JUDGMENT S.P. BHARGAVA, J. 1. This is plaintiffs' appeal from a judgment and decree of the District Judge, Chhatarpur, in Civil Suit, No. 12 of 1955 of his Court, passed on 25-10-1956. 2 The suit out of which this appeal arises was for a declaration that a decree made in a previous suit s ineffective and illegal against the plaintiffs. No further relief for reallocation of shares of fresh partition was asked for in the present case. 3. Briefly stated, the facts of the case are as follows:-The parties are members of a Hindu family governed by Mitakshara, whose common ancestor was one Bansidhar. The following geneological tree would disclose the relationship between the parties:- 4. After the death of Bansidhar and Shrinandan, Jwalaprasad, a grandson of Bansidhar, instituted a suit for partition against his uncle Choukheylal and his three sons, the legal representatives of his deceased uncle Shrinandan and against his own father and two brothers. This suit was registered as C. S. No. 36 of 1951 in the Court of the District Judge, Naogaon, and was decreed by the trial Court on 27-3-1952. This decree was confirmed on merits on an appeal being taken to the Additional Judicial Commissioner on 30-8-1952. Application was moved for obtaining sanction to appeal to the Supreme Court and for getting the judgment reviewed by the Additional Judicial Commissioner but these applications also were dismissed. The contesting defendants in the said suit were Choukheylal and his three sons. Choukheylal is said to have died during the pendency of the appeal in the Court of the Additional Judicial Commissioner and, therefore, subsequently, the contest remained between his three sons, i. e., defendants No. 8, 9 and 10 in the present suit, on the one hand and defendants No. 1 to 7 on the other. 5. In the said suit, the main plea of the contesting defendants was that during the life time of Bansidhar, he had made a partition in metes and bounds between his sons and later Bansidhar lived jointly with Choukheylal. The suit, as brought, comprised those properties which had been allotted to the share of, and were the self-acquired properties of Choukheylal and that there could not be a second partition of the same properties. All these contentions were negatived and a decree for partition was maintained. 6. The suit, as brought, comprised those properties which had been allotted to the share of, and were the self-acquired properties of Choukheylal and that there could not be a second partition of the same properties. All these contentions were negatived and a decree for partition was maintained. 6. To get away from the effects of the said decree, the seven plaintiffs who are the minor sons of defendants No. 8, 9 and 10 have brought the present suit alleging that the partition decree was obtained by fraud and collusion and prejudice to the plaintiffs was caused by bringing into hotchpot those properties of Choukheylal which belonged to him separately and these others which fell to his share on the partition having, been made by Bansidhar in his life-time between his sons. 7. The defendants denied all these allegations and inter alia contended that the decree in the partition suit was binding on the plaintiffs and had the force of res judicata; that there was no fraud or collusion practised or made in getting the partition decree; that no prejudice was caused to the plaintiffs and inasmuch as no material particulars of the alleged fraud or collusion were given by the plaintiffs, the plea could not be considered at all. 8. The trial Court tried to obtain particulars of fraud from the plaintiffs by examining the counsel for the plaintiffs on 14-8-1956 but he only stated that the particulars of fraud as alleged were already given in paragraphs 6 and 7 of the plaint. The trial Court then heard arguments with regard to the issue of res judicata and dismissed the plaintiffs suit after holding that the present suit was barred on the principle of res judicata. Hence, this appeal. 9. Shri R.K. Pandey, learned counsel for the plaintiff-appellants, conceded before us that the pleas of fraud and collusion were not made out from the allegations contained in the plaint, and therefore, he rested his case on the plea of prejudice having been caused to the minor plaintiffs by the partition decree in the previous suit. Hence, this appeal. 9. Shri R.K. Pandey, learned counsel for the plaintiff-appellants, conceded before us that the pleas of fraud and collusion were not made out from the allegations contained in the plaint, and therefore, he rested his case on the plea of prejudice having been caused to the minor plaintiffs by the partition decree in the previous suit. He contended that the defendants in the present suit did, not plead facts showing how the plaintiffs were bound by the decree passed in the previous suit, and the only basis on which according to Shri R.K. Pandey, the defendants could be held liable was under Explanation 6 to Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure. He said that the defendants had failed to state any facts with regard to the plaintiffs' representation by defendants No. 8, 9 and 10 in their written statement. He further said that the plaintiffs were entitled to claim a share in the joint and ancestral family property by virtue of their birth in their own right and they did not claim these rights through their fathers. It was, therefore, urged that the decree in the partition suit was not binding on the plaintiffs. 10. Shri Pandey's second contention was that the plaintiffs had clearly asserted in the plaint that they were prejudiced by the decree in the partition suit. The lower Court did not frame an issue on this point and did not record any evidence. The case could not be satisfactorily determined without going into the evidence and, therefore, he requested that the case should be remanded for proper inquiry about these facts. 11. On the basis of the arguments addressed to us, only one question arises for determination in this appeal, i. e., whether the decree in the partition suit is not binding on the plaintiffs. If this question could be decided in favour of the plaintiffs, the case must be remanded for recording evidence on the point of partition being prejudicial to them and for deciding the case afresh. On the other hand, if it is held that the decree in the partition suit is binding on them, their suit must fail. 12. With regard to this point it is obvious that the plaintiffs have come forward to attack the decree passed in the partition suit and pray that it may be declared to be ineffective or illegal against them. 12. With regard to this point it is obvious that the plaintiffs have come forward to attack the decree passed in the partition suit and pray that it may be declared to be ineffective or illegal against them. The very prayer implies that if the Court did not agree with the plaintiffs, the effective force of the decree would remain and that would be binding. Obviously, the plaintiffs must prove all those facts which entitle them to a declaration in the terms prayed. It is clear that defendants No. 8, 9 and 10 who are related to the present plaintiffs as their fathers, were the parties to the prior suit. The partition that was contemplated in that suit was only a partition between the branches and not a partition between the various members pertaining to the same branch. Defendants No. 8, 9 and 10 we clearly entitled to represent the interest of the minors in the said suit. As to whether they so represented or not could be gathered from the facts and circumstances of the case It was not essential for the defendants to raise the plea of constructive res judicata under Explanation-6 to Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The presumption being in favour of such a representation, it was for the plaintiffs to plead and prove that though the defendants 8, 9 and 10 were natural guardians of the plaintiffs and though ordinarily they had the right to represent them in the partition suit, yet due to some particular adversity of interest or otherwise, they were not in a position to do so or had not done so. On this point, we may refer to the decision in Ramamurty vs. Ramamma A.I.R. 1917 Mad 571, wherein the question of burden of proof in the same context came up for consideration and after reviewing the authorities, their Lordships stated: "... It is for those who seek to set aside a family arrangement to establish the grounds on which they impeach it." Their Lordships further observed therein (at page 574) :- "...In some cases the very nature of the transaction or the method of division may show that it was unfair or prejudicial to the interests of the minor and in such cases the burden which was on the plaintiff in first instance may be shifted atonce. The burden may be shifted also in cases where the facts are specifically in the knowledge of a particular party. (See S. 106. Evidence Act.)..." The same principles hold good in the instant case. 13. The decree is binding upon the adult or minor sons who were represented by their father in the partition suit. We are fortified in our view by the following authorities :- (i) In Rambahadursingh Vs. Nirbhaisingh A. I. R. 1920 Oudh 212 it was held :- "As a general rule, at a partition among the members of a joint Hindu family, each member is presumed to present not only himself but also his sons, and the sons take their share through their father as being included in the share allotted to him and the rule is not limited in its application to cases where the sons are minors." (ii) Further, in Jamna Prasad Vs. Mt. Durga Dai A.I.R. 1933 All 138, where a partition was between two brothers and the brothers had their minor sons, it was held that each brother represented his own branch consisting of himself and his sons and it was observed by the learned Judges :- "It is an ordinary incident of Hindu Law that when partition is effected between two brothers and these brothers have minor sons, each brother represents his branch consisting of himself and his sons. It is were not so, no partition would be effected so long as there are minors living in the family." (iii) In Lingangowda Vs. Basangowda A.I.R. 1927 P.C. 56, their Lordships have lucidly laid down the law in the following terms :- "In a case of Hindu family where all have rights, it is impossible to allow each member of the family to litigate the same point over and over again, and each infant to wait till he comes of age, and then bring an action or bring his action by his guardian before; and in each of these cases, therefore, the Court looks to explanation 6 of Section 11 of the Civil P. C., to see whether or not the leading member of the family has been acting either on behalf of minors in their interest or if they are majors, with the assent of the majors." 14. Explanation (VI) to Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure reads as under:- "Where persons litigate bona fide in respect of a public right or of a private right claimed in common for themselves and others, all presons interested in such right shall, for the purposes of this section, be deemed to claim under the persons so litigating." Under this explanation, where persons litigate bona fide in respect of a private right claimed in common for themselves and others, all persons interested in such rights shall be deemed to claim under the persons so litigating. It will be noticed that the explanation is a deeming provision which does not necessitate that if the son claims by virtue of his birth in his own right as opposed to the claim that he may make through his father, he would not be deemed to be a person interested in the light litigated. To bring the case within the purview of this explanation, it is not necessary to prove that the sons claim through the father. In the light of the decision in Privy Council Case A.I.R. 1927 P. C. 56 referred to above, Explanation (VI) to Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure applies to and governs this case unless fraud or collusion was alleged and proved. In the absence of gross negligence or fraud or collusion of the guardian a decree obtained against a minor properly represented is res judicata even in respect of the pleas which might and ought to have been raised but were not raised by the guardian. (Vide A.I.R. 1957 Oudh 354). It is reasonable to infer that defendants No. 8, 9 and 10 bona fide represented the plaintiffs in the partition suit and they were sued as representing not only themselves but representing their minor sons also. 15. We have already said that no case is made out at all in the pleadings for setting up fraud, or collusion of Pragilal, Harischandra and Rajaram. These appears to be no reason why there three persons who were related to different plaintiffs as their fathers would try to act against the interest of their own sons and their own interest. We have already said that no case is made out at all in the pleadings for setting up fraud, or collusion of Pragilal, Harischandra and Rajaram. These appears to be no reason why there three persons who were related to different plaintiffs as their fathers would try to act against the interest of their own sons and their own interest. In fact, it would be seen that they did their best to establish before the trial Court and the Additional Judicial Commissioner in the suit and the appeal that there was a prior partition but the evidence that they gave was disbelieved by both the courts. In the absence of fraud or collusion duly proved, there is nothing on the basis of which the decree can really be attacked. It was open to Choukheylal even if he had some separate property of his own and then the property was brought into the partition suit into hotchpot to say that he did not mind the partition of the property, the act would amount to throwing separate property into the joint family property. This is permissible under the rules of Hindu Law. Choukheylal wae a party to the partition suit. Thus, it will be clear that no question of prejudice to the present plaintiffs arises for consideration. 16 Shri R. K. Pandey relied upon Shewantibai Vs. Vishwas Rao A.I.R. 1953 Nag 167, for the proposition that if the father did not represent the minor son, the son will not be bound by the decree and the son will be able to challenge it on various grounds that may be open to him. In that case, it was found as a fact that the father was not acting for the son which is not the case here. It has no application to the facts of the present case. 17. Shri Pandey also relied upon some cases for the proposition that if the minor finds that the earlier partition is unfair or prejudicial to his interest, he may on attaining majority have it set aside by proper proceedings so far as regards himself. This dictum is correct to the extent it goes but in the instant case, we are not concerned with a partition made by mutual agreement of parties, but with a partition made under the decree of the Court in which minors were represented by their fathers. This dictum is correct to the extent it goes but in the instant case, we are not concerned with a partition made by mutual agreement of parties, but with a partition made under the decree of the Court in which minors were represented by their fathers. The law has been succinctly stated by the Supreme Court in Bhishundeo Vs. Seogani Rai A.I.R. 1951 S.C. 280 in paragraph 23 of the judgment:- "It is well established that a minor can sue for partition and obtain a decree if his next friend can show that that is for the minor's benefit. It is also beyond dispute that an adult coparcener can enforce a partition by suit even there are minors. Even without a suit, there can be a partition between members of a joint family when one of the members is a minor. In the case of such lastly mentioned partitions, where a minor can never be able to consent to the same in law, if a minor on attainining majority is able to show that the division was unfair and unjust, the Court will certainly set it aside. The rule, however, does not apply to decrees if the minor is properly represented before the Court and the decree is as binding on him as on the adult-parties, unless the minor can show fraud or negligence on the part of his next friend or guardian ad litem. This contention also, therefore, fails." 18. No decision was referred to on behalf of the appellants to support this contention that a partition under a decree against the father could be set aside on the mere ground that it was prejudiciall to him apart from any fraud or negligence on the part of the father in the partition suit. We, therefore, hold that the decree passed ultimately in the said partition suit (No. 36 of 195) operates as res judicata and is binding on the plaintiffs. 19. In the result, the appeal is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed