ORDER Pandey, J. This appeal under the Letters Patent is directed against an affirming order of the learned single Judge by which he dismissed an application of Kishan Chand Sharma, judgment-debtor No. 28, under section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure raising the following two contentions : (i) The final decree for sale is no longer executable. (ii) In any event, the occupancy lands of Kishan Chand Sharma are not liable to be sold in execution of the decree. The facts of this case in so far as they are necessary for disposal of this appeal may be briefly stated. By two deeds dated 4th September 1924 and 30th June 1927, Chaturbhuj and Sewaram, the then proprietors of village Jarwans, created two successive simple mortgages in favour of Pyarelal, Ramlal and Motilal. Subsequently, contrary to the express covenant in the second mortgage deed, the mortgagors alienated Kkudkasht and chhota ghas lands of the village in favour of numerous persons (judgment-debtors Nos. 3 to 36). Kishan Chand Sharma obtained by a registered patta dated 22nd August 1936 a lease for chhota ghas plots khasra Nos. 3/1, 5 and 7/1, area 130 acres, rental, Rs. 65, for a consideration of Rs. 480 and thereby became an occupancy tenant of the plots. Motilal and the successors-in-interest of the other mortgagees filed Civil Suit No. 5-A of 1943 on the foot of the two mortgages and secured on 1st April 1946 a preliminary decree for sale against the mortgagors and their aliened. Kishan Chand Sharma filed First Appeal No. 59 of 1946 against the decree and contended inter alia that, in view of section 43 of the Madhya Pradesh Abolition of Proprietary Rights (Estates, Mahals, Alienated Lands) Act, 1950 (hereinafter called the Abolition Act), his occupancy lands could not be sold in execution of the decree. That contention was not accepted and the appeal was dismissed on 19th January 1954. The preliminary decree for sale was made final on 20th January 1950. Thereafter the decree-holders filed an execution application and proceeded to recover the decretal amount by sale of the property covered by the decree. When the Abolition Act came into force, the decree-holders and the judgment-debtors made separate applications for settlement of the debt under section 19 of that Act. By a common order dated 22nd March 1952, the decretal amount was reduced from Rs. 48,891-3-0 to Rs. When the Abolition Act came into force, the decree-holders and the judgment-debtors made separate applications for settlement of the debt under section 19 of that Act. By a common order dated 22nd March 1952, the decretal amount was reduced from Rs. 48,891-3-0 to Rs. 39,615, the amount of compensation Rs. 6,594-6-0 was directed to be paid to the creditors and the remaining amount of Rs. 33,020-10-0 was declared to be a charge on the property specified in the order. On 4th December 1952, the decree-holders made an application to the executing Court for recovery of the decretal debt as reduced by the Claims Officer. On 26th June 1953, Kishan Chand Sharma filed the application, out of which this appeal arises, raising the two points mentioned in the opening paragraph of this order. The Court of first instance and the learned single Judge repelled his contentions. In regard to the first point, the precise contention is this. Since the debt due to the secured creditors was not an excluded debt, they had to submit their claim to the Claims Officer for determination under Chapter IV of the Abolition Act. Further, after the Claims Officer passed an order under section 27 of that Act, the only remedy available to them in respect of the amount remaining unpaid, as declared, was to apply for a preliminary decree for sale under section 28 of the Act. While the Court of first instance held that Kishan Chand Sharma was not entitled to the benefit of section 28, the learned single Judge took the view that since a final decree for sale had already been passed, there could not be two decrees and it was unnecessary for the secured creditors to apply afresh for a preliminary decree. As we would show presently, this view is not correct. In the instant case, the mortgagors transferred to Kishan Chand Sharma a part of the property which was subject to the mortgage burden. That being so, as a transferee, he was bound by the mortgage. This means that he stood in the shoes of the mortgagors in so far as he was bound to suffer the property transferred to him to be sold for satisfaction of the mortgage debt. In that sense, his liability was no greater than that of the mortgagors. That being so, as a transferee, he was bound by the mortgage. This means that he stood in the shoes of the mortgagors in so far as he was bound to suffer the property transferred to him to be sold for satisfaction of the mortgage debt. In that sense, his liability was no greater than that of the mortgagors. It follows that when the mortgage debt itself was scaled down, the property transferred to him could be made liable only for the reduced debt. The reason is obvious. Just as the liability under each mortgage was, in view of sections 60 and 67 of the Transfer of Property Act, a single liability, the decree passed in the suit was for a single amount. If the mortgagors paid the reduced debt, the mortgaged property would be freed from the encumbrance as against every person claiming interest in any part thereof. A transferee like Kishan Chand Sharma gets the benefit of reduction of the debt not because of the provisions of the Abolition Act, which may or may not apply to him personally, but because such benefit is, under the general law, a necessary incident of the transfer made in his favour. According to clause (a) of section 17 of the Abolition Act, 'secured debt' or 'secured claim' means a debt or claim subsisting on the date of vesting, whether due or not due, and secured by the mortgage of, or a charge on, the proprietary rights divested under section 3 of that Act. It is well established that even a final decree for sale does not extinguish the mortgage debt which remains subsisting : Bukhmanibai v. Mahendralal 1949 NLJ 113 : AIR 1949 Nag 174 : ILR 1949 Nag 182 (FB). The debt in this case was subsisting when the Abolition Act came into force and was, therefore, a secured debt within the meaning of that Act. Since that debt was scaled down under section 24 of the Act, the only remedy available to the decree-holders was the one provided by section 28 of the Act. This follows from section 33 of the Act, which reads as follows: The jurisdiction of the civil Courts shall, except as otherwise provided in this Act be barred in respect of-(c) the recovery of any secured debt or claim determined under section 24 except in the manner provided for in section 28. This follows from section 33 of the Act, which reads as follows: The jurisdiction of the civil Courts shall, except as otherwise provided in this Act be barred in respect of-(c) the recovery of any secured debt or claim determined under section 24 except in the manner provided for in section 28. The position is also otherwise clear. The amount for which the decree was originally passed was not only scaled down but was also partly satisfied and it was declared under section 27 of the Abolition Act that a smaller sum remained unpaid. That being so, it was no longer possible to rely upon the decree or to proceed to recover the amount ordered to be paid by that decree. The consequence of determination of the claim under section 24 and the order passed under section 27 was that the decree was wiped out with the result that the decree-holders had to apply afresh under section 28 for a preliminary decree and for fixation of time for payment of the amount. That subsisting secured debts, which were the subject-matters of proceedings in civil Court, are within the purview of section 28 is also clear from the proviso to sub-section (1) of section 29. In this view, the assumption that there will be two decrees and, therefore, it was not necessary to apply under section 28 cannot be accepted. In our opinion, the final decree for sale is no longer executable. In regard to the second point, the debt in this case was secured by a mortgage of immovable property including the land which Kishan Chand Sharma obtained in occupancy right. The very words of section 43 of the Abolition Act show that in this situation he cannot claim the benefit of that section even apart from the fact that the question is concluded by the decision in First Appeal No. 59 of 3946. In the view that we have taken of this case, the failure of the decree-holders to apply under section 28 prevents them from recovering the reduced mortgage debt. We, however, discover that, on 4th December 1952, the decree-holders made an application to the executing Court for recovery of the decretal debt as reduced by the Claims Officer. An application under section 28, for which no form is prescribed, had to be made to the same Court. We, however, discover that, on 4th December 1952, the decree-holders made an application to the executing Court for recovery of the decretal debt as reduced by the Claims Officer. An application under section 28, for which no form is prescribed, had to be made to the same Court. Although there is no prayer for passing a preliminary decree, the fact remains that it is one made for recovery of the reduced amount. In Motiram v. Chironjilal 1959 MPLJ 445 , a Division Bench of this Court treated a plaint as an application under section 28. In this situation, it will be open to the lower Court to consider whether the application dated 4th December 1952 should be treated as an application under section 28. The result is that the appeal succeeds and is allowed. The order of the learned single Judge and the one passed by the Court of first instance are set aside and the case is remitted to the Court of first instance for disposal according to law with advertence to the observation made in the last paragraph. The respondents shall bear their own costs and pay those of the appellant throughout. Counsel's fee here Rs. 50. Appeal allowed