JUDGMENT 1. THIS is the mother's appeal against an order of the learned District Judge, refusing her application for being appointed as the guardian of the person of her minor son Chhedi. The respondent Bhagirathi is the father of the said minor. The parties, namely, the present appellant Bimala Dasi and the present respondent Bhagirathi, were married in or about the year 1943. They were residents of Bansberia. Their first issue died a child. Then, about the year 1948, the minor son Chhedi, with whom we are now concerned, was born. The father Bhagirathi went away to Assam, when this minor child Chhedi was about six months old. At the time of going away as aforesaid, Bhagirathi made no arrangement for the maintenance of the mother Bimala and the son Chhedi during his absence. It appears from the record, flat, towards the end of the year 1949, Bhagirathi became a Rickshaw-puller in Assam and, towards the end of 1950, be came back and drove away the mother Bimala and the son Chhedi from his homestead. He, later, became attached to a widow Munia, and, in this state of things, the present appellant Bimala Dasi went to live with-one Sailen Das, who had been maintaining her (the mother) and the child Chhedi during Bhagirathi's absence. The appellant, thereafter, married Sailen in or about April, 1952, and Bhagirathi also married Munia in or about September, 1952. In the community, to which the parties belong, there was prevalent a custom of divorce and the parties actually remarried, as aforesaid, after they had finally given up each other by such customary divorce. 2. TROUBLE then started over the custody of the minor child (son) Chhedi, who was taken away forcibly by the father respondent Bhagirathi. Thereafter there were criminal proceedings, instituted by the appellant; mother, under which interim custody of the child was given to her, but, by his order, dated December 12, 1955, the learned Magistrate directed that that interim custody would continue only for a certain period of time, within which the appellant must obtain an order from the Civil Court, affirming and maintaining such custody; in default, the child Chhedi was to be restored to the respondent father Bhagirathi. This led to the present application by the mother appellant, the application being filed on December 21, 1955, when the minor concerned was aged about six years and six months. This led to the present application by the mother appellant, the application being filed on December 21, 1955, when the minor concerned was aged about six years and six months. The application was heard about a year thereafter and, in course of evidence, it transpired that Bhagirathi had refused to maintain the appellant Bimala Dasi and the minor son Chhedi, which led to a proceeding under section 488 of the Code of Criminal Procedure at the instance of the appellant mother Bimala Dasi but that case was, eventually, dismissed for default, which according to the appellant, was due to want of funds in her hands. 3. THE point now, is, who, in the above circumstances, should be declared entitled to the custody of the minor son Chhedi or to the guardianship of his person. The two sections of the Guardians and Wards Act, relevant on the point, are sections 17 and 19 (b ). Under section 19 (b) the father has the undisputed right to the guardianship of his child, so long as he is not and has not become unfit for the purpose. Under section 17, it is the interest and welfare of the minor concerned, which should be the guiding factor in the matter of appointment of his guardian. The learned District Judge has held that, even accepting all the allegations of the appellant, it cannot be said that the father respondent Bhagirathi has rendered himself unfit to be the guardian of his minor son Chhedi and that, once that is held, his claim to such guardianship cannot be refused or rejected on the ground of interest and welfare of the minor. The question, however, is whether, in taking the above view of law, the learned District Judge has approached the matter from the proper point of view and whether, in the circumstances of this case, he has duly determined the rights of the parties in regard to the disputed matter. 4. THE Court's power to appoint or declare a guardian of the person and/or property of a minor is contained in Chapter II of the Act, where section 19 also occurs. 4. THE Court's power to appoint or declare a guardian of the person and/or property of a minor is contained in Chapter II of the Act, where section 19 also occurs. In that context, the opening words of section 19 may well suggest that, in view of clause (b) of the said section, where the father of the minor is alive and is not unfit to be the guardian of the person of the minor concerned, no question of appointment or declaration of guardian of his person will arise and the Court will have no jurisdiction to make any such appointment or declaration. From that point of view, section 17, which, on its own words, applies, only where the Court has to appoint or declare the guardian of a minor, may not be relevant so far as section 19 is concerned, or, to be more precise and explicit, the said section 17 may not be strictly relevant in judging the fitness or unfitness of the father for purposes of guardianship, as contemplated in the said other section 19 of the Act. That however, does not, in our opinion, rule out altogether consideration of the question of welfare and/or interest of the minor in adjudging such fitness or unfitness of the father It will, no doubt, not be the paramount or the supreme overriding consideration in the matter as it would have been if section 17 had applied, but it may well be,-and, indeed, it will still be-one of the matters for consideration even under section 19. The question of fitness or unfitness of a person for the guardianship of a minor cannot be wholly dissociated from the welfare and interest of the minor concerned in any case whatsoever, but while, in other cases, it will almost be the paramount or the deciding factor, in the case of the husband and the father under clause (a) and clause (b) respectively of section 19, it will only be one of the factors to be considered for judging their fitness or unfitness for the guardianship. The result will be that, merely on this ground, namely, that the minor's welfare and/or interest will be better served by some other person as guardian, the husband's or the father's position as guardian of the particular minor cannot be disturbed, or, in other words, unless they are considered to be 'unfit' as distinguished from 'less fit' for such purpose, their position, as guardian as aforesaid, should be maintained and left undisturbed. To throw them out the test should be one of unfitness and not simply relative unfitness or inferiority in fitness and, in applying, such test, the interest and welfare of the minor will, inter alia, have to be taken into consideration. From the above standpoint, which will be supported by both principle and authority, properly understood and properly applied, the father, in the present case, must be held to have rendered himself, unfit far the guardianship of the person of the minor child (Chhedi) in question. He left the mother and the child to their fate when he went away to Assam, he never cared for them either when he was away or when he came back. He forcibly took away the child from the mother's custody, not, apparently, with any bona fide motive, and, in the context of his previous attitude or utter neglect towards the appellant mother and the minor child concerned, the evidence, given in the case on behalf of the appellant, that he, the father (respondent Bhagirathi), refused to maintain them and openly declared his intention in that behalf, cannot be lightly thrown away. Indeed, the probabilities of the case would largely support that evidence. In view of the above evidence, taken along with the respondent father's second marriage, we feel justified in holding that he, the respondent Bhagirathi, has rendered himself unfit to remain the guardian of the person of his minor son, Chhedi, the minor child in question. We would, accordingly, accept this appeal and allow the appellant mother's application for guardianship of the person of the minor boy Chhedi There will be no order for costs in this Court or in the Court below.