by revaluing or re-assessing any holding the value of which has been increased by additions or alterations to buildings;" If the provisions of Clause (c) are analysed, it becomes apparent that the jurisdiction vested in the municipality is that of altering or amending the assessment list "by enhancing the valuation of, or assessment on, any holding". This is conditioned upon the existence of two preliminary facts, viz., (1) that the holding has been incorrectly valued or assessed; and (2) that the incorrect valuation or assessment has been made by reason of fraud, misrepresentation or mistake. 18. The learned Advocate General has argued that the incorrectness of the valuation or assessment is the only jurisdictional fact, and that, if the Special Officers decision on that fact is correct, he must be held to have exclusive jurisdiction to decide whether the incorrectness was due to fraud, misrepresentation or mistake. There seems to be no warrant for this argument. The learned Advocate General has argued that the incorrectness of the valuation or assessment is the only jurisdictional fact, and that, if the Special Officers decision on that fact is correct, he must be held to have exclusive jurisdiction to decide whether the incorrectness was due to fraud, misrepresentation or mistake. There seems to be no warrant for this argument. As the jurisdiction of the municipality to enhance the valuation or assessment depends upon two facts, I do not see why one of them should be held to be a jurisdictional fact while the other is held to be a fact exclusively within the jurisdiction of the municipality to decide. Both facts are either jurisdictional facts or facts which the municipality has exclusive jurisdiction to decide. In my judgment, it is abundantly clear that both the facts are jurisdictional facts. Had it! been otherwise, the municipality could arbitrarily give itself jurisdiction to enhance the valuation or assessment of any holding by a wrong decision on .those facts. The use of the word "final" in Sub-section (4) of Sec.117 merely means that the decision of the committee or a majority of its members as to the assessment or valuation cannot be interfered with, i.e., the quantum of the assessment cannot be altered or modified if .the committee has acted with jurisdiction, or, in other words, if its decision on the existence of the jurisdictional facts is correct. There is nothing in any provision of the Act to suggest that the municipality has exclusive jurisdiction to decide whether the holding has been incorrectly valued or assessed and whether that was due to fraud, misrepresentation or mistake. 19. Sec.119 also does not help the appellant Municipal Corporation because what its provisions mean is that no objection to a valid "assessment or valuation" can be raised in a manner other than that provided in the Act. All that a committee constituted under Sec.117 can do is to decide whether the amount of assessment or valuation is correct. It cannot decide whether the assessment or valuation is with or without jurisdiction. That can only be adjudicated upon by the Civil Court or, in proper cases, by the High Court exercising its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution. 20. A consideration of the provisions of the other clauses of Sec.107(1), which I have quoted above, supports the conclusion which I have reached. That can only be adjudicated upon by the Civil Court or, in proper cases, by the High Court exercising its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution. 20. A consideration of the provisions of the other clauses of Sec.107(1), which I have quoted above, supports the conclusion which I have reached. I refer to them as examples. In order to enable the municipality to act under Clause (a) and to enter in the assessment list the name of any person or property, the existence of one of two facts is absolutely necessary. Those facts are that (1) the name or property ought to have been entered or (2) the property has become liable to taxation after the publication of the assessment list under Section 115. If neither of these facts exists, the municipality cannot exercise its jurisdiction to enter the name of any person or property in the assessment list under Clause (a). If the municipality imposes a tax upon any person or property on an incorrect decision on these facts it is obvious that the aggrieved person will be entitled to seek redress from the Civil Court against an illegal taxation. 21. The position relating to the exercise of power under Clause (b) is the same. The jurisdiction under that clause is to substitute a persons name in place of that of the owner or occupier. This is dependant upon the fact of succession of the substitute by transfer or otherwise to the ownership or occupation of the holding. That is a jurisdictional fact. Supposing that A is the rightful owner of a holding, the municipality cannot make B its owner by wrongly deciding the jurisdictional fact and holding that B has succeeded to the ownership or occupation by transfer or otherwise. It can hardly be disputed that, if the municipality enters the name of B in the assessment list as owner or occupier, A can agitate his right and title in the Civil Court and get himself declared as the rightful owner or occupier. If he succeeds in getting the declaration, he will be perfectly entitled to get the entry of Bs name cancelled arid to get his own name entered in the assessment iist, 22. Clause (d) gives jurisdiction to the municipality to revalue or re-assess any holding. If he succeeds in getting the declaration, he will be perfectly entitled to get the entry of Bs name cancelled arid to get his own name entered in the assessment iist, 22. Clause (d) gives jurisdiction to the municipality to revalue or re-assess any holding. The jurisdictional fact upon which the exercise of this power depends is that the value of the holding has increased by additions or alterations to buildings standing on it. If no addition or alteration has, in fact, been made, the municipality cannot give itself jurisdiction by wrongly holding that additions and alterations have been made to revalue or reassess the holding. 23. It is unnecessary to multiply instances. For the reasons which I have given, there is not the slightest doubt that a municipalitys decision, both on the question of existence of an incorrect valuation and on the question whether that was on account of fraud, misrepresentation or mistake, is liable to be questioned in the Civil Court and the High Court, which can determine whether the decision is right or wrong. To put it in other words, a jurisdictional fact must not only appear to a local authority to exist but it must, in fact, exist according to the findings of the Civil Court or the High Court an order that the authority can be held to have acted within its jurisdiction. 24. The views which I have expressed are in consonance with those taken in the decisions of this Court to which I have already made reference. In ILR 23 Pat 862: (AIR 1945 Pat 153), personal tax under Section 82(1)(a) of the Act was imposed upon the plaintiffs, a father and his son, governed by the Dayabhag School of Hindu Law, who lived in one house. The plaintiffs did not file an appeal under Sec.116. Relying upon the provisions of Sections 116, 117 and 119, the defendant municipality took the plea that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit for a declaration that imposition of the personal tax was illegal and for restraining the municipality from realising it. Manohar Lall, J. held that the Civil Court had jurisdiction to enquire whether the plaintiffs were occupiers of a holding, as the jurisdiction of the municipality to assess them depended upon the decision on that fact. Manohar Lall, J. held that the Civil Court had jurisdiction to enquire whether the plaintiffs were occupiers of a holding, as the jurisdiction of the municipality to assess them depended upon the decision on that fact. His Lordship further stated that the Commissioners could not give themselves jurisdiction to assess a person who is not an occupier by a wrong decision on facts. Beevor, J. said that it was only in view of the cursus curiae that he agreed that the Civil Court had jurisdiction in that case to decide the question of validity of the assessment. 25. In ILR 24 Pat 668 : (AIR 1946 Pat 167), it was argued that Sec.119 of the Act barred a suit in which an assessment by the municipality was questioned. Fazl Ali, C.J., with whom Ray, J. agreed, however, repelled this argument and said; "Where the whole assessment is ultra vires the assessee can always bring a suit for a declaration that the assessment is not binding upon him". In ILR 28 Pat 276: (AIR 1951 Fat 536), the question was whether an increase in the valuation and assessment of a holding by the municipality, acting under Clause (d) of Sec.107(1) on account of additions and alterations to the buildings, was ultra vires. The municipality took the defence that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction. Manohar Lall, J., with whom Mahabir Prasad, J. agreed, said: "It seems to me, therefore, that the jurisdiction of the municipality to revalue or reassess any holding on the ground of an increase in the value by reason of additions and alterations must depend upon the correctness of the finding whether there has been any addition or alteration. The extent of the additions and alterations cannot be questioned in the Civil Court, but the fact whether there has been any addition or alteration must be liable to be reviewed by the Civil Court." 26. The learned Advocate General has placed reliance upon, AIR 1951 SC 115 . The question in that case was whether the Civil Court had jurisdiction to question the decision of the House Controller in a case of eviction under Sec.11(1) of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1947, as to whether there was non-payment of rent. The learned Advocate General has placed reliance upon, AIR 1951 SC 115 . The question in that case was whether the Civil Court had jurisdiction to question the decision of the House Controller in a case of eviction under Sec.11(1) of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1947, as to whether there was non-payment of rent. After referring to the observations of Lord Esher in (1888) 21 QBD 313 (supra) and some observations of Sir James Colville in (1874) 5 PC 417 (supra), Fazl Ali, J., who delivered the judgment of the Supreme Court, observed: "There can be no doubt that the present case falls within the second category mentioned by Lord Esher, because here the Act has entrusted the Controller with a jurisdiction, which includes the jurisdiction to determine whether there is non-payment of rent or not, as well as the jurisdiction, on finding that there is non-payment of rent, to order eviction of a tenant. Therefore, even if the Controller may be assumed to have wrongly decided the question of non-payment of rent, which by no means is clear, his order cannot be questioned in a Civil Court." 27. It is clear that the conclusion followed from the premise that that case fell within the second class of cases mentioned by Lord Esher. The present case obviously falls within the first class because the Special Officer had no power to decide finally the preliminary facts referred to above, and it is within the competence of the Civil Court to review his decision on those facts. Hence, the case is manifestly distinguishable. I may refer in this connection to Hitendra Nath Bose V/s. Shyam Sunder Misser, AIR 1958 Pat 189 . That was a case in which the Houso Controller, acting under Section 9 of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1947, directed the tenant to make necessary repairs to the house in question and to deduct the cost of repairs from the rent. The question was whether the Civil Court could entertain a suit for declaration that the Controllers order was ultra vires snd for an injunction restraining the tenant from making repairs in pursuance of the order. Rai Brij Raj Krishnas case was relied upon by the lower Courts in support of the proposition that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction. The question was whether the Civil Court could entertain a suit for declaration that the Controllers order was ultra vires snd for an injunction restraining the tenant from making repairs in pursuance of the order. Rai Brij Raj Krishnas case was relied upon by the lower Courts in support of the proposition that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction. My Lord the Chief Justice and Raj Kishore Prasad, J. distinguished Brij Raj Krishnas case, AIR 1951 SC 115 , and said that the Controllers jurisdiction to pass the order depended upon "the preliminary condition that the landlord had failed to make the repairs which he was bound to make to the building". Their Lordships held that the Civil Court could enquire into the correctness of the Controllers finding on the preliminary condition in order to decide whether there was a lack of jurisdiction in him. 28. The Supreme Court distinguished Brij Raj Krishnas case, AIR 1951 SC 115 in Chaube Jagdish Prasad V/s. Ganga Prasad Chaturvedi, AIR 1959 SC 492 . Their Lordships had to consider in that case the scope and extent of the High Courts power under Sec.115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. They referred to the observations of Lord Esher in (1888) 21 QBD 313 (supra), and explained what those observations meant. After further consideration, Kapur, J. who delivered the judgment of the Court, observed: "Thus if a subordinate court had jurisdiction to make the order it made and has not acted in breach of any provision of law or committed any error of procedure which is material and may have affected the ultimate decision, then the High Court has no power to interfere. But if on the other hand it decides a jurisdictional fact erroneously and thereby assumes jurisdiction not vested in it or deprives itself of jurisdiction so vested then the power of interference under Sec.115, Civil Procedure Code, becomes operative". 29. With reference to Brij Raj Krishnas case, AIR 1951 SC 115 , Kapur, J. said that the observations of Sir James Colville in (1874) 5 PC 417 (supra), which had been quoted in it, had no application to the facts of the case before the Supreme Court in which the jurisdiction of the Additional Civil Judge was to be determined by the provisions of Sec. 5(4) of the U.P. Temporary Control of Rent and Eviction Act (U.P. III of 1947). 30. 30. I may now refer to three other decisions in which some pertinent observations have been made, though they were cases which arose out of applications under Article 226 of the Constitution for issue of writs of certiorari. The first one is T. C. Basappa V/s. T. Nagappa, AIR 1954 SC 440 . That case related to the Representation of the People Act. Relying upon, (1854) 9 Ex 111 (Supra), Mukherjea, J. has observed : " Certiorari may and is generally granted when a court has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction. The want of jurisdiction may arise from the nature of the subject matter of the proceeding or from the absence of some preliminary proceeding or the court itself may not be legally constituted or suffer from certain disability by reason of extraneous circumstances, ..... When the jurisdiction of the court depends upon the existence of some collateral fact, it is well settled that the court cannot by a wrong decision of facts give it jurisdiction which it would not otherwise possess......" 31. A Bench of this Court dealt with an application for a writ of certiorari in Chandreshwari Prasad Narain Deo V/s. State of Bihar, AIR 1956 Pat 104 . Acting under Sec. 4(h) of the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950, a Sub-divisional Officer had, in that case, cancelled the khorposh grants which stood in favour of the petitioners. Under the provisions of that section, the Collector could annul a transfer, if he was "satisfied that such transfer was made at any time after the first day of January, 194(3 with the object of defeating any provisions of this Act or causing loss to the State or obtaining higher compensation thereunder". The Sub-divisional Officer concerned held, after hearing the parties, that the khorposh grants to the petitioners had been made with the object of defeating the provisions of the Bihar Land Reforms Act and also for obtaining higher compensation. It is to be noticed that the words used in the section gave power to the Officer to act if he was "satisfied" about the preliminary facts. It is to be noticed that the words used in the section gave power to the Officer to act if he was "satisfied" about the preliminary facts. Ramaswami, J. (as my Lord the Chief Justice then was) delivered the judgment of the Bench, and observed: "The contention of learned Government Pleader was that the satisfaction of the Collector under Sec. 4(h) was in the nature of a subjective satisfaction and, therefore, could not be questioned by a superior Court. I am unable to agree. I think the word satisfied in Sec. 4(h) must be construed to mean "reasonably satisfied, and, therefore, the finding of the Collector under Sec. 4(h) cannot be a subjective or arbitrary finding but must be based upon adequate material. I also think that the satisfaction of the Controller under Sec. 4(h) is not a capricious satisfaction but must be capable of being tested in an objective manner." His Lordship has also stated: "It is obvious that by wrong deciding a question as to the fraudulent intention of the outgoing proprietor the Sub-divisional Officer cannot give himself jurisdiction to cancel or annul the khorposh grants. It is well established that where the jurisdiction of an administrative authority depends upon a preliminary finding of fact, the High Court is entitled in a proceeding for a writ of certiorari to determine upon its independent judgment whether or not that finding of fact is correct." 32. The last case, to which I wish to make reference, is of a Bench of this Court constituted by the same learned Judges in Bata Shoe Co., Ltd. V/s. Ali Hasan, AIR 1956 Pat 518 . In that case, the Industrial Tribunal at Patna proposed to proceed to decide a complaint filed before it under Sec.33-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, by one Jamuna Prasad before deciding as a preliminary issue the question whether Jamuna Prasad was a "workman" within the meaning of the Act. Their Lordships held that the question whether Jamuna Prasad, respondent No. 2, was a workman and the question whether there had been a contravention of the provisions of Sec.33 were "not questions of pure fact but questions of jurisdictional fact." Ramaswami, J. has said; "If in fact these conditions do not exist, the Industrial Tribunal cannot give itself jurisdiction by wrongly deciding that those conditions exist. The Industrial Tribunal cannot thereby give itself jurisdiction to decide a dispute and to submit an award to the State Government under the provisions of Sec.33-A." 33. It is manifest that the Civil Court can also interfere in the circumstances mentioned in the above three cases when a tribunal with limited jurisdiction has acted beyond its powers or has given itself jurisdiction on the basis of a wrong decision on collateral or jurisdictional facts, 34. On a review of the decisions referred to above, I hold that the point under consideration has been rightly decided in the cases of ILR 23 Pat 862: (AIR 1945 Pat 153) and ILR 28 Pat 276: ( AIR 1951 Pat 536 ) and that the decision of the Supreme Court in AIR 1951 SC 115 (supra) does not, in any way, affect their authority. The observations of Fazl Ali, C. J. in ILR 24 Pat 668 : (AIR 1946 Pat 167), which I have quoted, are also, if I may say so with great respect, perfectly correct. The Courts below acted within their jurisdiction in investigating the correctness of the Special Officers decision on jurisdictional facts upon which his power to enhance the valuation or assessment of the holding in question under Sec.107(1)(c) depended. They have found that there was no fraud or misrepresentation, and that there was no incorrect valuation at the time of the general assessment. Hence, the Special Officer had no jurisdiction to enhance the valuation or assessment. In view of this finding, they have rightly decreed the suit. 35. The first point raised by the learned Advocate General must, accordingly, be rejected. It is unnecessary to consider the second point because, even if the Special Officer could alone take the place of the committee, referred to in Sec.117, for the purpose of disposing of the objection filed under Sub-section (3) of Sec.107, he could not give himself power to enhance the valuation and assessment of the holding in question by a wrong decision on the jurisdictional facts, viz., that there was an incorrect valuation at the time of the general assessment and that that was due to misrepresentation or fraud. 36. For the reasons given above, I would dismiss the appeal with costs. Ramaswami, J. 37 I agree. Kanhaiya Singh, J. 38 I agree.